JEFF CARTER VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS (GOVERNMENT RECORDS COUNCIL) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0483-18T1
    JEFF CARTER,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS,
    DIVISION OF LOCAL
    GOVERNMENT SERVICES
    CUSTODIAL AGENCY,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    ______________________________
    Argued November 4, 2019 – Decided December 10, 2019
    Before Judges Fasciale and Moynihan.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Community Affairs, Government Records Council,
    GRC Complaint No. 2016-262.
    Jeff Carter, Ph.D., appellant, argued the cause pro se.
    Steven Michael Gleeson, Deputy Attorney General,
    argued the cause for respondent New Jersey
    Department of Community Affairs, Division of Local
    Government Services (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
    General, attorney; Raymond R. Chance, III, Assistant
    Attorney General, of counsel; Steven Michael Gleeson,
    on the brief).
    Debra A. Allen, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
    cause for respondent Government Records Council
    (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Jane C.
    Schuster, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
    Debra A. Allen, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Jeff Carter appeals from an August 28, 2018 final agency decision by the
    Government Records Council (GRC) declaring that Carter's request for records
    under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 through -13, was
    invalid as overly broad. The Division of Local Government Services (the
    Division) therefore did not exhaustively research or search for documents. We
    affirm.
    On August 9, 2016, Carter submitted his OPRA request seeking "complete
    copies of any and all 'Notice of Docketing' records issued by the New Jersey
    Superior Court, Appellate Division, resulting from an appeal (pursuant to
    N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.91) of any final [agency] decision of the Local Finance Board
    [(LFB)] from August 9, 2011 through August 9, 2016."            The custodian
    1
    N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.9 permits final agency decisions pertaining to the New
    Jersey Local Government Ethics Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.1 to -22.25, to be
    appealed to the Appellate Division.
    A-0483-18T1
    2
    responded on August 16, 2016, stating that "[t]he government records sought
    are not records that are maintained by the [Division]. Therefore, we have no
    government records that are responsive to your request." On August 18, 2016,
    the custodian responded to Carter's request for clarification.
    [The Division] and the Division of Law's databases do
    not organize or list matters based on the description of
    the record sought. Since [Carter] [has] not provided
    any identifiers such as a case name, party name, or
    docket number, the custodian would need to manually
    identify matters, locate records in storage through
    communication with the Division of Law, obtain those
    records, and review the entire case file for each
    potentially applicable case file to identify and compile
    responsive records. Such an exercise would require the
    custodian to exercise judgment and conduct research
    which is beyond the ambit of OPRA.
    Carter then filed a Denial of Access Complaint with the GRC, and the Division
    filed a Statement of Information (SOI) with the GRC, explaining that it refused
    the request because the records were not made, maintained, or received by the
    Division, and therefore could not be identified without significant research by
    the records custodian.
    Carter rebutted the SOI, requested a summary and expedited adjudication,
    and petitioned the GRC for a "contested case" determination, pursuant to
    N.J.A.C. 1:1-4.1(a). Carter renewed his request seven more times through a
    series of briefs filed with the GRC, and repeatedly petitioned the GRC for a
    A-0483-18T1
    3
    "contested case" determination. 2 The GRC then issued its final agency decision
    stating:
    [Carter's] request seeking [n]otices for a five . . . year
    period alleging a violation of N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.9 is
    invalid because it required research. The [c]ustodian
    had no legal duty to research her files, or cause
    research, to locate records potentially responsive to the
    request.
    ....
    [N]o factual causal nexus exists between [Carter's]
    filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief
    ultimately achieved. . . . Carter's request was invalid
    and no responsive records existed.
    On appeal, Carter argues:
    POINT I
    CARTER'S OPRA REQUEST IS VALID.
    A. The OPRA Request Contains More
    Than Enough Qualifiers.
    B. Burke Controls Here.
    C. Burnett And O'Boyle Control Here.
    D. Scheeler v. Gov. And Wronko Also
    Control Here.
