STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BRITTANY N. BYER (16-08-0658, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4161-17T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRITTANY N. BYER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued August 27, 2019 – Decided September 4, 2019
Before Judges Gilson and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 16-08-
0658.
Evan M. Levow argued the cause for appellant (Levow
DWI Law, PC, attorneys; Evan M. Levow, of counsel
and on the brief; Sandra Leigh Battista, on the brief).
Andre R. Araujo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Jennifer Webb-McRae,
Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney; Andre R.
Araujo, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Brittany Byer appeals from a March 27, 2017 decision denying
her motion to suppress her statements to police, as well as urine and blood draw
evidence, following a fatal car crash. We affirm for the reasons expressed in the
thorough and well-written opinion of Judge Cristen P. D'Arrigo.
We summarize the facts from testimony adduced during a two-day hearing
conducted by the judge. They are set forth in detail in his twenty-two page
decision.
In December 2015, defendant was involved in a serious auto accident.
Defendant was conscious and transported to the hospital because she had pain
in her foot. The driver of the other vehicle was unconscious, suffered grave
injuries, and later died.
Officers Frederick DeMary and Anne Marie McCormick were assigned to
investigate. According to her testimony, McCormick responded to the hospital
where defendant was taken to obtain blood and urine samples. Neither
McCormick nor defendant were aware the other driver would expire.
McCormick encountered defendant lying in a hospital bed, alert and
unrestrained.
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Defendant orally acknowledged and then signed a card confirming
McCormick had recited her Miranda1 rights. Defendant also signed a consent
form for a blood and urine draw, which McCormick had also read to her.
McCormick testified that defendant was unable to urinate, and, rather than wait,
defendant requested a catheter in order to provide a sample. After obtaining the
samples, McCormick then left the hospital, again leaving defendant unrestrained
and free to depart the hospital. McCormick informed DeMary defendant had
signed the Miranda card and the consent form for the samples.
While on route to the hospital to interview defendant, DeMary learned the
other driver had died. DeMary recorded the interview with defendant less than
two hours after she had been Mirandized. Defendant claimed her vehicle had
slipped on black ice, causing the accident. According to the judge's decision,
"DeMary stated that she had slow and slurred speech and made comments
unrelated to the accident. When asked whether she had consumed any alcohol,
she became upset and hostile." Defendant was permitted to return home and
was not arrested or charged until the toxicology reports were returned.
Defendant also testified at the hearing. Judge D'Arrigo found her
testimony "less than credible," noting she had "selective memory of the events"
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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and "was particularly evasive on the issue of the urine draw." Specifically,
"[s]he recalled events before and after the consents were signed and samples
were collected, yet does not recall being administered her rights, waiving her
rights, or even giving samples."
Citing the relevant case law, Judge D'Arrigo found defendant had not been
in custody while she was in the hospital and was free to leave. More importantly,
the judge noted "even if [d]efendant was in custody at the hospital[,] [d]efendant
was read her Miranda rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights."
The judge concluded the signature on the Miranda form belonged to defendant,
and defendant never
indicate[d] that she did not understand what . . .
McCormick was saying with respect to her Miranda
rights[, and] gave no indication that she wished to
remain silent or speak with an attorney. . . . She was
able to relay details of the accident providing further
evidence of her ability to voluntarily and knowingly
waive her rights.
The judge explained the circumstances did not warrant that defendant be
re-Mirandized by DeMary because "there were no intervening events that would
dilute the effectiveness of the waiver." Indeed, defendant had not left the
hospital between McCormick and DeMary's arrival and, at best, there was only
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a ninety-minute interval between the issuance of the Miranda warning and the
recorded interview.
The judge also found defendant had consented to the blood and urine
draw. He concluded "[s]he understood what was happening and the nature of
the officer's request." This appeal followed.
POINT I – BECAUSE A WARRANT WAS NOT
OBTAINED TO COLLECT BLOOD AND URINE
SAMPLES FROM APPELLANT, THE TEST
RESULTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
POINT II – APPELLANT DID NOT GIVE KNOWING
AND VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO PROVIDE
BLOOD AND URINE SAMPLES, THEREFORE, ALL
RESULTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
POINT III – APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS TO
POLICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED
BECAUSE APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY
AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HER MIRANDA
RIGHTS.
I.
"[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the
factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings
are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Rockford,
213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200
N.J. 1, 15 (2009)). "Those findings warrant particular deference when they are
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'substantially influenced by [the trial judge's] opportunity to hear and see the
witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot
enjoy.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15). "Thus,
appellate courts should reverse only when the trial court's determination is 'so
clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and
correction.'" State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014) (quoting State v. Elders,
192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). "A trial court's interpretation of the law, however,
and the consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any
special deference." Ibid. (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)).
"Therefore, a trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." Ibid.
In light of our standard of review, we conclude defendant's arguments on
appeal are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Our review of the record demonstrates no basis to second-guess
Judge D'Arrigo's detailed findings of facts and conclusions of law that defendant
was not in police custody, had been properly Mirandized and waived those
rights, and voluntarily consented to the blood and urine draw.
Affirmed.
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