DERRICK RUSSELL VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5802-17T2
    DERRICK RUSSELL,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________
    Submitted December 4, 2019 – Decided December 10, 2019
    Before Judges Haas and Mayer.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    Derrick Russell, appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Christopher Josephson, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Derrick Russell, an inmate currently in the custody of the
    Department of Corrections (DOC), appeals from the DOC's final administrative
    decision, adjudicating him guilty of institutional infractions *.002, assaulting
    any person; and .257, violating a condition of a Residential Community Release
    Program. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm.
    On May 12, 2018, a DOC Operations Counselor saw Russell and a female
    visitor sitting in the dining room of Talbot Hall. Suddenly, Russell stood up and
    "grasp[ed] the neck of his female visitor" and "[p]ush[ed] her head downward."
    The incident was also captured on videotape.
    The next day, a DOC sergeant served the charges upon Russell, conducted
    an investigation, and referred the matter to a hearing officer. Russell was
    granted the assistance of a counsel substitute, and entered "no plea" to the
    charges. At the hearing, Russell stated, "I didn't want her to leave. I feel I had
    unauthorized contact."      He asked for leniency because the visitor was not
    injured.    The DOC offered Russell the opportunity to confront and cross -
    examine witnesses, and to call witnesses of his own. However, he declined to
    do so.
    The hearing officer found Russell guilty of both charges. On the assault
    charge under *.002, the hearing officer sanctioned Russell by imposing 250
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    days' administrative segregation, 250 days' loss of commutation time, 30 days'
    loss of contact visit privileges, 30 days' loss of recreation privileges, 30 days'
    loss of commissary privileges, and 30 days' loss of television/radio privileges.
    On the .257 charge, the hearing officer sanctioned Russell by imposing 60 days'
    loss of commutation time, consecutive to the sanction imposed on the *.002
    charge, and 30 days' loss of recreation privileges, concurrent to the sanction
    imposed on the *.002 charge.
    Russell filed an administrative appeal and the Assistant Superintendent
    upheld the hearing officer's decision. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, Russell argues there was insufficient evidence in the record to
    support the hearing officer's finding of guilt on both charges, and that the hearing
    officer violated his due process rights. Russell also argues that the .257 charge
    was "duplicative" of the *.002 charge and should have been dismissed.
    The scope of our review of an agency decision is limited. In re Taylor,
    
    158 N.J. 644
    , 656 (1999).      "An appellate court ordinarily will reverse the
    decision of an administrative agency only when the agency's decision is
    'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [] is not supported by substantial
    credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr., 
    382 N.J. Super. 18
    , 23 (App. Div. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. Rahway
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    3
    State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80 (1980)). "'Substantial evidence' means 'such
    evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.'" Figueroa v. Dep't of Corr., 
    414 N.J. Super. 186
    , 192 (App. Div.
    2010) (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 
    35 N.J. 358
    , 376 (1961)).
    Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the
    full spectrum of rights due to a criminal defendant does not apply. Avant v.
    Clifford, 
    67 N.J. 496
    , 522 (1975). However, when reviewing a determination of
    the DOC in a matter involving prisoner discipline, we consider not only whether
    there is substantial evidence that the inmate committed the prohibited act, but
    also whether, in making its decision, the DOC followed regulations adopted to
    afford inmates procedural due process. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 
    139 N.J. 188
    ,
    194-96 (1995).
    Having considered the record in light of these principles, we conclude that
    sufficient credible evidence in the record supports the DOC's determination that
    Russell was guilty of assault. The Operations Counselor saw Russell stand up
    and aggressively grab the neck of his visitor and push her head downwar d. The
    incident was also captured on videotape. Russell conceded he touched the
    visitor because he did not want her to leave, but denied that he hurt her. Thus,
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    there is a substantial basis in the record for the hearing officer's finding that
    Russell was guilty of assault.
    Contrary to Russell's claim, the hearing officer did not prohibit him from
    calling witnesses or presenting witness statements. Instead, Russell declined to
    take advantage of these opportunities.     Under these circumstances, we are
    satisfied that Russell received all the process an inmate is due. Therefore, we
    affirm the hearing officer's determination that Russell was guilty of assault
    under charge *.002, and the sanctions imposed for that offense will not be
    disturbed.
    Russell also argues that the .257 charge of violating a condition of a
    Residential Community Release Program was subsumed within the assault
    charge and should have been dismissed.        The DOC agreed with Russell's
    position on this point and filed a motion for a partial remand. We denied the
    motion for a remand, but ordered that the .257 charge be "vacated and
    dismissed" in light of the parties' agreement. Therefore, Russell's argument
    concerning the .257 charge is moot because he has already received the relief he
    sought concerning this charge.
    Affirmed.
    A-5802-17T2
    5