STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. P.J.R. (FO-07-0181-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5018-17T3
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    P.J.R.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _____________________________
    Submitted October 21, 2019 – Decided November 14, 2019
    Before Judges Fasciale and Rothstadt.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
    No. FO-07-0181-18.
    Terry Webb argued the cause for appellant.
    Stephen Anton Pogany, Special Deputy Attorney
    General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
    for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex
    County Prosecutor, attorney; Stephen Anton Pogany,
    on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant's then wife (the victim) obtained a temporary restraining order
    (TRO) under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A.
    2C:25-17 to -35, which prohibited defendant from having any contact with her.
    Before appearing at a final restraining order (FRO) hearing, defendant texted
    the victim, violating the TRO.    The State charged him with fourth-degree
    contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(1), then downgraded the charge to a disorderly
    persons offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2). Defendant consented to the FRO's
    entry because the victim purportedly promised to dismiss the contempt charge,
    but that never happened.
    Defendant filed a motion to either dismiss the contempt charge or vacate
    the FRO. The judge vacated the FRO, reissued the TRO, and denied the motion
    to dismiss the charge. A different judge then conducted a trial on the contempt
    charge.   That judge took testimony from two witnesses⸺the victim and
    defendant's long-time friend⸺and admitted documentary evidence. The judge
    found defendant guilty of criminal contempt. Defendant now appeals from the
    order denying his motion to dismiss.
    On appeal, defendant argues:
    POINT I
    THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
    SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENFORCED AND THE
    A-5018-17T3
    2
    MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN
    GRANTED TO PREVENT FUTURE ABUSE OF THE
    DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT.
    POINT II
    THE      STATE  LACKED     TERRITORIAL
    JURISDICTION AND THUS THE CHARGE MUST
    BE DISMISSED.
    We disagree, affirm, and conclude that these contentions are without sufficient
    merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Nevertheless,
    we add these brief remarks.
    A victim in a domestic violence case is without authority to dismiss a
    related contempt charge brought by the State. Rather, a prosecutor—the chief
    law enforcement officer in each county—is vested with that authority. See
    N.J.S.A. 2A:158-5 (explaining "[e]ach prosecutor shall be vested with the same
    powers and be subject to the same penalties, within his [or her] county , as the
    attorney general"); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:158-4 (stating "[t]he criminal business
    of the State shall be prosecuted by the Attorney General and the county
    prosecutors"). "[A] prosecutor has the discretion to prosecute those whom the
    prosecutor believes [have] violated the law." State v. McCray, 
    458 N.J. Super. 473
    , 486 (App. Div. 2019). In the prosecution for contempt of a restraining
    order, "the State is the party in interest, not the complainant." State v. Brito,
    
    345 N.J. Super. 228
    , 231 (App. Div. 2001). The judge therefore correctly denied
    A-5018-17T3
    3
    defendant's motion to dismiss the contempt charge, and simultaneously
    protected the integrity of the PDVA by vacating the FRO.
    Defendant maintains that the State lacked "territorial jurisdiction" to
    prosecute him on the contempt charge because he and the victim were out-of-
    state when he texted her. When a judge denies a motion to dismiss based on
    territorial jurisdiction, we review that order de novo. See State v. Ferguson, 
    238 N.J. 78
    , 93 (2019). We conclude territorial jurisdiction existed under N.J.S.A.
    2C:1-3(a)(1).
    Defendant's contacts in New Jersey are undisputed: he and the victim lived
    in New Jersey for more than a decade when the predicate act of harassment
    occurred.   Indeed, a New Jersey judge entered the TRO that precluded
    defendant⸺who was served with the TRO in this state⸺from having "any oral,
    written, personal, electronic, or other form of contact or communication with
    [the victim]." The fact that defendant and the victim were not in New Jersey
    when he texted her is irrelevant.
    To fall under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(1), one of the criminal contempt charge's
    essential elements must have occurred in New Jersey, or the result of such
    conduct must have caused harm in New Jersey. State v. Tringali, 451 N.J. Super.
    A-5018-17T3
    4
    18, 26 (App. Div. 2017). The essential elements of contempt are outlined in
    N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2):
    In all other cases a person is guilty of a disorderly
    persons offense if that person purposely or knowingly
    violates an order entered under the provisions of the
    [PDVA], or an order entered under the provisions of a
    substantially similar statute under the laws of another
    state or the United States.
    [(Internal citations omitted).]
    The judge correctly noted that criminal contempt has three elements that a
    prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that there was an order
    entered; (2) that defendant knew of the existence of the order; and (3) that
    defendant purposefully or knowingly disobeyed the order.
    Here, two essential elements of criminal contempt occurred in New
    Jersey: an order was entered and defendant had knowledge of the order. The
    victim obtained a TRO⸺in New Jersey⸺against defendant on January 24, 2018,
    and she amended this order on February 1, 2018⸺in New Jersey. The victim
    testified, which the judge found credible, that defendant received notice of both
    TROs; specifically defendant received the amended TRO in court on February
    1, 2018⸺in New Jersey. Finally, defendant's conduct harmed a New Jersey
    resident—he violated the victim's TRO against him, and the victim sought
    intervention by New Jersey police.
    A-5018-17T3
    5
    Affirmed.
    A-5018-17T3
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-5018-17T3

Filed Date: 11/14/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2019