89 WATER STREET ASSOCIATES VS. JOHN H. REILLY, III (C-000003-15, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3366-17T1
89 WATER STREET
ASSOCIATES, Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN H. REILLY, III,
Personal Representative
of the Estate of JOHN H.
REILLY JR. and MARGARET
REILLY,
Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________
Argued telephonically April 5, 2019 – Decided October 1, 2019
Before Judges Rothstadt, Gilson and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Cumberland County, Docket No.
C-000003-15.
William G. Wright argued the cause for appellant
(Capehart & Scatchard, PA, attorneys; William G.
Wright, on the briefs).
Hugh J. Hutchison (Leonard, Sciolla, Hutchison,
Leonard & Tinari) of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted
pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondents
(Leonard, Sciolla, Hutchison, Leonard & Tinari, LLP,
and Hugh J. Hutchison, attorneys; Keith N. Leonard
and Hugh J. Hutchison, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROTHSTADT, J.A.D.
In 2004, plaintiff 89 Water Street Associates, LLC entered into contract
to purchase industrial property in Bridgeton from defendant John H. Reilly
III's father, the late John H. Reilly, Jr., and the decedent's wife, defendant
Margaret Reilly. Plaintiff appeals from the Chancery Division's January 10,
2018 judgment and from the denial of its motions for reconsideration and
clarification. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial judge erred by making
plaintiff's contractual right to purchase conditioned upon its assumption of
certain environmental obligations that were originally imposed on defendants
by the parties' contract. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the final
judgment and remand for further proceedings because the evidence did not
support the judge’s findings and her legal conclusions were incorrect.
I.
The origin of the parties' dispute related to the environmental condition
of the subject industrial property. At the time the parties entered into the
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contract, the elder Reillys were its sole owners.1 Approximately twenty years
earlier, the Reillys purchased the property, obtained a No Further Action Letter
(NFAL) from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(NJDEP),2 under the New Jersey Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA), N.J.S.A.
13:1K-6 to 13:1K-14, and leased the property in 1984 to National Refrigerants,
Inc. (NRI), an "independent worldwide distributor of refrigerants" and provider of
"associated refrigerant management service." John H. Reilly, Jr. was NRI's sole
shareholder.
The parties entered into the contract for sale of the property on October 29,
2004. The pertinent provisions are summarized as follows. The agreed upon
purchase price was $475,000. Section 5 of the contract required the closing to take
place on August 15, 2005, "provided the conditions set forth in this Agreement
have been satisfied or waived by that time." However, if all of the conditions in
the agreement were not satisfied by August 15, 2005, the closing date would be
1
In 2006, Margaret Reilly conveyed her interest in the property to her
husband.
2
As discussed in more detail below, under ISRA, the NFAL was a
determination by the NJDEP that "there are no discharged hazardous
substances or hazardous wastes present at the site of the industrial
establishment . . . and that . . . any hazardous wastes present at the industrial
establishment … have been remediated . . . ." N.J.S.A. 13:1K-8 (2004).
A-3366-17T1
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extended for an additional period not to exceed six months or February 15, 2006.
The agreement did not contain a time of the essence clause or language stating that
failure to close by August 15, 2005 or February 15, 2006 would be grounds for
defendants to cancel or terminate the agreement.
In Section 18, subsection (a), plaintiff "acknowledge[d] that [defendants
had] disclosed . . . prior environmental assessments[,] . . . studies[,] and test[ing of
the property that NRI had obtained, which] revealed certain environmental
conditions . . . requir[ing] further investigation and[, as the provision stated,] that
could have required the Property be remediated and/or cleaned-up." The disclosed
materials included an April 1993 NFAL regarding "groundwater contamination
discovered in 1989."
In Section 18, subsection (b), the contract imposed an obligation to obtain
from the NJDEP confirmation that the property was properly remediated under
existing or future environmental laws or regulations. It stated that "the parties
acknowledge[ed] that [ISRA], the regulations promulgated thereunder[,] and any
amending or successor legislation and regulations" applied to the transaction. It
also provided that as a condition precedent to plaintiff's obligations under the
agreement, defendants must "receive[] from the Industrial Site Evaluation Element
[(ISEE)] or its successor . . . a Clearance Document by the Closing Date." The
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Clearance Document was to be "(i) a non-applicability letter; (ii) a de minimus
quantity exemption; (iii) an unconditional approval of [defendants'] negative
declaration from the" ISEE or its successor; "or (iv) some other document from the
[NJ]DEP indicating that no further action is required with respect to any
environmental remediation of conditions on the Property."
