GUILIO MESADIEU VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0353-17T2
    GUILIO MESADIEU,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent.
    ____________________________
    Submitted September 10, 2019 – Decided September 23, 2019
    Before Judges Vernoia and Susswein.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    Guilio Mesadieu, appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Guilio Mesadieu, an inmate at East Jersey State Prison, appeals from the
    New Jersey Department of Corrections' (DOC) final agency decision finding
    him guilty of the following prohibited acts: *.260, refusing to submit to a
    medical test required by a court order, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(2)(xxvii); *.306,
    conduct that disrupts or interferes with the orderly running of the correctional
    facility, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(2)(xxix); and .256, refusing to comply with a
    staff member's order, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(4)(iv).         Because the DOC's
    decision is supported by substantial credible evidence and Mesadieu's arguments
    challenging the decision lack merit, we affirm.
    The DOC alleged that on August 18, 2017, Mesadieu refused to comply
    with a court order directing that he submit to the taking of a buccal swab; defied
    officers' orders that he cooperate in their taking of the swab; and interfered with
    the facility's operation by refusing to supply the swab, physically resisting the
    officers' attempts to obtain the swab, and necessitating the presence of more than
    six officers to obtain the swab. Mesadieu pleaded not guilty to the charges and
    was assigned a counsel substitute. In response to Mesadieu's request, a video
    recording of the incident giving rise to the charges was provided by the DOC
    and reviewed by Mesadieu, his counsel substitute, and the DOC disciplinary
    staff.
    A-0353-17T2
    2
    The disciplinary hearing officer reviewed numerous officer's reports, the
    video recording, and Mesadieu's statements. The hearing officer found that a
    court order directed Mesadieu to provide a buccal swab while he was
    temporarily remanded from East Jersey State Prison to the Union County Jail.
    The hearing officer also found that Mesadieu refused to submit to the taking of
    the swab and defied officers' orders that he do so. The officers placed Mesadieu
    in a restraint chair, and he again defied their order that he cooperate in the taking
    of the swab. Officers physically forced open Mesadieu's mouth and obtained
    the swab. Mesadieu's defiance and refusal disrupted the unit in which he was
    located because more than six officers were required to obtain the swab. At the
    hearing, Mesadieu said he told the officers he "was not submitting" to, and did
    not consent to, the taking of the swab, but he claimed he never closed his mouth,
    defied the officers' orders, or resisted their efforts to obtain the swab. Mesadieu
    declined to call or cross examine witnesses during the hearing, and he did not
    request any witness statements.
    The hearing officer determined Mesadieu committed prohibited acts
    *.260, *.306, and .256, and imposed sanctions. 1 Mesadieu appealed, and the
    1
    The hearing officer imposed the following sanctions on the *.260 charge: 180
    days' administrative segregation, 125 days' loss of commutation time, fifteen
    A-0353-17T2
    3
    East Jersey State Prison Assistant Superintendent upheld the hearing officer 's
    decision. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, Mesadieu offers the following arguments:
    POINT [ONE]
    [] MESADIEU SHOULD HAVE BEEN FOUND NOT
    GUILTY OF [*.306], [*.260], and [.256]
    BECAUSE . . . MESADIEU WAS EXERCISING HIS
    RIGHT TO CHOOSE THE LESSER EVIL, AND A
    DEFENSE OF NECESSITY IS A LEGITIMATE
    DEFENSE[.]
    POINT [TWO]
    THE ADMINISTRATOR'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS
    THE MERITS OF . . . MESADIEU'S APPEAL
    RENDERS THE DEC[I]SION ARBITRARY AND
    [CAPRICIOUS.]
    POINT [THREE]
    [MESADIEU] WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS
    BECAUSE HIS ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL WAS
    HEARD BY THE WRONG ADMINISTRATION[.]
    days' loss of recreation privileges, and 365 days of urine monitoring. On the
    *.306 charge, the hearing officer imposed 100 days' administrative segregation,
    100 days' loss of commutation time, and fifteen days' loss of recreation
    privileges. The officer reduced the .256 charge to an "on the spot correction,"
    N.J.A.C. 10A:4-7.3(a), and imposed a sanction of five days' loss of recreation
    privileges. Mesadieu does not challenge the sanctions on appeal.