    POINT II
    THE    GRC  ERRED  BY    ERRONEOUSLY
    CONFLATING    THE   OPRA    REQUEST'S
    PARENTHETICAL ELEMENT TO MEAN APPEALS
    2
    Carter filed approximately seven briefs between January 2017 and May 2018.
    A-0483-18T1
    4
    RELATING    TO  "QUORUM    VIOLATIONS,"
    BECAUSE THE WORD "QUORUM" NEVER
    APPEARS IN THE OPRA REQUEST, NOR IN THE
    REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION.
    A. The GRC Erred By Misstating Facts In
    The Record.
    POINT III
    THE CUSTODIAN CANNOT CLAIM IGNORANCE
    IN CLAIMING THAT THE REQUEST WAS
    OVERBROAD BASED ON HER EXTENSIVE
    LEGAL CITATIONS IN HER CLARIFICATION.
    POINT IV
    [RESPONDENTS] REFUSED TO COMPROMISE
    PURSUANT TO MASON, AND THE GRC NEVER
    ADDRESSED THEIR FAILURE TO DO SO.
    POINT V
    THE   CUSTODIAN  HAD    NO  PERSONAL
    KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEARCH FOR RECORDS;
    THUS,     HER   CERTIFICATION    WAS
    INSUFFICIENT.
    POINT VI
    CARTER NEVER SAID THAT HE POSSESSED
    BHALLA'S NOTICE OF DOCKETING RECORD;
    THUS, THE GRC ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER
    ITS   DISCLOSURE   BECAUSE      IT  WAS
    SPECIFICALLY   IDENTIFIED    AS    BEING
    RESPONSIVE.
    POINT VII
    THE GRC'S FAILURE TO ANSWER CARTER'S
    WRITTEN PETITIONS FOR A "CONTESTED
    CASE" DETERMINATION WITHIN THIRTY DAYS
    A-0483-18T1
    5
    VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE
    PROCESS OF LAW.
    A. Carter Could Not Seek Interlocutory
    Review.
    B. Carter's Efforts To Prosecute His
    Appeal In IMO FTEB Were Stymied By
    The GRC's Failure To Adjudicate His
    Complaint In A Summary, Expedited,
    And/Or Expeditious Manner.
    C. The GRC Acted In Bad Faith By
    Holding That It Handles Complaints In The
    Order They Are Received, Because The
    Public Record Eviscerates This Erroneous
    Holding.
    POINT VIII
    THE GRC IS COMPELLED TO HEED OPRA'S
    SUMMARY/EXPEDITED        ADJUDICATION
    PROVISIONS; THUS, COURTS MUST ASCRIBE
    MEANING TO THE LEGISLATURE'S CHOSEN
    WORDS.
    A. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 And -7(e) Must Be
    Harmonized.
    B. The GRC Failed To Heed And Execute
    The Mandatory Imperative In The Law[']s
    Use Of The Word "Shall," Which Is An
    Imperative The GRC Previously Held It Is
    Familiar With.
    POINT IX
    THE GRC'S INTERPRETATION OF JUDICIAL
    PRECEDENT IS DUE NO DEFERENCE; THE GRC
    IS CONSTRAINED TO FOLLOW JUDICIAL
    A-0483-18T1
    6
    PRECEDENT   INTERPRETING                  OPRA,       BUT
    IGNORED SAME.
    A. This Court Is Not Bound By The GRC's
    Erroneous Legal Opinions; Thus, The GRC
    Is Due No Deference.
    POINT X
    REVIEW OF THIS GRC MATTER IS DE
    NOVO.
    POINT XI
    CARTER IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLE
    ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR THE LEGAL WORK
    PERFORMED BELOW IF HE PREVAILS ON
    APPEAL.3
    Our review of the GRC's decision "is governed by the same standards as
    review of a decision by any other state agency," Fisher v. Div. of Law, 
    400 N.J. Super. 61
    , 70 (App. Div. 2008), and is therefore limited. In re Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011). This court "will not overturn an agency's decision unless
    it violates express or implied legislative policies, is based on factual findings
    that are not supported by substantial credible evidence, or is arbitrary, capricious
    or unreasonable." Fisher, 
    400 N.J. Super. at 70
    . This court's standard of review
    is "plenary with respect to" the GRC's interpretation of OPRA. Asbury Park
    Press v. Cty. of Monmouth, 
    406 N.J. Super. 1
    , 6 (App. Div. 2009).