Section 18, subsection (c) provided that "if [defendants are] unable to obtain
such a Clearance Document by the Closing Date, then [plaintiff] shall have the
right to cancel this agreement by written notice to [defendants] or to purchase the
Property subject to the completion of the ISRA process . . . ." However,
Subsection (d) stated that plaintiff could not exercise the option to cancel under
subsection (c) "if [defendants] continue [their] diligent efforts with the [NJ]DEP
seeking a Clearance Document, and ha[ve] taken all reasonable and necessary
actions required of" them. Ibid. And, it provided that "[t]he parties agree that so
long as [defendants] cooperate[] with the [NJ]DEP in good faith in pursuing a
Clearance Document, no party may exercise any right to terminate this
Agreement . . . until there has been a final decision with respect to the issuance of a
Clearance Document." The contract did not impose any time limit for defendants
to secure required documents nor did it place a cap on the amount of costs that they
would have to incur in order to secure the clearances from the NJDEP.
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Finally, Section 23 provided for the payment of attorney's fees to the
prevailing party in any action to enforce the agreement. It defined "prevailing
party" as a "party who substantially attains or defeats the relief sought, as the case
may be, whether by compromise, settlement, judgment, or the abandonment by the
other party of its claim or defense."
The environmental conditions disclosed by defendants to plaintiff were
revealed through various documents related to NRI's efforts to comply with
ISRA that began prior to 2004 and continued after the parties signed their
contract. During those years, NRI made various required submissions to the
NJDEP and received back notices of deficiencies that had to be corrected.
In the years prior to December 2012, when NRI was pursuing approval
from the NJDEP, NRI's and defendants' counsel was in contact with plaintiff's
attorney about NRI's efforts and the NJDEP's responses. Those
communications continued for years after July 21, 2005, when plaintiff advised
defendants that it was exercising its right under the contract to extend the closing
date by six months from August 15, 2005, and requested a report on the "status of
the efforts[] and progress[] made related to securing [the] environmental 'Clearance
Documents, which he later received.'" From 2005 through 2010, neither party took
any action to terminate their agreement or demand that closing occur.
A-3366-17T1
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In 2010, the NJDEP advised NRI of the newly enacted Site Remediation
Reform Act (SRRA) that replaced ISRA and recommended that NRI engage a
licensed site remediation professional (LSRP), as required by the new Act. In
response, NRI hired an LSRP and continued to pursue obtaining a Clearance
Document through 2017, which under the SRRA, was a Response Action Outcome
(RAO) report.
Beginning in April 2010 through 2011, plaintiff wrote to defendants
suggesting that they close title with the condition that defendants and NRI
"complete the remediation at [their] cost after closing." In response, defendants'
attorney advised that his clients "remain[ed] unwilling to close . . . until all
required environmental clearances have been issued and there is no further liability
on [defendants]."
In November 2012,3 defendants updated plaintiff on the NJDEP's latest
requirements as determined by NRI's environmental consultant. They advised that
at that point, the LSRP had not provided the estimated cost of the work needed to
secure a RAO.4
3
John H. Reilly, Jr. passed away on May 1, 2012.
4
In December 2016, defendants' LSRP issued a "Remedial Investigation
Report/Remedial Action Work Plan" and in February 2017 sent it to NJDEP.
(continued)
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On December 21, 2012, defendants attempted to cancel the contract. In a
letter from their attorney, defendants notified plaintiff that "the [c]ontract has
terminated without default by any party" because the environmental condition
precedent was not satisfied within the specified time period. Defendants' notice
also stated that there would be "no further obligations on the part of either party,"
and that plaintiff would be refunded its deposit.5
Plaintiff's counsel replied on January 8, 2013, stating that plaintiff relied on
defendants' good faith in connection with remediation of the environmental
conditions, that it "wishe[d] to proceed with the purchase of the property," and that
it believed the "[c]ontract [was] still in force." Counsel requested the status of the
environmental cleanup and concluded that plaintiff "ha[d] waited in good faith for
[defendants] to complete [their] obligations and the failure of [defendants] to [do
so] does not . . . suffice as a self-serving basis to void the contract." Counsel
considered the contract to be fully enforceable, stating that he took "issue with any
(continued)
The record does not contain any further information about the status of NRI's
efforts.
5
After unsuccessful attempts to return the deposit, plaintiff's counsel
deposited the funds into his trust account.
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assertion that the [c]ontract may be rescinded as a result of [defendants'] lack of
good faith in connection with the environmental remediation."
