175 EXECUTIVE HOUSE VS. LAMAR HARRIS (LT-008906-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5054-17T2
    175 EXECUTIVE HOUSE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    LAMAR HARRIS,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    __________________________
    Argued September 10, 2019 – Decided September 27, 2019
    Before Judges Ostrer, Vernoia and Susswein.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Essex County, Docket No. LT-008906-18.
    Erin Ehrlich Caro argued the cause for appellant
    (Ehrlich, Petriello, Gudin & Plaza, attorneys; Erin
    Ehrlich Caro, on the briefs).
    Felipe Chavana argued the cause for respondent
    (Essex-Newark Legal Services, attorneys; Maria D.
    Castruita and Felipe Chavana, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    In this landlord-tenant matter, plaintiff-landlord 175 Executive House
    sought possession, for non-payment of rent, of an apartment it leased to a
    longtime tenant, defendant Lamar Harris. Harris had recently lost his job due to
    an injury, and was in financial distress. He sought temporary rental assistance
    (TRA) from the Essex County Department of Family Assistance and Benefits.
    Harris qualified for assistance, but the agency also required plaintiff to complete
    various forms. Among other things, the forms committed plaintiff to accept the
    agency's TRA payments and dismiss its pending action against defendant,
    although the forms shielded the agency from suit if it failed to make payment.
    Plaintiff contended that if it completed the forms, it would waive various legal
    and contractual rights, including its right to immediate payment of rent, and its
    right to sue the agency if for any reason it failed to transmit the entire TRA
    payment. So, plaintiff refused.
    By order entered June 18, 2018, the trial court compelled plaintiff to
    complete the forms. The court held that plaintiff's refusal would violate the Law
    Against Discrimination's (LAD) prohibition of discrimination based on the
    "source of lawful income used for rental . . . payments." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(g)(1).
    A-5054-17T2
    2
    Plaintiff appeals from that order, contending that it refused to complete
    the forms not because of the source of rental assistance, but because the forms
    involved a waiver of its rights.
    We dismiss the appeal as moot. Plaintiff complied with the court's order,
    thereafter received all then-due rent arrears, and dismissed its suit for possession
    and removal.1 A matter is moot when the requested decision "can have no
    practical effect on the existing controversy." Redd v. Bowman, 
    223 N.J. 87
    , 104
    (2015) (quoting Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 
    422 N.J. Super. 214
    ,
    221-22 (App. Div. 2011)). We will generally not decide a case "in which the
    issue is hypothetical, a judgment cannot grant effective relief, or the parties do
    not have concrete adversity of interest." Cinque v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 261 N.J.
    Super. 242, 243 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Sills, 
    143 N.J. Super. 432
    , 437 (Ch. Div. 1976)); see also Statewide Hi-Way Safety, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't
    of Transp., 
    283 N.J. Super. 223
    , 225-26 (App. Div. 1995) (dismissing as moot
    an appeal challenging the award of a public contract that was substantially
    performed).
    1
    Thereafter defendant again fell behind in his rent payments, which prompted
    subsequent suits by the landlord, payment of arrears, and dismissal of the
    actions.
    A-5054-17T2
    3
    We recognize that we may consider moot issues that are "of substantial
    importance, likely to reoccur but capable of evading review." Zirger v. Gen.
    Accident Ins. Co., 
    144 N.J. 327
    , 330 (1996) (Pollack J., concurring); see also
    De Vesa v. Dorsey, 
    134 N.J. 420
    , 428 (1993). No doubt, access to housing is
    an issue of significant public importance. So are the rights of landlords to
    control their property within the law, and the rights of tenants to avail
    themselves of assistance without discrimination.
    However, we may hesitate to address a moot case that presents a novel
    question of significant potential impact, on a less than fulsome record. See Sente
    v. Mayor and Mun. Council of Clifton, 
    66 N.J. 204
    , 205 (1974) (declining to
    consider issues in moot case where "the record and contentions on a novel and
    very far-reaching question are so unsatisfactory that [the Court] cannot be
    confident of reaching the correct result"). That is the case, here. Plaintiff seeks
    a declaration on an issue unaddressed in our cases under the LAD that could
    significantly undermine the effectiveness of a vital housing assistance program.
    Critically, the matter before us does not include the agency as a party, nor does
    the scant record provide a full picture of how the program operates in practice.
    Furthermore, we recognize the issue presented to us conceivably may recur, if
    plaintiff refuses to cooperate when confronted with another tenant who seeks
    A-5054-17T2
    4
    TRA. However, we have no evidence that landlord resistance to the program is
    currently widespread, so as to call out for judicial resolution now. For those
    reasons, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
    Dismissed.
    A-5054-17T2
    5