STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAVIS SANTIAGO (009-07-15 AND 009-06-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0095-15T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVIS SANTIAGO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
Argued September 20, 2017 – Decided July 12, 2018
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz, and Suter.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, Municipal Appeal
Nos. 009-07-15 and 009-06-15.
Carmine R. Alampi argued the cause for
appellant (Alampi & De Marrais, attorneys;
Carmine R. Alampi, on the brief).
Annmarie Cozzi, Senior Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S.
Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney;
Annmarie Cozzi, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Davis Santiago appeals from his July 17, 2015
convictions for driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-
50, which were his second and third convictions under that statute.
He was convicted following de novo review in the Law Division of
two municipal court appeals. Defendant claims that it was error
to preclude him in both cases from calling an expert witness to
testify about his "pre-existing physical impediments" and, in one
of the cases, to admit the results from the Alcotest. He also
appeals from the July 24, 2015 order that denied reconsideration
of his request to stay the imposed fines and penalties.1 We affirm
both convictions.
I.
On August 30, 2013, defendant was charged with DWI, following
a motor vehicle stop in Montvale. The police stopped him again
on September 13, 2013, in Park Ridge and arrested him on a new DWI
charge.
The Montvale case was tried on October 23, 2014, in municipal
court. Defendant was convicted of DWI based on the Alcotest
results that showed a .15 percent blood alcohol concentration
(BAC). This was his second offense for driving while intoxicated.
The Park Ridge case was tried on November 20, 2014, before
the same municipal court judge. Defendant again was convicted of
1
Because this issue was not raised in his merits brief, it is
deemed waived. Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014).
2 A-0095-15T4
DWI. This was his third conviction. The conviction was based on
observation evidence, not on the result of the Alcotest.
Defendant appealed both cases to the Law Division. Following
de novo review, a Superior Court judge found defendant guilty of
DWI in both cases. In the Montvale case, the judge found a per
se violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, based on the Alcotest and also
convicted defendant based on observation evidence. Because this
was his second violation, his driver's license was suspended for
two years, he was required to attend the Intoxicated Drivers
Resource Center (IDRC) for two days, install an interlock device
for a year, and pay fines, penalties and costs.
In the Park Ridge case, the judge held there was probable
cause for the motor vehicle stop. The court based defendant's
conviction on observation evidence, and not on the Alcotest. The
court denied defendant's request, in both cases, to have Dr. Paul
Greenberg, a podiatrist, testify about defendant's feet, knee and
back, finding his 2014 report was not relevant because it did not
address whether defendant's physical conditions in 2013, affected
his ability to perform the roadside sobriety tests.
In the Park Ridge case, defendant was sentenced to 180 days
in jail, ninety days of which could be served at a treatment
center. His driver's license was suspended for ten years, an
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interlock device was required and he was ordered to pay fines,
penalties and costs. He was sentenced to twelve hours at IDRC.
He was to perform thirty days of community service. This sentence
was to be served consecutive to the Montvale sentence.
A.
The Montvale Case
On August 30, 2013, at about 1:18 a.m., Montvale Police
Sergeant Douglas McDowell was on patrol when he saw a car cross
over the double centerline as it approached him, causing McDowell
to steer to the right to avoid the car. He turned to follow the
car. The driver went right at an intersection, turning so widely
that the vehicle entered into the adjacent left hand turn lane.
The driver then over-corrected going "really close to the curb
line." The driver pulled into a bar/restaurant where McDowell
stopped him and asked for identification. McDowell described that
defendant "was fumbling the documents." He "passed over his
driver's license . . . several times before he got it." His
"speech was slow and slurred, . . . his eyes were bloodshot and
watery." McDowell smelled alcohol on his breath. McDowell asked
defendant to step out of his vehicle. He was "very . . . wobbly,
unsteady." He held onto the door and side of the car. He was
"swaying" and "lost his balance."
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McDowell asked defendant to perform the "walk-and-turn" and
the "one-leg stance" tests. On the first test, he did not take
the proper number of steps; he did not count out loud as he had
been instructed; he had his arms out for balance, stepped backwards
and did not walk in a straight line, failing the test. For the
one leg-standing test, defendant miscounted and put his foot on
the ground, failing that test. McDowell concluded that defendant
was intoxicated. Once at the station, McDowell described that
defendant's "eyes were bloodshot, watery, his speech was slow and
slurred."