On March 6, 2015, plaintiff filed its complaint seeking declaratory judgment
that "The Contract of Sale [Had] Not Terminated," and that it was "Not Obligated
to Close Until Defendants Obtained The Clearance Documents." Plaintiff also
sought specific performance, alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and argued that defendants were equitably
estopped from terminating the contract.
Defendants filed an answer and counterclaim, in which they contended that
the contract expired "by its own terms . . . as of February 16, 2006," that
"[p]laintiff never sought an[] extension of that deadline," and that plaintiff did not
deliver payment in full for the property. Defendants alleged that because the
contract provided for an environmental assessment to be supplied by plaintiff
within six months of the contract date, plaintiff "waived [all] environmental
conditions . . . relating to the Property," in accordance with Section 18(e) of the
contract.6 Defendants sought declaratory judgment that "[p]laintiff waived all
6
Section 18(e) of the contract states the buyer "may cause an environmental
assessment at a level commonly known as a Phase I Environmental
Assessment/Audit to be done on the Property." If plaintiff acted on this
option, it would have been required to "present [defendants] with a copy of the
(continued)
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environmental conditions relating to the property"; that "[p]laintiff never
[requested] to extend the time by which the parties were required to close on [the]
sale and purchase," and as such, "the [c]ontract terminated by its own terms"; and
it requested an order directing "the escrow agent to release the deposit funds."
The matter was tried without a jury on October 5, 2017. At trial, the parties
stipulated to certain facts and the admission into evidence of relevant documents
before calling any witnesses. Plaintiff's sole member Brent Hankins and an
attorney, Theodore E. Baker, testified for plaintiff. Baker had represented plaintiff
in the negotiation of the contract and its subsequent dealings with defendants.
Plaintiff also read into the record deposition testimony of Keith Leonard and
Stephen Labroli, who were both attorneys for the Reillys. The portions of
Leonard’s deposition read into the record described the type of representation he
and Labroli provided to defendants, and the continued efforts defendants made up
until trial to acquire the Clearance Documents, and that the contract between the
(continued)
Report within (6) months of the effective date of [the] Agreement. If [plaintiff
did] not do so within that period of time, [plaintiff was] deemed to have
approved or waived any environmental conditions at, on, under or otherwi se
arising out of or relating to the Property." If the Report indicated the
"likelihood of or the presence of hazardous substances, materials or wastes,"
plaintiff ha[d] five days to notify defendants if it "elect[ed] to terminate [the]
Agreement." Since plaintiff never conducted its own assessment, Section
18(e) was inapplicable.
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parties lacked any language indicating time was of the essence. Labroli's
testimony related to the parties' lack of any communications indicating the contract
would be cancelled if closing did not occur by February 15, 2006.7
Defendants' representative, Carmen Carosella, an officer and representative
of NRI, was the only witness who testified for defendants. Notably, defendants did
not call any experts to testify as to remediation and its historical or anticipated
costs.
Carosella testified that he negotiated the terms of the contract for the elder
Reillys in 2004. He explained that NRI had spent "in the area of $360 to
$400,000" toward its efforts to obtain NJDEP clearance. He stated that "[w]e had
no anticipation of incurring these kinds of costs . . . to get a final [NFAL]." He
testified that according to defendants' LSRP, additional expenses were estimated
by another $350,000. However, on cross-examination, Carosella clarified that
defendants did not pay any of the expenses as they were all paid by NRI, which did
not seek any reimbursement from defendants, and that there was no agreement
with NRI that required defendants to do so. To the contrary, he confirmed NRI
7
Most of the deposition testimony plaintiff planned to read was sustained on
objection.
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was obligated under its lease with defendants to pay all of the expenses related to
obtaining the Clearance Document.8
In the January 10, 2018 written decision, the trial judge set forth her findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Relying on two letters admitted as joint exhibits,
the judge made initial findings about the parties' intent at the time they entered into
the contract. The judge stated the following:
At the time of execution of the contract, buyer and
seller believed that obtaining a [C]learance
[D]ocument would not require significant time or, cost
[J-43, J-18, J-19]. This belief was reasonable because
seller had received a [NFAL] from [NJ]DEP prior to
purchasing the [property] and because the business
operation of the tenant, NRI, did not pollute the
[property].
