STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. AMIE MARROCCELLI (11-06-0380, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4243-17T1
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    AMIE MARROCCELLI, a/k/a
    ANNIE M. MARROCCELLI,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ______________________________
    Argued December 11, 2019 – Decided December 23, 2019
    Before Judges Haas, Mayer and Enright.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 11-06-
    0380.
    Cody Tyler Mason, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
    argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
    Public Defender, attorney; Stephen W. Kirsch,
    Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
    the brief).
    Paul Henry Heinzel, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
    cause for respondent (Michael H. Robertson, Somerset
    County Prosecutor, attorney; Paul Henry Heinzel, of
    counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    This matter returns to us following a remand ordered in our previous
    opinion. State v. Marroccelli, 
    448 N.J. Super. 349
    , 371 (App. Div. 2017). In
    that case, we reversed defendant Amie Marroccelli's conviction for second-
    degree vehicular homicide because the trial judge incorrectly barred defendant
    from introducing a note her husband allegedly wrote in which he admitted that
    he, rather than defendant, was driving the car that struck and killed the victim.
    
    Id. at 361,
    370-71. We also held that the judge "mistakenly exercised his
    discretion by preventing her from presenting evidence concerning her driving
    habits to support her claims she was not driving the [car] at the time of the
    accident." 
    Id. at 371-73.
    On remand, the judge conducted a new trial before a jury, which again
    convicted defendant of second-degree homicide in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
    5(b)(1). The judge sentenced defendant to seven years in prison subject to an
    eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early
    Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and three years of parole supervision upon her
    release. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:
    A-4243-17T1
    2
    POINT I
    THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO STRIKE
    TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT'S HUSBAND
    TOLD A STATE TROOPER AT THE SCENE OF THE
    ACCIDENT THAT DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING
    THE CAR; THAT TESTIMONIAL STATEMENT
    WAS    ADMITTED    IN    VIOLATION    OF
    DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT AND
    STATE-CONSTITUTIONAL       RIGHTS     TO
    CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HER.
    POINT II
    THE    JUDGE     IMPROPERLY      EXCLUDED
    "REVERSE" N.J.R.E. 404(b) EVIDENCE THAT, 21
    HOURS AFTER THE FATAL ACCIDENT, THE
    DECEDENT STILL HAD COCAINE AND
    MARIJUANA METABOLITES IN HIS SYSTEM
    AND,   THEREFORE,      MAY     HAVE   BEEN
    INTOXICATED HIMSELF AT THE TIME OF THE
    CRASH, RENDERING HIM UNABLE TO COPE
    WITH WHAT MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN
    ONLY A MINOR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT.
    POINT III
    WHEN SUSTAINING AN OBJECTION, [THE TRIAL
    JUDGE] IMPROPERLY TOLD THE JURY THAT HE
    HAD ALREADY DECIDED A PRETRIAL
    MIRANDA MOTION IN THE CASE, A CLEAR
    VIOLATION OF CASE LAW THAT FORBIDS A
    JUDGE FROM TELLING A JURY ABOUT
    PRETRIAL RULINGS BECAUSE TO DO SO MIGHT
    AFFECT THE JURY'S EVENTUAL CREDIBILITY
    FINDINGS.
    POINT IV
    A-4243-17T1
    3
    EVEN IF ANY ONE OF THE COMPLAINED-OF
    ERRORS WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO
    WARRANT REVERSAL, THE CUMULATIVE
    EFFECT OF THOSE ERRORS WAS TO DENY
    DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.
    (Not Raised Below).
    After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal,
    we affirm.
    I.
    As was the case in defendant's first trial, the primary issue on remand "was
    whether defendant was driving her car on I-78 in Somerset County on the night
    it struck a vehicle driven by the victim." 
    Marroccelli, 448 N.J. Super. at 355
    .
    That evening, a witness was driving behind the victim's car, and saw defendant's
    white BMW pass his car and pull directly alongside the victim's vehicle. The
    witness could not see who was driving the BMW. The witness testified the
    BMW suddenly moved to the right and struck the victim's car, sending it down
    an embankment where it crashed in the woods lining the highway.
