STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LUQMAN ABDULLAH (09-10-0928, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
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    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5547-16T1
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    LUQMAN ABDULLAH,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Submitted September 17, 2019 – Decided October 18, 2019
    Before Judges Hoffman and Currier.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Union County, Indictment No. 09-10-0928.
    The Anthony Pope Law Firm, PC, attorneys for
    appellant (Annette Verdesco and Eric William
    Feinberg, on the briefs).
    Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor,
    attorney for respondent (Michele C. Buckley, Special
    Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor
    and Reana Garcia, Special Deputy Attorney
    General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on
    the brief).
    Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Luqman Abdullah appeals from his conviction on numerous
    charges following a jury trial. He also asserts error in the denial of a pre-trial
    suppression motion and challenges the sneak and peek warrant. After a review
    of the arguments in light of the record and applicable principles of law, we
    affirm.
    I.
    A.
    We derive the facts from the evidence elicited at trial. In 2009, numerous
    law enforcement agencies in Union County, including the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation, began a joint narcotics investigation, targeting a suspected drug
    distribution network. A wiretap of a local drug dealer revealed the identities of
    the dealer's drug suppliers — one was Abdul Hassan. Defendant was observed
    at Hassan's residence. Further investigation disclosed defendant frequented
    several homes; he was often at his girlfriend's residence in Newark, his mother's
    home in Elizabeth and at his own residence in Sayreville. Defendant was
    observed driving numerous vehicles, only one of which was registered in his
    name.
    A-5547-16T1
    2
    Tracking devices on defendant's vehicles showed him frequently at an
    apartment building located on Chancellor Avenue in Newark. After police
    observed defendant enter the Chancellor Avenue parking lot several times, only
    remaining in the building ten to fifteen minutes, they suspected the residence
    was a "stash location," "a place where drugs were sold . . . or kept."
    When law enforcement surveilled defendant, they noticed he was
    "extremely surveillance conscious" and would drive erratically, such as driving
    too fast, making "many lane changes," frequently stopping on the side of the
    road, and circling around the block numerous times. Elizabeth Police Detective
    Daniel Merten testified that "squaring of blocks" and stopping frequently on the
    side of the road normally indicates counter surveillance techniques used by
    people trying "to make sure they are not being followed."
    Since the Chancellor Avenue residence was an apartment complex, law
    enforcement did not know which apartment was being used to manufacture and
    distribute drugs. A review of the electric bills for the entire complex showed
    apartment D2's bill was "unusually low," roughly ten dollars a month. In order
    to ascertain whether D2 was the correct apartment, an undercover detective
    walked into the building at the same time as Hassan, and observed him entering
    D2. As a result, law enforcement installed a camera in the hallway facing doors
    A-5547-16T1
    3
    D1, D2, and D3. This camera captured defendant at the Chancellor Avenue
    residence on April 12 and April 14, 2009.
    Shortly thereafter, a detective for the Union County Prosecutor's Office
    sought legal authorization via a "sneak and peek"1 in order "to plant . . . a 'bug'
    or a listening device" in apartment D2. A 127-page affidavit supported the
    application for the warrant. The search warrant was issued on April 17, 2009.
    In the early morning hours of April 22, 2009, officers physically entered
    apartment D2. Once inside, law enforcement observed that "it appeared that no
    one was living there;" there was "little to no furniture," no toiletries, no
    silverware, no food, and no bed. As they entered the kitchen, they noticed there
    was powder covering the floor, the cupboards were open with "large rock -like
    substances in plastic bags," there was baking soda, Pyrex containers, a "scale
    with powder substance on it," knives and razor blades covered in powder,
    "[p]ackaging material, ziplock bags, plastic bags, [and] rubber gloves."
    Additionally, they saw white powder covering the stove. Although the officers
    believed they were witnessing the production of controlled dangerous
    substances (CDS), specifically cocaine, they did not do a "thorough and
    1
    The detective described a "sneak and peek" as a "covert entry . . . into [an]
    apartment" where law enforcement "look[s] for a . . . position to place a listening
    device."
    A-5547-16T1
    4
    exhaustive search" for drugs as they were there to find a location to position the
    listening device.
    During the sneak and peek, law enforcement also observed a rifle and a
    handgun in two different closets. The officers recorded what they saw upon
    entering the apartment for the purpose of determining where to place the
    listening device, however, the video also captured the evidence found in the
    room. A sample of the powder and a rubber glove were taken for testing.
    Eleven hours after the search concluded, at 1:53 p.m. on April 22, 2009,
    defendant was observed leaving the apartment.          He was also seen at the
    apartment at 12:00 p.m. on April 23. Later that evening, at approximately 7:30
    p.m., police observed defendant leave apartment D2 and enter Hassan's Cadillac.
    The investigation ended that night after law enforcement became concerned that
    defendant and the other suspects were suspicious that they were being
    investigated.
    Arrest warrants were issued for defendant and Hassan. 2          A team of
    detectives and state troopers located Hassan's car parked outside a restaurant.
    When defendant and Hassan came out of the restaurant, the officers "jumped out
    of the car," "rushed both individuals," screamed "[p]olice, freeze, get down on
    2
    Twenty-four people were arrested as a result of the investigation.
    A-5547-16T1
    5
    the ground," "threw a distraction device down," used lights and sirens, and began
    a foot pursuit of the suspects.
    As both men began to flee, the officers chased them, screaming, "[p]olice
    stop, police stop, you're under arrest."        Defendant did not stop and law
    enforcement could not catch him.         Hassan ran across the street, but then
    surrendered to police and was arrested.
    That same night, law enforcement executed numerous search warrants for
    residences connected with defendant.          During a search of his girlfriend's
    apartment, law enforcement found mail addressed to defendant, two cell phones,
    three pictures of defendant hidden in the refrigerator, and $5000 in cash in the
    living room closet.
    The police also obtained a search warrant for apartment D2. They again
    noticed the scarce furnishings, only a couch and chair, and noted the apartment
    did not have a refrigerator, dishes, kitchen utensils, toiletries, or clothing in the
    closets.
