PAUL MATTIA VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM (POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1182-16T2
PAUL MATTIA,
Petitioner-Appellant, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v. June 13, 2018
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND APPELLATE DIVISION
FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
______________________________
Argued telephonically May 4, 2018 –
Decided June 13, 2018
Before Judges Sabatino, Ostrer and Rose.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the
Police and Firemen's Retirement System,
Department of Treasury, PFRS No. 03-10-051127.
Brooke E, Bagley argued the cause for
appellant (Ricci, Fava & Bagley, LLC,
attorneys; Ronald J. Ricci, of counsel; Brooke
E. Bagley, on the brief).
Robert E. Kelly, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S.
Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa
Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Christina Cella, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROSE, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).
Petitioner Paul Mattia appeals from a final determination of
the Board of Trustees ("Board") of the Police and Firemen's
Retirement System ("PFRS"), finding he was not eligible for
accidental disability retirement benefits, pursuant to N.J.S.A.
43:16A-7. Mattia suffered a disabling injury when he slipped and
fell on ice in the parking lot of the jail where he was employed,
before he was able to check in and receive his assignment. Because
Mattia had not yet begun performing his regular assigned duties,
the Board denied his claim for accidental disability retirement
benefits, determining he was still commuting when he was injured.
In doing so, the Board rejected the decision of an Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ") granting Mattia's petition. We affirm, finding
Mattia was still commuting when he was injured in the parking lot.
The facts are essentially undisputed, and are summarized in
the initial decision by the ALJ as follows:
At 7:50 a.m. on the morning of February 19,
2014, Paul Mattia was a Senior Correction
Officer, whose regular assignment was as a
Gate Officer, employed by the New Jersey
Department of Corrections at Northern (Rahway)
State Prison.[1] Mattia drove to work, parked
his car in the employee parking lot, exited
the car, and walked in the parking lot
1
In his answers to interrogatories, submitted to the ALJ and
contained in the record on appeal, Mattia stated he previously
worked at both Northern State Prison and Rahway Prison, but was
working at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center in Avenel at
the time of the incident.
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directly towards the entrance portal of the
prison building where his post was located.
He was reporting for his shift, which was to
start at 8:00 a.m. and continue to 4:00 p.m.
There was ice in the parking lot. While
walking, Mattia stepped into an icy pothole
and fell down, sustaining various injuries.
These injuries are the subject of the Board's
July 13, 201[5] determination [that Mattia is
totally and permanently disabled]. Two
photographs . . . show that the location of
the accident was adjacent to parked cars and
the prison building at which Mattia worked.
The photographs depict the distance of the
accident location from the parked cars, from
the prison building, and from the portal
towards which Mattia was walking when the
accident occurred.[2]
The sole issue presented to the ALJ was "whether [Mattia's]
disability resulted from an injury which he sustained 'during and
as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties.'"
See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43; Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., 192 N.J. 189,
212-13 (2007). Both parties moved for summary disposition and
presented documentary evidence at the hearing, but no witnesses
testified.
Among other documents, the Board submitted for the ALJ's
consideration a "Supervisor's Accident Investigation Report,"
listing Mattia's job duties as: "Watching [r]esidents; pat
2
Both photographs are contained in the record on appeal, but the
prison building and "portal" are not clearly depicted. Also, the
distances referenced generally by the ALJ are not numerically
measured on the photographs or specified elsewhere in the record.
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frisking [r]esidents; [w]alking [a]round work [a]rea; [r]esponding
to incidents." The Board also submitted a document entitled,
"Physical Demands Analysis," dated January 8, 2015, indicating
Mattia was "exposed to . . . environmental conditions
(temp[erature], hazards, etc.) . . . outside when walking between
compounds."