    About six minutes later, Trooper John Mucksavage arrived at the accident
    scene. He found the unconscious victim inside his car, bleeding and gasping for
    air. The trooper called for emergency medical assistance, and a helicopter
    A-4243-17T1
    4
    arrived to transport the victim to the hospital. The victim died the next day as
    the result of a brain hemorrhage.
    Trooper Mucksavage found defendant and her husband, Jason Bradbury,
    walking along the road. Defendant was barefoot. The couple told the trooper
    they were not injured in the crash, but defendant complained that she had gotten
    thorns in her feet from walking in the woods without shoes. Defendant stated
    she and Bradbury were coming from a wedding reception. The trooper testified
    defendant had alcohol on her breath and that Bradbury was "obviously
    intoxicated."
    Defendant told the trooper she was driving the car when she saw a deer or
    a dog in the middle of the road, causing her to veer off the highway into a ditch.
    She claimed she did not recall hitting the victim's car. However, Trooper
    Mucksavage saw that defendant's BMW had sustained damage and had "black
    rubber markings" and red paint on it from striking the victim's car. White paint
    from defendant's BMW was found on the driver's side of the victim's car.
    Defendant told Trooper Mucksavage that she was barefoot because she
    had taken off her high heels and put on "flip-flops" to drive. After the crash,
    defendant could not open the driver's side door of her car, so she climbed out on
    A-4243-17T1
    5
    the passenger side. She lost the flip-flops when she got out of car and walked
    back up to the highway.
    Defendant was much shorter than her husband.                 Photos taken of
    defendant's BMW showed that the driver's seat was positioned so far forward
    that a person of Bradbury's height would not have been able to sit in it.
    Approximately two hours later, Trooper Mucksavage administered field
    sobriety tests to defendant, and she failed them. He arrested defendant for
    driving while intoxicated, and drove her to the hospital to obtain a blood sample.
    Defendant's blood was drawn about ninety minutes later and her blood alcohol
    content (BAC) was .087%. Using extrapolation analysis, the State's expert
    witness testified that defendant's BAC at the time of the crash was 0.14%.
    Defendant's doctor testified that defendant came to her office two days
    after the crash for treatment of foot and leg injuries. Defendant told the doctor
    she was the driver of the car on the night it struck the victim.
    Defendant's employer testified that the wedding reception defendant and
    Bradbury attended was for his daughter. When later describing the accident to
    her employer, defendant told him that she was the driver. Defendant's insurance
    agent testified that when defendant called to file an insurance claim concerning
    the accident, she reported she was driving the BMW.
    A-4243-17T1
    6
    The parties stipulated that defendant later sent the victim's mother a letter
    that stated, among other things, that "[t]he depth of [her] guilt is
    immeasurable[,]" but it was "an accident" because she "saw a deer" and then
    "jolted the wheel," never thinking she "had hit another vehicle." Defendant told
    the victim's mother that she was "haunt[ed] . . . day in and day out" by what
    happened. She also stated that she once dreamed of the victim, who "winked
    and smiled and said it's all right, I'm okay. It's how it was meant to be. You
    will see one day. Others were near me to live and that is why I had to go."
    Defendant did not testify, but three witnesses testified on her behalf.
    Defendant's former boyfriend testified that he drove defendant to her attorney's
    office sometime in 2012. When they returned to his car to drive home, the
    boyfriend stated defendant handed him a letter that was allegedly signed by
    Bradbury. The letter stated, "To whom it may concern: I, Jason Bradbury, was
    driving the car at the time of the accident on 10-10-10. [Defendant] was not
    driving. Jason Bradbury, 2:32 a.m., April 5, 2011." The boyfriend stated he
    held on to the note for an unspecified period of time before returning it to
    defendant.
    Defendant also called a handwriting expert, who opined that Bradbury was
    the note's author, and that defendant was not. However, the expert never saw
    A-4243-17T1
    7
    Bradbury write the samples purporting to be his handwriting, nor did the expert
    observe defendant write the samples of her handwriting that he reviewed.