    During their search, the police found: a .45 caliber automatic firearm
    loaded with four rounds, a 7.62 x 39 rifle with two magazine clips and thirty-
    three rounds, a Ruger gun box, respirator masks, a prescription morphine bottle
    with seven pills, a plastic bag containing sixteen bricks and one bundle of
    A-5547-16T1
    6
    heroine, four plastic bags and four gloves, a .40 caliber firearm, a box of .9
    millimeter Luger pistol cartridges with forty-five bullets, three Pyrex measuring
    cups, scales, ziplock bags containing suspected CDS, baking soda, a bottle of
    rum, a red lighter, knives, numerous black bags and paper plates, one kilo of
    suspected cocaine in two plastic bags, and numerous bags of a rock-like
    substance which was suspected to be cocaine. In a search of Hassan's residence,
    the police found: a box of checks in Hassan's name, Hassan's Visa card, Hassan's
    passport, keys to his vehicle, six empty holders for a cell phone's SIM card,
    seven new SIM cards in their holders, five cell phones, and $6011 in cash
    discovered in three different rooms in the home.
    Police executed a no-knock search warrant for the Sayreville residence
    where they found defendant's insurance card, three cell phones, defendant's
    checkbook, defendant's BMW contract, defendant's driver's license, and $21,995
    in cash hidden in two articles of clothing in the master bedroom closet and the
    hallway closet.
    After searching apartment D2, law enforcement searched a vehicle
    associated with defendant that was parked at the building. The search produced:
    insurance papers issued to defendant, a Bank of America checkbook in
    defendant's name, receipts from BMW listing defendant as the customer, an
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    7
    Alamo rental receipt listing defendant as the renter, contractor estimate papers
    in defendant's mother's name, and a dry cleaning receipt in defendant's name.
    Testing on the seized materials from apartment D2 confirmed the
    substances were: 1.79 grams of morphine, 21.17 grams of heroin, and
    approximately 2,850 grams of cocaine. Fingerprints from Hassan and the other
    supplier were on numerous pieces of evidence. Defendant's fingerprint was
    found on one kilo wrapper.
    The lab testing also determined defendant's DNA was a match with a water
    bottle and latex gloves found in the apartment. Of the twenty-eight gloves that
    were analyzed, all "either contained a [DNA] profile that was a match to
    [defendant] or a profile where he could not be excluded as a contributor."
    B.
    On September 24, 2009, five months after defendant had eluded police,
    Clifton police conducted a routine traffic stop and pulled over a Jeep Cherokee
    for improperly tinted windows. The police asked both the driver and passenger
    to step out of the car. The passenger was described as six feet tall, approximately
    195 pounds, wearing a black shirt and a baseball cap, and had tattoos on both
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    8
    elbows: a spider web on his left and dog tags on his right. 3 The passenger was
    later identified as defendant.
    When defendant asked to sit on the curb, the police agreed, but instead of
    sitting, defendant "took off running using the curb almost like a shuttle block."
    As defendant fled across Route 3, the baseball cap "flew off his head and
    dropped to the ground." Defendant ran through six lanes of traffic, jumped over
    the four foot concrete barrier in the highway, ran through a gas station, and fled
    into a wooded area behind the highway. The police were unable to catch up
    with him. DNA testing on the baseball cap showed defendant's DNA was a
    match with the cap.
    II.
    In October 2009, defendant was charged in an indictment with: first-
    degree racketeering, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(c) and 2C:41-2(d) (counts one and two);
    second-degree conspiracy, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (count three); first-degree
    maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (count four); third-degree possession of a controlled
    dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (counts five, eight, and eleven);
    first-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to
    3
    The parties stipulated at trial that defendant had these tattoos on his elbows.
    A-5547-16T1
    9
    distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(1) (count six); third-degree
    possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute on or
    within 1,000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (counts seven and ten);
    third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to
    distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(3) (count nine); second-
    degree unlawful possession of a weapon (assault firearm), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f)
    (count twelve); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-5(b) (count thirteen); second-degree possession of a firearm in the course
    of committing a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.l(a) (count
    fourteen); third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 (count
    fifteen); fourth-degree prohibited device, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d) (count sixteen);
    third-degree financial facilitation of criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a)
    (count seventeen); fourth-degree resisting arrest (by flight), N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)
    (counts eighteen and twenty-two); third-degree hindering apprehension,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a) (count nineteen); third-degree hindering apprehension or
    prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(4) (count twenty); third-degree false
    A-5547-16T1
    10
    government documents, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.l(c) (count twenty-one); third-degree
    hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) (count twenty-three).4
    On the same day, defendant was charged in a second indictment with
    second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7. Three
    years later, in December 2012, defendant surrendered to the prosecutor's office.
    III.
    A.
    Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence
    seized during the sneak and peek search, asserting law enforcement lacked
    probable cause to obtain the warrant. 5 The trial judge disagreed, noting that
    [the warrant judge is] looking for probable cause that
    . . . there are criminal activities that are happening in
    that particular apartment in that particular location and
    whether there's probable cause for that. And he's
    looking at the totality of the activities vis-à-vis that
    apartment, not just probable cause relating to . . . the
    defendant here.
    Because the sneak and peek only required probable cause that the apartment had
    a connection to drug activity, the judge denied the suppression motion.
    4
    Counts seven, ten, twenty-one, twenty-two, and twenty-three were dismissed
    before trial.
    5
    The motion was originally filed as a motion to dismiss the indictment; counsel
    amended his request during argument on the application.
    A-5547-16T1
    11
    B.
    In the seven years that elapsed between the investigation and trial,
    defendant's appearance dramatically changed. In 2009 defendant was described
    as having long dreadlocks, light facial hair, a muscular-athletic build, weighing
    200 pounds, and six feet tall. In 2016, defendant had shorter hair without
    dreadlocks, a full beard that covered his chin, and "a slender build." As a result,
    the State sought to introduce police opinion testimony of defendant's
    identification.