    3
    We also considered the supplemental letter, pursuant to Rule 2:6-11(d),
    submitted by defendant on November 6, 2019.
    A-0483-18T1
    7
    "[D]eterminations about the applicability of OPRA and its exemptions are legal
    conclusions . . . and are therefore subject to de novo review." Carter v. Doe (In
    re N.J. Firemen's Ass'n Obligation), 
    230 N.J. 258
    , 273-74 (2017) (citations
    omitted). But under this "deferential standard of review, [this court] give[s]
    weight to the GRC's interpretation of OPRA." McGee v. Twp. of E. Amwell,
    
    416 N.J. Super. 602
    , 616 (App. Div. 2010). We do not, however, "simply rubber
    stamp the agency's decision." Bart v. City of Paterson Hous. Auth., 
    403 N.J. Super. 609
    , 618 (App. Div. 2008) (citations omitted).
    The law on OPRA is settled. "Any analysis of OPRA must begin with the
    recognition that the Legislature created OPRA intending to make government
    records 'readily accessible' to the state's citizens 'with certain exceptions[] for
    the protection of the public interest.'" Gilleran v. Twp. of Bloomfield, 
    227 N.J. 159
    , 170 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1); see also
    Mason v. City of Hoboken, 
    196 N.J. 51
    , 65 (2008). Thus, OPRA establishes "a
    comprehensive framework for access to public records." Mason, 
    196 N.J. at 57
    .
    OPRA requires, among other things, prompt disclosure of records, and it
    provides different procedures to challenge a custodian's decision denying
    access. 
    Ibid.
    A-0483-18T1
    8
    OPRA does not "'authorize a party to make a blanket request for every
    document' a public agency has on file. . . . Rather, a party requesting access to
    a public record under OPRA must specifically describe the document sought."
    Bent v. Twp. of Stafford Police Dep't, 
    381 N.J. Super. 30
    , 37 (App. Div. 2005)
    (quoting Gannett N.J. Partners, LP v. Cty. of Middlesex, 
    379 N.J. Super. 205
    ,
    219 (App. Div. 2005)). "While OPRA provides [a] . . . means of access to
    government documents not otherwise exempted from its reach, it is not intended
    as a research tool litigants may use to force government officials to identify and
    siphon useful information." MAG Entm't, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage
    Control, 
    375 N.J. Super. 534
    , 546 (App. Div. 2005).
    Blanket requests for unspecified documents are not proper under OPRA.
    The request "must identify with reasonable clarity those documents that are
    desired, and a party cannot satisfy this requirement by simply requesting all of
    an agency's documents." Bent, 
    381 N.J. Super. at 37
    . "OPRA does not authorize
    unbridled searches of an agency's property," ibid., that "would substantially
    disrupt agency operations," N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g). "[T]he custodian may deny .
    . . [a request] after attempting to reach a reasonable solution . . . that
    accommodates the interests of the requestor and the agency." 
    Ibid.
     A proper
    OPRA request must state "a specific subject matter that [is] clearly and
    A-0483-18T1
    9
    reasonably described with sufficient identifying information[.]"       Burke v.
    Brandes, 
    429 N.J. Super. 169
    , 176 (App. Div. 2012).
    As the GRC has pointed out, "[a] valid OPRA request requires a search,
    not research." Verry v. Borough of S. Bound Brook (Somerset), GRC Complaint
    Nos. 2013-43 and 2013-53, interim order (dated Sept. 24, 2013). The GRC
    explained in an opinion⸺finding an OPRA violation committed by the
    Township of Union for failing to fulfill a request for "[a]ll motor vehicle
    accident reports" for a ten-day period⸺that:
    Pursuant to [MAG], the custodian is obligated to search
    her files to find the identifiable government records
    listed in the Complainant's OPRA request. . . .