The contract reflects the parties' belief that obtaining a
clearance document would be an administrative
formality. The contract does not include a dollar
limitation to protect seller from a substantial
reanimation expenditure. The contract at paragraph
18 (c) allows buyer to take title and assume the
responsibility of obtaining a [C]learance [D]ocument
at buyer's cost. Buyer and seller are sophisticated
parties and each believed that [NJ]DEP would issue a
[C]learance [D]ocument in a relatively short time. [J-
18, J-19].
8
On direct examination, Carosella confirmed that the securing of an RAO was
NRI's responsibility and had to be obtained regardless if the property was sold
to plaintiff.
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However, the judge concluded that defendants' December 2012 attempt to
cancel the contract under Section 5 of the contract was not effective. According to
the judge, once the closing date addressed in Section 5 passed, defendants "did not
have the right to cancel the contract pursuant to [Section] 5" because defendants
"continued to work in good faith with [NJ]DEP to obtain a [C]learance
[D]ocument, [making Section] 18 (d) . . . applicable." The judge concluded, under
that section, neither party could "terminate . . . until there ha[d] been a final
decision on the issuance of the [C]learance [D]ocument."
The judge then explained that after the NJDEP chose not to review
defendants' ISRA submissions, because of the implementation of the SRRA's
procedures, defendants "could no longer work in good faith with [NJ]DEP to
obtain a final decision." At that point, under Section 18(c), plaintiff could either
"cancel the contract or proceed" with the closing without the Clearance Documents
and assume responsibility for the remediation, but receive financing through
defendants. According to the judge, plaintiff's right to cancel under Section 18(c)
was "limited by [Section] 18 (d) which obligate[d plaintiff] to perform if
[defendants] . . . continue[d] to work with [NJ]DEP to obtain a [C]learance
[D]ocument."
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However, the judge acknowledged that under the SRRA a Clearance
Document could still be obtained in the form of a RAO, but found it was "not one
of the four [C]learance [D]ocuments issued by [ISEE] of [NJ]DEP and described
in [Section] 18 (b)." Once defendants could no longer work with NJDEP because
of the SRRA's procedures, Section "18 (d) no longer tolled the time for [plaintiff's]
election to cancel or close as stipulated in [Section] 18 (c)."
Moreover, the judge concluded that because the cost of obtaining an RAO
was not "contemplated" by the parties and "[t]he cost exceed[ed] the contract
purchase price," defendants should not be responsible for obtaining the RAO.
Relying on the Court's opinion in Dixon Venture v. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co.,
122 N.J. 228, 233 (1991), and quoting from our opinion in Feighner v. Sauter, 259
N.J. Super. 583, 593 (App. Div. 1992), the judge stated that "[w]hen a contract . . .
is silent as to how much the seller is obligated to spend to comply . . . , by
implication the seller is obligated to spend a reasonable sum in relation to the
selling price."
The judge summed up her explanation by stating the following:
Given the length of time defendants have pursued the
[C]learance [D]ocument, [NJ]DEP's failure to make a
decision, the passage and implementation of the LSRP
procedure established by the SRRA, the cost/time of
the LSRP process, [plaintiff]'s continued interest in
purchasing the [property], and the language of
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[Section] 18 (c), the contract will be specifically
enforced to allow [plaintiff] either to cancel the
contract or proceed to closing and assume the cost of
obtaining an RAO.
The judge rejected plaintiff's arguments that equitable estoppel or
defendants' alleged breach of the covenant of good faith barred defendants from
being granted any relief from their obligations because there was no evidence that
defendants acted "deceitfully," made any "misrepresentations," and their "inability
to obtain a [C]learance [D]ocument was caused by [NJ]DEP."
The judge also found that defendants were not entitled to be excused from
performance, as modified by her decision, based on "the defenses of impossibility
or frustration of purpose." According to the judge, "the mutual purpose of the
contract [was] not frustrated" by the parties understanding of the change in cost of
obtaining clearances because "[t]he sale [could still] be completed with [plaintiff]
assuming the cost." The judge dismissed plaintiff's affirmative claims with
prejudice and neither party was deemed the "prevailing party within the meaning
of the contract," as it related to an award of attorneys' fees.
The judge memorialized her decision in the January 10, 2018 judgment
under appeal. Although the judgment provided that if plaintiff chose "to proceed
with the purchase of the property," it waived defendants' "further obligation to
obtain an RAO," and it also provided for a later "adjust[ment of] the cost of
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obtaining the RAO between [the parties] given the unique circumstances of the
case." For that reason, the judge retained jurisdiction over the matter.