    One of defendant's friends testified she spoke to Bradbury sometime
    before March 19, 2013, and he told her he was driving the car when it struck the
    victim. The friend claimed she later confronted Bradbury about this statement,
    and he confirmed he was driving, but "did not cause the accident."
    II.
    In Point I of her brief, defendant argues that when Trooper Mucksavage
    testified on re-direct examination that Bradbury stated defendant was driving
    the BMW on the night of the accident, this statement violated her Sixth
    Amendment right to confront the witnesses against her. We disagree.
    From the outset of the trial, defendant's position was that she told the
    police, her doctor, her employer, and her insurance agent that she was driving
    the car that struck and killed the victim, and apologized to the victim's mother
    for doing so, as part of a scheme to protect Bradbury from prosecution. Thus,
    defense counsel's opening statement alleged that Bradbury convinced defendant
    to "take the weight" for him and she agreed to do so because she believed the
    only charge would be driving while intoxicated. When the couple learned that
    the car had struck and killed the victim, defendant wanted Bradbury to admit he
    A-4243-17T1
    8
    was the driver and, following an argument sometime later, Bradbury took
    responsibility by writing the "confession note."
    During cross-examination, defense counsel repeatedly asked Trooper
    Mucksavage why he accepted defendant's admission that she was driving the
    BMW, rather than taking steps to investigate Bradbury. To address this defense
    tactic, the prosecutor and the trooper had the following brief exchange during
    the trooper's re-direct examination:
    Q:    You were asked questions by [defense counsel]
    about whether you asked [defendant] whether
    anybody else was driving the car, correct?
    A:    Yes, he asked me that.
    Q:    And you were asked questions by [defense
    counsel] that you accepted that she said she was
    the driver, correct?
    A:    Yes.
    Q:    Was Jason Bradbury also asked at the scene who
    was the driver?
    A:    Yes.
    Q:    And what did he say?
    A:    He informed me she was driving.
    Defendant did not object to this testimony, and the State moved on to question
    the trooper about other topics.
    A-4243-17T1
    9
    The State called ten additional witnesses after Trooper Mucksavage
    testified and then rested its case. During a charge conference conducted eight
    days after the trooper completed his testimony, defense counsel for the first time
    raised the trooper's statement that Bradbury said that defendant was driving for
    the first time. The attorney did not ask the judge to strike the trooper's statement
    as violative of defendant's confrontation rights, nor did he request a curative jury
    instruction. The attorney stated he had not objected to the statement because he
    did not want "to highlight it[,]" and he was concerned that if the judge now gave
    the jury an instruction to disregard it, this would only draw attention to what the
    trooper said. Instead, defense counsel asked the judge to bar the prosecutor from
    referring to this testimony during summations.
    As it was clear that defendant was not asking for any immediate action,
    the judge reserved on the issue, and stated:
    Well, had the objection been made in a timely fashion,
    I would like to think that I would have reacted as I have
    in these other circumstances, and explained to the jury
    that hearsay generally is not admissible. However,
    there are exceptions to the hearsay rule, among which
    are to explain why a witness took certain action or
    refrained from taking certain action. And so I would
    have given the jury a cautionary instruction at that time.
    Ladies and gentlemen, you can't take that hearsay as for
    the truth of what was said, you can only consider it to
    explain why the Trooper did something or didn't do
    something. Now out of context, I can still give that to
    A-4243-17T1
    10
    them, but they're going to look at me with a blank look,
    because they're not going to remember when that came
    in. But, we'll reserve on that give it some thought.
    Those are some possible outcomes.
    Two days later, defense counsel again asked the judge to bar the State
    from referring to Trooper Mucksavage's brief statement during summation. The
    judge denied the motion. In addition to finding that the testimony was only
    elicited to counter defendant's argument that the trooper was somehow remiss
    in failing to investigate the veracity of defendant's admission that she was the
    driver, the judge found that the statement was admissible under N.J.R.E. 806.