    However, the [c]ustodian is not required to research her
    files to figure out which records, if any, might be
    responsive to a broad or unclear OPRA request. The
    word search is defined as to go or look through
    carefully in order to find something missing or lost.
    The word research, on the other hand, means a close
    and careful study to find new facts or information.
    [Burnett v. Cty. of Gloucester, 
    415 N.J. Super. 506
    , 515
    (App. Div. 2010) (alterations in original) (internal
    quotations omitted) (quoting Donato v. Twp. of Union,
    GRC Complaint No. 2005-182, interim order (Jan. 31,
    2007)).]
    In Bent, the requestor sought information and records from a criminal
    investigation of his credit card activities conducted jointly by the township
    police, the United States Attorney for New Jersey, and a special agent of the
    A-0483-18T1
    10
    Internal Revenue Service. 
    381 N.J. Super. at 38
    . This court affirmed the GRC's
    denial, stating that "to the extent Bent's request was for records that either did
    not exist or were not in the custodian's possession, there was, of necessity, no
    denial of access at all." 
    Ibid.
     This court emphasized that the custodian was not
    under any obligation to search beyond the township's files. 
    Ibid.
    Carter's request sought notices from the Appellate Division for LFB
    decisions addressing violations of N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.9 over a five-year period.
    The custodian explained that the Division did not maintain "a database or list of
    records organized pursuant to . . . the general description of records requested[.]"
    The request did not identify a case name, party name, or docket number.
    Therefore, the custodian needed to "exercise discretion, survey employees or
    undertake research" to comply with the request. Specifically, the custodian had
    to search through thousands of cases to identify documents relevant to the
    request. The request required the custodian to "manually identify matters, locate
    records in storage through communication with the Division of Law, obtain
    those records, and review the entire case file for each potentially applicable case
    file to identify and compile responsive records." Such an endeavor constituted
    research, not a search, Burnett, 
    415 N.J. Super. at 515
    , which goes beyond what
    OPRA requires.
    A-0483-18T1
    11
    As we previously said, "[a] proper request [for information] 'must identify
    with reasonable clarity those documents that are desired.'" Burke, 429 N.J.
    Super. at 174 (quoting Bent, 
    381 N.J. Super. at 37
    ). Requests for general
    information—like here—that must be "analyzed, collated and compiled" by the
    agency are outside the scope of OPRA. MAG, 
    375 N.J. Super. at 549
    . Requests
    requiring the custodian to analyze and evaluate information to respond are
    improper. See Burke, 429 N.J. Super. at 174; see also Bent, 
    381 N.J. Super. at 33-39
     (denying a request for the "entire file" of the plaintiff's criminal
    investigation because it "neither identifies nor describes with any specificity or
    particularity of the records sought"); see also MAG, 
    375 N.J. Super. at 549
    (holding the plaintiff's request invalid for failing to provide any identifiers other
    than "a broad generic description of a brand or type of case prosecuted by the
    agency in the past"); see also N.J. Builder's Ass'n v. N.J. Council on Affordable
    Hous., 
    390 N.J. Super. 166
    , 172 (App. Div. 2007) (denying a request for "any
    and all documents and data" for asking the agency to identify the documents
    rather than specifically describing the documents sought).
    As Carter emphasized during oral argument before us, he specified a
    subject and the relevant timeframe, but he did not include a case name, party
    name, or docket number. The failure to include these identifiers would have
    A-0483-18T1
    12
    forced the custodian to research and manually identify the documents. Like in
    N.J. Builder's, this request for "any and all" information placed the burden on
    the custodian to locate germane documents, which is improper.
    Carter asserts his request comports with Burke. In Burke, the plaintiff
    requested government records in its possession or control regarding "EZ Pass
    benefits afforded to retirees of the Port Authority, including all . . .
    correspondence between the Office of the Governor . . . and the Port
    Authority[.]" 429 N.J. Super. at 171-72 (alterations in original). This court
    noted that the request was "confined to a specific subject matter that was clearly
    and reasonably described with sufficient identifying information[.]" Id. at 176.
