STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CARLOS COLON (84-09-2638, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4507-17T1
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    CARLOS COLON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _____________________________
    Submitted March 11, 2019 – Decided March 25, 2019
    Before Judges Sabatino and Sumners.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 84-09-2638.
    Carlos Colon, appellant pro se.
    Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
    Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat,
    Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
    Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Carlos Colon, pro se, appeals the trial court's April 18, 2018
    order denying his motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence. We affirm.
    In 1985, defendant unconditionally pled guilty to all three counts of an
    indictment charging him with felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3), first-
    degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a
    weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). The latter two counts merged at sentencing into
    the felony murder count. The trial court imposed a life sentence with a thirty-
    year period of parole ineligibility.
    Defendant argues his sentence is illegal because New Jersey law allegedly
    does not authorize the imposition of a life sentence with a thirty-year parole
    disqualifier as a punishment for murder. Not so. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1) clearly
    provides that, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, a defendant
    convicted of murder "shall be sentenced . . . to a term of 30 years, during which
    the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of
    years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person
    shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole." (Emphasis added). See
    also State v. Scales, 
    231 N.J. Super. 336
    , 340 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that, as
    the result of 1982 amendments to the Criminal Code, "three alternative sentences
    for murder could be imposed: (1) death; (2) a sentence of 30 years without
    A-4507-17T1
    2
    parole; and (3) a sentence between thirty years and life, with a 30-year term of
    parole ineligibility.").
    Defendant's sentence comports with these requirements. None of the
    cases he cites in his brief support a contrary result. The "life" component of his
    sentence is lawful and did not require a numeric designation of years. See 
    Ibid.
    (modifying a life sentence with a forty-year parole disqualifier to a life sentence
    with a thirty-year parole disqualifier); see also State v. Carroll, 
    242 N.J. Super. 549
    , 566 (App. Div. 1990) (modifying a life sentence with a fifty-year parole
    disqualifier to a life sentence with a thirty-year parole disqualifier); State v.
    Thomas, 
    224 N.J. Super. 221
    , 230-31 (App. Div. 1988) (noting that the
    imposition of a life sentence upon a defendant found guilty of murder is "beyond
    challenge," but modifying the parole disqualifier to comport with N.J.S.A.
    2C:11-3(b)).
    Defendant's citation to State v. Townsend, 
    186 N.J. 473
     (2006) is
    unavailing because that case concerned an extended term for murder and
    N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7 rather than, as here, an ordinary term for murder under
    N.J.S.A. 2C:11-2. 
    Id.
     at 485 n.2.
    Defendant's separate argument claiming that he was not sufficiently
    informed of the nature of the charges he was facing before entering his guilty
    A-4507-17T1
    3
    plea more than thirty years ago was not raised below, could have been raised
    long ago, and, for that matter, has not been shown to have any merit. R. 2:11-
    3(e)(2).
    Affirmed.
    A-4507-17T1
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-4507-17T1

Filed Date: 3/25/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/20/2019