    That Rule permits a party to introduce a hearsay statement in certain
    circumstances to contradict a hearsay statement introduced by the other party.
    In spite of the judge's ruling, the State never referred to Bradbury's
    statement during its summation. Therefore, defendant received all the relief she
    requested concerning the statement.
    Under these circumstances, we discern no reversible error due to the
    admission of the statement at trial. The Confrontation Clauses of both the
    United States and New Jersey Constitutions "prohibit the use of out-of-court
    testimonial hearsay, untested by cross-examination, as a substitute for in-court
    testimony." State ex rel. J.A., 
    195 N.J. 324
    , 342 (2008). "[A] declarant's
    narrative to a law enforcement officer about a crime, which once completed has
    A-4243-17T1
    11
    ended any 'imminent danger' to the declarant or some other identifiable person,
    is testimonial." 
    Id. at 348
    (citing Davis v. Washington, 
    547 U.S. 813
    , 827-830
    (2006)).
    However, "the [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of
    testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the
    matter asserted." Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 59 at n.9 (2004); see
    Tennessee v. Street, 
    471 U.S. 409
    , 414 (1985).           Therefore, non-hearsay
    statements are not subject to Confrontation Clause considerations.       State v.
    Buda, 
    195 N.J. 278
    , 301 (2008).
    Furthermore, a defendant may waive his or her right to confrontation.
    State v. Williams, 
    219 N.J. 89
    , 98 (2014). "Defense counsel, many times as a
    matter of trial strategy, will refrain from objecting to hearsay that may inure to
    the advantage of the defendant." 
    Id. at 99.
    Therefore, it "makes perfect sense
    that 'the defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause
    objection.'” 
    Ibid. (citing Melendez-Diaz v.
    Massachusetts, 
    557 U.S. 305
    , 327
    (2009)).   "It is the defendant's choice 'to assert (or forfeit by silence) his
    Confrontation Clause right.'" 
    Ibid. (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557
    U.S. at 326).
    Strategic decisions made by defense counsel will not present grounds for
    reversal on appeal, except for the most extreme cases. State v. Marshall, 123
    A-4243-17T1
    
    12 N.J. 1
    , 93 (1991). "The defendant cannot request the trial court to take a certain
    course of action, and upon adoption by the court, take his chance on the outcome
    of the trial, and if unfavorable then condemn the very procedure he sought and
    urged, claiming it to be error and prejudicial." State v. Pontery, 
    19 N.J. 457
    ,
    471 (1955). So where counsel deliberately chooses to forego an objection or a
    curative instruction in an attempt to minimize the impact of testimony, counsel
    cannot later "argue that the court should have given a more immediate curative
    instruction, when it was defense counsel who insisted that the court not
    'highlight' the [issue] with a[n] instruction to the jury." State v. Loftin, 
    146 N.J. 296
    , 365 (1996).
    Here, defendant waived her right to object to Trooper Mucksavage's
    statement. She waited eight days after he testified to bring up the issue, and then
    specifically declined the opportunity to move to strike the statement or have the
    judge give the jury an instruction on how to evaluate this testimony. Instead,
    defendant only sought to bar the State from referring to the statement in
    summation and, even though the judge did not grant defendant's request, the
    State never mentioned the statement in its final argument to the jury. In short,
    defendant made a strategic decision to avoid drawing attention to the statement
    either by asking to strike it or by having the judge instruct the jury about it.
    A-4243-17T1
    13
    Thus, defendant cannot now claim that the judge erred by following the course
    of action she urged at trial. 
    Loftin, 146 N.J. at 365
    .
    Moreover, the statement was admissible because it was not offered for its
    truth, but rather to explain why Trooper Mucksavage did not challenge
    defendant's admission that she was driving the car. See Tennessee v. Street, 
    471 U.S. 409
    , 414 (1985) (stating that "[t]he non-hearsay aspect of [an accomplice's]
    confession – not to prove what happened at the murder scene but to prove what
    happened when [defendant] confessed – raises no Confrontation Clause
    concerns"). In addition, the statement was also admissible under N.J.R.E. 806
    because it clearly responded to the hearsay statements contained in the note and
    defendant's friend's testimony indicating that Bradbury was the driver.