    The plaintiff made it clear that he was specifically seeking written or electronic
    correspondence between two offices. Id. at 176-77. The request involved no
    research or analysis, but rather a search for and production of "readily
    identifiable records[.]" Id. at 178. But Carter's request required research of
    thousands of records.
    Relying on Burnett and O'Boyle, Carter contends that the "government
    should not be able to shield its transactions from public scrutiny by the expedient
    of entrusting sole possession of relevant documents to third parties ."         See
    O'Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 
    426 N.J. Super. 1
    , 14 (App. Div. 2012). In
    A-0483-18T1
    13
    Burnett, we evaluated a request for "[a]ny and all settlements, releases or similar
    documents entered into, approved, or accepted" in the preceding two-year period
    from the County of Gloucester. 
    415 N.J. Super. at 508
     (alteration in original).
    We determined that the request was not overly broad because it sought a specific
    type of document. 
    Id. at 516
    . As noted in O'Boyle, the central holding in Burnett
    is that "documents accessible to the public which are generated on behalf of a
    public agency in the course of its official business are subject to disclosure no
    matter where they are located, even if they were never in the possession of the
    governmental entity." O'Boyle, 
    426 N.J. Super. at
    14 (citing Burnett, 
    415 N.J. Super. at 517
    ).
    Although Burnett establishes that requested documents not in the
    respective agency's possession does not excuse the agency from its OPRA
    obligations to produce the documents, Carter's request is distinguishable. See
    
    415 N.J. Super. at 516-17
    . In Burnett, the requested records were created by the
    respective agency in its official course of business, which is not the case here.
    
    Id. at 516
    . The Notices of Docketing sought here were records created by the
    court, only received by the Division in connection with each individual appeal.
    Because the records did not originate with the Division, the requested documents
    A-0483-18T1
    14
    are not classified separately in its files, thus requiring the custodian to conduct
    research to locate them.
    Moreover, Carter's reliance on Scheeler v. Office of the Governor, 
    448 N.J. Super. 333
     (App. Div. 2017) is misplaced. The plaintiff in Scheeler sought
    third-party OPRA requests submitted over a period of time. 448 N.J. Super. at
    338-39. This court found that the requests were made with sufficient clarity,
    but we emphasized that the request did not require the agency to do research to
    identify the records. Id. at 344. In Scheeler, the requested documents were
    maintained by the agency and were reasonably identifiable without the need for
    research. Id. at 344.
    Carter argues that the GRC incorrectly noted "[t]he request at issue here
    sought Notices from the Appellate Division for L[FB] decisions addressing
    violations of N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.9 for a five[-]year period." (emphasis added).
    Carter asserts that this is factually inaccurate because he actually sought Notices
    "resulting from an appeal (pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.9) of any [LFB] final
    decision." (emphasis added). It can hardly be said that the GRC decision here
    was so mistaken as to demand "intervention and correction" on behalf of the
    interests of justice, therefore Carter's reliance on Clowes v. Terminix Intern.,
    Inc., 
    109 N.J. 575
    , 588-89 (1988) is misplaced. Although the GRC may have
    A-0483-18T1
    15
    confused "pursuant to" and "violation of," Carter's request remains invalid as it
    required research, therefore falling outside the scope of the Division's OPRA
    obligations. It is the resulting process imposed on the custodian that makes the
    request impermissible.
    Carter alleges that the custodian failed to work with him to try to resolve
    the matter before he filed a complaint. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g) states that "the
    custodian may deny access to the [requested] record after attempting to reach a
    reasonable solution with the requestor that accommodates the interests of the
    requestor and the agency." An agency and a requestor compromise and work
    through problematic requests. Mason, 
    196 N.J. at 76
    . Carter urges that in
    accordance with Mason, the custodian should have made an effort to work
    through the issue⸺the overly broad request⸺with Carter. But the custodian
    responded to Carter's request with a denial seven days later. When Carter asked
    why his request was denied, the custodian provided her rationale two days later.