    A-0353-17T2
    4
    POINT [FOUR]
    MESADIEU   WAS     DENIED       EFFECTIVE
    ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL SUBSTITUTE IN
    CONTRAVENTION [OF] N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12[.]
    Our review of agency determinations is limited. See In re Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011); Brady v. Bd. of Review, 
    152 N.J. 197
    , 210 (1997);
    Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    414 N.J. Super. 186
    , 190 (App. Div. 2010). We
    will not reverse an administrative agency's decision unless it is "arbitrary,
    capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by substantial credible evidence
    in the record as a whole." Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (2011) (citation omitted);
    accord Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    412 N.J. Super. 243
    , 259 (App. Div. 2010).
    Nonetheless, we must "engage in a 'careful and principled consideration of the
    agency record and findings.'" Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 
    330 N.J. Super. 197
    ,
    204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 
    64 N.J. 85
    , 93 (1973)).
    Mesadieu argues he could not be found guilty of refusing to comply with
    the court's and officers' orders because he was entitled under our criminal code,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:3-2, to defy the orders based on the defense of necessity.         He
    contends he was entitled by necessity to refuse to provide the buccal swab
    A-0353-17T2
    5
    because the taking of the swab violated "his constitutionally protected civil
    liberties."
    "Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution,"
    Jenkins v. Fauver, 
    108 N.J. 239
    , 248 (1987) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    , 556-57 (1974)), and our criminal code has no application to the DOC's
    prosecution of charges against an inmate.        An inmate's rights related to
    disciplinary charges are codified in DOC regulations, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.1
    to -9.28, which "strike the proper balance between the security concerns of the
    prison, the need for swift and fair discipline, and the due-process rights of the
    inmates." Williams, 
    330 N.J. Super. at
    203 (citing McDonald v. Pinchak, 
    139 N.J. 188
    , 202 (1995)). The regulations do not provide for, or address, the
    defense of necessity.
    Mesadieu's reliance on the common law defense of necessity is similarly
    misplaced. See State v. Tate, 
    102 N.J. 64
    , 67-70 (1986) (discussing the elements
    of the common law defense of necessity to criminal charges).           Under the
    common law defense of necessity, "[c]onduct that would otherwise be criminal
    is justified if the evil avoided is greater than that sought to be avoided by th e
    law defining the offense committed, or, conversely, if the conduct promotes
    some value higher than the value of compliance with the law." 
    Id. at 73
    . Even
    A-0353-17T2
    6
    assuming the defense of necessity might be applicable in the context of a prison
    disciplinary proceeding,2 it provides Mesadieu no refuge. He claims the evil he
    sought to avoid by his defiance of the court's and officers' orders was a violation
    of his constitutional rights, but he does not cite to any authority for his claim
    that he had a constitutional right to refuse to comply with the court's order for
    the buccal swab. If Mesadieu objected to the court's order, his recourse was to
    challenge it on appeal. Where "a legal alternative [is] available, the illegal
    alternative [is] not 'necessary,'" and the common law defense of necessity is
    unavailable. 
    Id. at 75
    .
    We also reject Mesadieu's contention that the Assistant Superintendent's
    decision did not address critical issues or analyze the relevant evidence. The
    Assistant Superintendent expressly upheld the disciplinary hearing officer's
    decision, which included findings of fact supporting the determination that
    Mesadieu committed the charged prohibited acts.         "[I]n prison disciplinary
    matters we have not traditionally required elaborate written decisions,"
    Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 
    348 N.J. Super. 117
    , 123 (App. Div. 2002), and the
    2
    We need not, and do not, decide whether there might be circumstances
    permitting the proper assertion of a common law defense of necessity to inmate
    disciplinary charges. We decide only that, even assuming the defense is
    available, it has no application under the facts and circumstances presented.