    During the ensuing Rule 104 hearing, the State produced Detective Vito
    Colacitti, the lead detective in the narcotics investigation. Colacitti stated he
    first became familiar with defendant through his law enforcement experience in
    2000.     Prior to the subject investigation, Colacitti had looked at arrest
    photographs of defendant, motor vehicle photographs and had seen him
    numerous times in person. Although defendant's appearance had changed in the
    seven years proceeding trial, Colacitti testified that his "facial features [were]
    exactly the same."
    On cross-examination, Colacitti stated he had seen defendant "a dozen
    times" between 2002 and the time of the subject investigation.              Those
    observations were all made while the detective was driving in a car performing
    A-5547-16T1
    12
    his duties as a member of the prosecutor's narcotics task force. After the subject
    investigation began, Colacitti said he physically observed defendant, in person,
    five times. He also intended to identify defendant to the jury on the surveillance
    videos.
    On September 29, 2016, the trial judge issued an oral decision, finding the
    State could present opinion testimony through Colacitti to identify defendant.
    The judge distinguished this matter from State v. Lazo, 
    209 N.J. 9
    , 22-24 (2012),
    because here there was a "change of appearance." He explained that in Lazo,
    the Court found it was error to allow the detective to offer lay opinion testimony
    on the defendant's appearance because "the detective's ID was not based on prior
    knowledge . . . [he] had not witnessed the crime, did not know the defendant,
    [there was] no change in appearance, and the ID was based merely on the
    victim's description." 
    Id. at 24.
    In contrast, the judge found here that Colacitti
    had personal knowledge of defendant's appearance during the narcotics
    investigation and had observed defendant in person and over surveillance
    footage "commit acts in furtherance of the crime while they were going on."
    Therefore, the judge permitted Colacitti to testify about defendant's
    appearance during the investigation, his physical observations of defendant, the
    differences in defendant's appearance, and to discuss the videos "where he
    A-5547-16T1
    13
    actually [saw defendant's] facial features and [was] able . . . to identify [that the]
    person in the video [was] . . . defendant."
    The judge precluded Colacitti from testifying about any observations or
    knowledge of defendant prior to the narcotics investigation because it was not
    relevant, exposed defendant to "significant [Rule] 403 issues," and "could
    potentially prejudice the defense on cross-examination."
    C.
    The State also intended to introduce, under the attenuation doctrine, the
    baseball cap seized during the traffic stop in 2009. In the criminal case against
    the driver of the Jeep, the driver had moved to suppress the evidence seized
    during the stop. Although the judge 6 there determined the stop was proper, he
    found the subsequent warrantless              search   was unjustified under the
    circumstances. After the officers were satisfied that the Jeep was not stolen, the
    judge found they should have written a ticket and walked away. Therefore, the
    judge suppressed the evidence as to the driver of the car. Defendant here sought
    to suppress the baseball hat under the same premise.
    6
    A different judge presided over the Jeep driver's suppression motion than the
    trial judge in this case.
    A-5547-16T1
    14
    Although the trial judge here agreed with his colleague's determination
    regarding the constitutionality of the stop and subsequent search of the car, he
    found the prior decision had not addressed the attenuation doctrine. He stated
    that because the Jeep driver "did not do anything . . . to trigger any attenuation
    argument" as he was "totally cooperative" and "didn't run," the driver and
    defendant were "very differently situated" regarding attenuation. In addition,
    the State sought to use the hat as evidence against defendant, not the Jeep driver.
    As a result, an attenuation hearing was conducted.
    The only witness to testify at the hearing was the Clifton police officer
    who had made the traffic stop. Following his testimony, in an oral decision on
    September 28, 2016, the trial judge found the attenuation doctrine required the
    denial of defendant's motion to suppress the baseball cap.
    In making this determination, the judge considered the three factors set
    forth in State v. Herrerra, 
    211 N.J. 308
    , 331 (2012) (quoting State v. Johnson,
    
    118 N.J. 639
    , 653 (1990)), to evaluate whether the seized hat was sufficiently
    attenuated from the taint of the unconstitutional search: "'(1) the temporal
    proximity between the illegal conduct and the challenged evidence; (2) the
    presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the
    police conduct.'"
    A-5547-16T1
    15
    Although the judge found the first factor weighed in favor of defendant,
    he concluded it was "substantially outweighed by the other two factors." The
    judge noted that eluding the police and resisting arrest in response to an
    unconstitutional stop was an intervening act. He also found the officers had
    acted in good faith in stopping the vehicle based on the traffic violation and also
    their observation of damage to the passenger door. He stated the officers then
    took further action because they believed the driver was covering up the smell
    of marijuana or involved in a theft. The judge found: "Although their beliefs
    were insufficient to continue their stop, their actions could hardly be described
    as flagrant misconduct."
    As to intervening circumstances, the judge found defendant's actions in
    disobeying police commands to sit on the curb and to stop as he fled across six
    lanes of traffic and over a center barrier in heavy traffic "posed a risk of physical
    injury to police officers, members of the public, and defendant himself." The
    judge found the "significant intervening circumstances" supported the
    application of the attenuation doctrine and required the denial of the suppression
    motion.
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    16
    D.
    At the conclusion of the State's case, defendant moved for acquittal under
    State v. Reyes, 
    50 N.J. 454
    , 458-59 (1967). Defense counsel argued the State
    lacked proof to connect defendant to the crimes charged in the indictment. After
    hearing argument, the judge stated he was "satisfied under the Reyes standard
    that there[] [was] more than enough information to send all of the[] counts to
    the jury." The judge clarified he was not determining whether the State had
    proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but under the applicable standard, he
    believed there was "sufficient evidence that . . . defendant controlled . . .
    apartment [D2] and what was in it and was involved in this activity with at least
    . . . Hassan and . . . [the second drug supplier] and that there were repeated
    possessions with intent predicate acts."
    E.
    Prior to presenting his case, defense counsel sought to admit an invoice
    from a North Carolina Hilton Hotel to refute a police report prepared during the
    narcotics investigation that described surveillance of defendant on a particular
    day in a mall parking lot. The invoice showed defendant's credit card was used
    on that same day at the North Carolina hotel. The prosecution had not discussed
    A-5547-16T1
    17
    this day of surveillance in its direct case and the officer who prepared the report
    did not testify at trial.
