ANITA WALSH VS. PROSPECT EOGH, INC. (L-7912-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3218-17T2
    ANITA WALSH,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    PROSPECT EOGH, INC., d/b/a
    EAST ORANGE GENERAL
    HOSPITAL, and PROSPECT
    MEDICAL HOLDINGS, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellants.
    ______________________________
    Argued on October 31, 2018 – Decided November 21, 2018
    Before Judges Koblitz, Currier and Mayer.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7912-17.
    Ivan R. Novich argued the cause for appellant
    (Littler Mendelson, PC, attorneys; Ivan R. Novich, of
    counsel and on the brief; Lauren J. Marcus, on the
    briefs).
    Arthur L. Raynes argued the cause for respondent
    (Wiley Malehorn Sirota & Raynes, attorneys; Arthur L.
    Raynes, of counsel and on the brief; Courtney A. Reed
    Keren, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff Anita Walsh sued her former employer, Prospect EOGH, Inc.
    d/b/a East Orange General Hospital and Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc.
    (defendants) claiming she was wrongfully discharged under the New Jersey
    Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14.
    Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
    agreement (Agreement) that plaintiff admits signing. Plaintiff claims that the
    Agreement was not explained to her, she does not recall signing it, and argues
    for the first time on appeal that it is not enforceable because defendants did not
    sign the document. Without allowing the requested oral argument, the motion
    court issued an order denying defendants' motion, writing on it only: "Plaintiff
    did not agree to give up right jury [sic] trial." We reverse and remand for
    reconsideration, with oral argument.
    Plaintiff signed the Agreement on September 8, 2016, three days before
    she began work, in connection with her employment as Vice President of
    Operations. The Agreement is labeled "East Orange General Hospital Mutual
    Agreement to Arbitrate." Although there was a signature line for defendants,
    they did not sign the Agreement. The Agreement states:
    A-3218-17T2
    2
    To the fullest extent allowed by law, any controversy,
    claim or dispute between you and Prospect EOGH, Inc.
    dba East Orange General Hospital and/or any of its
    related entities, holding companies, parents,
    subsidiaries,    divisions,    officers, shareholders,
    directors, employees, agents, vendors, contractors,
    doctors, patients, insurers, predecessors, successors,
    and assigns (collectively, "the Company") relating to or
    arising out of your employment or the cessation of that
    employment will be submitted to final and binding
    arbitration.
    The Agreement covers "all employment related claims including, but not limited
    to . . . violation of public policy, discrimination . . . or any other employment -
    related claim under any state or federal statutes or laws relating to an employee’s
    relationship with his/her employer . . . ." The Agreement also states, directly
    above the signature lines, in capital letters: "BY AGREEING TO THIS
    BINDING MUTUAL ARBITRATION PROVISION, BOTH YOU AND THE
    COMPANY GIVE UP ALL RIGHTS TO A TRIAL BY JURY. BY SIGNING
    BELOW, I CONFIRM THAT I HAVE READ, UNDERSTAND, AND AGREE
    TO THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT."
    Defendants terminated plaintiff's employment on March 15, 2017, for
    reasons that she asserts in her November 2017 complaint were pretextual in
    nature.   Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated, contrary to CEPA, because
    she voiced her objections to the hospital's practices.
    A-3218-17T2
    3
    Defendants argue on appeal that their request for oral argument was
    denied improperly. They rely on Raspantini v. Arocho, 
    364 N.J. Super. 528
    ,
    531 (App. Div. 2003) (stating that "because defendants' initial motion sought
    dispositive relief, plaintiffs' request for oral argument should have been granted
    as of right"). Defendants argue that although a trial court may deny a request
    for oral argument on a substantive motion, "the reason for the denial of the
    request, in that circumstance, should itself be set forth on the record," which the
    trial court did not do here. 
    Id. at 531-32.
    We agree with defendants that oral
    argument, or the reason for not affording oral argument, must be provided by
    the court.
    Defendants urge us not to remand the matter to the motion court because
    of the lack of oral argument, but rather to review the motion de novo. The
    reasons for the court's decision, however, are also lacking. The trial court must
    provide reasons with its decisions, either on the record or in writing. As we said
    more than twenty years ago,
    Unfortunately, the judge made no findings of fact or
    legal conclusions as required by Rule 1:6-2(f). An
    articulation of reasons is essential to the fair resolution
    of a case. A trial judge has a duty to make findings of
    fact and conclusions of law "on every motion decided
    by written orders that are appealable as of right." R.
    1:7-4. Failure to perform this duty "'constitutes a
    disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the
    A-3218-17T2
    4
    appellate court.'" Curtis v. Finneran, 
    83 N.J. 563
    , 569-
    70 (1980) (quoting Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of
    Adjustment of Englewood, 
    141 N.J. Super. 1
    , 4 (App.
    Div. 1976)); see 
    id. at 570
    ("Naked conclusions do not
    satisfy the purpose of Rule 1:7-4.").
    [Italiano v. Rudkin (Italiano), 
    294 N.J. Super. 502
    , 505
    (App. Div. 1996).]
    "Moreover, the appellate court ordinarily cannot perform its review
    function in the absence of findings." Filippone v. Lee, 
    304 N.J. Super. 301
    , 306
    (App. Div. 1997). Although we review the grant of a motion for summary
    judgment de novo, we cannot review the decision of the trial court on a blank
    slate. Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 
    454 N.J. Super. 298
    , 301-02 (App.
    Div. 2018). The court wrote one sentence on the order, finding no evidence of
    a waiver of a jury trial, although such a waiver is set forth clearly in the
    Agreement. We are thus unclear as to whether the motion court reviewed the
    proper material. Additionally, the court gave no reason for not allowing oral
    argument.
    We reverse and remand to the court for oral argument and a reasoned
    decision. In the interest of completeness, the parties should be allowed to
    supplement their motion papers.
    Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
    A-3218-17T2
    5
    A-3218-17T2
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-3218-17T2

Filed Date: 11/21/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/20/2019