LARISSA TROFIMOVA VS. IGOR TROFIMOV (FM-14-1538-14, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0454-16T1
    LARISSA TROFIMOVA,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    IGOR TROFIMOV,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Submitted March 7, 2018 – Decided July 12, 2018
    Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
    Docket No. FM-14-1538-14.
    Ianoldi & Edens, LLC, attorneys for appellant
    (Ann M. Edens, of counsel and on the brief;
    Daniel R. Kraft, on the briefs).
    Ceconi   &  Cheifetz,   LLC,  attorneys for
    respondent (Kimberly A. Rennie, of counsel;
    Lindsay A. Heller, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Igor Trofimov and plaintiff Larissa Trofimova were
    divorced on September 19, 2016, by way of a final dual judgment.
    Defendant appeals virtually every financial aspect of the order.
    After our review of the record, the arguments on appeal, and the
    relevant precedents, we affirm in part, reverse and vacate in
    part, and remand.
    The    parties   married    on    October   24,    1981,   and   have   one
    emancipated child.     Plaintiff has a Master's Degree in Mathematics
    and Computer Science and is fully employed.               However, the trial
    judge found she deferred the development of her own career when
    the couple relocated to advance defendant's career, first from
    Russia to Germany, and then to the United States.                Defendant is,
    by his own account, a renowned scientist who "has advanced the
    science in his field."
    In 2012, the same year the parties separated, they entered
    into a separation agreement.          Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce,
    which resulted in the court issuing two pendente lite orders on
    January 30, 2015.     These orders enforced the separation agreement
    in which defendant assumed certain expenses, such as the cost of
    maintaining the marital home until sale.               Defendant was ordered
    to pay outstanding payments to plaintiff of his health and car
    insurance.
    In    March   2015,   the   parties    participated    in    a   mediation
    session, during which defendant paid $10,000 towards arrears and
    reimbursements on the January 30, 2015 order.            Thereafter, on July
    1, 2015, the parties entered into a consent order for pendente
    2                               A-0454-16T1
    lite support totaling $1832 per month, payable through probation.
    Defendant agreed to produce outstanding discovery to forensic
    accountants, who had been retained to provide expert reports for
    both parties, and provide a personal property list.              Defendant did
    neither.
    During     the   marriage,   the       parties   acquired   interests         in
    various companies, pension and retirement plans, and other assets.
    Plaintiff has a 401(k) through her employer with a balance in
    excess of $212,000 and a separate IRA. Defendant only acknowledged
    one IRA, despite listing two on his February 2011 Case Information
    Statement (CIS).      Defendant was not specific as to the amount in
    the one IRA he acknowledged.
    Defendant's share in a company he created with four friends,
    known as Akela Laser Corporation (Akela), was one of the assets
    subject    to   equitable   distribution.         Defendant      is   the     Chief
    Technology Officer and owns a 28.57% ownership interest in the
    company; it is his main source of income. Plaintiff also initially
    held an interest in the company, but sold her shares for $6000 and
    deposited the proceeds into the parties' joint checking account.
    At trial, the court-appointed expert testified the fair market
    value of defendant's interest in Akela was $214,000.
    Plaintiff owns Princeton Technology Advisers Company (PTAC).
    At   trial,     defendant   testified        plaintiff   could    retain        PTAC
    3                                   A-0454-16T1
    entirely.    The court-appointed expert assessed PTAC's value at
    $133,000.
    In his August 31, 2016 post-trial findings of fact, the trial
    judge concluded plaintiff was credible and defendant was not.            He
    found defendant incredible based on his demeanor and responses
    while testifying, and his lack of compliance with prior court
    orders.     The judge described defendant as "cagey rather than
    forthcoming," and cited as an example defendant's reluctance to
    even disclose where he was living——New Jersey or California.
    Additionally, defendant "stonewalled the production of documents
    for examination by the accounting experts."
    As   the   judge   observed,   defendant   claimed   he   signed   the
    separation agreement, "only under duress and without reading it."