    Defendant sought to introduce the hotel invoice to establish he was in
    North Carolina at the time of the purported surveillance and, therefore, the
    police officer, and by extension, all of the law enforcement involved in the
    investigation, misidentified defendant. Counsel intended to call David Mast, an
    employee of Hilton Short Hills, to authenticate the invoice.
    Counsel for Hilton and Mast explained to the court that Mast worked for
    a corporate Hilton in New Jersey and the North Carolina location was a franchise
    that may not have adopted the policies and procedures of the Hilton Corporation.
    With regard to the actual invoice, the Hilton counsel thought Mast could testify
    that it "look[ed] like a Hilton invoice," but he could not corroborate it came from
    the Charlotte, North Carolina Hilton.
    In response, the State presented several arguments as to the relevancy and
    probative value of the invoice. In particular, the State contended there was no
    testimony that it was defendant himself who checked into the North Carolina
    hotel or that the person who checked in even presented any form of
    identification. Mast could not authenticate "whether ID was required or shown,
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    whose ID was shown, [or] whether the person who showed up is the same person
    who paid for the room."
    The judge denied defendant's request to admit the invoice and precluded
    Mast's testimony because it was "very minimally probative and ha[d] the
    potential to lead to . . . confusion." He determined that Mast, as a Hilton
    employee in New Jersey, could not testify about any policies or procedures that
    were in place at the North Carolina Hilton franchise in 2009.
    F.
    During the charge conference, defendant requested the judge address his
    allegations regarding tampering of the evidence and defects in the chain of
    custody of evidence when charging the jury. Defense counsel proposed the
    following charge:7
    The defense has elicited testimony that with
    respect to the handling and storage of certain physical
    evidence the police without justification or explanation
    failed to follow police department protocol, and rules
    for the handling and storage of physical evidence, and
    for maintaining the integrity of the chain of custody
    which is necessary to assure the accuracy and validity
    of the evidence.
    7
    The charge was not read into the record during the charge conference. Defense
    counsel read the proposed charge into the record during argument on his motion
    for a new trial.
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    [. . . .]
    If you find that the State has not met its burden in this
    regard and you are left with the finding that you are not
    reasonably certain that there was no alteration or
    modification of — or tampering with such evidence,
    then you may disregard and not consider such evidence
    in relation to your deliberations. And you may further
    conclude that the State's failure in this regard
    constitutes reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.
    The judge agreed it was appropriate to charge the jury on this issue, but
    disagreed with defense counsel's proposed language. He stated:
    I'm not giving that charge. I think it's -- I think it's
    covered elsewhere, and it's exactly what I had in mind
    when you had me strike portions of their charge when
    you said it sounds just like what their summation is
    going to be. It's not -- it's your -- most of this is covered
    elsewhere. The first half of it is covered elsewhere, and
    the second half of it is your summation.
    The judge then read his charge to counsel. Defense counsel admitted that he
    "would prefer [his proposed] charge," but agreed to the judge's charge.
    Therefore, the judge instructed the jury:
    The defense has raised the issue of alleged
    defects in the chain of custody regarding kilo wrappers
    and gloves. You must determine whether there are such
    defects and the weight to give to such evidence. If you
    find there are any defects in the chain of custody, you
    may consider them in determining what weight to give
    to the testimony regarding the gloves and kilo
    wrappers. The State alleges that those items were in the
    same or substantially similar condition from when the
    A-5547-16T1
    20
    evidence was seized from 129 Chancellor Avenue,
    Apartment D2, until it was received by the laboratory.
    Defense counsel did not object.
    Defendant was found guilty on all counts on November 9, 2016.
    III.
    On December 12, 2016, the court and counsel received an anonymous
    letter purportedly written by a juror. 8 In this letter, the writer stated that before
    the jury was charged, the jurors discussed the case at a restaurant, Googled
    defendant, and learned he was "a leader of a street gang." Upon learning this
    information, the letter stated that several jurors were prejudiced against
    defendant and concluded that he was guilty. Moreover, the letter stated that on
    one or two occasions, numerous jurors saw defendant wearing shackles and
    noted that "he looked darker and menacing while in handcuffs." The letter
    concluded in stating the jurors should be recalled and questioned about their
    deliberations.   "Ms. Honest" signed the letter and listed a fictitious return
    address. Subsequent testing of the letter showed no fingerprints on the envelope
    and insufficient DNA despite the letter being "licked and sealed shut."
    8
    The letter was not read into the record during the July 27, 2017 hearing on the
    motion for new trial. Nor was it included in the record provided to this court.
    We, therefore, derive our information from counsels' argument and the trial
    judge's summary of its contents.
    A-5547-16T1
    21
    A.
    Defendant's motion for a new trial was heard on July 21, 2017. Defense
    counsel asserted the court erred by not using his proposed charge in the
    tampering of evidence and chain of custody jury instruction. He argued there
    was sufficient evidence to suggest law enforcement had tampered with the
    evidence seized at apartment D2.       He reiterated there was no evidence to
    demonstrate defendant was involved in the drug operation, and therefore, he
    could not have been found guilty of racketeering. Additionally, defense counsel
    claimed the court erred in not recalling the jury and conducting a voir dire of the
    jurors after receiving the anonymous letter. Lastly, defense counsel argued the
    jurors were prejudiced against defendant because they saw him in handcuffs
    during the trial.
    The trial judge began his ruling in addressing the letter. He noted it was
    anonymous, typed, undated, unsigned, and had a fictitious return address. After
    citing to a plethora of legal authority, the judge found the letter was unreliable
    and determined defendant had "not made the strong showing necessary to
    warrant the extraordinary procedure of post-trial interrogation of the []trial
    jurors."
    A-5547-16T1
    22
    In considering defendant's argument that the jurors saw him in handcuffs,
    causing them to be prejudiced against him, the judge found the assertion was
    "not supported by anything in the record." He noted when defendant made the
    same allegation near the end of trial, the judge had determined there was no
    support for the assertion.
