IN THE MATTER OF REQUEST FOR ADJUDICATORY HEARING ON NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ETC. (DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION) ( 2018 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5001-15T3
    IN THE MATTER OF REQUEST FOR
    ADJUDICATORY HEARING ON NEW
    JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
    FILE NO. 1803-02-0005.1 FHA 110001.
    ____________________________________
    Argued March 6, 2018 – Decided October 17, 2018
    Before Judges Yannotti, Mawla and DeAlmeida.
    On appeal from Flood Hazard Verification Approval
    No. 1803-02-0005.1 FHA 110001 by the New Jersey
    Department of Environmental Protection.
    William C. Sullivan, Jr. argued the cause for appellant
    Village Supermarket, Inc. (Scarinci & Hollenbeck,
    LLC, attorneys; William C. Sullivan, Jr., on the briefs).
    Jung W. Kim, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
    cause for respondent Department of Environmental
    Protection (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General,
    attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Jung W. Kim, on the brief).
    Stuart J. Lieberman argued the cause for intervenor-
    respondent Bernardsville Centre, LLC (Lieberman &
    Blecher, PC, attorneys; Stuart J. Lieberman, of counsel;
    Michael G. Sinkevich and Brittany W. DeBord, on the
    brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    DeALMEIDA, J.A.D.
    Appellant Village Super Market, Inc. (VSM) challenges the June 6, 2016
    order of the Commissioner, Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
    denying its request for an adjudicatory hearing with respect to two DEP
    decisions concerning property owned by respondent Bernardsville Centre, LLC
    (BC). We affirm.
    I.
    The following facts are taken from the record. BC owns real property on
    Route 202 in Bernardsville, on which it operates a shopping center that includes
    a Kings Supermarket. Berns Realty Company (Berns) owns property on the
    other side of Route 202 near BC's property. Berns's property is developed with
    a multi-tenant retail shopping center in which VSM, as a lessee, operates a
    ShopRite supermarket that competes with the Kings on BC's property.
    BC sought to develop a portion of its property to expand its shopping
    center. BC's development plans were dependent on the regulatory status of two
    water features on its property: an unnamed tributary of Penn's Brook (the
    Tributary), and an erosional drainage area that developed from a Department of
    Transportation (DOT) pipe directing storm water runoff from Route 202 onto
    A-5001-15T3
    2
    BC's property (the Erosion Feature). Neither the Tributary nor the Erosion
    Feature are on the property leased by VSM.
    The presence of these features on BC's property implicates two statutes:
    the Flood Hazard Area Control Act (FHACA), N.J.S.A. 58:16A-50 to -103, and
    the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act (FWPA), N.J.S.A. 13:9B-1 to -30.
    Under the FHACA, any development that encroaches on a flood hazard area or
    riparian zone of any regulated water requires a permit from the DEP. N.J.A.C.
    7:13-2.1 to -2.4.1 Before seeking a permit, an applicant may apply for a flood
    hazard area verification (FHAV) to establish the "flood hazard area design flood
    elevation, flood hazard area limit, floodway limit, and/or riparian zone limit on
    a site or any portion of a site." N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2; N.J.A.C. 7:13-6.1.
    The FWPA allows an applicant to request a Letter of Interpretation (LOI)
    from the DEP prior to applying for a development permit. N.J.A.C. 7:7A-3.1(d).
    An LOI is DEP's official determination as to the existence of freshwater
    wetlands, transition areas, and/or State open waters on a site, their boundaries,
    and the resource value classification of on-site freshwater wetlands. N.J.A.C.
    7:7A-3.1 to -3.4. An LOI is valid for five years and may be extended an
    1
    All references are to the 2007 regulations in effect at the time that the DEP
    issued the decision on appeal. The DEP amended the flood hazard area
    regulations effective June 20, 2016. See 47 N.J.R. 1041(a); 48 N.J.R. 1067(a).
    A-5001-15T3
    3
    additional five years provided the information upon which the original LOI was
    based remains valid. N.J.A.C. 7:7A-4.6(b). The DEP may void an LOI and
    issue a new LOI where it determines the original LOI was based on "inaccurate
    or incomplete" information. N.J.A.C. 7:7A-4.6(a).
    On May 22, 1997, the DEP issued a prior owner of BC's property an LOI
    (1997 LOI) that identified the boundaries of the Tributary and the Erosion
    Feature on the parcel, and classified both as State open waters. The LOI also
    identified wetlands near the Erosion Feature and classified them as having
    intermediate resource value with a fifty-foot buffer zone. The DEP's findings
    were based on a 1997 report by Schoor DePalma, an engineering and design firm
    (the Schoor DePalma Report).
