A.M v. VS. F.T. (FV-08-0599-18, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1943-17T2
A.M.V.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
F.T.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted December 5, 2018 – Decided September 18, 2019
Before Judges Fuentes and Accurso.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County,
Docket No. FV-08-0599-18.
Law Offices of Andrew N. Yurick, attorneys for
appellant (Nicholas J. Yurick, on the briefs).
Raymond T. Dorizio, attorney for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FUENTES, P.J.A.D.
Defendant F.T.1 appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) issued by the
Chancery Division, Family Part under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act
(PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to 2C:25-35. The Family Part found defendant
physically assaulted plaintiff A.M.V. while engaged in a verbal dispute.
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(2). Defendant argues plaintiff failed to prove, by a
preponderance of the competent evidence, that he committed the predicate act
of simple assault against defendant, as defined under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a(1).
Defendant also argues the trial judge issued the FRO without making the
findings required under the second prong of the two-prong paradigm this court
established in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (2006).
Plaintiff argues her testimony at the FRO hearing established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that defendant physically assaulted her while
under the influence of alcohol. Although plaintiff concedes the trial judge did
not specifically mention or apply the two-prong paradigm in Silver, she argues
the record shows the issuance of the FRO was patently necessary to prevent
defendant from having any future contacts with plaintiff and her eleven-year-
1
As required by Rule 1:38-3(d)(9), we use initials to protect the privacy of the
parties and the confidentiality of these proceedings.
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old son, thereby avoiding the likelihood of further contacts with defendant and
the prospect of future harm.
After reviewing the record developed by the parties before the Family Part
and mindful of prevailing legal standards, we affirm.
I
At all times relevant to this case, defendant and plaintiff were involved in
a romantic relationship and resided in the same apartment with plaintiff's eleven -
year-old son from a previous relationship. At approximately 11:23 p.m. on
November 11, 2017, plaintiff called the West Deptford Police Department to
report defendant had physically assaulted her. The police officers who
responded to the scene spoke to each party separately and thereafter arrested
defendant and charged him with simple assault.
Plaintiff also filed a civil complaint under the PDVA and obtained an ex
parte temporary restraining order (TRO) from the West Deptford Municipal
Court at 2:13 a.m. on November 12, 2017. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(a). The TRO
enjoined defendant from having any contacts with plaintiff or her son pending
the outcome of a final hearing before the Chancery Division, Family Part, in
Gloucester County on November 16, 2017. The parties appeared before the
Family Part on that day; neither one was represented by counsel.
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Plaintiff testified that at approximately eight o'clock in the evening on
November 11, 2017, she picked up her son from her mother's house and took
him "to see the roller derby." At approximately 10:45 p.m., she received a text
message from defendant "saying he was pretty f'ed up [sic] I didn’t let him know
that we were going to be staying out all night." Plaintiff claimed defendant
wanted to know her whereabouts and what time she planned to return to the
apartment. In response to the text, plaintiff told defendant she did not intend to
stay out all night.
While in the car on her way to the apartment, plaintiff testified she told
her son "not [to] say anything . . . [nor] make any noise just go straight to his
room and lay down." When plaintiff arrived at her apartment with her son, she
found the door had been chain-locked. She testified that she began "to bang on
the door and say, I have him [her son] let me in." Plaintiff testified defendant
was "already sleeping and reluctant" to let her and her son go inside the
apartment. According to plaintiff, when she was finally able to open the door,
her son walked straight to his room without saying a word. At this point,
plaintiff testified defendant "started a verbal argument." She also noted that
defendant had an odor of alcohol emanating from his person and deduced he had
been drinking before she arrived.
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At this point, plaintiff testified defendant became verbally abusive. This
verbal assault "escalated very, very quickly. He was yelling obscenities and bad
things about . . . my son and blaming my son for all the problems with our
relationship[.]" According to plaintiff, she became "nervous" when defendant
came out of the bedroom he shared with her and headed in the direction of her
son's room. This is when plaintiff decided to physically intervene. She provided
the following account of what transpired next:
So I did pull him by the back of his sweatshirt to be
able to get in front of him and we were arguing and I
was facing him and that's when he - - we just were
arguing and I told him not to touch my son, not to go
near my son and he shoved me so forcefully that I hit
the wall and the door to my son's room. And my son's
room['s] door was open. He witnessed this entire thing
and I instructed my son to lock the door and no matter
what happens - - [.]
Defendant testified in his own defense. He admitted to locking the
apartment's entrance door with the interior chain-lock "because I really didn’t
expect her to come home that night since I didn’t hear from her all day."
Defendant also admitted he drank "three beers" before plaintiff and her son
returned to the apartment. Defendant testified that plaintiff started to argue with
him about her son. However, instead of arguing with her, he walked away and
went to the bedroom "to go back to sleep." According to defendant, plaintiff
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was undaunted by this gesture and followed him into the bedroom to continue
the argument.
When he realized he was not "going to be able to lay back down and go to
sleep," defendant claimed he got up, put on his pants, grabbed his shirt, and
walked toward the living room. Plaintiff followed him into the living room and
continued to argue about her son. It was at this point that defendant claimed he
told plaintiff: "I do not want her son here anymore and he's not accepted here
anymore because he's disrespectful and doesn’t give a damn about myself or us
because he disrespected her several times too[.]"
According to defendant, as he and plaintiff were arguing, the boy "opened
the door, came out of his room, [and] started screaming. Defendant claimed the
boy had "something in his hand . . . so I turned my attention to him." At this
point, defendant testified that plaintiff "got in the middle of us." We discern
this to mean that plaintiff placed herself physically between defendant and her
eleven-year-old son. Defendant admitted he "shoved" plaintiff over the
sectional. He also claimed she "threw herself into the doorway and landed on
the floor."