    The judge disbelieved this, given defendant's level of education,
    and the fact he was "used to reviewing contracts and grants."
    Defendant raises the following points on appeal:
    POINT ONE
    THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
    REFERENCE, ANALYZE OR CONSIDER N.J.S.A. 2A:34-
    23.1 FACTORS IN SUPPORT OF ITS AWARD OF
    EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION FOR THE BUSINESSES,
    RETIREMENT ASSETS AND BANK ACCOUNTS (Absent
    from Dal-Da20).1
    A.     MARITAL BUSINESSES
    1
    Defendant failed to cite specific parts of the record in his
    point headings, as required by Rule 2:6-2(a)(6). Instead,
    defendant repeatedly notes "Absent from Dal-Da20."
    4                            A-0454-16T1
    B.   MARITAL   FINANCIAL   BANK   ACCOUNTS
    C.   RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS ACQUIRED DURING
    THE MARRIAGE
    POINT TWO
    THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO STATE
    FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
    THROUGHOUT THE FINAL DUAL JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE
    (Absent from Dal-Da20).
    A.   THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED
    ESCROW OF PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF THE
    PARTIES' FORMER MARITAL HOME
    B.    THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED
    PTAC,    AN  ASSET  FORMED   DURING   THE
    MARRIAGE,    EXEMP[T]   FROM    EQUITABLE
    DISTRIBUTION
    C.   THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
    CREDIT OF MONIES [PLAINTIFF] SQUANDERED
    POST-SEPARATION
    D.   THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
    CREDIT   OF   MONIES   [DEFENDANT]   PAID
    PENDENTE LITE
    POINT THREE
    THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO STATE
    FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND THE
    ISSUES ABSENT FROM THE RECORD OR ADDRESSED IN
    THE COURT'S OPINION LETTER (Absent from Dal-
    Da20).
    A.   THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT
    ORDERED [DEFENDANT] TO MAINTAIN A LIFE
    INSURANCE POLICY FOR SIX (6) YEARS
    B.   THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT
    ORDERED [DEFENDANT] TO PAY HIS SHARE OF
    EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION BY WAY OF THE
    PROBATION DEPARTMENT OF THE FAMILY
    DIVISION
    5                           A-0454-16T1
    C.   THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT
    ORDERED [DEFENDANT] TO PAY 4% INTEREST
    RATE ON THE OUTSTANDING MONIES OWED ON
    THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AWARD
    D.   THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT
    ORDERED    [DEFENDANT]     TO    RELEASE
    LITIGATION DOCUMENTATION POST-DIVORCE
    POINT FOUR
    THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
    REFERENCE, ANALYZE OR CONSIDER NEW JERSEY
    FACTORS IN SUPPORT OF ITS COUNSEL FEE AWARD
    (Absent from Dal-Da20).
    I.
    Appellate review of a trial court's decision is limited, as
    "findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported
    by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."        Cesare v. Cesare,
    
    154 N.J. 394
    , 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v.
    Inv'rs Ins. Co., 
    65 N.J. 474
    , 484 (1974)).       "[M]atrimonial courts
    possess special expertise in the field of domestic relations.
    . . .   Because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and
    expertise   in   family   matters,   appellate   courts   should    accord
    deference to family court factfinding."      
    Id. at 412-13.
    "Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly
    mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should an appellate court intervene
    and make its own findings to ensure that there is not a denial of
    justice."    N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 
    196 N.J. 88
    , 104 (2008) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L.,
    6                             A-0454-16T1
    
    191 N.J. 596
    , 605 (2007)).           Deference is extended to the family
    court's factual findings because of its ability to make first-hand
    credibility    judgments.       
    Ibid. "However, a judge's
        legal
    conclusions    are    subject   to    our   plenary   review."      Milne       v.
    Goldenberg, 
    428 N.J. Super. 184
    , 197-98 (App. Div. 2012) (citations
    omitted).
