ALEXANDRA M. SALAS VS. BOARD OF REVIEW (BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4981-17T3
    ALEXANDRA M. SALAS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF REVIEW,
    DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
    and PRECISION METAL
    MACHINING, INC.,
    Respondents.
    __________________________
    Argued November 20, 2019 - Decided December 13, 2019
    Before Judges Mayer and Enright.
    On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
    Labor, Docket No. 074,750.
    Sara Z. Cullinane argued the cause for appellant (Sara
    Z. Cullinane, attorney; Alexandra Salas, on the pro se
    briefs).
    Rimma Razhba, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
    cause for respondent Board of Review (Gurbir S.
    Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Donna Arons,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Aimee Blenner,
    Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
    Respondent Precision Metal Machining, Inc. has not
    filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Alexandra M. Salas appeals from a May 21, 2018 decision by
    respondent Board of Review (Board) disqualifying her for receipt of
    unemployment benefits. We affirm.
    Salas worked for respondent Precision Metal Machining, Inc. (PMMI) as
    a metal polisher from 2004 until July 13, 2012. In the performance of her job,
    she used a chemical which, over time, caused her to develop a skin rash. Salas
    was able to control the rash with medication. She claimed she notified PMMI
    of her condition in December 2011. PMMI's Director of Operations denied
    being told about the rash.
    In mid-2012, Salas became pregnant. She feared the medication used to
    control her rash would harm her unborn child and elected to discontinue it during
    her pregnancy. In July 2012, Salas obtained a note from a certified nurse
    midwife, suggesting Salas "get a [t]ransfer, even temporary while she [was]
    pregnant, to decrease the effect on her pregnancy." The nurse midwife did not
    causally connect Salas's rash to the chemical at PMMI's facility. Nor did the
    A-4981-17T3
    2
    nurse midwife state Salas was unable to take any medication or treatment for
    her skin condition while she was pregnant. Salas did not provide a medical note
    from the doctor who treated her skin rash.
    Salas provided the nurse midwife note to PMMI and met with PMMI's
    management. At this meeting, Salas claimed PMMI's representative mentioned
    the possibility of disability or layoff. PMMI denied any such discussion. PMMI
    offered Salas "a temporary job in a self-contained quality controlled clean room
    without any change in pay or hours."
    Initially, Salas accepted the job in PMMI's quality controlled clean room.
    However, after speaking with her husband immediately after she accepted the
    alternate position, Salas abruptly resigned from the company. Salas claimed she
    would have been exposed to the same irritating chemical if she worked in the
    quality controlled area because she had to cross the factory floor to enter or exit
    the building and use the bathroom. Salas admitted she did not tell PMMI that
    she would have accepted an office job in lieu of the position in the quality
    controlled clean room. PMMI's office has a separate entrance to the building
    that would not have required Salas to enter through the factory.
    Salas applied for unemployment benefits. Initially, the Board's deputy
    awarded unemployment benefits, determining Salas left her job "because the
    A-4981-17T3
    3
    work was adversely affecting [her] health." PMMI appealed. The Appeal
    Tribunal (Tribunal) held Salas was disqualified from receipt of benefits as of
    July 8, 2012 because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable
    to such work.1 The Tribunal also concluded PMMI presented an alternate job
    position to address Salas's medical condition and "that Salas 'failed to accept the
    offered [position] and never discuss[ed] the matter with her physician regarding
    the accomodations,' instead, choosing to leave her employment." Salas I, slip
    op. at 1.
    As a result of Salas II, the Board conducted a hearing on April 20, 2018
    and heard testimony from Salas, a representative of PMMI's management, and
    PMMI's Director of Operations. The Board also considered two expert reports
    supplied by Salas and the July 2012 note from her nurse midwife.
    In a May 21, 2018 decision, the Board denied unemployment benefits
    because Salas left work voluntarily "without good cause attributable to the
    work." The Board doubted Salas's contention that the quality controlled clean
    room "would not meet her needs because she had worked a few times in this part
    1
    The procedural history related to appeals filed prior to the Board's May 21,
    2018 decision are not relevant to our review of appellant's contentions on this
    appeal. See Salas v. Bd. of Review, No. A-3077-13 (App. Div. Oct. 15, 2015)
    (Salas I) and Salas v. Bd. of Review, No. A-1189-16 (App. Div. Jan. 29, 2018)
    (Salas II) (ordering a remand to the Board to conduct a hearing).
    A-4981-17T3
    4
    of the plant and had experienced allergic reactions." The Board determined that
    on the occasions when Salas worked in the quality controlled clean room, she
    also worked her regular job in the factory and therefore she could not
    differentiate which area of the workplace caused her symptoms.