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II
Based on these facts, the Family Part judge stated: "I'm satisfied that
[defendant was] in fact intoxicated. I'm satisfied likewise that [defendant] did in
fact assault[] [plaintiff]. I'm going to enter a final restraining order." The judge
did not elaborate beyond these cryptic remarks.
In this appeal, the parties are represented by counsel. Defendant argues
the record developed before the Family Part does not support a finding that
defendant committed the predicate act of simple assault as defined in N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1a(1), which provides: "A person is guilty of assault if he: (1) Attempts
to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a) defines: “bodily injury” as "physical pain,
illness or any impairment of physical condition[.]" Defendant emphasizes that
"[d]uring the entire hearing, there is no testimony regarding any type of physical
pain, illness, or impairment experienced by . . . [p]laintiff."
Ordinarily, our standard of review as an appellate court requires us to
defer to a trial judge's factual findings, especially when those findings are
influenced by the judge's unique opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and
acquire a "feel" of the case. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964). Here,
the record is undisputed that the trial judge did not make specific findings
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concerning the elements of "bodily injury" as codified under N.J.S.A. 2C:11 -
1(a). Furthermore, plaintiff concedes she did not specifically testify that she felt
pain as a result of defendant shoving her "so forcefully that I hit the wall and
the door to my son's room."
Plaintiff nevertheless argues that the record of the FRO hearing provides
a reasonable basis for this court to infer plaintiff suffered some measure of pain
as a consequence of defendant's action. In support of this argument, plaintiff
cites State ex rel. S.B., 333 N.J. Super. 236, 239 (App. Div. 2000), in which the
Family Part adjudicated a juvenile delinquent based on an offense that if
committed by an adult would constitute aggravated assault under N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1b(5)(d). In S.B., four middle school teachers intervened to stop a
physical altercation between the juvenile and another student. Ibid. The trial
judge found the juvenile guilty of physically assaulting two teachers. Ibid. One
of these two teachers testified that when the juvenile kicked him in the leg, he
felt the "impact of the kick but was not in any particular pain." Id. at 239-240.
The other teacher testified the juvenile "jumped up into my face and pushed me,
and I put my hands up to stop him and pushed him away." Id. at 240. As he and
the other teacher attempted to put the juvenile into a chair, the juvenile "grabbed
a picture from the wall and attempted to swing it around." Ibid.
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On appeal, the juvenile argued there "was insufficient evidence to support
a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt," that the first teacher, whom the juvenile
kicked in the leg, "suffered bodily injury" as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a).
S.B., 333 N.J. at 243. This court rejected this argument and upheld the
adjudication of delinquency. Id. at 244. With respect to the element of "pain,"
this court held that:
physical discomfort, or a sensation caused by a kick
during a physical confrontation, as well as pain, as that
word is commonly understood, is sufficient to
constitute bodily injury for purposes of a prosecution
for simple assault. Indeed, here [the teacher] did not
say he did not suffer pain, he said he did not suffer any
"particular" pain.
[Ibid.]
Here, we apply the common sense approach our colleagues applied in S.B.
to uphold the trial judge's finding that plaintiff proved, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that defendant committed the predicate offense of simple assault.
In her description of the confrontation she had with defendant, plaintiff stated
defendant was inebriated and yelling obscenities when he headed toward her
eleven-year-old son's bedroom demanding that the child leave the apartment that
night. When plaintiff placed herself between defendant and her son's bedroom,
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defendant testified he "shoved" her with sufficient force to knock over the
sectional.
Based on this record, we conclude that plaintiff experienced a measure of
pain as a direct result of defendant's unambiguously violent physical act against
her. We emphasize, however, that pursuant to Rule 1:7:4(a) "a judge "shall, by
an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and
state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury[.]"
[(Emphasis added)]. See also State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). This
mandatory responsibility of the judge is especially important in a PDVA hearing
in which the parties are not represented by counsel. Under these circumstances,
the judge is often required to question the parties directly to determine whether
there is a factual basis for relief, while at all times remaining impartial and
vigilant to avoid appearing to favor any party in the case. See DeNike v. Cupo,
196 N.J. 502, 507 (2008).
Although the judge's failure to perform this critically important function
proved to be legally inconsequential in this case, we are compelled to point out
this dereliction directly undermines our institutional role as an intermediate
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appellate court. As then Judge Long2 eloquently noted nearly thirty years ago:
"Failure to perform the fact-finding duty constitutes a disservice to the litigants,
the attorneys and the appellate court.'" Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443
(App.Div.1990), (quoting Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-570 (1980)).
Finally, we address defendant's argument based on the trial judge's failure
to apply the two-prong analytical paradigm this court established in Silver to
determine whether plaintiff was entitled to a FRO. Under Silver, a trial judge
must first determine "whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of
the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A.
2C:25-19a has occurred." 387 N.J. Super. at 125. If a plaintiff meets this burden
of proof, the judge must determine "whether the court should enter a restraining
order that provides protection for the victim." Id. at 126. However, as this court
recently reaffirmed, "[w]hen the predicate act is an offense that inherently
involves the use of physical force and violence, the decision to issue an FRO 'is
most often perfunctory and self-evident.'" A.M.C. v. P.B. 447 N.J. Super. 402,
417 (App. Div. 2016), (quoting Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127).
2
Governor Whitman appointed Judge Long to the Supreme Court on June 17,
1999. She served honorably as an Associate Justice until her retirement in 2012.
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Here, defendant's conduct against plaintiff was unmistakably violent.
Although the trial court failed to conduct the required analysis, we are satisfied
the record supports the issuance of the FRO.
Affirmed.
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