ESTATE OF PATRICIA QUINN VS. MICHAEL F. QUINNÂ (FM-20-9858-69, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1490-15T4
ESTATE OF PATRICIA
M. QUINN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL F. QUINN,
(deceased),
Defendant.
________________________________
Submitted March 14, 2017 – Decided July 12, 2017
Before Judges Reisner and Rothstadt.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Union County, Docket No. FM-20-9858-69.
Marita Quinn, appellant pro se.
Post, Polak, Goodsell & Strauchler, P.A.,
attorneys for respondent John N. Post, Esq.
(John N. Post, of counsel and on the brief;
Siobhan Beere, on the brief).
Graham Curtin, attorneys for respondents
Ceconi & Cheifetz, LLC and Sheryl J. Seiden,
Esq. (Christopher J. Carey, of counsel;
Theodore T. Reilly, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
The dispute in this post-judgment matrimonial matter relates
to claims made by the estates of both parties who are now deceased.
Specifically, Marita Quinn, second wife and executrix of defendant
Michael Quinn's estate, appeals from Judge Lisa F. Chrystal's
October 23, 2015 order denying Marita's1 "informal request" for
Rule 1:4-8 sanctions against plaintiff's counsel. We now affirm,
substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Chrystal in her
oral decision of the same date.
In 2015, we issued an opinion reversing and remanding a
different judge's resolution of a dispute over Michael's life
insurance proceeds between Marita and plaintiff's testatrix, the
late Patricia Quinn. See Estate of Quinn v. Quinn, No. A-0855-13
(App. Div. April 22, 2015). In our opinion, we set forth the
history of the parties' relationship and the details of the dispute
over the insurance proceeds. We need not repeat those details
here. Suffice it to say, we remanded the matter to the Family
Part with specific instructions for the court to enter an order
directing the release of certain funds to Marita. Id. at 11-12.
After we issued our opinion, Marita wrote to Judge Chrystal
asking her to impose Rule 1:4-8 sanctions upon plaintiff's counsel.
1
Because the various parties share the same last name, we
refer to the parties by their first names to avoid confusion.
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According to Marita, counsel engaged in fraudulent conduct over
the years with Patricia in an attempt to prevent Marita from
recovering her portion of Michael's life insurance proceeds.
In response to our remand, Judge Chrystal entered an order
to show cause allowing the parties to raise any arguments they had
about distribution of the funds in accordance with our earlier
opinion. Marita's response to the order to show cause expanded
upon her assertions regarding her informal request for sanctions,
noting Patricia's counsels' alleged failure to comply with court
orders concerning disbursement of the life insurance proceeds or
to respond to Marita's letters requesting compliance.
On the return date, the judge disbursed the funds as we
directed. As to Marita's request for sanctions, the judge noted
she considered the request even though it was made informally and
found there were "no facts nor legal arguments that support this
[c]ourt issuing any sanction against those attorneys." Judge
Chrystal stated "[t]here was not . . . one fact set forth in any
of the extensive legal arguments . . . that point to any
impropriety . . . by these attorneys in this case." The judge
concluded, "[u]nder these circumstances, the [c]ourt is
constrained to deny with prejudice any informal request by Marita
for sanctions or any other . . . fees or costs to be awarded
against the counsel in this case." This appeal followed.
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Generally, we review "[a] trial judge's decision to [not]
award attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 1:4-8," under an abuse of
discretion standard. McDaniel v. Lee, 419 N.J. Super. 482, 498
(App. Div. 2011); United Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J.
Super. 379, 390 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 367 (2009).
"Reversal is warranted when 'the discretionary act was not premised
upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon
consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts
to a clear error in judgment.'" Ferolito v. Park Hill Condo Ass'n,
408 N.J. Super. 401, 407 (App. Div.) (quoting Masone v. Levine,
382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005)), certif. denied, 200
N.J. 502 (2009); see also Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171
N.J. 561, 571 (2002).
We conclude from our review that Judge Chrystal properly
exercised her discretion and denied Marita's informal request for
Rule 1:4-8 sanctions. We find Marita's thirteen points of
argument, with numerous sub-parts, to be without sufficient merit
to warrant extensive discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following brief comments.
Preliminarily, we note that Marita's frivolous litigation
claims under the Rule were beyond the scope of our remand that
addressed only the disbursement of the insurance proceeds.
Further, if Marita wanted to raise a claim under the Rule, she was
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obligated to follow the detailed procedures set forth in Rule 1:4-
8 for a litigant to seek sanctions against an attorney for pursuing
a frivolous claim. See Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor,
190 N.J. 61, 68-69 (2007). Among the specific requirements for
pursuing sanctions, a litigant must make a formal motion to the
court, "separate[] from other applications," supported by a
certification stating that written demand was made upon the
attorney to withdraw the pleading or other document that the
litigant believes was frivolous. R. 1:4-8(b)(1); see also United
Hearts, supra, 407 N.J. Super. at 389. Strict application of the
rule is required. LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 99 (2009).
Moreover, Marita's allegations of fraud and the like did not
give rise to a cognizable claim for sanctions under the rule. The
nature of conduct warranting sanction under Rule 1:4-8 has been
strictly construed in order to avoid limiting access to the court
system. See First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super.
419, 432-33(2007). Even if they did and she had complied with the
Rule's procedural requirements, Judge Chrystal could not have
awarded Marita fees as sanctions because she pursued an award of
fees for periods while she appeared as a self-represented litigant.
"Th[e] rule simply compensates a party for the legal fees and
expenses it actually incurred and became obligated for as a direct
result of the adversary pursuing frivolous litigation," and not
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for damages incurred as a result of appearing pro se. Alpert,
Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super.
510, 546 (App. Div. 2009), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 93 (2010).
In any event, Judge Chrystal determined there was no evidence that
supported Marita's allegations. We have no reason to disagree.
Affirmed.
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