WILLIAM LUNGER VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM (POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1879-17T3
WILLIAM LUNGER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND
FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
__________________________________
Submitted January 30, 2019 – Decided February 20, 2019
Before Judges Accurso and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and
Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the
Treasury, PFRS No. 3-105264.
Feeley & LaRocca, LLC and The Blanco Law Firm,
attorneys for appellant (Pablo N. Blanco, of counsel
and on the brief; John D. Feeley, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Eric L. Apar, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner William Lunger, a former Sussex County sheriff's officer,
appeals from a final decision of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Police and
Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS) 1 denying his request to file an application
for ordinary disability retirement benefits. Because the Board correctly
determined Lunger is ineligible for ordinary disability retirement benefits, we
affirm.
Lunger's employment as a Sussex County sheriff's officer began in 2007.
On April 11, 2016, Lunger was arrested and charged with third-degree
conspiracy to commit official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(2) and N.J.S.A.
2C:30-2(a), third-degree pattern of official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-7(a),
four counts of second-degree official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(a), and a
disorderly persons theft offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a). On the same day, Lunger
was suspended without pay from his sheriff's officer position pending resolution
of the criminal charges against him.
On January 27, 2017, Lunger pleaded guilty to third-degree conspiracy to
commit official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(a). On
1
N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1 to -68.
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March 13, 2017, the court sentenced Lunger to a 270-day custodial term as a
condition of a three-year probationary term. The court also ordered that Lunger
forfeit his employment as a sheriff's officer and not seek public employment in
the future. In the judgment of conviction, the court explained that the charge
against Lunger resulted when the Sussex County Prosecutor's Office learned the
Sussex County Sheriff's Department had information that a sheriff's officer,
"Lunger[,] was involved in a sexual/romantic relationship with [a] drug court
participant," and "had been alerting [the participant] of upcoming surprise drug
screens and taking drug testing kits used by probation and providing them to
[the participant]." On the day of Lunger's sentencing, he resigned his
employment as a sheriff's officer.
On February 10, 2017, following entry of his guilty plea, but prior to his
sentencing, Lunger submitted an application to the Division of Pensions and
Benefits for ordinary disability retirement benefits commencing on March 1,
2017. The Division requested documentation necessary to process the
application and subsequently learned about Lunger's pending criminal charges.
The Division requested information from Sussex County concerning the charges
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and, on April 24, 2017, was advised Lunger was sentenced on the criminal
charges and his employment as a sheriff's officer ended on March 13, 2017.2
In a May 10, 2017 letter, the Division advised Lunger he was ineligible to
apply for ordinary disability benefits under N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4(b) because he was
removed from his position "for cause or forfeiture of public office" and
ineligible to return to any position "should [his] alleged disability diminish at
some time in the future to the point that [he] could return to employment and
thereby comply with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2)."
Lunger appealed from the Division's denial. The Board subsequently
denied Lunger's request to apply for ordinary disability retirement benefits,
finding his official misconduct conviction required the forfeiture of his pension
under N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1(b); he is ineligible to apply for ordinary disability
retirement benefits under N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4; and he is ineligible for ordinary
retirement benefits because "he has no job to return to should the alleged
disabling condition diminish" and therefore cannot comply with N.J.S.A.
43:16A-8(2).
2
The Division also received a March 22, 2017 Final Notice of Disciplinary
Action sustaining charges against Lunger pursuant to N.J.A.C. 2C:51-2(b) based
on his guilty plea and conviction.
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Lunger appealed the Board's determination and requested a hearing before
the Office of Administrative Law. On November 20, 2017, the Board issued its
final decision finding the information before it was sufficient to determine
Lunger is ineligible for ordinary disability retirement benefits and denying his
request to apply for the benefits. This appeal followed.
Lunger presents the following argument for our consideration:
POINT I
THE REFUSAL BY THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES TO
PROCESS LUNGER'S DISABILITY RETIREMENT
APPLICATION WAS ARBITRARY AND A
FAILURE TO TURN SQUARE CORNERS IN
DEALING WITH ITS MEMBER.
Our standard of review of a final decision of a State administrative agency
is well-settled. We will not upset an agency's ultimate determination unless the
agency's decision is shown to have been arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,
or not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.
Barrick v. State, 218 N.J. 247, 259 (2014). We must defer to the agency's
expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field, and do not substitute our
judgment for that of the agency. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011).
However, we are not bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its
determination of a strictly legal issue. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 658 (1999).
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The party challenging the administrative determination bears the burden of
proof. Boyle v. Riti, 175 N.J. Super. 158, 166 (App. Div. 1980). Measured
against these standards, we discern no basis to reverse the Board's well-reasoned
decision.