    At that time, defense counsel informed the court that although he had not
    seen a juror view defendant in handcuffs, defendant told him he thought the
    jurors had seen him cuffed. In response, the judge explained it was "impossible"
    because the door to the hallway was always locked when defendant was brought
    in or out of the courtroom. Additionally, a sheriff's officer was stationed outside
    the jury room door during those times and the jurors were not permitted outside
    the room when defendant was in transit.
    During his discussion of the issue following the motion for new trial, the
    judge explained that he, in addition to counsel, had reviewed the courtroom
    security footage, and particularly the segment where defendant alleged the jury
    had seen him in cuffs. With regard to that allegation, the judge described
    defendant as sitting at counsel table, which was about fifty feet from the jury
    room door. The video depicted defendant sitting in a high-chair, with his back
    to the jury room door. Based on "the distance, the angle, the high-back chair,
    A-5547-16T1
    23
    . . . [and] defendant's body blocking the view from anybody in the back of the
    [c]ourtoom," the judge concluded it was "impossible" for any juror in the jury
    room to have seen defendant in shackles. Additionally, the footage did not
    depict a juror near the door during this time; instead, it showed a sheriff's officer
    standing in the doorway. Therefore, he determined that no member of the jury
    had seen defendant in handcuffs.
    The judge denied defendant's motion for a new trial, referring to his prior
    rulings and finding there was "enough evidence in the record to support the
    predicate racketeering acts." His ruling was memorialized in a September 8,
    2017 order.
    IV.
    Defendant presents the following issues on appeal:
    I.   THE   TRIAL   COURT      COMMITTED
    REVERSIBLE   ERROR    IN   DENYING
    APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
    II.   THE   TRIAL   COURT     COMMITTED
    REVERSIBLE   ERROR   IN    DENYING
    APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT
    OF ACQUITTAL
    III.   THE   TRIAL   COURT    ABUSED   ITS
    DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE STATE'S
    MOTION TO PERMIT OPINION TESTIMONY
    RELATING TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF
    APPELLANT
    A-5547-16T1
    24
    IV.    THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
    DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
    SUPPRESS THE BASEBALL HAT AS
    EVIDENCE IN THE CASE
    V.    THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
    RULING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED
    FOR THE SNEAK AND PEEK WARRANT
    In defendant's supplemental pro se brief he argues:
    I.   THE COURT'S FAILURE TO ARTICULATE
    ANY FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
    ON DEFENDANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION,
    AND ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED
    AS A RESULT OF THE SNEAK AND PEEK
    WARRANT WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED
    BY PROBABLE CAUSE NOR STATUTORILY
    AUTHORIZED, WAS A VIOLATION OF THE
    FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND A DENIAL OF
    DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A
    FAIR    TRIAL    THEREFORE      THE
    CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED
    II.   THE PROSECUTOR’S USE OF A "SNEAK
    AND PEEK" SEARCH WARRANT AS A
    PRETEXT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE
    CAUSE FOR SUBSEQUENT SEARCH AND
    ARREST   WARRANTS   CREATED   AN
    APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY AND
    AMOUNTED TO MISCONDUCT THAT
    DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS DUE
    PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
    THEREFORE THE CONVICTION SHOULD
    BE REVERSED
    A-5547-16T1
    25
    A.
    We begin by addressing defendant's argument that probable cause was
    lacking for the sneak and peek warrant.       It is well settled that there is "a
    presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search
    warrant." State v. Broom-Smith, 
    406 N.J. Super. 228
    , 240 (App. Div. 2009)
    (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    , 171 (1978)). Our "role is not to
    determine anew whether there was probable cause for issuance of the warrant,
    but rather, whether there is evidence to support the finding made by the warrant -
    issuing judge." State v. Chippero, 
    201 N.J. 14
    , 20-21 (2009). Therefore, "[w]e
    accord substantial deference to the discretionary determination resulting in the
    issuance of the [search] warrant." State v. Sullivan, 
    169 N.J. 204
    , 211-12 (2001)
    (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Marshall, 
    123 N.J. 1
    , 72 (1991)). It is
    defendant's "burden to prove that there was no probable cause [to support] the
    issuance of the warrant . . . ." State v. Keyes, 
    184 N.J. 541
    , 554 (2005) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Probable cause is "consistently characterized . . . as a common-sense,
    practical standard for determining the validity of a search warrant." State v.
    Novembrino, 
    105 N.J. 95
    , 120 (1987). It is established when police have "'a
    well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed.'" Sullivan,
    A-5547-16T1
    
    26 169 N.J. at 211
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Waltz, 
    61 N.J. 83
    , 87 (1972)).
    Here, we are satisfied that the 127-page affidavit presented in support of
    the warrant provided ample evidence to support probable cause for the issuance
    of a sneak and peek warrant. The affidavit detailed the surveillance techniques
    used by law enforcement, the wiretapped conversations in which the speakers
    discussed narcotics sales, apartment D2's uncharacteristically low electric bills
    indicative of a stash location, and defendant's and the drug suppliers' "frequent
    and short visits" to the Chancellor Avenue building where none of the three
    lived.
    The affidavit sufficiently showed there was a "fair probability" and a
    "well-grounded suspicion" that criminal activity — the production of drugs —
    was occurring in apartment D2. See ibid.; State v. Demeter, 
    124 N.J. 374
    , 380-
    81 (1991). Under the substantial deference we accord to the warrant-issuing
    judge's finding, we are convinced there was sufficient evidence to support the
    sneak and peek warrant of apartment D2.
    A-5547-16T1
    27
    B.
    We likewise discern no error in the trial judge's denial of defendant's
    motion to suppress his baseball cap seized by the police after defendant fled
    from the traffic stop.
    In reviewing a motion to suppress, we defer to the factual and credibili ty
    findings of the trial court, "'so long as those findings are supported by sufficient
    credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Coles, 
    218 N.J. 322
    , 342 (2014)
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Hinton, 
    216 N.J. 211
    , 228
    (2013)). Deference is afforded because the findings of the trial judge . . . are
    substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to
    have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. State v.