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. In its motion, plaintiff argued
that it did not have an opportunity to address the judge's conclusion that the
substitution of SRRA for ISRA was an altering event that warranted defendants
being relieved of their obligation to obtain a Clearance Document because the
issue was not raised by defendants at trial. Plaintiff further argued that the judge
wrongfully determined it was not entitled to attorney’s fees even though it
prevailed on its claim that the contract was not terminated.
Plaintiff also filed a motion for clarification, asking the judge to confirm that
while her decision imposed on plaintiff the obligation to obtain the environmental
clearance as between the parties, it did not impact the question of whether NRI as a
tenant had a legal obligation to remediate the property and obtain the clearance.
The judge denied both of plaintiff's motions on March 16, 2018, in an oral
decision placed on the record. In her decision, the judge stated that she relied upon
the parties expectation in 2004 that the transaction would amount to a quick sale
and that the associated cost of obtaining the Clearance Document by 2012 far
exceeded the parties expectations. According to the judge, because plaintiff
became the equitable owner of the property upon entering into the contract, it was
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fair to impose the unexpected costs of obtaining the Clearance Document. As to
the clarification motion, the judge denied relief because NRI was not a party to the
action. Finally, as to attorney’s fees, the judge reiterated that neither party
prevailed.
In reaching her decision, the judge stated:
You know, in truth, neither party thought there was
going to be this kind of expenditure. But once the
LSRP process kicks in, it becomes a very expensive
proposition. I don't have the details on the numbers, I
just know that this transaction becomes a very difficult
one for the seller as a result of the LSRP's
recommendations, the cost of even doing the analysis,
let alone any future remediation, so that, buyer's kind
of in a gotcha position where they're saying, well,
look, there's no cap on the environmental
responsibility of the sellers set forth in the document.
And that's consistent with both party's intent, that this
is going to be a relatively quick sale, an easy get for
an [NFAL], and so much so that the buyer is willing to
take on the cost of same if the seller can't do it.
You know, it's 200[4] I think they signed the contract.
And by 2012 sellers frustrated and sends a
cancellation letter. Well, when you looked at the
contract, and that's what I tried to do, I looked at the
contract, I said what I said about it. I didn't see in
there the right for the seller to cancel it.
This appeal followed.
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II.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial judge erred by relieving defendants
of their contractual obligation to obtain the Clearance Document and imposing it
on plaintiff, if plaintiff chose to proceed to closing, and by "retain[ing] jurisdiction
to adjust the cost of obtaining the RAO between" the parties. It also contends that
the judge should have awarded it attorney’s fees as the prevailing party under the
contract. Plaintiff further challenges the denial of its reconsideration motion.
Our review of a trial judge’s factual determinations in a non-jury case is
limited. Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011). "[W]e
do not disturb the factual findings . . . of the trial judge unless we are convinced
that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]"
Ibid. (second alteration in the original) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs
Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Such findings "are binding on appeal when
supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Ibid. (citing Cesare v.
Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).
Issues of law, however, are reviewed de novo, and we will not defer to a trial
court's conclusions of law or the legal consequences that flow from established
facts. Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Bd., 234 N.J. 403,
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414-15 (2018). Specifically, "[w]hen a trial [judge’s] decision turns on its
construction of a contract, appellate review of that determination is de novo."
Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 115 (2014).
III.
Applying that standard, we conclude the trial judge misinterpreted the
contract and that the evidence did not support her findings about the expectations
of the parties. Moreover, we find inapposite the judge's reliance upon Feighner
and Dixon as support for her decision that defendants should be relieved of their
responsibility to obtain the Clearance Document.
A.
We begin by acknowledging the limitations on a court's power to alter
written agreements. "Contracts, should be read 'as a whole in a fair and common
sense manner.'" Manahawkin Convalescent, 217 N.J. at 118 (quoting Hardy ex rel.
Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009)). Courts generally give
contractual terms their plain and ordinary meaning. Schor v. FMS Fin. Corp., 357
N.J. Super. 185, 191 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Nester v. O’Donnell, 301 N.J.
Super. 198, 210 (App. Div. 1997)). "A party that uses unambiguous terms in a
contract cannot be relieved from the language simply because it had a secret,
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unexpressed intent that the language should have an interpretation contrary to the
words' plain meaning." Ibid.
A contract "should not be interpreted to render one of its terms
meaningless." Cumberland Cty. Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co., 358
N.J. Super. 484, 497 (App. Div. 2003). Similarly, courts should construe the
provisions of a contract so that its terms do not conflict. Silverstein v. Dohoney,
32 N.J. Super. 357, 364 (App. Div. 1954). If such conflict is unavoidable, "the
more specific provision . . . usually controls over the more general." Burley v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 251 N.J. Super. 493, 500 (App. Div. 1991). Likewise, "[a]
subsidiary provision is not . . . to be interpreted . . . to conflict with the obvious
'dominant' or 'principal' purpose of the contract." Newark Publishers' Ass'n v.
