BLAIR LAZAR VS. KERRI LAZAR (FM-13-1045-13, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5442-17T3
BLAIR LAZAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KERRI LAZAR, n/k/a
KERRI WEISS,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________
Argued September 9, 2019 – Decided October 2, 2019
Before Judges Fasciale and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County,
Docket No. FM-13-1045-13.
Stephanie Palo argued the cause for appellant (Buchan
& Palo, LLC, attorneys; Stephanie Palo, of counsel and
on the brief).
Brian D. Winters argued the cause for respondent
(Keith, Winters & Wenning, attorneys; Brian D.
Winters, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Blair Lazar (Husband) appeals from portions of the Family Part
judge's April 27, 2018 order denying relief he sought regarding parenting time
and children-exchange related to provisions in the parties' matrimonial
settlement agreement (MSA)—which was incorporated in their August 2015
dual judgment of divorce—and the judge's subsequent order denying his motion
for reconsideration and granting other relief to defendant Kerri Lazar (Wife).1
Because Judge Kathleen A. Sheedy's findings are supported by adequate,
substantial, credible evidence and she did not err, as a matter of law, in enforcing
the parties' MSA and refusing to modify same, and the judge did not abuse her
discretion in denying Husband's motion for reconsideration, we affirm.
The parties' MSA provides parenting time as follows:
The parties shall alternate weekends, specifically from
Friday after school or camp through Monday to school
or camp; Husband shall enjoy overnight parenting time
with both children every Wednesday; and Wife shall
enjoy every Monday and Tuesday; Husband shall enjoy
overnight parenting time with [the parties' son] every
Thursday except the Thursday prior to the Wife's
second weekend of parenting time when the Husband
will enjoy overnight parenting time alone with [the
parties' daughter].
1
We use the designations of "Husband" and "Wife" for clarity as they are
consistent with the terms the parties utilized in their MSA.
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2
Children-exchange parameters were also spelled out:
The party receiving the child and/or children shall pick
them up and drop them off at either school or camp. In
the event an exchange of the children occurs on a
holiday or a non-school or non-camp day, then pick-up
and drop-off shall occur at the bank at 10:00 a.m. unless
otherwise set forth herein, until such time as Dr.
Baszczuk[2] recommends curbside or not which shall be
binding upon the parties, at the Wife's home with the
Husband stopping his vehicle at the Wife's mailbox and
remaining in the vehicle and the Wife remaining in the
home and no third parties outside of Wife's property or
outside Husband's vehicle.
As to his first motion, Husband argues the judge erred in denying his
request for 50-50 parenting time with the parties' children—born September 1,
2005 and July 14, 2007—"such that Wife has custody on Monday and Tuesday,
Husband has custody on Wednesday and Thursday, with the weekends being
alternated between the parties[.]" Husband essentially sought an additional day
with the children: Thursdays. He also contends the judge erred in denying his
proposal to have the children "walk for exchanges, with a text sent to the
receiving parent 15 minutes prior, and a text sent upon arrival, with exchange at
the bank when transfer by walking or school/camp bus are not utilized."
2
Dr. Patricia Baszczuk was, at one point, the parties' co-parenting therapist.
Dr. Charles Diament is the co-parenting therapist referenced in the appealed
orders.
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3
Judge Sheedy, in a comprehensive and well-reasoned twenty-eight page
written decision that recognized both parties' arguments, denied without
prejudice Husband's requested parenting-time modification and required "the
parties to work with [their co-parenting therapist] to discuss" that proposed
change.3 The judge also denied Husband's proposed children-exchange and
similarly directed the parties to discuss that issue with the co -parenting
therapist.4
Contrary to Husband's present arguments that the judge abdicated her
decision-making power by requiring the parties discuss the contested issues with
the co-parenting therapist and that the judge failed to consider the best interests
of the children in denying the parenting-time modification, Judge Sheedy
cogently analyzed the law regarding the parties consensual MSA and the
modification of same in her written decision before denying "Husband's requests
to change the roles of the professionals as set forth in the parties' MSA" and
enforcing the provisions of "the parties['] bargained for and consensual MSA."
3
The judge also denied Wife's request to modify the parties' parenting-time
agreement and also directed the parties to discuss those issues with the co-
parenting therapist. Wife did not appeal the judge's order.
4
The judge denied Wife's request that the co-parenting therapist provide his
written clinical recommendation regarding curbside exchange to the court "as
the parties will discuss same with [the therapist]."
A-5442-17T3
4
Considering our limited scope of review of Family Part orders, and
recognizing the deference due to the family courts because of their "special
jurisdiction and expertise" in family law matters, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
413 (1998), yet exercising our plenary review of a Family Part "judge's legal
conclusions, and the application of those conclusions to the facts," Spangenberg
v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Reese v.
Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)), and a de novo review of the
MSA provisions, Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45-46 (2016); Kieffer v. Best
Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 222-23 (2011), we affirm substantially for the reasons set
forth in Judge Sheedy's written decision.