    The trial court has the discretion to allocate marital assets
    to the parties in matters of equitable distribution.               La Sala v.
    La Sala, 
    335 N.J. Super. 1
    , 6 (App. Div. 2000) (citing Borodinsky
    v. Borodinsky, 
    162 N.J. Super. 437
    , 443-44 (App. Div. 1978);
    Jacobitti v. Jacobitti, 
    263 N.J. Super. 608
    , 613 (App. Div. 1993).
    On appeal, these decisions are reviewed, "to determine whether the
    court has abused its discretion."           La 
    Sala, 335 N.J. Super. at 6
    .
    "An abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is "made without
    a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established
    policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."'"              Milne, 428 N.J.
    Super. at 197 (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 
    171 N.J. 561
    ,   571   (2002)    (quoting      Achacoso-Sanchez     v.   Immigration       &
    Naturalization Serv., 
    779 F.2d 1260
    , 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).
    We affirm equitable distribution awards "as long as the trial
    court could reasonably have reached its result from the evidence
    presented, and the award is not distorted by legal or factual
    mistake."     La 
    Sala, 335 N.J. Super. at 6
    (citing Perkins v.
    7                                A-0454-16T1
    Perkins, 
    159 N.J. Super. 243
    , 247-48 (App. Div. 1978)).                The award
    will be affirmed even if we would not have made the same ruling
    as the trial court. 
    Perkins, 159 N.J. Super. at 247-48
    . "Reversal
    is warranted only when a trial court's findings reflect a mistake
    must have been made because the factual findings are 'so manifestly
    unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and
    reasonably   credible    evidence    as   to   offend    the    interests       of
    justice.'"    Clark v. Clark, 
    429 N.J. Super. 61
    , 70 (App. Div.
    2012) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, 
    Inc., 65 N.J. at 484
    (quotation
    omitted)).
    N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 specifies the factors that a court should
    consider   when   determining    equitable     distribution       of    marital
    assets.      These   include   the   duration    of     the    marriage,      the
    contribution each party made to the acquisition of assets, the
    standard of living, and the economic circumstances of each party
    at the time of the division of property.         N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1(a),
    (c), (d), and (f).      The statute requires judges to make findings
    of fact on the evidence relevant to the issues being decided.
    N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1       We do not agree the judge did not make
    adequate factual findings; he made such findings as to each asset.
    The court must first identify the property eligible for
    distribution, determine the value of those assets, and then decide
    the manner in which equitable allocation should be made.                Rothman
    8                                   A-0454-16T1
    v. Rothman, 
    65 N.J. 219
    , 232 (1974).        Each case must be examined
    on its own merits and facts.
    II.
    Defendant   first   challenges   the    trial   court's   equitable
    distribution of the parties' businesses, retirement assets, and
    bank accounts.   The judge gave great weight to the thirty-three
    year length of the marriage.    He acknowledged the parties' moves
    from Russia to Germany, and then to the United States——made to
    advance defendant's career——delayed the development of plaintiff's
    career.   The judge's reliance on these factors is based on well-
    established precedent and demonstrates one example of the explicit
    fact-finding in which he engaged.
    In rendering his valuation of the parties' interest in their
    respective companies, the judge relied upon the opinion of a court-
    appointed accounting expert.   With regard to PTAC, the judge found
    plaintiff was the sole owner of that $133,000 asset.           The judge
    fixed plaintiff's share of Akela at forty percent of defendant's
    equity, or $85,600.      We find no basis to disturb the judge's
    decisions with regard to these assets.       In making such decisions,
    judges may rely on expert opinions at their discretion.        See Carey
    v. Lovett, 
    132 N.J. 44
    , 64 (1993) (applying that principle to
    malpractice cases); see also Brown v. Brown, 
    348 N.J. Super. 466
    ,
    9                              A-0454-16T1
    478 (App. Div. 2002) (applying that principle to expert testimony
    on valuation issues).
