DWAYNE WRIGHT VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1584-17T3
    DWAYNE WRIGHT,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY STATE
    PAROLE BOARD,
    Respondent.
    _________________________
    Submitted November 1, 2018 – Decided January 24, 2019
    Before Judges Whipple and DeAlmeida.
    On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
    Dwayne Wright, appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant
    Attorney General, of counsel; Gregory R. Bueno,
    Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Dwayne Wright, an inmate serving a life sentence with a thirty-year term
    of parole ineligibility, appeals from a September 20, 2017 final agency decision
    denying parole and imposing a sixty-month future eligibility term (FET). We
    affirm.
    On April 18, 1986, Wright was convicted after a jury found him guilty of
    murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4),
    possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) and
    unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), in connection with a
    murder for hire in Willingboro.1 Wright previously sought parole on August 14,
    2014, but was denied parole and given a three-year FET. He became eligible
    for parole on September 28, 2016. A hearing officer reviewed Wright's case and
    on June 16, 2016, a New Jersey State Parole Board (Board) panel referred the
    matter to the full Board for a hearing. On August 31, 2016, the full Board denied
    parole and referred the case for the imposition of an FET that Wright argues
    exceeded administrative guidelines.
    1
    Wright's original judgment of conviction reflects a May 29, 1986 sentence
    imposed by Judge Cornelius P. Sullivan. Judge Sullivan entered a corrected
    judgment on April 22, 1994, to set aside the fourth-degree aggravated assault
    convictions. The sentence imposed did not change; however, the corrected
    judgment inaccurately indicates adjudication was by guilty plea. Wright raises
    this discrepancy as the basis of request for a remand. We are not persuaded it
    is relevant to any analysis given by the Board in its determination.
    A-1584-17T3
    2
    The Board denied parole for the following reasons: the serious nature of
    Wright's offense; the escalation of his criminal record; his incarceration for
    multiple offenses; commission of a new offense while on community
    supervision; prior opportunities for community supervision did not deter
    criminal behavior; and Wright's institutional infractions and demonstrated
    insufficient problem resolution.
    The Board noted Wright "cannot articulate any understanding as to why
    he chose to commit a violent crime at the behest of another." In reaching this
    conclusion, the Board considered Wright's complete administrative record
    including a confidential mental health evaluation and determined Wright lacks
    insight into his criminal behavior and minimizes his conduct. The Board also
    carefully considered and credited positive aspects of Wright's institutional
    record, favorable efforts at participation in institutional programs and his risk
    assessment score, which denoted a low risk of recidivism.                 Wright
    administratively appealed the full Board's decision on June 23, 2017.         On
    September 20, 2017, the full Board issued a final agency decision denying parole
    and imposing a sixty-month FET. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, Wright argues the decision of the Board to deny parole and
    impose a sixty-month FET is arbitrary and capricious and should be reversed
    A-1584-17T3
    3
    because the decision was based on one institutional infraction: a *202 prohibited
    act for possession of a rolled up newspaper, which constituted possession of a
    weapon. In his reply brief, Wright argues the Board's decision was based on
    incorrect sentencing information requiring a remand. We disagree.
    The scope of our review of final decisions of administrative agencies is
    limited. Decisions of the Board, like those of other administrative agencies, are
    not reversed unless they are "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [are] not
    supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v.
    Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80 (1980).
    Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a), the Board should generally grant
    parole requests for release on an inmate's parole date unless there is a
    "reasonable expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of parole" and
    such an expectation is demonstrable "by a preponderance of the evidence." In
    determining that Wright was ineligible for parole, the Board considered several
    factors, including mitigating and aggravating factors. The Board noted that
    appellant's criminal history was extreme, and that his past experiences with the
    parole and probation systems did not deter him from other, more violent criminal
    behaviors.
    A-1584-17T3
    4
    The Board considered all of the mitigating factors raised, but found they
    were outweighed by the aggravating nature of the totality of the circumstances.
    The Board's discretionary assessment is supported by substantial credible
    evidence in the record as a whole.
    We reject Wright's argument that the imposition of a sixty-month FET was
    arbitrary and capricious. The Board's establishment of a sixty-month FET is
    permissible pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21. Under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a),
    a standard FET for someone convicted of murder is twenty-seven months. If,
    however, the inmate in question has not made "satisfactory progress in reducing
    the likelihood of future criminal behavior," the Board is entitled to impose a
    lengthier FET. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d).
    The Board's decision to impose a lengthier FET pursuant to N.J.A.C.
    10A:71-3.21(d) was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.      The Board
    considered the aggregate of all pertinent factors including those set forth in
    N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b). The Board found Wright has not developed enough
    insight to understand why he committed his crimes and how to prevent himself
    from doing so in the future. These findings are all supported by sufficient,
    credible evidence in the record.
    Affirmed.
    A-1584-17T3
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-1584-17T3

Filed Date: 1/24/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/20/2019