Newark Typographical Union, 22 N.J. 419, 426 (1956).
Applying these guiding principles to the undisputed facts in this case, we
find no support for the trial judge's conclusion that Section 18(b) of the contract
contemplated defendants only being obligated to secure a Clearance Document
under ISRA and not under SRRA as a superseding law, or that they anticipated the
transaction, including securing the Clearance Document, would be quick or
inexpensive. First, Section 18(b) of the contract stated that not only ISRA, but
"any amending or successor legislation and regulations [were] applicable to the"
A-3366-17T1
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sale of the property. The SRRA therefore governed the sale after its adoption, and
pursuant to the SRRA, the contract provided for defendants to pay the cost of the
RAO report. The Section also stated that a Clearance Document includes "some
other document from [NJ]DEP indicating that no further action is required with
respect to any environmental remediation of or conditions on the Property." An
RAO satisfies that definition.
The SRRA "changed the mechanism for remediation projects by placing the
bulk of oversight duties in the hands of [LSRPs] and retaining only minimal
oversight responsibilities for [NJ]DEP." Magic Petroleum Corp. v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 218 N.J. 390, 400 (2014) (footnote omitted). "The former resolution of a
spill cleanup—the NJDEP's issuance of a [NFAL]—has been replaced by the
rendering of findings by an LSRP who, upon finding a site to be clean so advises
the NJDEP, which may thereafter conduct its own confirmatory examination."
Matejek v. Watson, 449 N.J. Super. 179, 182 (App. Div. 2017). The LSRP's
findings are embodied in a RAO report, which the LSRP provides "to the person
responsible for remediation" and files with NJDEP when "the site has been
remediated." N.J.S.A. 58:10C-14(d).
The SRRA adopted and incorporated into ISRA, identical definitions of a
RAO letter as
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a written determination by a [LSRP] that the
contaminated site was remediated in accordance with
all applicable statutes and regulations, and based upon
an evaluation of the historical use of the site, or of any
area of concern at that site, as applicable, and any
other investigation or action [NJDEP] deems
necessary, there are no contaminants present at the
site, or at any area of concern, at any other site to
which a discharge originating at the site has migrated,
or that any contaminants present at the site or that
have migrated from the site have been remediated in
accordance with applicable remediation regulations,
and all applicable permits and authorizations have
been obtained.
[N.J.S.A. 58:10C-2; accord N.J.S.A. 13:1K-8.9]
9
At the time the parties executed the contract, ISRA defined a NFAL as:
a written determination by the [NJDEP] that, based
upon an evaluation of the historical use of the
industrial establishment and the [site], or of an area of
concern or areas of concern, as applicable, and any
other investigation or action the department deems
necessary, there are no discharged hazardous
substances or hazardous wastes present at the site of
the industrial establishment, at the area of concern or
areas of concern, or at any other site to which
discharged hazardous substances or hazardous wastes
originating at the industrial establishment have
migrated, and that any discharged hazardous
substances or hazardous wastes present at the
industrial establishment or that have migrated from
the site have been remediated in accordance with
applicable remediation regulations.
[N.J.S.A. 13:1K-8 (2004).]
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A RAO report serves similar purposes as a NFAL under ISRA, N.J.S.A.
13:1K-9(b)(2) and 9(d)(2), and under other statutes affected by SRRA. N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11g(e); N.J.S.A. 58:10B-11(a); N.J.S.A. 58:10B-13.1 to 13.2. The SRRA
amendments treat both an NFAL and an RAO as a "Final remediation document."
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11b; accord N.J.S.A. 58:10B-1. Therefore, the trial judge's
conclusion that an RAO report does not fit the definition in Section 18(b) was
incorrect.
Second, as the trial judge correctly observed, the contract did not contain
any limitation on the cost to be incurred by defendants in performing their
obligation. If these "sophisticated" business parties wished to impose a limitation,
the contract reveals that they were aware that a limitation could be imposed. For
example, in Section 14 of the agreement, the parties imposed a limitation on
defendants' responsibility for repairing damage to the property caused by wood
destroying insects. There was no evidence at trial that indicated the parties
contemplated any limitation on the costs defendants were to incur for the
environmental remediation or that the parties intended to shift the burden of those
costs to plaintiffs.