    Even if the statement should have been stricken from the record, however,
    any error in failing to do so was clearly harmless under the circumstances of this
    case. State v. J.R., 
    227 N.J. 393
    , 417 (2017) (stating that "[a]n error will not
    lead to reversal unless it is 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result'")
    (quoting R. 2:10-2). The brief statement was never referred to again by the
    State. It was also consistent with defendant's repeated contention throughout
    the trial that she and Bradbury agreed to lie at the accident scene and say that
    defendant was driving the car. Moreover, the evidence that defendant was the
    A-4243-17T1
    14
    driver was overwhelming. Defendant admitted she drove the BMW to the
    police, her doctor, her insurance agent, and her employer. Defendant also sent
    a letter to the victim's mother expressing her guilt after the victim allegedly
    appeared to her in a dream. In addition, the driver seat of the car was also
    positioned in a way that only defendant could have driven it.
    Therefore, we reject defendant's contention on this point.
    III.
    In Point II, defendant next argues that under N.J.R.E. 404(b), the judge
    should have allowed her to introduce a toxicology report stating that the victim
    had metabolites of cocaine and marijuana in his system at the time of the
    accident. Again, we disagree.
    Before the trial began, the State filed a motion to bar defendant from
    introducing the report unless she presented an expert witness to explain its
    significance to the jury. Defendant argued that the presence of metabolites of
    cocaine and marijuana in the victim's system would permit the jury to infer that
    the victim was under the influence of these substances at the time of the accident,
    and that his reckless driving caused the accident.
    Defendant did not retain an expert witness to make this causal connection
    or to otherwise explain the significance of the report. Accordingly, the judge
    A-4243-17T1
    15
    denied defendant's motion. In doing so, the judge noted that "defendant assumes
    that the mere presence of these metabolites in the victim's blood inhibited his
    ability to drive carefully and that, therefore, it may be inferred that it was the
    victim's own reckless conduct which caused the accident and his death[.]"
    However, "[c]riminal defendants are not permitted to suggest inferences to be
    drawn from evidence where expert testimony is required to support such
    inferences . . . That is the case here."
    The judge also stated that "we don't know that [the victim] was under the
    influence of these substances, and cannot know it from the toxicology report[.]"
    Thus, the court found that the toxicology report was not relevant, because:
    the evidence proposed does not have a tendency in
    reason to aid the trier of fact in the determination of an
    issue before it. Without expert testimony the jury
    would not know any more than this court knows what
    to make of the toxicology report. And to permit the jury
    to speculate as to what this toxicology report might
    indicate in terms of operation under the influence,
    impairment is so confusing and speculative as to form
    and the basis to grant the State's motion… Clearly
    expert testimony as to the issues presented in this case
    is necessary to explain the significance of the
    toxicology report because its significance, that is, what
    does it mean? It is beyond the ken of the average juror.
    Such an interpretation would require scientific,
    medical, or forensic knowledge outside that possessed
    by the ordinary juror.
    A-4243-17T1
    16
    During the trial, defendant raised the issue again, and the judge conducted
    two hearings at which two State experts testified that the toxicology report
    required expert interpretation.   This was so because, in the uncontradicted
    opinion of the State's experts, metabolites are "not active." Thus, while the
    presence of a metabolite in a victim suggests past use of a drug, it does not mean
    that the victim was affected in any way by the drug at the time of an accident.
    Accordingly, the judge again denied defendant's motion to introduce the report
    in the absence of any expert testimony to explain it to the jury.
    N.J.R.E. 404(b) states:
    [e]xcept as otherwise provided by Rule 608(b),
    evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
    admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order
    to show that such person acted in conformity therewith.
    Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes,
    such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
    preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of
    mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a
    material issue in dispute.
    When the State proffers 404(b) evidence, a four-pronged analysis,
    outlined in State v. Cofield, must take place.       
    127 N.J. 328
    , 338 (1992).
