SEAN LINK VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES (BOARD OF TRUSTEES, STATE POLICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM) ( 2019 )


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  •                                  NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5520-17T2
    SEAN LINK,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF TRUSTEES, STATE
    POLICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    ______________________________
    Submitted August 13, 2019 – Decided September 5, 2019
    Before Judges Sumners and Moynihan.
    On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the State
    Police Retirement System, SPRS No. 8-5697.
    Limsky Mitolo, attorney for appellant (Marcia J.
    Mitolo, of counsel and on the briefs).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Robert Seymour Garrison, Jr.,
    Deputy Attorney General, on the brief.)
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Sean Link appeals from a July 24, 2018 final decision of the
    Board of Trustees (the Board) of the State Police Retirement System (SPRS)
    that rejected the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) recommendation for partial
    forfeiture of his pension credit and reaffirmed its initial decision that his pension
    credit was totally forfeited due to two incidents of misconduct that occurred in
    2008 and 2009. The Board also found that Link did not leave his employment
    due to a disabling condition, but rather because of the disciplinary charges filed
    against him, thereby making him ineligible for accidental disability retirement
    benefits. We affirm.
    I
    The record before the Board revealed that Link was employed as a New
    Jersey State Trooper for approximately ten years and eleven months beginning
    on February 9, 2005, until he resigned pursuant to a Negotiated Voluntary Plea
    Agreement General Disciplinary Matter on April 18, 2016.
    Link was charged with, and pled guilty to, five New Jersey State Police
    disciplinary charges for incidents occurring on April 7, 2008 and January 18,
    2009.    In the first incident, Link, while on patrol, followed a vehicle for
    approximately ten miles and used his New Jersey State Police Mobile Data
    A-5520-17T2
    2
    Computer (MDC) to conduct a "Full Disclosure Inquiry" to obtain the female
    driver's personal information without initiating a proper motor vehicle stop.
    About nine months later, Link, again on duty, requested and obtained the
    phone number of a woman, who was awaiting processing for a driving while
    intoxicated (DWI) charge, based on his representation that he could help her get
    the charge dismissed. For several months he inappropriately used his position
    as a Trooper to procure a romantic relationship with the woman by suggesting,
    among other things: she contact a judge "to pull some strings"; that proper
    procedures were not followed during the stop; and he could tell the arresting
    Trooper that she was a childhood friend and to "lay off" her case. At one point,
    he even appeared at her workplace unannounced and called her several times
    from a blocked number. When questioned about his conduct in August 2012,
    Link provided false and misleading statements and incorrectly claimed that he
    had submitted a Special Report about the woman's allegations against him.
    Prior to his resignation, Link applied for accidental disability retirement
    benefits on December 30, 2014, in anticipation of retiring on May 1, 2015, based
    upon injuries he sustained from an on-duty motor vehicle accident on October
    16, 2012.
    A-5520-17T2
    3
    On May 24, 2016, the Board considered Link's application for accidental
    disability retirement benefits.1   However, the receipt of the benefits was
    conditioned on rendering honorable service.        See N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(a).     In
    evaluating whether his misconduct warranted forfeiture of benefits, the Board
    balanced the eleven factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c):
    (1) the member's length of service;
    (2) the basis for retirement;
    (3) the extent to which the member's pension has
    vested;
    (4) the duties of the particular member;
    (5) the member's public employment history and record
    covered under the retirement system;
    (6) any other public employment or service;
    (7) the nature of the misconduct or crime, including the
    gravity or substantiality of the offense, whether it was
    a single or multiple offense and whether it was
    continuing or isolated;
    (8) the relationship between the misconduct and the
    member's public duties;
    (9) the quality of moral turpitude or the degree of guilt
    or culpability, including the member's motives and
    reasons, personal gain and similar considerations;
    1
    Link's accidental disability benefits application was delayed due to multiple
    amendments.
    A-5520-17T2
    4
    (10) the availability and adequacy of other penal
    sanctions; and
    (11) other personal circumstances relating to the
    member which bear upon the justness of forfeiture.
    [Uricoli v. Bd. of Trs., 
    91 N.J. 62
    , 77-78 (1982).]
    The Board determined that Link was not eligible for accidental disability
    retirement benefits because "his egregious misconduct . . . continued over
    numerous years[]" and "demonstrated a high degree of moral turpitude" showing
    "a pattern of violation of the public trust." As a result, it voted for a total
    forfeiture of his SPRS service credits, "leav[ing] him with no service credit with
    which to base an application for a disability retirement." Further, the Board
    found that Link did not leave employment due to disability, but rather
    termination.      Link was allowed a "refund of his accumulated pension
    contributions [he made] during active service."          He appealed the Board's
    decision and the case was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law for a
    hearing.
