DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, ETC. VS. STEVEN SCHEFERS (F-015174-16, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0982-17T1
    DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
    COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR GSAMP
    TRUST 2006-FM1 MORTGAGE PASS-
    THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES
    2006-FM1,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    STEVEN SCHEFERS and DENIELLE
    SCHEFERS,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    and
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Defendant.
    _______________________________________
    Submitted September 18, 2018 - Decided September 26, 2018
    Before Judges Hoffman and Firko.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Ocean County, Docket No. F-
    015174-16.
    Steven H. Schefers 1, appellant pro se and attorney for
    Denielle Schefers.
    Parker, McCay PA, attorneys for respondent (Gene
    Mariano, of counsel; Stacy L. Moore, Jr., on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for GSAMP
    Trust 2006-FM1 (Bank), initiated this action against defendants, Steven and
    Denielle Schefers, seeking to foreclose on a mortgage issued in connection with
    a residential loan. Defendants now appeal the October 28, 2016 order striking
    their answer, defenses and counterclaims and denying their cross-motion to
    compel discovery, the December 16, 2016 order denying their motion for
    reconsideration, and the September 20, 2017 final judgment of foreclosure.2
    Having reviewed the parties' arguments in light of the record and applicable
    principles of law, we affirm.
    I.
    We briefly summarize the relevant facts granting all reasonable inferences
    to defendants. R. 4:6-2(e). On December 14, 2005, Steven executed a note in
    1
    Mr. Schefers is an attorney.
    2
    The trial court issued a Statement of Reasons/Amplification of Prior Opinion
    on November 14, 2017, pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b).
    A-0982-17T1
    2
    the amount of $340,000 to FGC Commercial Mortgage Finance (FGC). The
    same day, Steven and Denielle executed a residential mortgage as security for
    the note to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., (MERS) as nominee
    for FGC. On March 24, 2008, MERS assigned the mortgage to the Bank. A
    loan modification agreement was signed by defendants on October 17, 2008, and
    duly recorded on January 20, 2009. Defendants failed to make their scheduled
    payments beginning in October 2015.
    When the Bank filed its foreclosure complaint in the Chancery Division
    on May 31, 2016, it possessed both the note and mortgage. An answer was filed
    asserting boilerplate defenses and counterclaims that lacked specificity and did
    not challenge the Bank's prima facie right to foreclose. Voluminous discovery,
    including depositions of Bank representatives, was sought by defendants that
    Judge Francis R. Hodgson found would not provide any "new" information or
    shed any light on their "compliance with foreclosure requirements."
    Consequently, on October 25, 2016, the judge granted plaintiff's motion to strike
    defendants' answer and affirmative defenses, dismissed the counterclaims,
    denied defendants' motion for additional discovery, and remanded the case to
    the Office of Foreclosure to proceed as uncontested. On September 20, 2017, a
    final judgment of foreclosure was entered against defendants in the amount of
    A-0982-17T1
    3
    $403,933.26 following rejection of defendants' opposition. Their motion for
    reconsideration was denied.
    II.
    On appeal, defendants challenge the Chancery Division orders denying
    their cross-motion to compel discovery and granting the Bank's motion to
    dismiss, as well as the final judgment of foreclosure.
    We begin our analysis by addressing the order denying defendants' cross-
    motion to compel. Defendants argue that the judge abused his discretion by
    failing to order discovery. We disagree.
    As noted by the judge:
    Plaintiff has demonstrated the validity of the [n]ote and
    [m]ortgage and its contractual right to accelerate the
    principal balance in the event of the borrower's default.
    Defendants do not dispute executing the loan
    documents and defaulting on the loan, accordingly, the
    court is satisfied that plaintiff has established its right
    to foreclose on the subject property.
    Defendants failed to allege any facts establishing that the note and
    mortgage are invalid. The general denials asserted in their answer lacked detail
    and specificity. The judge found that the Bank certified as to notice and properly
    served the Notice of Intent (NOI). Hence, defendants do not articulate how
    additional documents or depositions would clarify any factual or legal issues in
    A-0982-17T1
    4
    this case. "A defendant should not be allowed to 'transform the discovery
    process into an unfocused, haphazard search for evidence.'" State v. Gilchrist,
    
    381 N.J. Super. 138
    , 147 (App. Div. 2005).           Absent specific references to
    documents or anticipated testimony that are integral to resolving this foreclosure
    action, we discern no reason to overturn the judge's decision and find no abuse
    of discretion as to his denial of the cross-motion to compel.
    III.