We note that in their MSA, the parties agreed to attend co-parenting
therapy. Furthermore, the parties agreed "they shall use good faith efforts to
address with the co-parenting therapist a 50-50 parenting arrangement in the
future." Paragraph 41 of the MSA provides:
The parties agree that if a dispute arises in connection
with the custodial provisions of this Agreement or the
custodial provisions contained in a related judgment,
order or agreement, they will attempt to resolve the
dispute first with the co-parenting therapist, then with
the Parenting Coordinator if no agreement reached with
the co-parenting therapist. If that fails, then either party
shall have the right to address the matter to the [c]ourt
on notice. The [Parenting Coordinator] and co-
parenting therapist['s] recommendations agreed upon
A-5442-17T3
5
by the parties shall be enforced, without the need for a
"Consent Order" as provided in paragraph 2 of [the
Consent Order Appointing Parent Coordinator
(COAPC)].5
Judge Sheedy properly held the parties to their agreement. Unlike the
inapposite cases relied upon by Husband, the judge did not foreclose the parties'
access to the court or impose restrictions on access that were not bargained for.
The parties were merely obliged to follow the MSA terms requiring that they
first attempt to resolve parenting disputes with the co-parenting therapist.
Failing that—and, in accordance with the MSA—the parties were free to apply
to the court; notably, the judge denied the motion without prejudice.
And, in considering the children's best interests, Judge Sheedy
acknowledged the important requirement that the court "strain every effort to
attain for the child the affection of both parents," citing in In re Jackson, 13 N.J.
Super. 144, 148 (App. Div. 1951), as well as the public policy that children of
separated parents should have the love and respect of both parents for the general
welfare and happiness of the children, Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J. 599, 604-05 (1956).
The children's best interests were at the heart of her decision to require the
parties to adhere to the negotiated dispute-resolution process which she fostered
5
The COAPC was incorporated in the MSA.
A-5442-17T3
6
by granting Husband's request that "the children's therapist, the co-parenting
therapist, and the [parenting coordinator] . . . communicate . . . amongst
themselves as they deem necessary," while maintaining the confidentiality of
the co-parenting process as requested by Wife. Judge Sheedy found:
based on the high-conflict nature of the parties'
situation and the continuous inability of the parties to
co-parent in an emotionally and developmentally
appropriate manner to promote the best interests of
their children, it is imperative that all of the
professionals involved in this case have the ability to
exchange information and recommendations to ensure
that the best interests of the children are at least fostered
by these helping professionals if not by the children's
parents.
We are thus unpersuaded by Husband's arguments, especially considering
the judge's comprehensive twenty-seven page written decision addressing, in
part, Husband's motion to reconsider her initial ruling on the parenting-time and
children-exchange issues. Judge Sheedy clarified that, although the parties were
to discuss the issues with the co-parenting therapist, she did not abdicate her
responsibilities to the therapist, noting that her prior order did not require the
co-parenting therapist to make decisions. The judge sought to employ the
applicable MSA provisions which she determined made "clear that the co-
parenting therapist is to try to get the parties to effectively co-parent." The judge
was "not satisfied that . . . Husband actually followed the [c]ourt['s] [o]rder and
A-5442-17T3
7
the parties' agreement which made it clear" they "were to [first] discuss
parenting[-]time" and children-exchange issues with the co-parenting therapist.
Instead, it appeared to the judge that the co-parenting therapist offered dates,
but appointments were never scheduled. Judge Sheedy reminded the parties that
they "must comply with their bargained for MSA, and must learn to
communicate with each other as adults, and the parents of their children."
We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of
discretion, Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996), which
occurs "when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably
departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis,'" U.S.
Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467-68 (2012) (quoting Iliadis v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)). We perceive no abuse in
discretion in the judge's denial of Husband's motion to reconsider her ruling on
the parenting-time and children-exchange issues. See R. 4:49-2; see also Pitney
Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App.
Div. 2015). As the judge ruled, the parties were required to follow the terms of
their MSA, not only to resolve their disputes but to learn to effectively co-parent,
a goal that is certainly in their children's best interests. Neither the co-parenting
therapist nor the parenting coordinator were to make decisions, which the judge
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made clear she was prepared to address if the parties' efforts were not fruitful.
Indeed, the MSA provides, "[t]he parties shall continue the appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator as set forth in the [COAPC]." The COAPC provides
"[t]he [p]arenting [c]oordinator shall not have authority to conduct parenting[-
]time or custody evaluations or to make recommendations concerning said
issue." It delineates the parenting coordinator's scope of authority and outlines
she or he is authorized to make recommendations about issues that may include:
 Interpretation and implementation of the parties'
existing Parenting Time Order.
 Dates, time, places, and conditions for transitions
between households.
 Temporary variation from the schedule for a
special event or particular special circumstance.
 Information exchange (school, health, social,
etc.) and communication about the children.
 Clarification of provisions in the existing
Parenting Time Order including, but not limited
to, holiday and vacation plans.
 Communications with the children when they are
in the other household.