Montvale Patrolman Jeffrey Hanna also observed that
defendant's eyes were watery and bloodshot. He detected the odor
of alcohol from defendant. He believed based on his observations
and experience that defendant was intoxicated.
On the Drinking Driving Questionnaire, defendant answered
that he was not injured or under the care of a doctor. He admitted
having three to four beers between 10:30 p.m. to midnight with a
meal at 10 p.m. He did not say anything about physical problems.
The Alcotest machine at the Montvale department did not work
properly. Defendant was taken to Park Ridge Police Department for
the test. Hanna observed defendant for twenty minutes, and
commenced testing at 3:18 a.m. The first test was taken at 3:46
5 A-0095-15T4
a.m. The third was taken at 3:51 a.m. They both showed a reading
of .15 percent BAC. The second test could not be used because the
"minimum [breath] volume [was] not achieved." Hanna described the
procedures, which involved inserting a new mouthpiece for the
tests.
The Montvale case was listed for trial on June 9, 2014.
Defendant's expert witness, Kevin M. Flanigan, was not available
until July. Just days before trial, defendant's counsel served
an expert report from Dr. Richard Saferstein, to testify about the
Alcotest. Because of a professional conflict with Dr. Saferstein,
the municipal court judge disqualified himself sua sponte. In
disqualifying himself, the municipal court judge stated: "You have
made your bed, and now you're going to sleep in it . . . . While
I will recuse myself, . . . I am also going to indicate within
that order that the only expert that you can use in this matter
is Dr. Saferstein [.]" The June 11, 2014 order also transferred
the case for reassignment, providing that "the defense expert
shall be none other than Richard Saferstein, Ph.D."
The case was reassigned to another municipal court judge. A
week before the October 23, 2014 trial, defendant served an expert
report dated August 19, 2014 from Dr. Greenberg, a podiatrist.
The report concluded that defendant's "gait evaluation" was
6 A-0095-15T4
"abnormal" because of bilateral heel spurs, bunions, shortened
Achilles tendons, knee surgery, adhesions from hernia repair, loss
of weight and tight shoes. Defendant was not able to perform the
"one leg stand" and "walk and turn" tests when Dr. Greenberg
examined him on August 13, 2014.
At trial, no one could remember why the June 11, 2014 order
appeared to limit defendant to one expert, and no transcript was
available. The judge barred Dr. Greenberg's testimony based on
the June 11, 2014 order. McDowell and Hanna testified at the
trial to the facts involving defendant's arrest, field sobriety
testing and Alcotest.
Dr. Saferstein testified about the Alcotest. He alleged that
Hanna did not testify directly about changing the mouthpiece before
the third test. He also claimed the observation period had not
been long enough.
Defendant admitted having three beers with his meal. He
testified that he swerved into the other lane because he was
texting. He denied making a wide right turn at an intersection.
He denied having difficulty retrieving his driver's license. He
denied having any difficulty performing any of the field sobriety
tests, but claimed he could not do them that day because of pain
in his feet and legs.
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Defendant testified that he suffered from heel spurs that
caused him "to hobble" and "can't really stay on [his] feet a long
time." He had be treated with cortisone injections in the past,
had left knee surgery in 2009 for a torn meniscus and had bilateral
hernia surgery in 1998. He claimed he told McDowell at the scene
that he was going to have difficulty performing the tests while
wearing his shoes.
The municipal court judge found the testimony of the two
officers to be credible. He held that there was probable cause
for the motor vehicle stop and arrest based on McDowell's
observations. He rejected defendant's arguments attacking the
reliability of the Alcotest, finding that the tests were
administered properly. The municipal court judge convicted
defendant of operating his vehicle on August 30, 2013, while
intoxicated in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.
B.
The Park Ridge Case
At 2:10 a.m. on September 13, 2013, Officer John Szot of the
Park Ridge Police Department saw a vehicle make a left turn onto
Pascack Road and accelerate very quickly "grabbing [his]
attention." The driver made a right turn at a red light. The
vehicle was moving quickly. Szot saw the vehicle make a wide turn
8 A-0095-15T4
onto another street. He turned on the siren and overhead lights,
but the vehicle did not stop. The driver, later identified as
defendant, put on his left directional signal, turned left, and
then pulled into his driveway. Szot testified defendant had been
driving over the posted speed limit, failed to stop at a red light
and failed to keep right before making a wide turn. Defendant
also failed to stop for the siren and lights.