    On April 1, 1998, a different prior owner of BC's property requested
    modification of the 1997 LOI to reclassify the Erosion Feature as unregulated
    because it is manmade, having been caused by storm water discharge from a
    pipe.    In addition, the application requested that the wetlands previously
    identified in the area of the Erosion Feature be characterized instead as a
    gravel/silt accumulation area. The application was supported by an expert report
    that relied on various historical sources, including an aerial photograph of the
    A-5001-15T3
    4
    site, soil surveys, maps, topographic information, and DOT plans for the
    relevant section of Route 202.
    On July 27, 1998, after an investigation, DEP issued a modified LOI (1998
    LOI) reclassifying the Erosion Feature as non-regulated.          DEP's written
    determination, however, maintained the language in the 1997 LOI that wetlands
    on the property are of intermediate resource value with a fifty-foot buffer area.
    This language was an apparent contradiction to the agency's determination that
    the Erosion Feature was non-regulated.
    On May 20, 2002, a prospective developer of BC's property submitted an
    application seeking a reissuance of the 1997 LOI, as modified by the 1998 LOI,
    because it was due to expire. On June 28, 2002, DEP extended the 1997 LOI,
    as modified by the 1998 LOI, for five years (2002 LOI).
    On August 10, 2007, BC submitted an application for a new LOI because
    the 2002 LOI had expired. DEP reviewed the information in BC's application,
    obtained additional information, considered submissions from the public, and
    conducted two site inspections. DEP personnel collected soil, vegetation , and
    hydrology samples at two locations on the property. Neither sample produced
    evidence of wetlands.
    A-5001-15T3
    5
    Based on these findings, on May 27, 2008, DEP issued an LOI (2008 LOI),
    stating that wetlands are not present on BC's property, identifying the Erosion
    Feature as not regulated, and identifying the Tributary as State open water. The
    2008 LOI, however, refers to the 1997 Schoor DePalma report, which depicts
    wetlands, including in the areas of the Erosion Feature, as accurate. Reference
    to the 1997 Schoor DePalma report is an apparent contradiction to DEP's
    conclusion that wetlands are not present on BC's property.
    On May 18, 2010, VSM filed an application for an FHAV. Although the
    application referenced the property on which VSM is a tenant, VSM actually
    sought a jurisdictional determination for the Tributary on BC's property. The
    application described the Tributary as Category One (C-1) surface water with a
    three-hundred-foot riparian buffer, which extends slightly into the parking lot
    on the property where VSM is a tenant. The extension of the buffer to that parcel
    is the sole alleged jurisdictional basis for VSM's application. This application
    identifies the Erosion Feature as an "erosion ditch" with no riparian buffer.
    On September 14, 2010, DEP issued an FHAV to VSM (2010 FHAV) that
    classified two unnamed tributaries in the vicinity of Berns's property, including
    the Tributary, as C-1 streams. To safeguard their aesthetic value and ecological
    integrity, C-1 streams are protected from measurable changes in water quality
    A-5001-15T3
    6
    based on their exceptional ecological, recreational and water supply significance
    or exceptional fisheries resources.     N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2; N.J.A.C. 7:9B-1.4;
    N.J.A.C. 7:9B-1.15(c) to (i). As a result of this classification, DEP assigned a
    three-hundred-foot riparian zone around the features.         The riparian zone
    designated by DEP substantially affected BC's property, given the regulatory
    restrictions in such zones, but did not extend to the property VSM leases.
    On January 19, 2011, BC applied for a new FHAV for its property. This
    application classified the Erosion Feature as a non-regulated erosional gully, and
    the Tributary as a Fresh Water Two-Non-Trout (FW2-NT) water feature with a
    fifty-foot riparian zone. See N.J.A.C. 7:9B-1.15(b).
    On January 24, 2011, VSM submitted a request to DEP to void the 2008
    LOI issued to BC because it conflicted with the 2010 FHAV issued to VSM. In
    support of its request, VSM cited N.J.A.C. 7:7A-4.6(a), which provides that an
    applicant may rely on an LOI for five years, “unless the letter of interpretation
    is determined to have been based on inaccurate or incomplete information, in
    which case the department may void the original letter of interpretation.” 2
    2
    In the 2011 application, VSM is described as the owner of the parcel on which
    it operates a supermarket. This incorrect characterization of VSM's interest in
    the property is repeated in VSM's merits brief filed in this court. After BC
    submitted with its merits brief a 2003 deed establishing that Berns owns the
    property, VSM's counsel acknowledged that VSM is a tenant at the property.
    A-5001-15T3
    7
    As explained above, the 2008 LOI significantly reduces regulatory
    controls on BC's property because it contains a determination that wetlands are
    not present and does not establish a riparian zone around the Tributary. The
    2010 LOI, on the other hand, increases regulatory controls on BC's property
    because it contains a determination that the Tributary requires a three-hundred-
    foot riparian zone. Voiding the 2008 LOI would not have an impact on the
    property VSM leases, but would leave the 2010 LOI and its regulatory
    restrictions on BC's property in place. It appears that VSM's interest in vacating
    the 2008 LOI is to inhibit BC, its competitor, from developing its property.