As to those remediation costs, defendants, not plaintiff, were at the time of
the contract, and for years thereafter, involved in NRI's efforts to obtain
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environmental clearances. They were in the best position to assess NRI's
expenditures before the parties entered into the contract. The fact that the costs
were more than anticipated or the process was taking longer than they hoped did
not warrant relief from their obligations under the contract. Neither the delay nor
the costs warranted relieving defendants of their obligations under the doctrines of
impossibility or frustration. As to those doctrines, we recently observed the
following:
Indeed, "[b]oth the impossibility and frustration
doctrines are concerned with '[a]n extraordinary
circumstance [that] may make performance [of a
contract] so vitally different from what was
reasonably to be expected as to alter the essential
nature of that performance.'" "The doctrines stem
from the concept of an implied condition within a
contract." "[T]he concept is that a contract is to be
considered 'subject to the implied condition that the
parties shall be excused in case, before breach, the
state of things constituting the fundamental basis of
the contract ceases to exist without default of either of
the parties.'"
Frustration of purpose arises when "the obligor's
performance can still be carried out, but the
supervening event fundamentally has changed the
nature of the parties' overall bargain." "The
frustration must be so severe that it is not fairly to be
regarded as the risks that [the party invoking the
doctrine] assumed under the contract." Relief from
performance of contractual obligations on the theory
of frustration of purpose "will not be lightly granted;
the evidence must be clear, convincing[,] and
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adequate." By comparison, under the related doctrine
of impossibility or impracticability of performance, a
party is excused from having to perform his contract
obligations "where performance has become literally
impossible, or at least inordinately more difficult,
because of the occurrence of a supervening event that
was not within the original contemplation of the
contracting parties."
[Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, ___ (App.
Div. 2019) (slip op. 22-23) (alterations in the original)
(citations omitted).]
Defendants' conduct demonstrated that until December 2012 they were not
concerned with the time or expenses NRI was spending to get the Clearance
Document. In fact, in 2010, defendants refused to schedule a closing before
having the Clearance Document in hand. It was not until after John H. Reilly, Jr.
passed away in 2012 and the NJDEP issued its findings in December of that year
that defendants took any action towards cancelling the agreement, which they did
before being aware of the costs to complete the remediation.
Finally, the contract imposed the obligation to secure the Clearance
Document on defendants. However, NRI was pursuing the required document and
incurring the costs. Although there existed a commonality of ownership, NRI
remained a separate entity. Courts generally "abide by 'the fundamental
propositions that a corporation is a separate entity from its shareholders, and
that a primary reason for incorporation is the insulation of shareholders from
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25
the liabilities of the corporate enterprise.'" Richard A. Pulaski Constr. Co. v.
Air Frame Hangars, Inc., 195 N.J. 457, 472 (2008) (quoting Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 500 (1983)). It would be an abuse of the
corporate form to relieve a party to a contract of his or her responsibility to the
other party because a company, in which the party is the sole shareholder, is
incurring expenses pursuant to a lease with its shareholder that the shareholder is
obligated to incur under his or her agreement with the other party.
Moreover, as already noted, the obligation assumed by defendants included
complying with any "amending or successor [environmental] legislation" and
required that it obtain certain documents under ISRA or "some other document
from [NJ]DEP, indicating that no further action is required with respect to any
environmental remediation of or conditions on the Property." If defendants wanted
to insulate themselves from the risk of obligations imposed by new legislation, the
contract could have included a provision allowing for termination on that basis.
However, it did not and our function "is not to rewrite a contract for the parties
better than or different from the one they wrote for themselves." Kieffer v. Best
Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011).
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B.
We also conclude the judge's reliance on Feighner or Dixon to relieve
defendants from their obligation was mistaken. Both cases are distinguishable by
the fact that there was no evidence in either case that the landowner was subject to
the environmental laws and regulations that were later imposed after the contract,
or that the landowner assumed responsibility for compliance in the agreement.
In Feighner, an industrial landowner entered into a contract to sell its
property prior to the passage of a predecessor to ISRA, the Environmental Cleanup
Responsibility Act (ECRA), N.J.S.A. 13:1K-6 to -13. Feighner, 259 N.J. Super. at
586. After being notified by the NJDEP of the passage of ECRA and that its sale
was subject to its provisions, the landowner obtained various estimates for the cost
of remediation that exceeded more than ten percent of the property's sale price. Id.
at 587. After the purchaser rejected the landowner's attempt to rescind the contract
based on a claim that it could not comply with ECRA, litigation ensued between
the parties. Id. at 588. In our opinion, we affirmed the trial judge's rejection of the
landowner's attempt to rescind a contract for sale and the judge's ordering of
specific performance to the purchaser, while capping the seller's obligation for
clean-up costs at "less than 9% of the selling price." Id. at 594.