Mattia submitted his answers to interrogatories with
attachments for the ALJ's review. He defined his job duties as
including "security of the gate, entry into the facility, inmate
transfers to and from facility, inmate supervision as well as
tasks/orders directed by supervising officers." He also
referenced and included a three-page document entitled "Job
Specification," defining the position of a Senior Correction
Officer, and setting forth "examples of work for this title . . .
for illustrative purposes only." Two of the eighteen examples
listed for the Job Specification are set forth as follows:
Conducts periodic inspections of the locks,
windows, bars and grills, doors and gates, and
other places of possible egress . . . .
Notes suspicious persons and conditions and
takes appropriate measures in reporting
significant actions, and occurrences in the
buildings and on the grounds; reports
conditions constituting dangers and hazards;
and takes the necessary steps to assure safe
and orderly conditions.
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The ALJ found Mattia's documents "speak for themselves."
Relying on the examples cited by Mattia, the ALJ determined
Mattia's application for accidental disability retirement should
be granted. The ALJ reasoned:
It is apparent that Mattia's employer called
upon him to exercise vigilance inside and
outside the prison at any time and any place
he happened to be present. Obviously, this
included the minutes spent before and after
his shift began or ended; it included his time
inside the building and outside the building.
It follows . . . that per his job description,
Mattia was performing his duties as soon as
he arrived by car on the premises, continued
as he alighted from his vehicle to walk to the
entrance portal where his post was located,
and continued throughout the course of his
shift. . . . Mattia's commute ended as soon
as his vehicle arrived on his employer's
premises, whereupon his regular or assigned
duties immediately commenced, even before his
shift officially began. . . . [A]s Mattia
walked from his parked car to the entrance
portal of the building, he was duty-bound to
exercise the vigilance set forth in his Job
Description and thereby was engaged in conduct
that was preliminary but necessary to the
performance of his work duties.
After the Board filed exceptions and Mattia filed a reply,
the Board determined Mattia was still in the process of commuting
at the time of his accident. In its October 18, 2016 final
decision, the Board adopted the findings of fact set forth in the
ALJ's initial decision, with modification, but rejected the ALJ's
conclusion of law that the incident at issue occurred during and
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as a result of Mattia's assigned duties. In doing so, the Board
rejected the ALJ's determination that "Mattia had a duty to perform
work tasks on the way into his employer's building and was actually
performing said tasks when he was injured." This appeal followed.
The standard of review that applies in an appeal from a state
agency decision is well established. "Judicial review of an
agency's final decision is generally limited to a determination
of whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
or lacks fair support in the record." Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs.,
431 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Hemsey v. Bd. of
Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223 (2009)). In
reviewing an administrative decision, we ordinarily recognize the
agency's expertise in its particular field. Ibid. However, we
are not bound by an agency's statutory interpretation or other
legal determinations. Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's
Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011). Indeed, as we recognized today
in Bowser v. Police & Firemen's Retirement System, ___ N.J. Super.
___, ___ (App. Div. 2018) (slip op. at 7), "we owe no deference
to an administrative agency's interpretation of judicial
precedent."
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43, a member of PFRS may be
retired on an accidental disability pension if the "employee is
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permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic
event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his
regular or assigned duties." See also Richardson, 192 N.J. at
213-15 (holding that in order to qualify for such benefits, a
member of the retirement system must establish, among other things,
that "the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the
member's regular or assigned duties").
Mattia argues that the Board misinterpreted the law in
disqualifying him from accidental disability retirement benefits,
and Kasper v. Board of Trustees, Teachers' Pension and Annuity
Fund, 164 N.J. 564 (2000) compels a different finding by this
court. Specifically, Mattia claims his commute was completed when
he arrived in the parking lot and was "doing something preparatory
to [his] job function like making way to the entrance of [his] job
heading to [his] post." We disagree.
In Kasper, the petitioner was an education media specialist,
who was assaulted and robbed on the stairway entrance to a school
forty-five minutes before the school day began. Id. at 570.
Kasper arrived early because she was tasked with distributing
media material prior to the official start of classes. Id. at
571. The Court found that since Kasper had "parked her car,
crossed the street to the school, and was negotiating the stairs"
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of the school when the incident occurred, her commute was completed
and she was in the performance of her duties when she was injured.