    Reece, 
    222 N.J. 154
    , 166 (2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
    Here, the trial judge found the police effectuated a valid traffic stop in
    2009 but the subsequent warrantless search was not justified by the
    circumstances. However, the exclusionary rule will not require the suppression
    of   the   wrongfully-seized    evidence     if   "'the   connection   between   the
    unconstitutional police action and the secured evidence becomes so attenuated
    as to dissipate the taint from the unlawful conduct.'" State v. Shaw, 
    213 N.J. 398
    , 414 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Badessa,
    A-5547-16T1
    28
    
    185 N.J. 303
    , 311 (2005)). "[W]hen law enforcement officials secure evidence
    that is sufficiently independent of the illegal conduct — evidence that is not
    tainted by the misdeed — then withholding evidence from the trier of fact is a
    cost that may not be justified by the exclusionary rule." 
    Ibid. (citing Badessa, 185
    N.J. at 311).
    To determine whether a seizure of evidence is sufficiently attenuated from
    an unlawful search, a court must consider three factors: "(1) 'the temporal
    proximity' between the illegal conduct and the challenged evidence; (2) 'the
    presence of intervening circumstances'; and (3) 'particularly, the purpose and
    flagrancy of the official misconduct.'" 
    Id. at 415
    (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 
    422 U.S. 590
    , 602-04 (1975)); accord State v. Williams, 
    192 N.J. 1
    , 15 (2007)
    (Williams I).
    Here, an analysis of the three factors favors the State and supports the
    admission of the hat under the attenuation doctrine.            Only the temporal
    proximity factor weighs in favor of defendant because the chase occurred a short
    time between the police ordering defendant out of the car and his subsequent
    flight.     However, "temporal proximity 'is the least determinative' factor."
    Williams 
    I, 192 N.J. at 16
    (quoting State v. Worlock, 
    117 N.J. 596
    , 622-23
    (1990)).
    A-5547-16T1
    29
    The third factor requires a showing of flagrant misconduct by the Clifton
    police. Both trial judges who considered the suppression of the evidence seized
    pursuant to the traffic stop found the police properly stopped the Jeep due to its
    tinted windows. The suppression motion judge believed "the officers should
    have written a ticket and just walked away" after confirming the car was not
    stolen. However, the failure to do so did not equate to flagrant misconduct. As
    our Supreme Court has stated, "[E]ven though the officers may have acted
    mistakenly, they did so in good faith." Williams 
    I, 192 N.J. at 16
    . We see no
    evidence to the contrary.
    With two factors in equipoise, the second factor, whether intervening
    events exist, becomes most significant to the analysis. See 
    Worlock, 117 N.J. at 623
    (holding that the presence of intervening criminal events is the most
    important factor in the attenuation analysis).
    In State v. Williams, 
    410 N.J. Super. 549
    , 563 (App. Div. 2009) (Williams
    II) (quoting William 
    I, 192 N.J. at 15
    ), we considered whether there were
    "significant 'intervening circumstances'" that "posed a risk of physical injury to
    police officers and . . . members of the public." In that case, we noted the
    "defendant did not force the officers to engage in a lengthy and dangerous
    pursuit to apprehend him." 
    Ibid. A-5547-16T1 30 Here,
    in total disregard for himself, the police and innocent bystand ers,
    defendant ran across six lanes of heavy rush hour traffic, jumped over a center
    barrier and ran into a gas station and into the woods.
    Defendant's actions placed himself, the Clifton police, motorists, and
    pedestrians in danger. See Williams 
    I, 192 N.J. at 12-13
    (recognizing "'any
    flight from police detention is fraught with the potential for violence because
    flight will incite a pursuit, which in turn will endanger the suspect, the po lice,
    and innocent bystanders'") (quoting State v. Crawley, 
    187 N.J. 440
    , 460 n.7
    (2006)).   We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's finding of
    sufficient intervening acts between the traffic stop and the seizure of the baseball
    cap. The taint from the search was significantly attenuated by defendant's
    criminal flight leading to the seizure of his hat.       The exclusionary rule is
    inapplicable under these circumstances.
    C.
    Because defendant's appearance dramatically changed in the seven years
    that elapsed between the narcotics investigation and defendant's trial, the State
    sought to introduce lay opinion testimony through Detective Colacitti. To the
    jurors, defendant was not readily identifiable as the man in the surveillance
    A-5547-16T1
    31
    videos. Therefore, the State wanted Colacitti to identify defendant as the person
    in the surveillance footage — proffering a lay opinion.
    N.J.R.E. 701 permits a lay witness to give relevant opinion testimony if it
    is "rationally based on the perception of the witness and . . . will assist in
    understanding the witness' testimony or in determining a fact in issue." A police
    officer is permitted to testify as a lay witness when his or her opinions are based
    on personal observations and experiences. State v. LaBrutto, 
    114 N.J. 187
    , 198
    (1989).
    In Lazo, the Supreme Court found it error for a detective to testify that he
    believed the defendant closely resembled a composite sketch of a suspect
    because his lay opinion was not based on any prior 
    knowledge. 209 N.J. at 24
    .
    The detective did not know the defendant and had not witnessed the crime; his
    opinion was based entirely on the victim's description of the suspect. 
    Ibid. There also was
    no change in the defendant's appearance so the jurors did not
    need clarification from the officer that it was the defendant. 
    Ibid. The Court stated
    the jury could compare the photo and composite sketch itself. 
    Ibid. In evaluating whether
    a law enforcement officer could present lay opinion
    testimony on the issue of identification, the Court looked to other jurisdictions
    and offered several factors for a trial judge's consideration. One factor was
    A-5547-16T1
    32
    "'whether the witness knew the defendant over time and in a variety of
    circumstances. 
    Id. at 22
    (quoting United States v. Beck, 
    418 F.3d 1008
    , 1015
    (9th Cir. 2005))'". A second factor was "whether there are additional witnesses
    available to identify the defendant at trial."     
    Ibid. (citing United States
    v.
    Butcher, 
    557 F.2d 666
    , 670 (9th Cir. 1977)); State v. Carbone, 
    180 N.J. Super. 95
    , 97-100 (Law Div. 1981).