    However, "[w]hen a person charged with a criminal offense seeks to use other -
    crimes evidence defensively, the Cofield standard does not govern because 'an
    accused is entitled to advance in his defense any evidence which may rationally
    A-4243-17T1
    17
    tend to refute his guilt or buttress his innocence of the charge made.'" State v.
    Weaver, 
    219 N.J. 131
    , 150 (2014) (citing State v. Garfole, 
    76 N.J. 445
    , 453
    (1978)).
    Therefore, when it is the defendant "who 'offers that kind of proof
    exculpatorily . . . simple relevance to guilt or innocence" is the deciding factor
    for admissibility. 
    Ibid. (citing Garfole, 76
    N.J. at 452-53). Evidence is relevant
    where there is a "logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact
    in issue, i.e., whether the thing sought to be established is more logical with the
    evidence than without it." State v. Hutchins, 
    241 N.J. Super. 353
    , 358 (App.
    Div. 1990).
    Despite this more relaxed standard, however, "trial courts must still
    determine that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
    outweighed by any of the Rule 403 factors, which are 'undue prejudice,
    confusion of issues, or misleading the jury,' and 'undue delay, waste of time, or
    needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'" 
    Weaver, 219 N.J. at 151
    . "This
    determination is highly discretionary." Ibid.; see State v. Cook, 
    179 N.J. 533
    ,
    568-69 (2004) (where the court found that although the other-crimes evidence
    was relevant, its probative value was "minimal" because there was "nothing
    distinctive to tie" a sexual assault with a non-sexual abduction).
    A-4243-17T1
    18
    Applying these principles, we discern no basis for disturbing the judge's
    decision to bar the admission of the victim's toxicology report. It is well
    established that "[a]lthough jurors may draw rational inferences from the
    evidence, they are not permitted to speculate or connect the dots on mere
    surmise." State v. Fortin, 
    189 N.J. 579
    , 596 (2007). Thus, "New Jersey courts
    have required expert testimony to explain complex matters that would fall
    beyond the ken of the ordinary juror." 
    Ibid. Here, the uncontradicted
    expert testimony presented on the science
    surrounding metabolites clearly established that the mere presence of
    metabolites of marijuana and cocaine in the victim's system simply indicated
    that the victim had consumed these substances at some unknown point prior to
    the accident. Therefore, without an expert available to "connect the dots," the
    admission of the toxicology report in evidence would not make it more or less
    likely that the victim was under the influence of either drug when the accident
    occurred. Thus, there was an ample basis in the record to support the judge's
    determination that the relevance of the report was "beyond the ken of the
    ordinary juror" in the absence of any explanatory expert testimony.
    Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion by granting the State's
    motion to bar the admission of the report at trial.
    A-4243-17T1
    19
    IV.
    In Point III, defendant argues that the trial judge improperly informed the
    jury that he had previously ruled on a Miranda1 issue. However, we conclude
    that any error in doing so was harmless under the circumstances of this case
    because the judge never told the jury how he ruled on that application, and he
    immediately provided the jury with a strong cautionary instruction not to
    speculate about what the ruling might have been.
    In response to defendant's cross-examination, Trooper Mucksavage
    acknowledged that defendant and Bradbury were not free to leave while they
    were on the highway waiting for the emergency medical helicopter to arrive, and
    that the trooper continued to speak to them during that period. Defense counsel
    followed up by stating, "[a]nd that's before you read them their Miranda,
    correct?" The State objected to this question and the judge held a sidebar
    conference outside the presence of the jury. The judge sustained the State's
    objection after determining that the roadside questioning did not trigger the need
    to provide defendant and her husband with Miranda warnings.
    Before going back on the record before the jury, the parties and the judge
    discussed how best to inform the jury that the State's objection had been
    1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966).
    A-4243-17T1
    20
    sustained. After taking a recess, the judge stated he would simply tell the jury
    that the objection had been sustained without any further explanation.
    When the jury returned, the judge told defense counsel he could resume
    questioning the trooper and added that the State's objection had been sustained.