Id. at 588.
In reaching its decision, the Court noted the amendments to
the accidental disability statutes, requiring the traumatic event
occur "during and as a result of the performance of [the
employee's] regularly assigned duties," was "intended to
reestablish the integrity of the premises rule and eliminate the
judicially created exceptions to the going and coming rule." Id.
at 580. In doing so, the Court recognized agency decisions
determining that an employee was still commuting when the employee
"was not yet engaged in his or her employment duties on property
owned or controlled by the employer." Id. at 581-82. For example,
the Court cited Lewis-Miles v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees'
Retirement System, TYP 8932-96, initial decision, (July 16, 1998),
adopted, (Aug. 20, 1998),
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/final/typ8932-96.pdf,
(denying accidental disability benefits for an employee who was
injured when her car slid on ice and struck another vehicle shortly
after she drove through the front gate of her employer's facility),
and Estate of Matza v. Board of Trustees, Teachers' Pension and
Annuity Fund, 96 N.J.A.R.2d 224, (Div. of Pensions) (denying such
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benefits where a teacher slipped and fell on ice when walking
across the parking lot to his employer's school).
Therefore, to qualify for accidental disability retirement
benefits, an employee cannot merely be coming to, or going from
work. Id. at 581. Rather, the employee "must be engaged in his
or her employment duties on property owned or controlled by the
employer." Id. at 581. In sum, in order to qualify for accidental
disability benefits, employees must satisfy the statutory criteria
that they were on the work premises and performing a function
causally connected to their work. Id. at 588.
We conclude, as did the Board, that Mattia had not yet
completed his commute when he was injured, and was not performing
any function connected to his work assignment when he was injured.3
For example, he was not chasing an escapee, but merely walking
from his car to the prison entrance, when he slipped and fell on
ice in the parking lot.
Moreover, the record before us does not establish what
Mattia's particular assignment would have been on the day of the
3
In light of our disposition that Mattia was not engaged in or
assigned to perform any work-related activity before the start of
his shift, we need not reach, in this appeal, the question of
whether the area where he fell in the parking lot can be considered
part of his work location.
9 A-1182-16T2
incident. The Job Specification document relied upon by the ALJ
lists examples of work for a "Senior Correction Officer," in
general, as evidenced by the notation which precedes the eighteen
examples, that they "are for illustrative purposes only." The
record is devoid of evidence that any of the examples listed
describe Mattia's specific job duties at the time of the incident.
Even if Mattia were specifically tasked with the duties generally
described in the examples, none of the examples supports the ALJ's
finding that Mattia's employer "called upon him to exercise
vigilance inside and outside the prison at any time and any place
he happened to be present."
Rather, the record before the ALJ and this court reveals that
Mattia's specific job duties did not include before-hours
vigilance in the parking lot. In particular, the only mention in
the record of his "outside" work activities is "walking between
compounds." While the record does not establish whether the
parking lot is located between compounds, the record does indicate
that Mattia had not yet reported to his work assignment when he
was injured. Further, the record is devoid of any evidence that
Mattia was required to report early to work on the day he was
injured, for example, to surveil the parking lot for safety.
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Although the Board found Mattia's injury was directly caused
by the incident, that finding alone does not satisfy the statutory
requirement "the injury occurred during and as a result of the
performance of his regular or assigned duties." N.J.S.A. 43:15A-
43. Predicated upon the factual scenario presented here, when
considered with controlling law, we conclude Mattia's injury was
not causally connected to his work. As such, we are in accord
with the Board that Mattia's claim does not satisfy the criteria
for eligibility for accidental disability retirement benefits.
We, therefore, conclude from our review of the record that
the Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable
and was supported by sufficient credible evidence. Accordingly,
there is no basis to alter the Board's decision. See In Re Young,
202 N.J. 50, 70 (2010) (upholding an agency decision where "there
was substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to
support the agency's findings").
Affirmed.
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