    We see no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's determination to permit
    Colacitti to identify defendant in the surveillance videos. Colacitti had a long
    history of observing defendant, both in person and via surveillance footage. As
    the lead detective for the narcotics investigation, he reviewed live surveillance
    footage, arrest photographs, motor vehicle photographs, and personally
    observed defendant five times.
    Colacitti was familiar with defendant's appearance in 2009. He testified
    that even though defendant's appearance had changed in the seven years
    preceding trial, his "facial features [were] exactly the same." We are satisfied
    Colacitti had sufficient prior interactions with defendant to allow him to identify
    defendant.
    The trial judge permitted Colacitti to describe defendant's appearance
    during the investigation, his physical observations of defendant, and the
    A-5547-16T1
    33
    differences in defendant's appearance between the investigation and trial. He
    also permitted the detective to identify defendant in the surveillance videos ,
    which Colacitti said he could do based on defendant's facial expressions and
    distinctive walk. His testimony was proper as it was based on his first-hand
    knowledge.
    Defendant also argues it was error for the judge to permit other law
    enforcement officers to identify defendant in surveillance footage and comment
    on his changed appearance. There was no objection to the officers' testimony at
    trial and therefore we review defendant's assertions for plain error. R. 2:10-2.
    In response, the State asserts those officers were introduced as fact
    witnesses, who did not offer opinion testimony. See N.J.R.E. 602 (requiring
    non-expert witnesses to confine their testimony to matters of personal
    knowledge). Rather, the officers simply described the surveillance footage on
    the days they observed defendant.
    We find defendant's argument meritless. The officers testified as fact
    witnesses. Two detectives described the surveillance footage taken during their
    physical surveillance of defendant. Neither offered any opinion testimony. Two
    other officers also testified regarding their surveillance of defendant. They
    identified defendant in the courtroom and described the differences in his
    A-5547-16T1
    34
    appearance. These comments were based on their prior personal observations
    of defendant. Their testimony was not "clearly capable of producing an unjust
    result." R. 2:10-2.
    D.
    We briefly address defendant's assertion of error in the denial of his
    motion for acquittal. Like the trial court, "[w]hen evaluating motions to acquit
    based on insufficient evidence, [we] must view the totality of evidence, be it
    direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the State." State v. Perez,
    
    177 N.J. 540
    , 549 (2003). The State is entitled to "'the benefit of all its favorable
    testimony as well as of the favorable inferences [that] reasonably could be drawn
    therefrom.'" 
    Ibid. (alterations in original)
    (quoting State v. Reyes, 
    50 N.J. 454
    ,
    459 (1967)). Such evidence is sufficient if it would enable a reasonable jury to
    find that the accused is guilty of the crime or crimes charged beyond a
    reasonable doubt. 
    Ibid. At the close
    of the State's case, defendant asserted (1) there was
    insufficient evidence to prove he was involved in a racketeering enterprise or
    pattern of activity, because the State failed to produce a witness to testify that
    defendant distributed narcotics; (2) the State failed to establish all the necessary
    A-5547-16T1
    35
    elements of maintaining or operating a CDS production facility; and (3) there
    was insufficient evidence to charge defendant with weapons offenses.
    The State presented surveillance footage of defendant frequenting the
    Chancellor Avenue residence for mere minutes, the evidence seized from
    apartment D2 including defendant's DNA on a water bottle, and the abundance
    of cash and numerous burner phones found at his home. Additionally, the State
    presented an expert on narcotics production and distribution. In his testimony,
    he discussed street-level, mid-level, and upper-level narcotics sales, the
    different forms of cocaine, the different types of packaging, the price, the
    physical description of a kilogram of drugs, the description of a location used
    solely for packaging drugs, the presence of face masks and latex gloves when
    dealing with drugs, and opined that people who distribute drugs usually use
    multiple cell phones and have a "stash location," and that transactions are done
    with cash.
    There was ample evidence recovered by the police pursuant to the search
    warrants for a reasonable juror to find defendant guilty of the charged offenses
    of operating or maintaining a CDS production facility and weapons offenses. In
    addition, the narcotics expert advised the evidence recovered at the apartment
    A-5547-16T1
    36
    included materials commonly used to distribute narcotics. It was not error to
    deny the motion for acquittal.
    E.
    Lastly, we turn to the argument that it was error to deny the motion for
    new trial.   Defendant asserts a new trial is warranted because there was
    insufficient evidence to support the racketeering charges, the judge erred in
    charging the jury and denying admission of the Hilton invoice, and the jurors
    were prejudiced by seeing defendant in handcuffs. Defendant also contends the
    trial judge was required to recall the jurors after receiving the anonymous letter,
    and conduct a voir dire examination to determine whether the verdict was
    tainted.
    "'[A] motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
    judge, and the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with on appeal
    unless a clear abuse has been shown.'" State v. Armour, 
    446 N.J. Super. 295
    ,
    306 (App. Div. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Russo, 333 N.J.
    Super. 119, 137 (App. Div. 2000)). In determining whether a miscarriage of
    justice has occurred, we defer to the trial court on matters not transmitted by the
    record, such as credibility, demeanor, and the feel of the case. State v. Gaikwad,
    
    349 N.J. Super. 62
    , 82-83 (App. Div. 2002). "There is no 'miscarriage of justice'
    A-5547-16T1
    37
    when 'any trier of fact could rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt
    that the essential elements of the crime were present.'" State v. Jackson, 
    211 N.J. 394
    , 413-14 (2012) (quoting State v. Afanador, 
    134 N.J. 162
    , 178 (1993)).
    Our application of this standard leaves us unpersuaded by defendant's
    arguments.
    As stated earlier, the State presented sufficient evidence to substantiate
    convictions on the racketeering charges. The evidence presented of defendant
    entering and exiting apartment D2 in addition to the cash and burner phones
    found at his residences indicates he was involved in the narcotics enterprise.
    The officers need not have physically seen defendant distribute or sell the drugs.