If the parties could not heed the judge's call to "work together" to resolve
issues through their chosen procedure—what Judge Sheedy aptly described as
"an elaborate system [they devised] to help them reach an agreement"—they
A-5442-17T3
9
were free to apply to the Family Part who would then decide if changed
circumstances or the children's best interests require a modification of the MSA
and whether a plenary hearing is necessary.
We, likewise, discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's denial of the
balance of Husband's motion for reconsideration, and we also affirm
substantially for the reasons Judge Sheedy delineated in her written opinion. In
granting, in part, Husband's requests regarding the MSA and COAPC provisions
about the extent of the parenting coordinator's role, the judge, again, merely
enforced the parties' MSA. Husband's argument that the judge "unjustifiably
found that a plenary hearing would be required to interpret the parties' MSA" is
entirely meritless. As Husband's counsel conceded at oral argument before us,
the judge's comment was made during colloquy at oral argument and was not
part of the judge's ruling. Judge Sheedy granted Husband's requested relief in
accord with the MSA and COAPC terms, reiterating:
The [c]ourt will not modify the parties' MSA or the
COAPC in anyway, but will enforce the terms within
both agreements as they pertain to the parties' use of the
[parenting coordinator]. The parties are to continue to
use both the co-parenting therapist and the parent[ing]
coordinator as the agreement specifies.
We agree with her interpretation and decision.
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10
The judge also denied Husband's request to modify the MSA provision
that "[e]ach party shall be responsible for the co-parenting therapist['s] fees/time
with the Husband paying 90% and the Wife paying 10% of same" to require the
parties to equally split those fees. At oral argument, the judge stated to
husband's counsel:
And your client wants to do away with the therapist,
that's the flavor I get from your papers. Your client
wants to do away with the therapist because he has to
pay [ninety] percent of the therapist. . . . He wanted to
change the amount of the therapist, the cost of the
therapist, and really he wants to rely solely on the
parenting coordinator and that's not their agreement.
Their agreement is therapy and coordinate, right?
The judge perspicaciously determined Husband's motive was financially driven
to avoid the two-step process set in place by the parties' agreement, rejecting
Husband's contention that "revision [was] necessary to prevent the continued
abuse of the dispute resolution process agreed upon by the parties." Inasmuch
as the judge concluded the parties had yet to avail themselves of that process
vis-à-vis the issues presented by Husband, we see no error in the judge's decision
to adhere to the MSA terms.
Husband also argues the judge erred in denying his request to have Wife
pay her outstanding bill for the parent coordinator's fees. The judge denied the
motion without prejudice because
A-5442-17T3
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Wife certified that she is disputing charges incurred by
the parties in their use of the [parenting coordinator].
Wife further certified that the amount the parties owe
to the [parenting coordinator] may fluctuate based on
the outcome of her grievance dispute with the
[parenting coordinator]. At this time, the [c]ourt will
not require Wife to remit payment within seven days
based on her grievances with the [parenting
coordinator].
We agree with her sound reasoning.
Husband also contends the judge erred by denying his request for a right
of first refusal if Wife was out of the State without the children. The judge
directed the parties to follow their MSA which provides: "The parties will
address the right of first refusal which shall be defined as an overnight without
the children with Dr. Baszczuk[, w]hich recommendation shall be binding if the
parties reached an agreement." The judge also granted Wife's "request to
enforce paragraph 31 of the MSA, such that the parties will address the right of
first refusal" with the co-parenting therapist.
Husband also challenges the judge's decision to grant Wife's requests to
enforce: "paragraph 42 of the MSA such that the other parent must be notified
of any and all detailed medical information within 48 hours"; paragraph 56 of
the MSA, designating the children's physicians and alternates; and paragraph
40 of the MSA, prohibiting negative behavior in the parties' communications
A-5442-17T3
12
and requiring the parties follow specified "message rules and protocols
established by the parent coordinator and/or co-parenting therapist[.]" The court
reiterated, "Neither party shall engage in e-mail communication that is
demeaning, degrading, accusatory, or which includes negative insinuation s or
the recounting of past history." In so granting those requests, the court repeated:
"The [c]ourt, again, reminds both parties that they have a very detailed MSA, in
addition to the hired help of a co-parenting therapist and [parenting
coordinator]."
The judge's decision to enforce the parties' agreement and deny requests
to modify same reflected the strong public policy "favoring the use of
consensual agreements to resolve marital controversies." Konzelman v.
Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999). Judge Sheedy heeded the Konzelman
Court's caution that "it 'would be shortsighted and unwise for courts to reject out
of hand consensual solutions to vexatious personal matrimonial problems that
have been advanced by the parties themselves[,]'" Ibid. (quoting Petersen v.
Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 645 (1981)), and that "fair and definitive arrangements
arrived at by mutual consent should not be unnecessarily or lightly disturbed."
Id. at 193-94 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 358 (1977)).
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In light of the judge's authoritative decision, with which we wholly agree,
we determine Husband's arguments regarding the reconsideration motion are
without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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