    Next, we address the Bank's motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaims.
    In accordance with Rule 4:6-2(e), when reviewing a litigant's pleading to
    determine the adequacy of the pleaded claims, the appropriate test is a liberal one.
    Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 
    116 N.J. 739
    , 746 (1989) (citation
    omitted). As the Supreme Court instructed, the review must begin by determining
    "whether a cause of action is 'suggested' by the facts." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Velantzas v.
    Colgate-Palmolive Co., 
    109 N.J. 189
    , 192 (1988)). The Court further explained that
    courts must review pleadings "in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the
    fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of
    claim . . . ." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 
    43 N.J. Super. 244
    , 252 (App. Div. 1957)). The review of the allegations should take "a generous
    and hospitable approach," and afford a litigant every "reasonable inference" from
    A-0982-17T1
    5
    the alleged facts. 
    Ibid.
     "Obviously, if the [counterclaims] [state] no basis for relief
    and discovery would not provide one, dismissal is the appropriate remedy." Banco
    Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 
    184 N.J. 161
    , 166 (2005).
    Proof of execution, recording, and non-payment of a mortgage is
    sufficient to establish a prima facie case for foreclosure. Thorpe v. Floremoore
    Corp., 
    20 N.J. Super. 34
    , 37 (App. Div. 1952). Defendants do not dispute the
    mortgage execution, recordation, or default in this case. Rather, they allege
    violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 
    15 U.S.C. § 1692
    (a)(6), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a).
    They also contend that they are entitled to another loan modification. We
    disagree.
    In a cogent and comprehensive opinion, the judge correctly concluded that
    the FDCPA does not apply to this case because plaintiff is attempting "to collect
    its own debt" as holder of the note and mortgage as opposed to another entity.
    Furthermore, the one-year statute of limitations applicable to FDPCA violations
    expired on December 14, 2006. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The judge aptly
    determined that defendants' allegations of New Jersey Fair Foreclosure Act
    violations were unfounded because the Bank provided certified copies of the
    NOIs to defendants, in writing, by certified and regular mail, to their last known
    A-0982-17T1
    6
    address, and to their Manahawkin residence, which is the subject of the
    foreclosure, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(b). In her certification,
    Sarah Lee Stonehocker certified that she is employed by Wells Fargo Bank,
    N.A., the servicing agent for the Bank. She also certified that she personally
    reviewed the relevant business records, which were created at or near the time
    of the events in question. With only assertions of possible misdoings by Ms.
    Stonehocker presented to the court, and no evidence rebutting her certification,
    the judge appropriately relied upon same in making his decision.
    IV.
    In their answer, defendants enumerated sixteen affirmative defenses as
    follows:
    1. Failure to state a claim;
    2. Any liabilities already satisfied;
    3. Waiver;
    4. Failure to mitigate damages;
    5. Estoppel;
    6. Unclean hands;
    7. Statute of limitations;
    8. Unjust enrichment;
    A-0982-17T1
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    9. Laches;
    10. Accord and satisfaction;
    11. Lack of service of process;
    12. Violation of unnamed federal, state, and local laws;
    13. Violation of the Fair Foreclosure Act;
    14. Defense related to Hurricane Sandy;
    15. Defective service of process; and
    16. Wrongful foreclosure.
    After conducting a painstakingly detailed analysis of each defense, the
    judge appropriately relied upon Rule 4:6-5 in striking all of the defenses. "It is
    well recognized that, where the answer and any proffered defenses fail to
    challenge the essential elements of the mortgagee's right to foreclose, and fail to
    interpose a validly recognized defense, the mortgagee is entitled to a final
    judgment of foreclosure."     Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Currie, 
    284 N.J. Super. 571
    , 574-75 (Ch. Div. 1995) (citations omitted).
    V.
    Lastly, we address the final judgment of foreclosure. Defendants argue
    that they presented "proof of the disputed claims" in response to the Certification
    of Amount Due filed by the Bank. In response to their challenge to the Bank's
    A-0982-17T1
    8
    calculation of advancement of homeowner's insurance premiums, real estate
    taxes, and late charges, the judge found that "defendant[s] [have] not stated with
    specificity any basis to dispute plaintiff's calculation . . . [therefore] their
    opposition can be characterized as general and unsupported."            The proofs
    showed defendants were "provided a credit for hazard insurance." We therefore
    disagree with defendants and find no numerical discrepancies in the Bank's
    proofs that warrant overturning the final judgment.
    To the extent not addressed, defendants' other arguments lack sufficient
    merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
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