    Thereafter, Carter failed to modify his request, choosing instead to file a
    complaint with the GRC. Thus, the custodian worked with Carter.
    Carter argues that the custodian's certification contained in the Statement
    of Information (SOI) filed with the GRC is insufficient because the custodian
    did not personally search for the records. Carter insists that the Executive
    A-0483-18T1
    16
    Assistant to the LFB, who conducted the search, should have submitted a
    certification to substantiate the SOI. In accordance with Paff v. New Jersey
    Department of Labor, agency personnel must produce sworn statements by
    agency personnel detailing the following information:
    (1) the search undertaken to satisfy the request;
    (2) the documents found that are responsive to the
    request;
    (3) the determination of whether the document or any
    part thereof is confidential and the source of the
    confidential information;
    (4) a statement of the agency's document
    retention/destruction policy and the last date on which
    documents that may have been responsive to the request
    were destroyed.
    [
    392 N.J. Super. 334
    , 341 (App. Div. 2007) (emphasis
    omitted).]
    The GRC has discretionary authority to require additional certifications from
    any party where needed for appropriate adjudication of a complaint. N.J.A.C.
    5:105-2.3(k), -2.4(j)(l).   Sworn statements must be "made on personal
    knowledge, setting forth only facts which are admissible in evidence to which
    the [custodian] is competent to testify[.]" R. 1:6-6; see N. Jersey Media Grp.
    Inc. v. Office of the Governor, 
    451 N.J. Super. 282
    , 300 (App. Div. 2017).
    A-0483-18T1
    17
    The custodian completed its search of records responsive to Carter's
    request by delegating the search of records to a LFB employee. An additional
    certification was unnecessary because the documents submitted with the
    custodian's SOI sufficiently detail the scope and process of the records search.
    The documents and emails exchanged between the custodian and the executive
    assistant demonstrate that the request was properly handled. Because the GRC
    is granted the discretionary authority to require supplemental certifications, its
    decision not to require an additional certification is not arbitrary, capricious or
    unreasonable.
    Carter asserted in his complaint, dated September 14, 2016, that he was
    aware of three records that he sought. After identifying these records, Carter
    stated that "[b]ecause [Carter] is already in possession of these particular
    responsive records as the matter's appellant, there is no need for [the GRC] to
    order disclosure." The GRC misunderstood this to mean that Carter possessed
    all three Notices, therefore it did not provide him with any. Because the GRC
    did not provide Carter with the identified Notices, he argues that the GRC failed
    to disclose this record.
    As previously mentioned, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g) notes that a custodian may
    deny access to the record after attempting to reach a reasonable solution with
    A-0483-18T1
    18
    the requestor. The agency and requestor are encouraged to compromise and
    work through problematic requests. Mason, 
    196 N.J. at 76
    . Again, Carter did
    not make another request upon the custodian, specifically mentioning this
    requested record by name. In fact, the name of the requested record was not
    mentioned until Carter filed a complaint with the GRC. Carter made no effort
    to work with the custodian to clarify his request by either modifying it or
    submitting a new request with the sufficient identifying information.
    Accordingly, the GRC's misunderstanding that Carter already possessed the
    record is immaterial.
    Carter argues that because his case contains "contested facts," he is
    entitled to a determination from the agency within thirty-days of receipt of his
    petition, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-4.1. Carter filed for a "contested case" status
    on October 12, 2016, but he ultimately did not receive a decision from the GRC
    until August 28, 2018. Carter points to the alleged LFB quorum issues and their
    failure to maintain certain records with the agency as "contested facts." Carter
    asserts that this delay was in bad faith, as the agency was aware that Carter
    sought these documents for another appeal he had pending against the LFB.