    Review of equitable distribution is subject to abuse of
    discretion, and none has been demonstrated here.                The judge's
    decisions    are     not   "inexplicably    departed    from     established
    policies, or rest[ing] on an impermissible basis."               
    Milne, 428 N.J. Super. at 197
    (quoting 
    Flagg, 171 N.J. at 571
    (quotation
    omitted)).    The challenge to the equitable distribution of the
    marital estate lacks merit.
    Defendant also asserts he should have received a share of
    PTAC.   In his trial testimony, however, defendant acknowledged
    plaintiff    owned   the   company   and   said   "[t]hat's    her    company,
    whatever she wants to do with it."         Defendant had stopped working
    for the company years prior and did "not have time to work there."
    Defendant denied having an interest in PTAC when asked directly
    by the court.      When asked if he wanted to be compensated through
    equitable    distribution     for    his   share,    defendant       responded
    "whatever they assessed the value, that's hers."                Under these
    circumstances——where defendant explicitly abdicated any interest
    in PTAC——allocation of ownership solely to plaintiff was not an
    abuse of discretion.
    10                                A-0454-16T1
    III.
    Defendant      contends   the    judge     erred       when   he      ordered
    defendant's share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital
    home be held in escrow pending his satisfaction of equitable
    distribution and counsel fee obligations.              It is obvious the judge
    did so based on defendant's unjustified failure to comply with
    prior orders and to respond fully and truthfully in the discovery
    process and trial of the matter.             Since defendant had seemingly
    relocated to another state or intended to do so, the creation of
    a fund with which to make equitable distribution payments seems
    an   exercise   in   ordinary   prudence.        It    was   not    an    abuse    of
    discretion.     Again, defendant refused to identify even his current
    state of residence or disclose plans to relocate.                        Perhaps if
    defendant     had    not   repeatedly        avoided     giving     such      basic
    information, these measures would not have been necessary.
    IV.
    Defendant wanted to be credited $50,000 for funds plaintiff
    removed from the parties' joint bank account post-separation, and
    reimbursement for all pendente lite payments made to plaintiff
    pursuant to Mallamo v. Mallamo, 
    280 N.J. Super. 8
    (App. Div. 1995).
    In this regard, the judge stated:
    There is no question that [plaintiff] used
    joint funds to maintain the household after
    [defendant]  left  in   October  2012.  She
    11                                    A-0454-16T1
    submitted a spreadsheet setting forth her
    disposition of the money from the joint
    account for joint housing expenses. It also
    appears that [defendant] used money from the
    joint account for his own personal expenses.
    While [defendant] should receive some credit
    for [plaintiff]'s use of funds from the joint
    account, . . . any credit is washed away by
    his failure to pay joint expenses or payments
    pursuant to the Separation Agreement and Court
    Order.
    Based on these findings, the judge properly denied defendant's
    request for reimbursement of the pendente lite support payments
    made.
    The court allocated the proceeds from the sale of the home
    equally,     which   supports     the        pendente lite   award   requiring
    defendant to pay half of the Schedule A "shelter" expenses.
    Importantly, the     court based the pendente lite order on the
    parties' own separation agreement, where defendant explicitly
    agreed to pay half of the expenses for the house.                    Defendant
    acknowledges this agreement, but claims since plaintiff was not
    awarded alimony, and the contract is silent as to a refund, he is
    entitled to reimbursement under Mallamo.
    It is true "pendente lite support orders are subject to
    modification prior to entry of final judgment and at the time of
    entry   of   final   judgment."         Mallamo,    280   N.J.   Super.    at    12
    (citations omitted).      However, the fact that the court did not
    ultimately award     alimony does not alone require a refund of
    12                                A-0454-16T1
    pendente lite support paid.              The pendente lite payments in this
    case were not alimony. The payments represented only fifty percent
    of plaintiff's Schedule A "shelter" expenses for the former marital
    residence    which    defendant         agreed     to    pay    in    the    separation
    agreement.