    The Board also reviewed and rejected the written statement from a doctor
    "who interviewed [Salas] six years after her separation" from PMMI. The Board
    noted the doctor "append[ed] a statement from an industrial expert who ha[d]
    unflattering things to say about the employer's factory which apparently he never
    visited." The medical expert never examined Salas and did not review her
    medical records. He also assumed the "environmental conditions at the factory
    were the cause of the allergic reaction" based on the industrial expert's report
    and interview with Salas. The doctor's entire report was based on "[a]ssuming
    [Salas's] view is correct" in her reporting of conditions at PMMI's factory.
    According to the report submitted by the industrial expert, he did not
    speak to anyone at PMMI regarding the company's operations, equipment,
    ventilation system, or chemicals used. The expert solely relied on information
    and photographs provided by Salas. He hypothesized that persons in the quality
    controlled clean room had a "likelihood of exposure" to "fumes, aerosols and
    dust from the machines."     His entire report was rife with speculative and
    A-4981-17T3
    5
    unsubstantiated conclusions. While the Board considered both expert reports, it
    gave them "little weight."
    The Board also questioned Salas's testimony "that she would have
    accepted a transfer to the employer's office had it been offered." The Board
    found the response by PMMI's testifying witness more credible.           PMMI's
    witness testified, "that had they known this they would have accommodated
    her." Because Salas abruptly resigned after accepting the offered transfer to the
    quality controlled clean room, the Board concluded "[t]his foreclosed the chance
    of any further change in her work."
    On appeal, Salas alleges the following: (1) PMMI discontinued the
    interactive process regarding a reasonable accommodation for her disability; (2)
    she had good cause for refusing the offered alternate position; (3) she resigned
    prior to an imminent discharge by PMMI; (4) the accommodation in the quality
    controlled clean room should be considered "new work"; and (5) she should not
    be compelled to refund unemployment benefits.
    The scope of review of an administrative agency's final determination is
    limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 
    152 N.J. 197
    , 210 (1997). The agency's
    decision may not be disturbed unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious,
    unreasonable, or inconsistent with applicable law. 
    Ibid. "If the Board's
    factual
    A-4981-17T3
    6
    findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to
    accept them.'" 
    Ibid. (quoting Self v.
    Bd. of Review, 
    91 N.J. 453
    , 459 (1982)).
    "[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation
    proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same
    conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the
    factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." 
    Ibid. We "must .
    . .
    give due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge
    their credibility." Logan v. Bd. of Review, 
    299 N.J. Super. 346
    , 348 (App. Div.
    1997).
    The Board was instructed to determine whether Salas's separation should
    be decided under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) as a voluntary leaving of work or under
    N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) as a refusal of suitable work. Salas I, slip op. at 2-3. Salas
    argues neither occurred because "the employer discontinued the interactive
    process for a reasonable accommodation for her disability after [she] reasonably
    rejected the proposed new work."
    In alleging failure to accommodate a disability, a plaintiff must establish:
    (1) a disability; (2) the individual was otherwise qualified to perform the
    obligations of the job; and (3) the individual suffered an adverse employment
    action because of the disability. Svarnas v. AT&T Commc'ns, 326 N.J. Super.
    A-4981-17T3
    7
    59, 73 (App. Div. 1999). At no time did Salas claim she was disabled. Nor did
    Salas contend PMMI discriminated against her because of a disability. Having
    failed to present a qualifying disability, Salas cannot establish her failure to
    accommodate claim.
    Even assuming Salas was disabled as a result of her pregnancy or skin
    rash, PMMI did not discontinue the interactive process regarding a reasonable
    accommodation. The Board found the testimony offered by PMMI credible
    regarding Salas's abrupt resignation from the company without any further
    discussion about the temporary job position. It is incumbent upon the employee
    and employer "to assist in the search for appropriate reasonable accommodation
    and to act in good faith." Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Superior Court of N.J.,
    
    351 N.J. Super. 385
    , 400 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville
    School District, 
    184 F.3d 296
    , 312 (3d Cir. 1999)).
    Here, the record does not support Salas's argument because she resigned
    after initially accepting PMMI's offer of an alternate job as an accommodation
    during her pregnancy. Salas cannot claim a failure to accommodate when she
    abruptly quit her job without any further discussion.
    We next consider whether Salas had good cause for refusing the alternate
    position in the quality controlled clean room. An individual will be disqualified
    A-4981-17T3
    8
    from receipt of unemployment benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual
    has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for
    each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed . . . . " N.J.S.A.
    43:21-5(a). An individual who leaves a job due to a health condition "which
    does not have a work-connected origin but is aggravated by working conditions
    will not be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work without good
    cause 'attributable to such work,' provided there was no other suitable work
    available which the individual could have performed." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b).
    Our Supreme Court has held the "good cause" element "denotes 'a reason
    related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to
    give the individual no choice but to leave the employment.'" Ardan v. Bd. of
    Review, 
    231 N.J. 589
    , 602 (2018) (quoting N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b)). "The test of
    'ordinary common sense and prudence' must be utilized to determine whether an
    employee's decision to leave work constitutes good cause." 