    On March 18, 2011, DEP issued a letter to counsel for BC and VSM
    stating that the 2010 FHAV issued to VSM was incorrect because the
    classification of the Tributary as a C-1 water with a three-hundred-foot riparian
    zone was based on inaccurate mapping. DEP advised that it would determine
    the correct regulatory classifications of the water features and riparian zones on
    BC's property, and reconsider both the 2008 LOI and the 2010 FHAV, when
    deciding BC's then-pending FHAV application. The agency requested both
    parties to submit all materials they deemed relevant and stated that the matter
    would be considered on written submissions, without a public hearing.
    A-5001-15T3
    8
    On April 18, 2011, DEP issued two determinations. In the first, the
    agency determined that the 2010 FHAV issued to VSM was incorrect when it
    designated the Tributary as a C-1 water requiring a three-hundred-foot buffer
    zone. The error was the result of DEP's reliance on inaccurate mapping. The
    agency, therefore, vacated the 2010 FHAV.
    In the second, DEP issued an FHAV to BC (2011 FHAV) confirming its
    determination that classification of the Tributary as a C-1 water was a result of
    incorrect mapping, and designating the Tributary as a FW2-NT with a fifty-foot
    riparian zone. The 2011 FHAV also confirmed that the Erosion Feature was not
    regulated because it was manmade and found an absence of wetlands on the
    property. DEP noted that it had terminated the 2010 FHAV issued to VSM and
    declined to invalidate the 2008 LOI.
    On June 1, 2011, VSM requested an adjudicatory hearing. VSM sought
    to challenge: (1) the 2011 FHAV issued to BC; (2) DEP's affirmation of the
    2008 LOI; and (3) the agency's termination of the 2010 FHAV issued to VSM.
    On October 28, 2011, the DEP granted appellant's hearing request with
    respect to the termination of the 2010 FHAV. BC's motion to intervene in that
    matter was granted on April 23, 2015. The matter is pending before the Office
    of Administrative Law and is not before this court.
    A-5001-15T3
    9
    On June 6, 2016, the Commissioner denied VSM's request for a hearing
    with respect to the 2011 FHAV issued to BC and the affirmation of the 2008
    LOI. He found that VSM was a third party with no statutory right to a hearing,
    and had no particularized property interest affected by the 2011 FHAV and the
    2008 LOI. Despite denying VSM's request for a hearing, the Commissioner
    reviewed and affirmed the underlying substantive decisions. 3
    This appeal followed. 4
    II.
    Appellate review of agency action is deferential and limited.         In re
    Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 27 (2007). A "strong presumption of reasonableness
    attaches to the actions of the administrative agencies." In re Carroll, 
    339 N.J. Super. 429
    , 437 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting In re Vey, 
    272 N.J. Super. 199
    , 205
    (1993)). We are not bound by an agency's interpretation of the law. Thurber v.
    City of Burlington, 
    191 N.J. 487
    , 502 (2007) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v.
    Bureau of Sec., 
    64 N.J. 85
    , 93 (1973)). We will, however, generally "afford
    3
    The Commissioner's written decision incorrectly refers to VSM as the owner
    of the property on which it operates its supermarket.
    4
    On October 19, 2012, DEP issued three permits to BC authorizing construction
    of drainage improvements at the property, realignment of the sanitary sewer
    main, and elimination of the Erosion Feature. BC completed this work in 2013.
    BC's brief states that it is actively completing expansion of the shopping center.
    A-5001-15T3
    10
    substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency is
    charged with enforcing." Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 
    200 N.J. 413
    ,
    420 (2009) (quoting Richardson v. Board of Trs., 
    192 N.J. 189
    , 196 (2007)).
    Substantial deference must be extended to an agency's interpretation of its own
    regulations, particularly on technical matters within the agency's expertise. In
    re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 
    180 N.J. 478
    , 488-89 (2004).
    Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA or the Act), an "applicant"
    in entitled to request an adjudicatory hearing with respect to a decision by the
    DEP on its application. The APA defines "applicant" as an entity seeking an
    "agency license, permit, certificate, approval, chapter, registration[,] or other
    form of permission required by law." N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2. The Act, however,
    "strictly limits the situations in which third parties are entitled to . . . a formal
    hearing to challenge a permit application."         In re Riverview Dev., LLC,
    Waterfront Dev. Permit, 
    411 N.J. Super. 409
    , 424 (App. Div. 2010). A third
    party is defined as any person other than:
    a.    An applicant . . . .
    b.    A State agency; or
    c.     A person who has a particularized property
    interest sufficient to require a hearing on constitutional
    or statutory grounds.
