GARY MADDOX VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0618-18T1
    GARY MADDOX,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent.
    ____________________________
    Submitted November 20, 2019 – Decided December 11, 2019
    Before Judges Koblitz and Mawla.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    Gary Maddox, appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Nicholas A. Sullivan, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Gary Maddox is confined to prison, serving a lengthy term with a thirty-
    year mandatory minimum term for leading a narcotics network and other related
    charges. He appeals from a June 11, 2018 final decision of the New Jersey
    Department of Corrections (DOC), finding him guilty of *.204, use of prohibited
    drugs. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(2)(xvi). As a result of the infraction, Maddox
    received 150 days of administrative segregation, 210 days' loss of commutation
    time, 365 days of urine monitoring, permanent loss of contact visits, 1 referral
    for mental health care and thirty days' loss of JPay privileges. We affirm the
    finding of the infraction, but vacate and remand the sanction for the DOC to
    reconsider and supply appropriate reasons for the new sanction imposed.
    On April 23, 2018, the prison gave Maddox a urine test, which was
    positive for opiates. Maddox accepted the assistance of a counsel substitute.
    Maddox argued the prescribed drug he was taking, Benadryl, had caused a false
    positive result. Because the DOC acknowledged the Benadryl could create a
    false positive for methadone, his urine sample was then sent to an outside
    laboratory, Atlantic Diagnostic Laboratories (Diagnostic). The Diagnostic test
    results reflected the presence of morphine and hydrocodone.
    1
    An inmate may apply to reinstate the permanent loss of contact visits after 365
    days. N.J.A.C. 10A:18-6.20(a).
    A-0618-18T1
    2
    Maddox sought to confront the medical personnel in the prison as well as
    the laboratory workers at Diagnostic. The hearing officer (HO) denied the
    request, determining that such testimony would not be relevant.
    Our role in reviewing a prison disciplinary decision is limited. Figueroa
    v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    414 N.J. Super. 186
    , 190 (App. Div. 2010). In general,
    the decision must not be disturbed on appeal unless it was arbitrary, capricious,
    or unreasonable, or lacked the support of "substantial credible evidence in the
    record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579–80 (1980).
    An adjudication of guilt of an infraction must be supported by "substantial
    evidence."   N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a).       "'Substantial evidence' means 'such
    evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.'" 
    Figueroa, 414 N.J. Super. at 192
    (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec.
    & Gas Co., 
    35 N.J. 358
    , 376 (1961)). "Where there is substantial evidence in
    the record to support more than one regulatory conclusion, 'it is the agency's
    choice which governs.'" In re Vineland Chem. Co., 
    243 N.J. Super. 285
    , 307
    (App. Div. 1990) (quoting DeVitis v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 
    202 N.J. Super. 484
    ,
    491 (App. Div. 1985)).
    On appeal, Maddox argues the decision was contrary to the evidence, and
    that he should have been permitted to question the individuals who performed
    A-0618-18T1
    3
    the laboratory tests and those who were familiar with his prescription for
    Benadryl.    Maddox argues before us that he was also taking two other
    medications. We do not consider evidence or arguments not provided to the
    agency. In re Stream Encroachment Permit, Permit No. 0200-04-002.1 FHA,
    
    402 N.J. Super. 587
    , 602 (App. Div. 2008).
    We reject Maddox's due process arguments.          N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(b)
    states: "Evidence relied upon in making a determination shall be specified on
    the Adjudication of Disciplinary Report form." The DOC complied with its
    obligations. Maddox received notice of the charges, and was afforded assistance
    of a counsel substitute at the hearing. See Avant v. Clifford, 
    67 N.J. 496
    , 523,
    536 (1975). He was able to see the evidence the HO relied upon and the report
    form set forth the statements and reports relied upon to adjudicate the infraction.
    The right of an inmate to confront witnesses is not absolute. N.J.A.C.
    10A:4-9.13(a). The DOC appropriately sent the urine sample for an outside,
    objective, more accurate test. See Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., __ N.J.
    Super. __, __ (App. Div. 2019) (slip op. at 1–2) (requiring the DOC to use a
    confirmatory laboratory test on a substance found on an inmate).
    The HO, however, did not provide an adequate explanation for the
    sanctions imposed on Maddox. The HO stated:
    A-0618-18T1
    4
    [Inmate] must be held responsible for his actions. His
    urine tested positive for not one, but two substances that
    he is not prescribed by Medical or Dental. The use of
    substances not prescribed poses a safety [and] security
    risk within the institution [and] will not be tolerated.
    Note C1 — yes/yes/no. [Inmate] advised he has [forty-
    eight] hours to appeal.
    C1 is a mental health "Disciplinary Report Form." The form stated that
    Maddox suffered from a mental illness, yet was responsible for his actions and
    competent.    The form states: "there is no evidence that [the inmate] will
    decompensate if given a [twenty-one]-day [restrictive housing unit] sanction."
    The 150 days administrative segregation, a form of solitary confinement
    in a restrictive housing unit, and the other sanctions imposed were not the
    minimum permitted for such an offense. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.1(g). The DOC
    offered an insufficient explanation of how the sanctions were proportionate to
    the offense and the offender.        The DOC must provide an inmate with
    "individualized reasons for the specific sanctions imposed." Malacow v. N.J.
    Dep't of Corr., 
    457 N.J. Super. 87
    , 96–97 (App. Div. 2018); see also Mejia v.
    N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    446 N.J. Super. 369
    , 378–79 (App. Div. 2016). The DOC
    must articulate the factors considered in the imposition of sanctions so that we
    may perform our review of "whether a sanction is imposed for permissible
    reasons."    
    Mejia, 446 N.J. Super. at 379
    ; see also N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.17(a)
    A-0618-18T1
    5
    (providing relevant factors for individualized sanctions). One reason given, that
    two "substances" were found in Maddox's urine, is specific to the offense. But
    in itself this reason is insufficient. The other comments are not specific to
    Maddox. Maddox claims this is his first disciplinary infraction. We therefore
    reverse the sanctions and remand for a re-imposition of sanctions with valid
    inmate-specific reasons.
    Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part.        We do not retain
    jurisdiction.
    A-0618-18T1
    6