    Brady, 152 N.J. at 214
    (quoting Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 
    85 N.J. Super. 46
    , 52 (App. Div.
    1964)).
    "The decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial
    and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones."
    Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 
    192 N.J. Super. 284
    , 288 (App. Div. 1983).
    A-4981-17T3
    9
    Employees must attempt to remain employed rather than seek unemployment
    benefits. 
    Ibid. (citing Condo v.
    Bd. of Review, 
    158 N.J. Super. 172
    , 175 (App.
    Div. 1978)).
    Salas left her employment because she claimed the alternate assignment
    in the quality controlled clean room failed to filter the irritating chemical despite
    the use of a special air-filtration system. Salas failed to proffer any proof that
    the quality controlled clean room had the same exposure to chemicals as the
    factory floor.   Nor did she provide evidence that she attempted to remain
    employed at PMMI in some other position rather than seek unemployment
    benefits. The representative of PMMI told the Board Salas was a valuable
    employee and it would have found an office position if she had requested such
    a job instead of resigning.
    "When an individual leaves work for health or medical reasons, medical
    certification shall be required to support a finding of good cause attributable to
    work." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(d). The claimant bears the burden of proving his or
    her medical condition was aggravated by his or her employment duties to qualify
    for the medical good cause exception. 
    Brady, 152 N.J. at 218
    .
    Salas alleged she left the job for medical reasons, which required her to
    provide a medical certification. During the hearing before the Board, Salas
    A-4981-17T3
    10
    provided only the July 2012 note from her nurse midwife and two expert reports.
    The Board considered these documents in rejecting Salas's request for benefits.
    The Board found the nurse midwife's note merely "encouraged" Salas to
    "possibly" obtain an alternate assignment on a temporary basis. The Board gave
    little weight to the industrial expert's report because his opinion was not based
    on a physical inspection. The Board also concluded the doctor's report was not
    persuasive because his opinion was based on an interview with Salas six years
    after she resigned from PMMI.       Having reviewed the medical documents
    provided by Salas, we agree that the nurse midwife's note and expert reports
    failed to satisfy Salas's burden to prove the work setting aggravated a medical
    condition.
    We next consider the argument that the job offered to Salas in the quality
    controlled clean room constituted "new work" pursuant to N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.5.
    Salas argues the offered "new work" was unacceptable because she would have
    been exposed to the same chemicals in the new work location.
    N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.5(a)(3) defines "new work" as "[a]n offer of work made
    by an individual's present employer of substantially different duties, terms or
    conditions of employment from those he or she agreed to perform in his or her
    existing contract of hire."   When determining whether an assignment will
    A-4981-17T3
    11
    constitute "new work," the court will consider "the employer's change of hours
    or shift, job duties, location, salary, benefits, work environment and h ealth and
    safety conditions." 
    Ibid. Here, PMMI testified
    there was no change in pay, hours, benefits, or
    building location for the position offered to Salas. Based on substantial credible
    evidence in the record, we are satisfied the Board correctly determined the
    alternate job did not constitute "new work" and therefore the separation was the
    result of Salas's voluntary resignation under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) rather than
    refusal of suitable work under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c).
    We next address the argument that Salas left work prior to an impending
    discharge by PMMI. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.5 provides, "[i]f an individual leaves work
    after he or she is notified by the employer of an impending layoff or discharge, he
    or she shall be subject to disqualification for benefits unless the individual will be
    separated within 60 days."       Allowing benefits to an employee under such
    circumstances requires near certainty the employee would be discharged absent his
    or her resignation. Cottman v. Bd. of Review, 
    454 N.J. Super. 166
    , 170 (App. Div.
    A-4981-17T3
    12
    2018) (holding "when an employee knows that he or she is about to be fired, the
    employee may quit without becoming ineligible" for unemployment benefits).
    Here, PMMI made no imminent threat to Salas's employment. Salas
    conceded "the employer did not threaten discharge." She failed to produce
    evidence she would be laid off or discharged from her employment. To the
    contrary, PMMI testified Salas was "an excellent employee." Based on the
    credible evidence, we conclude the Board appropriately found no imminent
    threat to Salas's job that caused her to resign rather than be discharged or laid
    off.
    Salas also argues she should not be compelled to refund unemployment
    benefits. We decline to address this argument based on Rule 2:2-3(a)(2), which
    reserves appeals as of right for review of final decisions or actions of any state
    administrative agency. Here, there is no final agency decision regarding Salas's
    obligation to refund the benefits awarded. The Board determined "[w]hether the
    claimant is liable to refund the benefits she received while disqualified is a
    matter for the Director to decide . . . . As to whether the claimant qualifies for
    a refund waiver, the claimant must pursue this matter by petitioning the Director
    who has original jurisdiction in such matters."         Absent a final agency
    A-4981-17T3
    13
    determination that Salas is liable to refund the benefits, the matter is not ripe for
    appellate review.
    Affirmed.
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    14