IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT RANDOLPH, JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) (CONSOLIDATED) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-1432-16T4
A-1434-16T4
IN THE MATTER OF
ROBERT RANDOLPH,
JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION
_____________________________
Submitted June 6, 2018 – Decided September 5, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez, Currier, and Geiger.
On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket Nos. 2015-3213, 2015-3214,
and 2015-3215.
Charles J. Sciarra argued the cause for
appellant Robert Randolph (Sciarra &
Catrambone, LLC, attorneys; (Charles J.
Sciarra, of counsel; Deborah Masker Edwards,
on the brief).
Emily M. Bisnauth, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent New Jersey
Juvenile Justice Commission (Gurbir S. Grewal,
Attorney General, attorney; Melissa Dutton
Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Peter H. Jenkins, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent Civil Service Commission
(Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney General,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Robert Randolph appeals from an October 21, 2016 final
determination of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which upheld
his demotion to senior parole officer with the Juvenile Justice
Commission (JJC). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The JJC served Randolph with two Final Notices of Disciplinary
Action (FNDA) sustaining disciplinary charges and demoting him.
The charges in the first FNDA were conduct unbecoming a public
employee and misuse of state property, namely, the internet
connection available at his workplace and his workplace computer.
N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6) and (8). The JJC also served him with an
FNDA sustaining a charge of other sufficient cause defined as
violation of State policy prohibiting discrimination in the
workplace, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12),1 based on his possession and
transmission of the materials in question——semi-nude or sexually
suggestive photographs of women. Randolph appealed, and the
Division of Appeals and Regulatory Affairs transmitted the matter
to the Office of Administrative Law under the Administrative
Procedures Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, for hearing under the
Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6.
1
The FNDA charged defendant with N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(11), but
that "other sufficient cause" has since been recodified as N.J.A.C.
4A:2-2.3(a)(12).
2 A-1432-16T4
The ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the Agency
had not met its preponderance of the evidence burden. He relied
mainly on the agency investigator's lack of training on the
policies related to computer usage and banning discrimination
because the investigator could not produce written copies of the
policies, and because he drew his conclusions regarding the sexual
nature of the photographs on Randolph's computer from his personal
opinion. However, the ALJ did find as a fact that Randolph had
forwarded sexually suggestive photographs (which are included in
the appendices on this appeal) to six other people, including two
colleagues. Randolph also forwarded the photographs to a
subordinate.
On May 21, 2015, the CSC addressed the exceptions filed by
the JJC and cross-exceptions filed by Randolph in writing, after
a May 6, 2015 public meeting at which formal action regarding the
matter was taken.2 The CSC agreed with the JJC that Randolph had
violated State policies by transmitting inappropriate emails.
Specifically, the CSC found that the violation occurred when
Randolph transmitted a slide show of scantily clad women to
others——two of whom were colleagues——thus engaging in conduct
2
The JJC filed other charges which were dismissed. Those
dismissals are neither being appealed nor are they relevant to the
issues raised in this matter.
3 A-1432-16T4
unbecoming a public employee. The CSC defined such conduct as
"conduct that adversely affects morale or efficiency or has a
tendency to destroy public respect for governmental employees and
confidence in the operation of public services." Furthermore, the
CSC found that forwarding emails containing "slide shows of
scantily clad women in sexually suggestive poses" to a subordinate
constituted a violation of the State's policy against
discrimination. The CSC also noted that Randolph was an assistant
district parole supervisor when he engaged in the conduct, and
thus held to a higher standard. See N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(e).
Therefore, the CSC affirmed the "appointing authority's" decision
to demote Randolph to senior parole officer for violating N.J.A.C.
4A:2-2.3(a)(6) and N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12).
Randolph filed an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration.
In its denial, the CSC first addressed Randolph's argument that
the original decision was untimely. The CSC observed that pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), a decision may issue beyond the forty-
five day statutory framework so long as the agency obtains an
extension order from the OAL, which the CSC did. Additionally,
formal action was taken at a public meeting on May 6, 2015, within
the forty-five day window. In the opinion of the CSC, the OAL's
order of extension allowed it to issue a final decision up until
June 28, 2015. Thus, the May 21 written decision formalizing the
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action taken on May 6 was also timely. Therefore, the CSC
reasoned, the "deemed adopted" language of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c)
did not apply. This appeal followed.
