TAMI CORRELLO VS. DOUGLAS CORRELLO (FM-11-0393-03, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5570-16T3
    TAMI CORRELLO,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    DOUGLAS CORRELLO,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _____________________________
    Argued November 5, 2018 – Decided November 20, 2018
    Before Judges Haas and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County,
    Docket No. FM-11-0393-03.
    Douglas G. Corrello, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
    Respondent has not filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    This post-judgment matrimonial matter returns to us after remand
    proceedings directed by our previous opinion. See Corrello v. Corrello, No. A-
    0292-12 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2016). As we directed, the trial judge recalculated
    defendant's alimony and child support obligations, determined the appropriate
    credits due plaintiff as a result of those adjustments, and granted plaintiff's
    motion for counsel fees and costs. The judge explained the basis for his rulings
    in a comprehensive forty-eight-page oral opinion containing his detailed
    findings of fact and conclusions of law.
    Defendant appeals from the July 14, 2017 and August 8, 2017 orders
    memorializing the judge's decision, and raises the following contentions:
    I.     THE    TRIAL   COURT    IMPROPERLY
    INCLUDED DEFENDANT'S PREVIOUSLY
    EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTED PENSION, AND
    DISABILITY PORTION OF PENSION, WHEN
    EVALUATING THE CURRENT ALIMONY
    AWARD.
    II.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID
    NOT CONSIDER THE PARTIES['] CURRENT
    FINANCIAL SITUATION AS REQUIRED BY
    N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) AND (b).
    III.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID
    NOT REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO DISCLOSE
    THE TERMS AND AMOUNT OF HER
    INHERITANCE. THE TRIAL COURT WAS
    NOT ABLE TO PERFORM A PROPER
    ALIMONY ANALYSIS DUE TO PLAINTIFF'S
    WITHHOLDING     OF      SIGNIFICANT
    INHERITANCE, ASSETS AND TRUST
    FUNDS AVAILABLE TO HER.
    A-5570-16T3
    2
    IV.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPUTING
    "INTEREST INCOME" TO DEFENDANT.
    V.    THE   TRIAL   COURT    ERRED    IN
    RETROACTIVELY      RECALCULATING
    CHILD SUPPORT FOR RELIEF NOT
    PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED OR NOTICED.
    VI.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD
    OF ATTORNEY FEES AND SHOULD BE
    REVERSED.
    A.   THE TRIAL COURT ORDER FOR
    APPENDIX FEE'S [SIC] SHOULD BE
    REVERSED.
    B.   THE TRIAL COURT ORDER FOR
    PLAINTIFF'S FEES FOR THE 2012
    CROSS[-]MOTION    SHOULD  BE
    REVERSED.
    C.   THE TRIAL COURT DECISION FOR
    THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
    FOR THE PLENARY HEARING, THE
    APPEAL, AND THE REMAND, ARE
    CONTRARY TO [N.J.S.A.] 2A:34-23,
    NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD,
    AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
    VII. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE
    WEIGHT TO PLAINTIFF'S SUBMISSION
    WHICH INCLUDED INFORMATION IN
    REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S SUBSEQUENT
    MARRIAGE. THIS SHOULD TERMINATE
    ALIMONY IN THIS CASE (ISSUE NOT
    RAISED BELOW).
    A-5570-16T3
    3
    VIII. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THIS MATTER
    SHOULD BE HEARD BY A DIFFERENT
    JUDGE.
    Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude
    that defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant extended
    discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for
    the reasons set forth in the trial judge's thorough decision. We add the following
    brief comments.
    The scope of our review of the Family Part's order is limited. We owe
    substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of that court's
    special expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    , 411-12
    (1998).   Thus, "[a] reviewing court should uphold the factual findings
    undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate,
    substantial and credible evidence on the record." MacKinnon v. MacKinnon,
    
    191 N.J. 240
    , 253-54 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth
    & Family Servs. v. M.M., 
    189 N.J. 261
    , 279 (2007)).
    While we owe no special deference to the judge's legal conclusions,
    Manalapan Realty v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995), we
    "'should not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge
    unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent
    A-5570-16T3
    4
    with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the
    interests of justice' or when we determine the court has palpably abused its
    discretion." Parish v. Parish, 
    412 N.J. Super. 39
    , 47 (App. Div. 2010) (alteration
    in original) (quoting 
    Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412
    ). We will only reverse the judge's
    decision when it is necessary to "'ensure that there is not a denial of justice'
    because the family court's 'conclusions are [] "clearly mistaken" or "wide of the
    mark."'" 
    Id. at 48
    (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
    Servs. v. E.P., 
    196 N.J. 88
    , 104 (2008)).
    Applying these principles, defendant's arguments concerning the July 14,
    2017 and August 8, 2017 orders reveal nothing "so wide of the mark" that we
    could reasonably conclude that a clear mistake was made by the judge. The
    record amply supports the judge's factual findings and, in light of those findings,
    his legal conclusions are unassailable.
    Affirmed.
    A-5570-16T3
    5