SANDRA SCOTT VS. BOARD OF REVIEW (BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4041-16T3
SANDRA SCOTT,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW, NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, and
RELIANT PRO REHABILITATION,
LLC,
Respondents.
______________________________
Submitted May 9, 2018 – Decided June 27, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez and Currier.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department
of Labor, Docket No. 109,044.
Carolyne S. Kalson, attorney for appellant.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent Board of Review (Jason W.
Rockwell, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Francis A. Raso, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Respondent Reliant Pro Rehabilitation, LLC,
has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Claimant Sandra Scott appeals from the April 28, 2017 decision
of the Board of Review (Board) finding her ineligible for
unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). After a
review of the contentions in light of the record and applicable
principles of law, we affirm.
As a result of some medical issues, claimant took an approved
leave of absence from her employment as an occupational therapist
assistant at Reliant Pro Rehabilitation on June 17, 2016. While
on leave, claimant received disability benefits. Although her
physician cleared her to return to work, she did not do so after
the expiration of her disability benefits on December 20, 2016.
Instead, claimant requested her employer terminate her effective
December 21, 2016.
After claimant applied for unemployment benefits, the
Director of Unemployment Insurance (Director) mailed claimant a
"Notice of Determination" on January 10 and 11, 2017. The letters
informed claimant she was disqualified for benefits because she
voluntarily resigned without good cause attributable to the work,
and she was not eligible for benefits because she had received
disability payments during a period of time for which she was
seeking unemployment benefits.
Claimant appealed the decisions, and after a telephonic
hearing was conducted on February 10, 2017, the Appeal Tribunal
2 A-4041-16T3
issued two decisions. The first decision affirmed the Director's
determination that claimant was disqualified for benefits for
voluntarily leaving her employment. The Tribunal stated:
the claimant left the work voluntarily due to
her own personal health reasons. . . . [T]he
claimant's electronic mail thread with the
employer's human resource witness, provided by
the claimant herself, indicated that the
claimant did not claim that the work either
caused or aggravated her medical condition.
. . . Clearly the claimant's health condition
in question did not have a work connected
origin as it existed prior to the claimant's
employment.[1]
Claimant appealed the Appeal Tribunal's decision to the
Board. On April 28, 2017, the Board affirmed the decision of the
Tribunal. A request to reopen and reconsider its decision was
denied on May 26, 2017.
On appeal, claimant contends the Board's decision should be
reversed because it incorrectly determined that she resigned her
position when, in fact, she was terminated. Claimant also asserts
if she did leave work voluntarily, she is nevertheless entitled
to employment benefits because her medical condition was
aggravated by her work. We are mindful that our review of
administrative agency decisions is limited. We will not disturb
an agency's action unless it was clearly "arbitrary, capricious,
1
The Director's second decision was reversed by the Tribunal and
is not a subject of this appeal.
3 A-4041-16T3
or unreasonable." Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210
(1997).
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) provides, in pertinent part, that an
individual is disqualified for benefits "[f]or the week in which
the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the
individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in
employment."
With few exceptions, leaving work for personal reasons
unrelated to the work, no matter how reasonable, disqualifies an
employee from receiving unemployment benefits. See Utley v. Bd.
of Review, 194 N.J. 534, 544 (2008) (stating that if an individual
leaves "for personal reasons, however compelling, he [or she] is
disqualified under the statute"); see also Ardan v. Bd. of Review,
231 N.J. 589, 602 (2018); Brady, 152 N.J. at 213-14; Self v. Bd.
of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 460 (1982).
Where a medical issue prevents an employee from working, it
is the employee's obligation to establish through competent
medical evidence that a health issue attributable to work forced
her to leave employment. See Wojcik v. Bd. of Review, 58 N.J.
341, 344 (1971). When a non-work connected physical condition
makes it necessary for an individual to leave work due to an
inability to perform the job, the individual shall be disqualified
4 A-4041-16T3
for benefits for voluntarily leaving work, unless the work is
medically proven to aggravate the condition. N.J.A.C. 12:17-
9.3(b).
The record is clear that claimant's medical condition was not
caused or aggravated by her work as an occupational therapy
assistant. Claimant testified she was diagnosed with the
degenerative condition prior to commencing her employment at
Reliant. Claimant's physician medically cleared her to return to
work as an occupational therapy assistant. Claimant did not allege
her employment aggravated or worsened her condition.2 Therefore,
the credible evidence in the record supported the Board's
determination.
Although claimant asserts she was terminated by her employer,
the record indicates that her "termination" was initiated by her
and was a mutual agreement with her employer to end her employment
with the purpose of allowing claimant to obtain unemployment
benefits. Claimant's employer explained to the Appeal Tribunal
that the employer and claimant "decided mutually that she wouldn't
have to . . . come back." Claimant expressed thanks to her
2
To the contrary, in an email to her former employer, claimant
advises that she never claimed any causal connection between her
medical condition and her employment.
5 A-4041-16T3
employer in the email chain for "terminating" her.3 The
substantial credible evidence in the record, therefore, supports
the Board's determination that claimant was disqualified from
benefits.
Affirmed.
3
Her employer wrote, "we will 'term' you. Essentially, lay you
off," to which claimant replied, "[t]hanks."
6 A-4041-16T3