Defendant produced his driver's license at the officer's
request. Szot detected a faint odor of alcohol coming from the
vehicle, but a strong odor of cologne. Defendant was "sweating
profusely." He "had bloodshot, watery eyes, his . . . movements
were slow, lethargic, he was shaking a little bit because he
. . . appeared to be nervous." He also was slurring his words.
His face was "very flush." Defendant produced the requested
registration but not his insurance card. Defendant was "fumbling"
looking for the documents.
Defendant told Szot he was coming from a friend's house. He
denied having had any alcohol. Defendant could not satisfactorily
recite the alphabet from D to Q; did not accurately count backwards
from 69 to 54; and staggered as he got out of his vehicle.
Szot again noticed an odor of alcohol as he conducted the
field sobriety tests. Defendant did not tell Szot he would have
9 A-0095-15T4
any problem performing the tests because of a physical condition.
Defendant did not successfully perform the heel-to-toe test,
raising his arms for balance, stepping off the line, turning
incorrectly and taking the wrong number of steps. He also did not
count aloud as instructed. On the one-leg stand test, defendant
raised his arms, put the other foot down, and swayed. Szot
testified that based on his experience and observation, defendant
was intoxicated and placed him under arrest.
Once at the police station, Szot testified the "odor of an
alcoholic beverage became more apparent." He observed defendant
for a full twenty minutes beginning at 2:53 a.m. Defendant told
Szot as they completed the in-custody screening form that he had
surgery on his left knee and heel spurs on both feet.
Sergeant Peter Mauro performed the Alcotest. He noted that
defendant's eyes were "bloodshot and watery." He smelled an odor
of alcohol on defendant's breath. Defendant was slurring his
words. Mauro also concluded that defendant was intoxicated.
Mauro entered defendant's "pedigree" information into the
Alcotest machine and waited for the twenty-minute observation
period to elapse. He checked to make sure everyone was free of
electronic devices. He put a new mouthpiece on the hose for the
first and second test. On cross-examination, he testified that
10 A-0095-15T4
the observation period commenced at 2:53 a.m. and the first test
was completed at 3:13 a.m., although there may have been a
discrepancy in the clocks that were used.
Mauro could not access the computer to enter the readings
"through the calculator," so he called an officer at the Montvale
police department who ran the readings through the calculator and
physically brought the results over to Mauro. The reading was .13
percent BAC.
The municipal court judge "reaffirmed" his prior order of
June 11, 2014, that barred expert witnesses other than Dr.
Saferstein. Also, Flanigan was not available to testify about the
Alcotest. The court concluded there was probable cause for the
motor vehicle stop, denying defendant's motion to suppress the
police videotape. The municipal court found Szot's testimony
credible that he could not catch up to defendant and that
"[defendant] was clearly going in excess of a speed that's required
on a residential road" in the Borough. The municipal court judge
found defendant guilty of DWI based on observation evidence from
the police officers who he found to be credible. He rejected the
Alcotest results, however, because there was reasonable doubt
about whether the twenty-minute observation period had elapsed.
11 A-0095-15T4
C.
Superior Court De Novo Review
Defendant appealed the convictions under the process codified
in Rule 3:23-1 to -9. On July 15, 2015, both convictions were
heard de novo in the Law Division based on the municipal court
record. See R. 3:23-8. The trial court found that Dr. Greenberg's
report had been properly excluded because it was not served on the
State until a week before the Montvale trial. Independent of this
discovery violation the report also was "not relevant" because it
never gave an opinion about whether defendant could have performed
the field sobriety tests when he was arrested in in 2013. "There
[was] nothing in the report that indicate[d] that the defendant
[was] unable to perform these tests a year earlier." Further, Dr.
Greenberg's testimony would have been limited to the "four corners
of the report," meaning that he could not have offered an opinion
at trial about defendant's abilities as of 2013.
The Law Division found defendant guilty of DWI in the Montvale
case based on the Alcotest result of .15 percent BAC and on
observation evidence by the police. The judge deferred to the
credibility findings of the municipal court judge. He also found
the officers' testimony, observations, and opinions to be
credible. The court found probable cause for the motor vehicle
12 A-0095-15T4
stop. The court rejected defendant's argument that the Alcotest
was improperly administered. Although the testimony about
changing the mouthpieces between the second and third tests was
"sketchy," the court was satisfied from the transcripts that the
officer changed the mouthpieces.