    A-0353-17T2
    7
    hearing officer's findings, as adopted by the Assistant Superintendent, provide a
    sufficient record to discern the basis for the DOC's final decision, allow
    Mesadieu to challenge the DOC's actions, and permit appropriate appellate
    review. See Williams, 
    330 N.J. Super. at 203
     (explaining that appellate review
    of an agency decision requires a "careful and principled consideration of the
    agency record and findings" (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co., 
    64 N.J. at 93
    )).
    Mesadieu also argues that he could not be disciplined because he was not
    "provided with fair notice of the rules and regulations of [the] Union County
    Jail," and therefore he was deprived of his right to receive notice "of not only
    the conduct that is prohibited but also the sanction that may be imposed." We
    reject this contention because although Mesadieu was present in the Union
    County Jail when he committed the prohibited acts, he had been remanded there
    from East Jersey State Prison, "continued to be 'an adult offender [] committed
    to State correctional institutions,'" Ries v. Dep't of Corr., 
    396 N.J. Super. 235
    ,
    239 (App. Div. 2007), and "remained subject to the legal custody and authority
    of the Commissioner of Corrections," 
    id. at 238
    . Mesadieu was neither charged
    with nor found guilty of violating any Union County Jail rule or regulation. The
    Union County Jail's administration did not file or adjudicate disciplinary charges
    against Mesadieu, and the Union County Jail's rules and regulations were
    A-0353-17T2
    8
    applicable to him only to the extent they did not conflict with the DOC's
    regulations applicable to state prison inmates. Bryan v. Dep't of Corr., 
    258 N.J. Super. 546
    , 546 (App. Div. 1992); see also N.J.S.A. 30:4-85. The Union County
    Jail rules and regulation could supplement, but not usurp, the DOC regulations
    pursuant to which Mesadieu was charged.
    The DOC charged Mesadieu with committing prohibited acts under its
    regulations.   See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1.     Therefore, any purported failure to
    provide notice of the Union County Jail's rules and regulations did not result in
    a denial of due process. See Bryan, 258 N.J. Super. at 552 (explaining due
    process requires that "an inmate . . . be given notice before committing an
    infraction of not only the conduct that is prohibited but also the sanction that
    may be imposed"). Mesadieu does not claim that he did not receive notice of
    the DOC's regulations prior to the August 18, 2017 incident. He also does not
    argue that when he was admitted to East Jersey State Prison, the DOC failed to
    provide him with a disciplinary rule book detailing the chargeable offenses and
    sanctions, explaining the disciplinary procedures and appeal process, and
    advising that "N.J.A.C. 10A:4" concerning inmate discipline "also applies to
    State sentenced inmates incarcerated within [an] adult county correctional
    facility," as required by N.J.A.C. 10A:31-16.2(a)(5). Thus, the record does not
    A-0353-17T2
    9
    permit a conclusion that Mesadieu lacked notice of the prohibited acts and their
    concomitant sanctions under the DOC's regulations prior to the incident that
    resulted in the disciplinary charges.
    Mesadieu also argues his counsel substitute was ineffective by failing to
    appeal the hearing officer's determination "to the correct institution," which
    Mesadieu erroneously contends is the Union County Jail. The argument is
    without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
    3(e)(1)(E).
    We are satisfied Mesadieu was afforded all due process protections
    required under Avant v. Clifford, 
    67 N.J. 496
    , 525-46 (1975), the DOC's
    decision is based on substantial credible evidence establishing that Mesadieu
    committed the prohibited acts, 3 and the DOC's decision is not arbitrary,
    capricious, or unreasonable. Ramirez v. Dep't. of Corr., 
    382 N.J. Super. 18
    , 23
    (App. Div. 2005) (citing Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80
    3
    Mesadieu does not argue there is a lack of substantial credible evidence
    supporting the hearing officer's and Assistant Superintendent's findings and
    determinations. An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived. See
    Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 
    417 N.J. Super. 648
    , 657 (App. Div. 2011); Jefferson
    Loan Co. v. Session, 
    397 N.J. Super. 520
    , 525 n.4 (App. Div. 2008).
    A-0353-17T2
    10
    (1980)); N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). We therefore affirm the DOC's final agency
    decision.
    Affirmed.
    A-0353-17T2
    11