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In Dixon, "the contract of sale nor the title-closing documents adverted in
any way to the satisfaction of ECRA's requirements . . . ." 122 N.J. at 230-31.
After the closing of title, the purchaser sought to recover cleanup costs when it was
required to comply with ECRA. Id. at 231. Under those circumstances, the
Supreme Court agreed with our determination that where the risk of compliance
was not shifted to a purchaser, it should be able to maintain a cause of action to
recover its costs as well as one for rescission because a "seller assumes the risks of
cleanup and should not be able to avoid them by insistence on the rescission
remedy," as the purchaser's only remedy. Id. at 234. However, the Court
"remand[ed] the case to the trial court to fashion the remedy that best effectuates
'the common understanding' reached by the parties in light of the intervening
ECRA requirements." Ibid. It did so because "the seller was not aware of its
duties under ECRA, and thus was not aware that it was subject to liability for the
cleanup," and "the buyer could not be held clearly liable either" because it "had
agreed to purchase the property before the effective date of the Act, but the closing
occurred after the effective date." Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc.,
129 N.J. 479, 511 (1992).
Those cases both involved situations where the parties' original agreements
did not contemplate compliance with existing environmental laws. Id. at 230;
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Perini, 129 N.J. at 511. The facts in the case before us are different. Here, before
the parties entered into the contract, NRI was already pursuing compliance with
ISRA as required by its lease with defendants. The contract for sale disclosed
those efforts and further acknowledged that ISRA was applicable to their
transaction. Despite that knowledge, the parties did not shift the burden of
compliance to plaintiff or impose any limits on the cost defendants were going to
incur. And, again, significantly, defendants' tenant, not defendants, was incurring
those costs. As the Dixon Court stated, a contract "that . . . reflect[ed] that the
parties made the market choices and took the economic risks with knowledge of
the [environmental] requirements," should be enforced. Dixon, 122 N.J. at 234.
The parties' transaction here reflected that choice and defendants assumed all such
risks.
C.
Finally, we find no evidentiary support for the trial judge's conclusion that
the cost of obtaining the Clearance Documents was unexpected or that they would
be obtained quickly. As already noted, there was no expert testimony about the
work or its costs and other than Carosella's unsupported statement about the
parties' understanding in 2004, there was no direct evidence of their intentions.
Even the trial judge acknowledged that although she believed "once the LSRP
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29
process kicks in, it becomes a very expensive proposition," she did not "have the
details on the numbers."
As to the parties' expectations about the time it would take to secure the
Clearance Documents, in her decision, the judge citied to two letters exchanged
between the parties' attorneys in 2007, three years after they entered into the
contract. The first letter sent by plaintiff's counsel acknowledged receipt of a
"Notice of Deficiency" from the NJDEP,10 which counsel found to be "neither
monumental nor substantial in nature." Counsel understood that the requirements
set forth in the notice would delay the issuing of a NFAL for "nine to twelve
months," but assured defendants' attorney that plaintiff was committed to going
forward. In response, defendants' attorney wrote the second letter, which stated
that the NJDEP notice was "unexpected," but that "many of the issues [raised in it]
can be resolved quickly," and that defendants "appreciated [plaintiff's]
commitment." Neither letter related to the parties' understanding or expectation
about how long the process would take or the extent of the costs associated with
complying with the contract's obligations. In fact, none of the documents
stipulated to or otherwise admitted that were exchanged between the parties,
10
The NJDEP's December 1, 2006 notice is the third document referred to by
the judge as supporting his conclusion.
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30
referred in any way to the parties having an initial expectation that the matter
would be closed quickly or limited to any anticipated cost. The parties' subsequent
conduct was consistent with moving forward with the matter as originally
contemplated until December 2012, when defendant attempted to cancel the
agreement.
IV.
In light of our determination that the parties agreement should have been
enforced without modification, there can be no question that plaintiff was a
"prevailing party" under the agreement entitled to legal fees as contemplated by the
parties. For that reason, on remand, the trial judge must award attorney’s fees
consistent with the parties' agreement and Rule 4:42-9.
Since we conclude plaintiff was entitled to relief for the reasons already
stated, we need not address any of its remaining arguments.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
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