The trial court found defendant guilty of DWI in the Park
Ridge case based solely on the observation evidence. Reviewing
the transcript de novo, the court found there was probable cause
for the motor vehicle stop of defendant based on "violation of the
motor vehicle laws." The court found the officer's testimony to
be credible. Szot had to travel in excess of the posted speed
limit to catch up with defendant; he observed defendant's failure
to stop; and defendant did not stop despite the officer's siren
and lights.
The judge also denied defendant's motion to suppress the
police video tape. The court reviewed Szot's testimony about
defendant's odor of alcohol, his appearance, slow movements,
flushed face and cognitive testing, finding that the officer "had
a right to ask [defendant] to step out of the vehicle."
The trial court convicted defendant based on observation
evidence that was "beyond a reasonable doubt." The officer's
testimony was corroborated by the video tape. The field sobriety
13 A-0095-15T4
tests were properly given. Defendant did not testify at trial.
The court found defendant's failure to perform the sobriety tests
resulted from being under the influence of alcohol and not from
any medical or physical disability. Defendant also failed
cognitive tests, noting there would be no physical reason for
this.
II.
On appeal, defendant raises the following issues:
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS PRECLUDED FROM INTRODUCING
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS.
A. The Lower Courts Misinterpreted and
Overextended Judge Norton's Recusal Order.
B. Dr. Greenberg's Testimony is Relevant.
C. At a Minimum, Dr. Greenberg's Testimony
was Subject to a Rule 104 Hearing.
D. Dr. Greenberg's Preclusion was Related in
Part to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Not
Raised Below).
POINT II
THE OCTOBER 23, 2014 TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY
ADMITTED EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO THE ALCOTEST
AS THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT PROPER
PROCEDURES WERE FOLLOWED.
14 A-0095-15T4
POINT III
APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY STOPPED ON SEPTEMBER
13, 2013 AND COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE MADE AN
APPROPRIATE MOTION TO DISMISS (Raised in Part
Below).
On appeal, we "consider only the action of the Law Division
and not that of the municipal court." State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J.
Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 2001) (citing State v. Joas, 34 N.J.
179, 184 (1961)). Under Rule 3:23-8(a)(2), the Law Division makes
independent findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo, based
on the record from the municipal court. See State v. States, 44
N.J. 285, 293 (1965). We determine "whether the findings made
could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence
present in the record." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)
(quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). Our review
of legal determinations is plenary. See State v. Handy, 206 N.J.
39, 45 (2011).
We are satisfied that the State produced sufficient
observation evidence in both cases to convict defendant of driving
while under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt.
The thrust of the Motor Vehicle Act is safety on the highway.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) prohibits the operation of
a motor vehicle under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. The phrase "under the
influence" means a substantial deterioration
15 A-0095-15T4
or diminution of the mental faculties or
physical capabilities of a person. State v.
Tamburro, 68 N.J. 414, 420 (1975). In a case
involving intoxicating liquor, "under the
influence" means a condition which so affects
the judgment or control of a motor vehicle
operator "as to make it improper for him to
drive on the highway." State v. Johnson, 42
N.J. 146, 165 (1964).
[State v. Cryan, 363 N.J. Super. 442, 455
(App. Div. 2003).]
An officer's subjective observation of a defendant is a
sufficient ground to sustain a DWI conviction. See Cryan, 363
N.J. Super. at 456-57 (sustaining DWI conviction based on
observations of defendant's bloodshot eyes, hostility, and strong
odor of alcohol); see also State v. Cleverley, 348 N.J. Super.
455, 465 (App. Div. 2002) (sustaining DWI conviction based on
officer's observation of the defendant's driving without
headlights, inability to perform field sobriety tests,
combativeness, swaying, and detection of odor of alcohol on the
defendant's breath); Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. at 251-52
(sustaining DWI conviction based on officer's observations of
watery eyes, slurred and slow speech, staggering, inability to
perform field sobriety tests, and defendant's admission to
drinking alcohol earlier in the day).
In the Montvale case, the police officers testified about
defendant's odor of alcohol, watery and blood shot eyes, and slow
16 A-0095-15T4
speech that was slurred. He was wobbly and unsteady. He failed
the field sobriety tests in a number of ways, including not taking
the proper number of steps and not counting out loud as instructed.
He had driven over the center line and turned widely.