A PFRS member "who [has] involuntarily or voluntarily terminated
service" as the result of a "[r]emoval for cause or total forfeiture of public
service" "will not be permitted to apply for a disability pension." N.J.A.C. 17:1-
6.4(b)-(b)(1); see In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 17:1-7.5 & 17:1-7.10,
454 N.J. Super. 386, 398 (App. Div.) ("[D]isability retirement benefits are
intended for members who become disabled while in active service and can no
longer work, not for members who have voluntarily or involuntarily terminated
their service for some other reason." (quoting 48 N.J.R. 1307(a) (June 20,
2016))), certif. denied, ___ N.J. ___ (2018). Here, N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4(b)(1)
barred Lunger's application for disability retirement benefits. He was removed
from his position as a sheriff's officer both for cause by Sussex County and as a
result of the judgment of conviction ordering forfeiture of his employment.
Lunger is also not entitled to ordinary disability pension benefits because
he was convicted of an offense that directly touches on his employment as a
sheriff's officer. N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 provides "for 'mandatory forfeiture of
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retirement benefits . . . for public officers and employees convicted of certain
crimes.'" State v. Steele, 420 N.J. Super. 129, 133 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting L.
2007, c. 49). "The statute applies upon conviction of a person who holds 'any
public office, position or employment' for a designated crime that 'involves or
touches' his office, position or employment." Id. at 134 (quoting N.J.S.A. 43:1-
3.1(a)). Official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, is one of the designated crimes
the conviction of which requires mandatory forfeiture of retirement benefits
under N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1(a). N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1(b)(17).
Where the crime touches on a PFRS member's employment, he or she
"shall forfeit all of the pension or retirement benefit earned as a member of any
State or locally-administered pension fund or retirement system in which he
participated at the time of the commission of the offense and which covered the
. . . employment involved in the offense." Steele, 420 N.J. Super. at 133 (quoting
N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1(a)). Lunger's conviction of official misconduct required
forfeiture of all of his retirement benefits in PFRS. It is undisputed that Lunger's
commission of the crime of official misconduct touched on his employment as
a sheriff's officer. Indeed, he advised a drug court participant about upcoming
drug tests based on information he obtained as a result of his employment and
for the purpose of aiding the participant in avoiding the tests, and he stole drug
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testing kits to which he gained access as a sheriff's officer and provided them to
a drug court participant "in order that she may provide clean urine[] [samples]
in advance." Thus, the Board correctly determined Lunger was not entitled to
ordinary disability retirement benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1(a).
We also agree with the Board's determination that Lunger is ineligible for
benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8, which provides that a retiree who proves that
a disability is rehabilitated is entitled to return to active service in the same
status and position held at the time of retirement, if that duty is available. See
In re Adoption of N.J.A.C., 454 N.J. Super. at 401 (citing Klumb v. Bd. of Educ.
of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 33-35 (2009),
and In re Allen, 262 N.J. Super. 438, 444 (App. Div. 1993)). In light of that
rehabilitation statute, in In re Adoption of N.J.A.C., we reasoned:
Returning to active service presumes that, at the time
the beneficiary left public service, he or she actually
had a duty. . . . And so, a beneficiary who previously
left public service for some reason other than a
disability—like termination for cause—would have no
employment or work duty from which to return.
The rehabilitation statutes presume that, unlike other
retirees attempting to return to state service, the only
obstacle to a disability retiree's reemployment is the
disability itself. Once the disability abates, the
disability retirement beneficiary may be entitled to
reinstatement. See Allen, 262 N.J. Super. at 444
(interpreting the rehabilitation statutes, and observing
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that, "[t]he Legislature clearly recognized that
individuals returning from a disability retirement are in
a unique situation, plainly different from all other
employees returning to active service . . . [and t]heir
separation from employment is unlike the voluntary
separation of other civil servants" (emphasis added)).
The statutory language expressly conditions
reinstatement for disability retirees upon disability
rehabilitation. It logically follows then that disability
retirees must have left public service because of the
disability in the first instance; unlike someone who has
been terminated for cause.
[Id. at 401-02 (last three alternations in original).]
Lunger cannot return to work if he proves rehabilitation. He is barred from
returning to his position by the express terms of his judgment of conviction.
We have considered Lunger's arguments that the Board erred by finding
him ineligible to apply for ordinary disability benefits and find they are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
We add only that we agree with the Board that there was no need to refer
Lunger's appeal to the Office of Administrative Law because there were no
disputed facts requiring resolution at an evidentiary hearing. See In re Farmers'
Mut. Fire Assurance Ass'n of N.J., 256 N.J. Super. 607, 618 (App.Div.1992)
("An evidentiary hearing is mandated only when the proposed administrative
action is based on disputed adjudicatory facts."); see also In re Xanadu Project
at Meadowlands Complex, 415 N.J. Super. 179, 187-88 (2010) (explaining that
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referral of a matter to the Office of Administrative law for a hearing is in an
administrative agency's discretion).
Affirmed.
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