    V.
    Defendant makes a number of related arguments challenging the
    mechanisms      chosen     by    the    trial     judge    to    enforce      equitable
    distribution.        The    court's     order     that    equitable        distribution
    payments be made through the probation department was mistaken.
    The probation department has authority over matters involving only
    "alimony, maintenance or child support."                  See R. 5:4-7.
    We are uncertain as to the manner in which the language
    requiring defendant to maintain life insurance equivalent to the
    unpaid balance of equitable distribution was included in the final
    judgment of divorce.            It is possible plaintiff's attorney added
    that   clause    without        any   objection    being       made   by    defendant's
    counsel.     The judge then signed the final judgment as submitted
    without comment.         We are unable to find any indication in the
    record that the provision was required by the judge, as opposed
    to simply being an add-on by counsel to guarantee payment.                             We
    leave resolution of that question to counsel.
    13                                    A-0454-16T1
    If the court did in fact order the maintenance of life
    insurance in order to ensure payment, the language can remain.
    See generally Claffey v. Claffey, 
    360 N.J. Super. 240
    (App. Div.
    2003).      If the paragraph was included solely at plaintiff's
    counsel's     initiative,      albeit     without    objection       by    opposing
    counsel, it must be deleted from the final judgment and defendant
    is thus relieved of that obligation.
    The court ordered interest imposed on an annual basis if
    defendant decided to pay the minimum of $1800 a month by way of
    equitable distribution, as opposed to a lump sum satisfaction of
    the decree.     The court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
    The judge's comments regarding defendant's evasiveness, lack of
    cooperation with the discovery process, and lack of credibility
    adequately inform his decision to impose interest.                   See Heinl v.
    Heinl, 
    287 N.J. Super. 337
    , 347 (App. Div. 1996) (requiring
    specified, articulate findings of fact and conclusions of law in
    court's decision, not naked conclusions).
    VI.
    Defendant        challenges    the    judge's    order    that    he   provide
    plaintiff     with    the     financial       information    and   documentation
    regarding PTAC for the 2016 tax year so she can file her 2016
    income tax return.          At that time, only defendant was employed by
    the company and had access to the company's records.
    14                                 A-0454-16T1
    Defendant's delay in supplying the necessary documents meant
    plaintiff was unable to file her return.                      The nature of the
    documentation is clearly spelled out.             This argument requires no
    further discussion in a written opinion.
    VII.
    Defendant objects to the court's imposition of a counsel fee
    obligation. The judge made a forty percent across-the-board award,
    resulting in a $31,488.10 obligation.            Although the judge did not
    specify the factors he considered pursuant to Rule 5:3-5(c), the
    discussion throughout the opinion made clear he had those very
    factors in mind.         The court's obligation is to consider the
    factors, not mechanically reiterate them.               R. 5:3-5(c).
    The   judge   did    find    the   requested      fees    to   be    "fair   and
    reasonable,"     and    that     much   work    was    required       due   to    the
    "recalcitrance     of    [defendant]."         Plaintiff      faced      substantial
    difficulties in attempting to enforce the separation agreement,
    enforce subsequent court orders, and prepare for the final hearing.
    A forty percent award was therefore appropriate.
    An award of counsel fees rests in the discretion of the court.
    Williams v. Williams, 
    59 N.J. 229
    , 233 (1971). The court must
    consider the factors established under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, Rule
    5:3-5(c), Rule 4:42-9, and RPC 1.5(a).                We find that the judge's
    decision was adequately informed by those factors.
    15                                   A-0454-16T1
    Affirmed in part, but reversed as to the requirement that
    equitable distribution payments be made through the probation
    department.   The life insurance question must be resolved by
    counsel, and if no agreement is reached on the point, it should
    be submitted to the trial judge for disposition.
    Affirmed in part, reversed and vacated in part, and remanded.
    16                          A-0454-16T1