In the Park Ridge case, the officers testified about
defendant's odor of alcohol, particularly when he was at the
station, that his speech was slow and slurred, eyes bloodshot and
watery, and his face was flush. He fumbled for his documents. He
staggered and took the wrong number of steps in the field sobriety
tests that he failed. He could not recite the alphabet or count
backwards properly. He had accelerated rapidly and turned wide.
He had not stopped for the police officer's siren and lights.
A defendant's demeanor, physical appearance, slurred speech,
and bloodshot eyes, together with an odor of alcohol, are
sufficient to sustain a DWI conviction. State v. Bealor, 187 N.J.
574, 588-89 (2006); State v. Morris, 262 N.J. Super. 413, 421-22
(App. Div. 1993). The Law Division judge did not err in finding
that the observation evidence satisfied these standards beyond a
reasonable doubt and in convicting defendant of driving while
intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.
We reject defendant's argument that there was no probable
cause for the motor vehicle stop in Park Ridge on September 13,
17 A-0095-15T4
2013. "Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances
within . . . [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves
to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed." State v. Moore, 181 N.J.
40, 46 (2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Schneider v.
Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 361 (2000)). A police officer has
justification to stop a motor vehicle where he has an "articulable
and reasonable suspicion" that the driver has committed a motor
vehicle offense. State v. Smith, 306 N.J. Super. 370, 380 (App.
Div. 1997).
Here, the municipal court and Law Division judges found Szot's
testimony to be credible. We defer to that finding. "Under the
two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake
to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility
determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and
exceptional showing of error." Locurto, 157 N.J at 474. Szot
testified he saw defendant accelerate quickly, proceed through a
red light, turn right, turn widely and fail to stop for the officer
once his siren and lights were activated. Under the totality of
the circumstances, these facts were enough for an objectively
18 A-0095-15T4
reasonable police officer to believe that defendant had committed
a motor vehicle in violation.
Any error with respect to not permitting Dr. Greenberg to
testify was harmless in light of our decision here that the
convictions are affirmed based on observation evidence. See State
v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 312 (2006) (quoting State v. Macon, 57
N.J. 325, 337-38 (1971)) (providing based on Rule 2:10-2 that
"[w]e will disregard '[a]ny error or omission [by the court]
. . . unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable
of producing an unjust result.'"). There was overwhelming
observation evidence of defendant's guilt in both cases based on
his driving, appearance, smell, behavior and cognitive
inabilities. Defendant admitted he had been drinking in the
Montvale case. Dr. Greenberg's testimony about defendant's
physical condition would not have explained away any of the other
evidence of intoxication.
If there were errors by trial counsel, "[o]ur courts have
expressed a general policy against entertaining ineffective-
assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal because such claims
involve allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial
record." State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 313 (2006), (quoting
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992).
19 A-0095-15T4
Finally, we reject defendant's argument that the Alcotest
procedures were flawed in the Montvale case. Defendant contends
that there was no direct testimony that the officer removed cell
phones and other devices before starting the test. The State
bears the burden of proving compliance by clear and convincing
evidence. State v. Campbell, 436 N.J. Super. 264, 270 (App. Div.
2014). However, the Court provided in Chun that "there is ample
support for the finding that the Alcotest is well-shielded from
the impact of any potential RFI that might otherwise affect the
reported results or limit our confidence in the accuracy of the
test results." State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 89 (2008). We said
in Carrero that "even if sources of RFI happened to be found in
the testing area at the [police station] where [defendant's] blood-
alcohol level was tested, those sources would not suffice to call
into reasonable question the accuracy or validity of the Alcotest
results for the purpose of a DWI prosecution." State v. Carrero,
428 N.J. Super. 495, 510 (App. Div. 2012), rev'd on other grounds,
225 N.J. 582 (2016).
Defendant also contends there was no affirmative testimony
by the officer that he put a new mouthpiece on the machine after
the second test and before the third in the Montvale case.
However, we agree that the record supported the trial court's
20 A-0095-15T4
finding that proper procedures were followed in the testing. The
officer described the process. "You hit continue, and the defendant
blows again. And the same process. Um, again, with a new
mouthpiece, not the old one . . . ." He described the procedures
in detail. The officer responded to the question "and that's what
you remember doing" after he described this and other procedures,
with the answer "I do remember doing that, yes." Based on the
record, we have no basis to attack the findings of the Law Division
judge that the Alcotest was properly performed. Thus, there also
was independent credible evidence to convict defendant of DWI on
a per se basis in the Montvale case. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.
Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
21 A-0095-15T4