    See State v. Ball, 
    141 N.J. 142
    , 175 (1995) (holding a defendant can be found
    to have participated in an enterprise even if his role "do[es] not exert control or
    direction over the affairs of the enterprise, as long as the actor, directly or
    indirectly, knowingly seeks to carry out, assist, or further the operations of the
    enterprise or otherwise seeks to implement or execute managerial or supervisory
    decisions").
    We need only briefly discuss the contention regarding the jury charge.
    During the charge conference, defense counsel advocated for a more specific
    tampering charge. The judge declined counsel's proposed charge, finding it was
    A-5547-16T1
    38
    argument and not the pertinent law. Defense counsel then agreed to the judge's
    charge. The trial judge was not "bound to utilize the language" requested by
    defense counsel.    State v. Green, 
    86 N.J. 281
    , 290 (1981) (citing State v.
    Thompson, 
    59 N.J. 396
    , 411 (1971)). Without an objection, we review the
    charge for plain error, and see none.
    We next consider whether it was error to deny admission of the Hilton
    invoice. Defendant argues the document went "to the heart of [his] defense . . .
    that [he] was mis-identified in surveillance" and the State took "far-reaching
    efforts . . . to implicate him in the crimes charge[d]." We see no abuse of
    discretion in the trial judge's evidentiary ruling.
    Defendant was unable to authenticate the invoice. The proposed witness
    worked at a Hilton corporate office in New Jersey. The invoice was purportedly
    from a North Carolina Hilton franchise. The witness could not testify to the
    procedures used during booking or checking into the North Carolina hotel.
    There was no evidence to substantiate it was defendant who actually checked
    into and stayed in the room. We see no reason to disturb the judge's conclusion
    that the invoice was "minimally probative and had the potential to lead to . . .
    confusion."
    A-5547-16T1
    39
    We turn to the anonymous letter sent several weeks after the verdict.
    Defendant contends the information in the letter required the trial judge to recall
    the jurors and conduct a voir dire examination to determine if their verdict was
    tainted. We disagree.
    Defendant contends he was prejudiced when the jury saw him in handcuffs
    and when some jurors learned from an internet search that he was the leader of
    a street gang.
    "[A] criminal defendant's right to a fair trial requires that he be tried before
    a jury panel not tainted by prejudice." State v. Biegenwald, 
    106 N.J. 13
    , 32
    (1987) (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 
    366 U.S. 717
    , 722 (1961)). A new trial must be
    granted when improper influence "'could have a tendency to influence the jury
    in arriving at its verdict in a manner inconsistent with the legal proofs and the
    court's charge.'" State v. Weiler, 
    211 N.J. Super. 602
    , 610 (App. Div. 1986)
    (quoting Panko v. Flintkote Co., 
    7 N.J. 55
    , 61 (1951)). Such improper influence
    may include instances when jurors view a defendant in restraints. State v.
    Kuchera, 
    198 N.J. 482
    , 496-97 (2009); State v. Damon, 
    286 N.J. Super. 492
    ,
    497-98 (App. Div. 1996). Because "the trial court is in the best position to
    determine whether the jury has been tainted[,]" we apply an abuse of discretion
    A-5547-16T1
    40
    standard of review to challenges to the integrity of jury deliberations. State v.
    R.D., 
    169 N.J. 551
    , 559 (2001).
    During deliberations, defense counsel told the judge that defendant
    thought the jurors had seen him with handcuffs on, although counsel had not
    witnessed that. No further information was provided, such as when this occurred
    or which jurors may have seen defendant cuffed.
    The trial judge advised defendant it would have been "impossible" for any
    juror to see him in handcuffs because the door to the hallway was always locked
    when defendant was brought in or out of the courtroom. A sheriff's officer was
    stationed outside the jury room door during these times and the jury was not
    permitted outside the room when defendant was in transit.
    The anonymous letter raised this issue again, stating that on one or two
    occasions, jurors saw defendant wearing shackles and "he looked darker and
    more menacing while in handcuffs." In response, the trial judge reiterated his
    courtroom procedures. He also reviewed the court surveillance footage with
    counsel. Over the three months of trial, the judge stated he only saw a glance
    of defendant's handcuffs for a "matter of seconds." However, when considering
    the distance from defendant's seat to the jury room, the judge was confident
    defendant could not be seen by the jurors. Moreover, at the specific time viewed
    A-5547-16T1
    41
    in the footage, a sheriff's officer was standing in the jury room doorway; no
    jurors could be seen.
    In deference to the trial judge's "unique perspective," 
    id. at 559-60,
    and
    his thorough review and consideration of this issue, we see no reason to disturb
    his decision that denied a new trial and the request to recall the jury.
    The anonymous letter also failed to demonstrate the required "strong
    showing that [defendant] may have been harmed by jury misconduct." State v.
    Athorn, 
    46 N.J. 247
    , 250 (1966). The information provided here were hearsay
    statements in an anonymous letter bearing a fictitious return address.
    Our courts have been wary of implementing the extraordinary remedy of
    conducting post-verdict interviews under those circumstances. See State v.
    Koedatich, 
    112 N.J. 225
    , 289 (1988) (denying post-verdict interviews because
    the information was not a reliable juror affidavit and "the contents of a single
    newspaper article, indisputably hearsay, [could not] be the sole basis for the
    extraordinary procedure of a post-trial jury interrogation."); see also State v.
    Freeman, 
    223 N.J. Super. 92
    , 120 (App. Div. 1988) (explaining a non-juror's
    letter discussing a juror's statement was "at best hearsay," which did not
    "provide good cause for post-verdict interrogation of jurors."); State v. DiFrisco,
    
    174 N.J. 195
    , 242 (2002) (holding the unreliable hearsay "statements of an
    A-5547-16T1
    42
    alternate juror as conveyed through PCR counsel's affidavit" was insufficient
    "to warrant the extraordinary procedure" of interviewing the jurors post-
    verdict).
    Presented with only an unreliable and anonymous letter, the trial judge
    did not abuse his discretion in declining to exercise the very extraordinary
    remedy of recalling the jury. Defendant has not demonstrated any bases upon
    which to grant a new trial.
    Affirmed.
    A-5547-16T1
    43