    Under N.J.A.C. 1:1-2.1, a contested case is defined as:
    [A]n adversary proceeding . . . in which the legal rights,
    duties, obligations, privileges, benefits or other legal
    A-0483-18T1
    19
    relations of specific parties are required by
    constitutional right or by statute to be determined by an
    agency by decisions, determinations, or orders,
    addressed to them or disposing of their interests, after
    opportunity for an agency hearing[.]
    The quorum issue is controlled by OPRA. See N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to 10:4-21.
    Therefore, quorum issues falling under this Act are not within the GRC's
    authority to adjudicate.
    The GRC has no authority to regulate or adjudicate the manner in which
    an agency maintains its files or records. 4 Because these issues are not under the
    authority of the GRC to adjudicate, and they were not pertinent to the GRC's
    determination of this case, they are not considered "contested facts." Since
    Carter's case is not considered a "contested case," he was not entitled to the
    thirty-day determination timeframe enumerated in N.J.A.C. 1:1-4.1.
    In turning to Carter's bad faith argument, he asserts that the agency
    purposely delayed his case (1) so that he could not seek interlocutory review,
    and (2) to stymy his efforts to argue another appeal he had pending against the
    LFB. See In re Appeal of the Dec. of the Franklin Twp. Ethics Bd. (Somerset
    4
    See e.g., Toscano v. N.J. Dep't of Labor, Div. of Vocational Rehab. Serv.,
    GRC Complaint No. 2010-58 (June 28, 2011); Kvederas v. Town of Morristown
    (Morris), GRC Complaint No. 2009-70 (Apr. 8, 2010); Gillespie v. Newark Pub.
    Sch., GRC Complaint No. 2004-105 (Nov. 9, 2004); Katinsky v. River Value
    Twp., GRC Complaint No. 200-68 (Nov. 13, 2003).
    A-0483-18T1
    20
    Cty.) in FTEB Complaint #11-01, No. A-2561-15 (App. Div. Nov. 14, 2017).
    As to Carter's interlocutory review argument, he relies on the time it took the
    GRC to issue its decision. Carter accuses the GRC of colluding with the
    Division.
    The GRC noted in its final decision that its "established policy does not
    provide a process for complainants to request an expedited adjudication. The
    GRC instead adjudicates complaints in the order that they are received." Carter
    contends that this is not true because he reviewed their website and manually
    counted the subsequently filed complaints that were adjudicated before his. But
    Carter did not produce any evidence as to this assertion, though he offered to do
    so if required.   We conclude the GRC's final decision was not arbitrary,
    capricious or unreasonable.
    Carter argues that the GRC did not conduct its analysis of his complaint
    in a "summary or expedited manner" in accordance with N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. He
    further urges that the GRC failed to abide by the temporal limits set in N.J.S.A.
    47:1A-6 and -7(e). Under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, a person who is denied access to a
    government record by the custodian may either institute a proceeding to
    challenge the custodian's decision by either filing an action in the Superior Court
    or by filing a complaint with the GRC. "Any such proceeding shall proceed in
    A-0483-18T1
    21
    a summary or expedited manner." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7(e) states
    that "[a]ll proceedings of the council . . . shall be conducted as expeditiously as
    possible." "[C]itizens are entitled to swift access to public records, and both the
    public and governmental bodies are logically entitled to have any disputes
    brought and addressed in the same, rapid manner." Mason, 
    196 N.J. at 69
    .
    As the GRC noted in its final decision, it has an established procedure of
    addressing complaints in the order that they are received. The GRC merely
    addressed Carter's complaint when it was his turn. Because the GRC has an
    established, reasonable procedure in addressing complaints, the GRC's delay in
    response was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
    Carter contends that he is entitled to attorney's fees should he prevail in
    this appeal. Under OPRA, a requestor who prevails in any proceeding is entitled
    to reasonable attorney's fees.     N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.      Because Carter has not
    prevailed in this proceeding, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
    To the extent that we have not specifically addressed Carter's remaining
    arguments, we conclude that they are without merit to warrant attention in a
    written opinion.    R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).      We otherwise affirm for the reasons
    expressed by the GRC.
    Affirmed.
    A-0483-18T1
    22