    A-5001-15T3
    11
    [N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2.]
    Accordingly, a non-applicant can demand an adjudicatory hearing only
    where the non-applicant can demonstrate: (1) a right to a hearing under an
    applicable statute; or (2) a "particularized property interest" of constitutional
    significance. In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 
    185 N.J. 452
    ,
    463–64 (2006). These limitations are "intended to prevent the processing of
    permit applications by State agencies from being bogged down by time-
    consuming and costly formal hearings," which "consume substantial public and
    private resources." In re Riverview Dev., 
    411 N.J. Super. at 424
    .
    Having considered the record in light of the applicable legal precedents,
    we conclude that the Commissioner's decision denying VSM's request for an
    adjudicatory hearing is sound. VSM is not an applicant with respect to either
    the 2011 FHAV issued to BC or the 2008 LOI concerning BC's property. VSM
    did not seek a permit to develop either BC's property, or the parcel on which it
    is a tenant, or any other permitting authority from the agency.
    Nor does the record establish that VSM has a statutory right to an
    adjudicatory hearing. Neither the FHACA nor the FWPA provide a third-party
    with a statutory right to appeal a decision issued to an applicant. In re Auth. For
    Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permit 6, 
    433 N.J. Super. 385
    , 407 (App.
    A-5001-15T3
    12
    Div. 2013) (finding that the FWPA does not provide third-party objectors with
    the right to a plenary administrative hearing to challenge the DEP's issuance of
    a permit); In re Riverview Dev., 
    411 N.J. Super. at 429
     (where third parties did
    not have a statutory right to a hearing guaranteed under the FHACA). VSM
    identified no other State or federal statute entitling it to a hearing.
    Finally, we agree with the Commissioner's determination that VSM does
    not have a property interest sufficient to create a constitutional right to a hearing
    with respect to either the 2011 FHAV or the 2008 LOI.               "[T]hird parties
    generally are not able to meet the stringent requirements for constitutional
    standing in respect of an adjudicatory hearing."           In re DEP Permit No.
    NJ0025241, 
    185 N.J. 474
    , 482 (2006). VSM does not own the property on which
    it operates its supermarket. It is instead one of several tenants at the property.
    Furthermore, even if VSM owned that parcel, "landowners objecting to the
    development of neighboring property" do not, by proximity alone, "have a
    particularized property interest warranting an adversarial hearing before an
    administrative law judge." In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, 
    185 N.J. at 470
    . Our courts have consistently held that a generalized property right shared
    with other property owners, such as collateral economic impacts, traffic, views,
    quality of life, recreational interest, and property values, are insufficient to
    A-5001-15T3
    13
    establish a third-party right to an adjudicatory hearing. In re Riverview Dev.,
    
    411 N.J. Super. at 429
    ; In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, 
    185 N.J. at 470
    ;
    In re AMICO/Tunnel Carwash, 
    371 N.J. Super. 199
    , 212 (App. Div. 2004); In
    re Waterfront Dev. Permit No. WD88-0443-1, Lincoln Harbor Final Dev., 
    244 N.J. Super. 426
    , 436 (App. Div. 1990); Spalt v. DEP, 
    237 N.J. Super. 206
    , 212
    (App. Div. 1989); Normandy Beach Improv. Ass'n v. Comm'r, DEP, 
    193 N.J. Super. 57
    , 61 (App. Div. 1983).
    With regard to the 2011 FHAV, VSM's primary objection is DEP's
    reclassification of the Tributary. As the Commissioner indicated, however,
    [w]hile the classification of the [T]ributary may
    indirectly affect VSM inasmuch as it changes the
    previously issued [2010 FHAV] (and the associated
    riparian zone) it does not rise to the level of a
    "particularized property interest" of constitutional
    significance because the Tributary is not located on
    VSM's property and the reduction of the [three-
    hundred] foot riparian zone formerly associated with
    the Tributary serves only to reduce the impact of the
    Department's regulation of the Tributary on VSM's
    property. Therefore, VSM’s interest is nothing more
    than a "generalized property right shared with" other
    surrounding property owners.
    We agree.
    We reject VSM's argument that it should be considered an "applicant"
    with respect to the 2011 FHAV and the 2008 LOI because those applications
    A-5001-15T3
    14
    concern the same factual bases as VSM's 2010 FHAV. We note, as did the
    Commissioner, that all of VSM's contentions with respect to the water features
    of BC's property will be addressed at VSM's hearing on the termination of the
    2010 FHAV, where VSM will have an opportunity to establish its position that
    the Tributary requires a three-hundred-foot riparian zone that extends to the
    parking lot of the property on which VSM is a tenant.
    We find VSM's remaining arguments, including its challenge to the
    substantive bases of the 2011 FHAV and the 2008 LOI, to be without merit
    sufficient to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
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    15