    The ALJ, after balancing the Uricoli factors, found that while Link's
    misconduct began on April 7, 2008, there was no allegation of improper conduct
    prior to that time on which to base total forfeiture, stating that total forfeiture of
    pension benefits is reserved for "the most egregious cases." Relying on T.J.M.
    A-5520-17T2
    5
    v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Fireman's Ret. Sys., 
    218 N.J. Super. 274
    , 279 (App.
    Div. 1987), he determined that total forfeiture would result in an excessive
    forfeiture and recommended a partial forfeiture from the date of the first offense,
    April 7, 2008, to the date of Link's resignation, making him partially eligible for
    disability retirement benefits.
    In its final agency decision, the Board rejected the ALJ's recommendation
    that partial forfeiture would be appropriate in this case. It rejected the ALJ's
    reliance on T.J.M., because unlike the police officer in that case, Link's
    misconduct was directly related to his employment as a State Trooper, and the
    ALJ provided no analysis to support his conclusion that the partial forfeiture
    should begin from April 7, 2008 – the date of the first misconduct incident. The
    Board found that adopting such a position would result in an excessive pension,
    as the first, second, third, and fifth Uricoli factors weighed strongly against
    Link. Therefore, it reaffirmed its initial decision to totally forfeit Link's service
    credit and hold him ineligible for accidental disability retirement benefits.
    II
    On appeal, Link argues the Board erred in reaffirming the total forfeiture
    of his SPRS service credits, maintaining that his misconduct was neither
    pervasive nor chronic, and his service credits should have been only partially
    A-5520-17T2
    6
    forfeited because he committed no misconduct before April 7, 2008, and served
    honorably in the time between the first and second incidents. Further, he argues
    the Board misinterpreted the ALJ's reliance on T.J.M., because the ALJ relied
    on that case to determine whether any allegations of misconduct arose prior to
    the incident and not whether the misconduct took place while on duty or off
    duty. See 
    218 N.J. Super. at 276
    . He also maintains that he left employment
    due to a permanent disability.
    We begin with the principles that guide our decision. Our scope of review
    of an administrative agency's final determination is limited. In re Herrmann,
    
    192 N.J. 19
    , 27 (2007). A "strong presumption of reasonableness attaches" to
    the agency's decision. In re Carroll, 
    339 N.J. Super. 429
    , 437 (App. Div. 2001)
    (quoting In re Vey, 
    272 N.J. Super. 199
    , 205 (App. Div. 1993)). The burden is
    upon the appellant to demonstrate grounds for reversal. McGowan v. N.J. State
    Parole Bd., 
    347 N.J. Super. 544
    , 563 (App. Div. 2002); see also Bowden v.
    Bayside State Prison, 
    268 N.J. Super. 301
    , 304 (App. Div. 1993) (stating "[t]he
    burden of showing the agency's action was arbitrary, unreasonable[,] or
    capricious rests upon the appellant.").
    Moreover, "an appellate court is 'in no way bound by the agency's
    interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue . . . .'" In
    A-5520-17T2
    7
    re Carter, 
    191 N.J. 474
    , 483 (2007); see also Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.
    Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995). With these considerations in
    mind, we will "not disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings
    unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the
    decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not
    supported by substantial evidence." In re Application of Virtua–West Jersey
    Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 
    194 N.J. 413
    , 422 (2008); see also
    Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., 
    422 N.J. Super. 227
    , 233-34 (App. Div. 2011).
    We have considered Link's arguments in light of the record and applicable
    legal principles and conclude there is ample credible evidence in the record to
    support the Board's evaluation of the Uricoli factors and its decision that a total
    forfeiture of his public service credit was warranted under the circumstances.
    See J.B. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    229 N.J. 21
    , 43 (2017). As such, we affirm
    substantially for the reasons set forth in the Board's final agency decision, which
    is supported by credible evidence in the record. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We add
    only the following comments.
    The receipt of a public pension is "expressly conditioned upon the
    rendering of honorable service by a public officer or employee." N.J.S.A. 43:1-
    3(a). The Board may "order the forfeiture of all or part of . . . [a] pension . . .