    A juror then interjected and asked, "[c]ould you remind me what the State's
    objection was?" The judge responded:
    The [S]tate objected to the question that [defense
    counsel] posed as to the timing of the so-called Miranda
    warnings.
    ....
    Now you've heard Trooper Mucksavage testify that he's
    testified on a couple other occasions, all right? This
    case has been the subject of pretrial hearings and
    pretrial motions before this Court, and other
    proceedings, okay? And things like Miranda have been
    adjudicated by me. Thus, I sustained the objection.
    But I tell you that about the other proceedings so that
    you don't speculate about that and say, wait a minute,
    what do you mean you've testified before? What's
    going on here? What happened with the – this, like
    many, many criminal cases, is subject to what we call
    pretrial motion practice. And in many instances, in
    order for the [j]udge to decide legal issues in pretrial
    motion practice, I have to have testimonial hearings and
    other proceedings, and I do.
    Okay, so this is tabula rasa, a blank slate, it's a brand
    new case, okay? So you're not to speculate as to when,
    why, what the result was, or anything else that
    A-4243-17T1
    21
    happened in this matter except on December 10th –
    December 21, 2010, as presented to you in this
    courtroom in this trial.
    The judge then asked the parties if they had any objections to that
    explanation. Defense counsel did not object to the instruction and, at sidebar,
    proceeded to address an unrelated matter.
    In State v. Hampton, the Court held that once a trial judge makes a
    determination that a statement is admissible under Miranda, the jury must then
    determine if the statement is true without being informed of the court's prior
    decision. 
    61 N.J. 250
    , 272 (1972). The Hampton rule was codified in N.J.R.E.
    104(c)(2), which states that:
    Where by virtue of any rule of law a judge is required
    in a criminal action to make a preliminary
    determination as to the admissibility of a statement by
    the defendant, the judge shall hear and determine the
    question of its admissibility out of the presence of the
    jury . . . If the judge admits the statement the jury shall
    not be informed of the finding that the statement is
    admissible but shall be instructed to disregard the
    statement if it finds that it is not credible.
    "[T]he judge cannot tell the jury anything that would preempt its fact -
    finding function." State v. Ridout, 
    299 N.J. Super. 233
    , 239 (App. Div. 1997).
    If the trial court is permitted to tell the jury about its holdings on pretrial motions
    regarding the admissibility of evidence, "such an advisory obviously influences,
    A-4243-17T1
    22
    and improperly so, the jury's independent consideration of the same
    circumstances for purposes of making its credibility finding." 
    Id. at 240.
    Here, the judge did not need to mention the fact that a pre-trial motion
    was filed concerning a Miranda issue in responding to the juror's question.
    However, the judge never told the jury how he decided that issue and, therefore,
    never divulged whether the statement was determined to be admissible or
    inadmissible.
    Moreover, even if the judge made a mistake in referring to a prior Miranda
    motion, he immediately corrected that misstep by giving the jury a very forceful
    curative instruction that they were not to speculate about "when, why, what the
    result was, or anything else that happened in this matter except for" what
    happened on the date of the accident.         Defendant did not object to this
    instruction. "If the defendant does not object to the [curative instruction] at the
    time it is given, there is a presumption that the [instruction] was not error and
    was unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case." State v. Singleton, 
    211 N.J. 157
    ,
    182 (2012). In addition, we must presume that the jurors followed the judge's
    clear instruction "without cavil or question." State v. Manley, 
    54 N.J. 259
    , 270
    (1969); see also Loftin, 
    146 N.J. 367
    .
    A-4243-17T1
    23
    Under these circumstances, we reject defendant's contentions on this
    point.
    V.
    Finally, defendant argues in Point IV that the cumulative prejudice of the
    errors she raises deprived her of a fair trial.      Having rejected defendant's
    argument that any reversible error occurred during her trial, we also reject her
    cumulative error argument.
    VI.
    In sum, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 2
    Affirmed.
    2
    As for the balance of any of defendant's arguments not expressly discussed
    above, they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
    opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
    A-4243-17T1
    24