Randolph raises the following issues for our consideration:
POINT I
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION'S FINAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION DENYING RANDOLPH'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHEREIN IT AFFIRMED
ITS MAY 21, 2015 DECISION, AFFIRMING THE JJC'S
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AND DEMOTION OF RANDOLPH
RELATED TO HIS COMPUTER USAGE AND ALLEGED
DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE, WAS IN ERROR AND ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS, UNREASONABLE AND NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD.
POINT II
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, COMMITTING A
MATERIAL ERROR IN ISSUING ITS FINAL DECISION,
AS IT WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH N.J.S.A.
40A:14-204.
POINT III
THE CSC'S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS,
AND UNREASONABLE AND IT ERRED IN AFFIRMING ITS
FINAL DECISION AS IT WAS NOT ABIDING BY THE
POLICY BEHIND THE CIVIL SERVICE ACT IN
ASSURING DISCIPLINARY MATTERS ARE FAIRLY
DETERMINED AS IT IS A PRO-MANAGEMENT BOARD.
POINT IV
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE ERRING IN FINDING
THAT RANDOLPH MISUSED PUBLIC PROPERTY AND
ENGAGED IN CONDUCT UNBECOMING AS ITS DECISION
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
5 A-1432-16T4
A. As found by the A.L.J.,
Randolph did not violate the
Administrative Code, misuse the
State computer, or violate the JJC
rules and regulations by receiving
and not opening, without
solicitation, e-mails that had
photographs attached alleged to be
inappropriate.
B. It was arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable, and a failure to apply
the law for Civil Service Commission
to find Randolph violated the
Administrative Code and the JJC's
policies pertaining to a charge that
Randolph was not given any notice.
POINT V
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ERRED IN
AFFIRMING ITS FINAL DECISION ACTING ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE IN FINDING THAT
RANDOLPH COMMITTED DISCRIMINATION AND
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AS THIS DECISION
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
A. As found by the ALJ, Randolph
did not violate the State Policy
prohibiting discrimination in the
workplace by receiving without
solicitation, and not opening, e-
mails that had photographs alleged
to be inappropriate.
B. It was a clear material error
for the CSC to find Randolph had
committed discrimination in the
workplace pertaining to a charge
that he was not given any notice of
which is arbitrary, unreasonable
and capricious as there was a
failure to apply the appropriate
law.
6 A-1432-16T4
POINT VI
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF A VIOLATION IS
SUBSTANTIATED PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE SHOULD
APPLY.
We first address Point III. This argument is so lacking in
merit as to not warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E). A numerical review of decisions rendered by the
CSC in the last two years does not support the proposition that
the Agency is biased and "pro management," as Randolph alleges.
Also substantially lacking in merit is the contention raised
in Point II, that the CSC violated the forty-five day timeline
found in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-204. That section of the statute applies
to the suspension or termination of law enforcement officers or
firefighters subject to Title 11A. Randolph is not in that
category. The relevant forty-five-day time period is, as the CSC
noted, found in N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c).
The CSC rendered its decision on May 6 at a public meeting,
taking formal action rejecting the ALJ's initial decision within
the time allowed by statute. It subsequently obtained an extension
order and issued a written decision documenting its prior action
well within the OAL extension and fifteen days after formal action.
See Cavalieri v. Bd. of Trs. of Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 368 N.J.
Super. 527, 539 (App. Div. 2004). Thus, the deemed adopted rule
7 A-1432-16T4
does not apply. The point does not warrant further discussion in
a written opinion. R. 2:22-3(e)(1)(E).
The remaining alleged errors Randolph raises stem from two
theories. First, Randolph claims the CSC's decision was arbitrary,
capricious and unreasonable, and not supported by the substantial
credible evidence in the record. Second, Randolph contends that
progressive discipline should have been applied, making the
demotion improper.
We only reverse the decision of an administrative agency
where "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or [] not supported
by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry
v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); Campbell v.
Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 566 (1963); Town of Belville
v. Coppola, 187 N.J. Super. 147, 153 (App. Div. 1982).
In deciding whether agency action is proper, we ask "whether
the findings made could have been reasonably reached . . .
considering the proofs as a whole, with due regard also to the
agency's expertise when such expertise is a pertinent factor."
Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965); Burrus v. Dep't
of Human Servs., Div. of Pub. Welfare, 194 N.J. Super. 60, 67
(App. Div. 1984); Freud v. Davis, 64 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div.
1960).
8 A-1432-16T4
A presumption of reasonableness attaches to the actions of
administrative agencies, particularly when an agency is dealing
with specialized matters within its area of expertise. Newark v.
Nat. Res. Council, 82 N.J. 530, 539-41 (1980); In re Matter of
Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993). We do not
substitute our judgment for that of the agency and, if there is
any argument supporting the agency action, it must be affirmed.
Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 587 (1988).
Furthermore, petitions for reconsideration must include new
evidence or additional information not presented at the original
proceeding which would change the outcome, along with the reason
the evidence has not been previously proffered. See N.J.A.C.
4A:2-1.6(b). Additionally, the petition must demonstrate that a
clear material error has occurred. Ibid.We agree that Randolph was entitled to notice from the JCC
with regard to the charges. See Pepe v. Twp. of Springfield, 337
N.J. Super. 94, 97 (App. Div. 2001). Contrary to his claim,
however, Randolph received adequate notice. The FNDA specifies
that an Office of EEO investigative report substantiated that he
possessed sexually inappropriate material on his work computer.
Randolph argues he was merely charged with possession, as
opposed to transmission, and that thus he cannot be found guilty
of misuse. The argument is specious. Randolph transmitted the
9 A-1432-16T4
material irrefutably proving he knew it existed in his computer.
He was on notice of the facts leading to the charges.
Randolph's transmission of the materials established conduct
unbecoming a public employee. This longstanding offense, as the
CSC pointed out, is behavior "that adversely affects morale or
efficiency or has a tendency to destroy public respect for
governmental employees and confidence in the operation of public
services." The CSC properly relied on In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super.
136 (App. Div. 1960), in finding that a State employee's
transmission of sexually explicit materials from a State computer,
originating from a State e-mail address, during work hours, is
conduct which certainly has a tendency to erode public respect for
governmental employees and to diminish confidence in the operation
of public service.3 Thus, the CSC's decision in this regard was
not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. The CSC drew reasonable
conclusions from irrefutable proofs.
Similar arguments are made by Randolph with regard to the
application of the State's anti-discrimination policy. Forwarding
such material to colleagues and a subordinate at work is clearly
the transmission of demeaning images regarding gender. See
3
Emmons is an early decision regarding conduct unbecoming,
defining the disciplinary charge as including conduct that
undermines "public respect[.]" Id. at 140.
10 A-1432-16T4
N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(b)(1)(vii). There is no question that Randolph
did not intend to harass or demean the recipients of the
emails——that is not the gravamen of the offense, however. Rather,
it is the transmission of material which is demeaning to women to
others in the workplace that gives rise to the violation. N.J.A.C.
4A:7-3.1(b)(1)(vii) actually offers by way of an example of such
behavior, the display of material in the workplace "that contains
derogatory or demeaning language or images pertaining to any of
the protected categories." Randolph's transmission readily falls
within that language.
Furthermore, at the time Randolph transmitted the material,
he was held to a higher standard because of his supervisory role,
as the CSC also pointed out. See N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(e). Thus, the
CSC's decision that Randolph violated the State's anti-
discrimination policy is neither arbitrary nor capricious, but is
founded on irrefutable proofs and a clearly expressed policy in
effect at the time of the conduct.
Finally, Randolph alleges that his demotion was
disproportionate to his conduct and that it violated principles
of progressive discipline. We alter a disciplinary penalty if
"such punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light
of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of
fairness." In re Herrmann, 191 N.J. 19, 29 (2007) (citing In re
11 A-1432-16T4
Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). But progressive discipline need
not be employed in every case. Id. at 33. It is inapplicable,
"when the misconduct is severe, when it is unbecoming to the
employee's position or renders the employee unsuitable for
continuation in the position, or when application of the principle
would be contrary to the public interest." Ibid.
There is no question that Randolph had no prior disciplinary
history. But Randolph, a supervisor, forwarded sexually
suggestive material to others from his public workplace, including
to colleagues, and one subordinate——whose ideas of the behavior
expected of a public employee would be influenced by his
supervisor's behavior. Given his position and the blatant
deviation from workplace policies, the penalty does not shock our
sense of fairness. See id. at 29.
Affirmed.
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