    A-5520-17T2
    8
    for misconduct occurring during the member's public service which renders the
    member's service or part thereof dishonorable . . . ." N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(b). In
    evaluating a member's misconduct to determine whether it breaches the
    condition requiring that the member's service be "honorable" and whether total
    or partial forfeiture of the member's earned service credit is appropriate, the
    Board must consider and balance the eleven factors in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c).
    However, under N.J.S.A. 41:1-3(b), the misconduct must only "occur[] during
    the member's public service" to trigger forfeiture, and need not "involve[] or
    touch[] upon" the employee's public office. See Corvelli v. Bd. of Trs., Police
    and Fireman's Ret. Sys., 
    130 N.J. 539
     (1992) (emphasis omitted) (holding that
    pension benefits may be forfeited under a discretionary analysis for "a crime
    involving moral turpitude which is unrelated to . . . public office").
    The date Link's misconduct first occurred was the starting point of the
    Board's analysis of how much service credit should be forfeited. Pursuant to
    N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(d),
    [w]henever [the Board] determines, pursuant to this
    section, that a partial forfeiture of earned service credit
    or earned pension or retirement benefits is warranted, it
    shall order that benefits be calculated as if the accrual
    of pension rights terminated as of the date the
    misconduct first occurred or, if termination as of that
    date would in light of the nature and extent of the
    misconduct result in an excessive pension or retirement
    A-5520-17T2
    9
    benefit or in an excessive forfeiture, a date reasonably
    calculated to impose a forfeiture that reflects the nature
    and extent of the misconduct and the years of honorable
    service.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    While it is true that we held in T.J.M. that a flexible balancing test should
    be used in applying the Uricoli factors, it does not support Link's arguments.
    See 
    218 N.J. Super. at 276
    . Rather, in T.J.M., we reversed the Board's denial of
    a disability retirement pension to a police officer who had been convicted of off-
    duty aggravated sexual assault upon his daughter because although the officer's
    behavior was unforgivable, we held that the Board erred in imposing a total
    forfeiture of benefits without giving sufficient attention to numerous mitigating
    factors, including the officer's documented history of psychological
    disturbances. 
    Id. at 277, 283
    .
    This was not the case here, as the Board considered all of the Uricoli
    factors, including his three years of service, but determined that factors one,
    two, three, and five – which all consider the length of service, type of pension
    sought, and employment history – weigh strongly in favor of total forfeiture,
    which is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. The Board
    reasonably determined that the nature and extent of Link's culpable conduct
    A-5520-17T2
    10
    would result in an excessive retirement benefit, and total forfeiture was
    warranted.
    Moreover, it is evident that the Board's decision to totally forfeit Link's
    service credit was based on two incidents, both of which constituted deplorable
    conduct and a clear breach of public service. See N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(b). First, he
    followed a woman, in a marked State Trooper vehicle while on duty, and
    conducted an unauthorized "Full Disclosure Inquiry" to obtain her personal
    information. Then, only a year later, became personally involved in another
    woman's DWI litigation, while on duty, in an attempt to coerce her into a
    romantic relationship, as well as making unwanted phone calls to her on a
    blocked number and showing up at her workplace uninvited. Taken together,
    both incidents contravene Link's assertion that his misconduct encompassed a
    single isolated incident, and only amounted to "flirtatious" conduct not related
    to his position as a State Trooper. Further, the fact that Link did not personally
    benefit from either incident is irrelevant, as the true casualty of his misconduct
    was betrayal of the public's trust.
    The record, therefore, supports the Board's determination that, under the
    circumstances of both incidents, Link's service was dishonorable and related to
    his duties as a State Trooper. See Masse v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys.,
    A-5520-17T2
    11
    
    87 N.J. 252
    , 263 (1981). As such, Link has not demonstrated that the Board's
    action was arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. McGowan, 
    347 N.J. Super. at 563
    .
    We also briefly note that even if Link was eligible for partial service
    credit, he would not be entitled to accidental disability benefits because he left
    his employment as part of a voluntary plea agreement related to his misconduct
    charges. It is well-established that in order to obtain disability benefits, N.J.S.A.
    53:5A-10 requires the member to leave employment as the direct result of a
    traumatic injury. See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 
    454 N.J. Super. 386
    ,
    411 (App. Div. 2018); Patterson v. Bd. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 
    194 N.J. 29
    , 42 n.1, 42-43 (2008) (stating that the standard for accidental disability
    benefits is the same for the SPRS, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, and
    Public Employee's Retirement System).
    To the extent that we have not addressed certain arguments by Link, we
    conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
    opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
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    12