STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. AMALIA MIRASOLA (11-02-0201, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1007-18T1
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    AMALIA MIRASOLA, a/k/a
    AMALIA ACEVEDO, AMALI
    MIRASOLA, and AMALIA
    MIRASOLAACEVEDO,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _____________________________
    Argued November 18, 2019 – Decided December 4, 2019
    Before Judges Fasciale and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Morris County, Indictment No. 11-02-0201.
    Ruth Elizabeth Hunter, Designated Counsel, argued the
    cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
    Defender; attorney; Ruth Elizabeth Hunter on the
    brief).
    John K. McNamara, Jr., Chief Assistant Prosecutor,
    argued the cause for respondent (Fredric M. Knapp,
    Morris County Prosecutor,         attorney;   John   K.
    McNamara, Jr., on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant appeals from a July 12, 2018 order denying her petition for
    post-conviction relief (PCR). 1   Defendant maintains that her trial counsel
    rendered ineffective assistance. The PCR judge entered the order and rendered
    a twenty-four page written opinion.
    On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
    POINT I
    THE PCR [JUDGE] SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED
    DEFENDANT TIME TO OBTAIN CRITICAL
    MEDICAL    RECORDS  AND    ADDITIONAL
    FUNDING FROM THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
    DEFENDER FOR AN EXPERT BECAUSE EXPERT
    SERVICES WERE NECESSARY FOR HER
    DEFENSE.
    POINT II
    THE PCR [JUDGE] ERRED IN DENYING THE
    PETITION   WITHOUT    AN   EVIDENTIARY
    HEARING       BECAUSE       DEFENDANT
    "PRESENT[ED] A REASONABLE BASIS TO BE
    PERMITTED A HEARING TO EXPLORE FURTHER
    1
    In January 2013, a jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A.
    2C:11-3(a)(1) and (a)(2); and second-degree possession of a weapon for an
    unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). We affirmed the convictions, State v.
    Mirasola, No. A-3639-12 (App. Div. Nov. 25, 2015) (slip op. at 1), and the
    Supreme Court denied certification, State v. Mirasola, 
    224 N.J. 526
     (2016).
    A-1007-18T1
    2
    THE POSSIBILITY OF" MENTAL DEFENSES. SEE
    STATE v. HARRIS, 
    181 N.J. 391
    , 528 (2004).
    We conclude that these arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discus sion in
    a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons set
    forth by the PCR judge in her well-reasoned written decision and add the
    following brief remarks.
    A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only when he or she "has
    presented a prima facie [case] in support of [PCR]," State v. Marshall, 
    148 N.J. 89
    , 158 (1997) (first alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v.
    Preciose, 
    129 N.J. 451
    , 462 (1992)), meaning that a "defendant must
    demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed
    on the merits." 
    Ibid.
     For a defendant to obtain relief based on ineffective
    assistance grounds, he or she is obliged to show not only the particular manner
    in which counsel's performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency
    prejudiced his or her right to a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    ,
    687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 
    105 N.J. 42
    , 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-
    part test in New Jersey, now known as the Strickland/Fritz test). Defendant has
    failed to present such a prima facie case of ineffectiveness.
    It is undisputed that defendant possessed the gun and shot and killed her
    husband. The question for the jury was whether she did so purposefully and
    A-1007-18T1
    3
    knowingly or whether it was in self-defense. Mirasola, slip op. at 4. Although
    defendant contends that she lacked the mental capacity to commit the murder
    and therefore that her trial counsel failed to develop such a defense, trial counsel
    employed strategy by utilizing the defense of self-defense. Indeed, trial counsel
    investigated the possibility of a diminished capacity defense and consulted with
    experts, but was unable to produce any experts, medical records, or evidence at
    trial to demonstrate that defendant shot her husband because of her purported
    mental incapacity.
    Defendant also maintains that her trial counsel failed to develop her
    defenses of self-defense and defense of others. But the PCR judge—agreeing
    with the State that defense counsel "followed the necessary protocol" as to the
    defense—pointed out that the jury rejected defendant's theory. The PCR judge
    also agreed with the State that not testing the blood on defendant's clothes would
    not have supported a self-defense claim, particularly because defendant had no
    wounds, bruising, or scarring the morning after the murder. And as to the
    defense of others contention, the jury heard evidence that defendant allowed her
    daughter and her husband to travel together—overnight—despite defendant's
    purported concerns about her husband abusing their daughter. The jury also
    heard evidence that defendant shot her husband hours after their daughter told
    A-1007-18T1
    4
    him to "[g]et off me," and after defendant and her husband watched television
    together.
    Finally, in April 2016, defendant filed her petition for PCR. Her PCR
    counsel withdrew the petition without prejudice and re-filed it in March 2018.
    The PCR judge conducted oral argument and rendered her written decision in
    July 2018. There was no request to adjourn the oral argument, and defendant's
    contention that the judge should have given her more time to prepare for the
    PCR argument is without merit.
    Affirmed.
    A-1007-18T1
    5