MICHELLE LOMET VS. LAWES COAL COMPANY (NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) ( 2018 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1169-16T1
    MICHELLE LOMET,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    and
    DENNIS LOMET, SR.,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    LAWES COAL COMPANY,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    ______________________________
    Argued March 12, 2018 – Decided July 11, 2018
    Before Judges O'Connor and Vernoia.
    On appeal from the Department of Labor and
    Workforce Development, Division of Workers'
    Compensation, Claim Petition Nos. 2012-16521
    and 2012-32718.
    Michelle Lomet, appellant, argued the cause
    pro se.
    David P. Kendall argued the cause for
    respondent (Ann DeBellis, of counsel and on
    the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Michelle Lomet is the widow of Dennis Lomet, Sr.1
    She appeals from a Division of Worker's Compensation order
    dismissing a petition Dennis filed after he was diagnosed with
    lung cancer, in which he sought worker's compensation benefits
    from respondent Lawes Coal Company (Lawes).   The order also
    dismissed a dependency claim petition Michelle filed.    The two
    petitions were consolidated for the hearing, in which the sole
    issue was whether the lung cancer from which Dennis died was
    caused by exposure to asbestos and other chemicals during his
    employment with Lawes.
    After reviewing the evidence adduced at the hearing and the
    applicable legal principles, we affirm for the reasons set forth
    in the judge of compensation's October 6, 2016 oral decision.
    Dennis was employed by Lawes from 1987 to 2012, when he
    died of lung cancer at the age of forty-seven.   His job duties
    at Lawes were to install, remove, or repair heating and air
    conditioning equipment.   He had never been a smoker.   Before his
    death, he informed one of his treating physicians that he had
    been exposed to chemicals, soot, and asbestos in the workplace.
    One of Dennis's friends who worked for Lawes from 1987
    through 1992 testified he believed he and Dennis were exposed to
    1
    To avoid confusion, we refer to Michelle Lomet as "Michelle"
    and Dennis Lomet, Sr., as "Dennis." We intend no disrespect by
    referring to these parties by their forenames.
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    A-1169-16T1
    asbestos during that five year period.    Michelle testified that
    when Dennis came home from work, she often observed him blowing
    his nose, and saw black material come out of his nose when he
    did so.   In addition, he often had to shower twice in order to
    get clean.    There was no other evidence about Dennis's alleged
    exposure to asbestos or other chemicals while he worked for
    Lawes.
    Michelle called William A. Lerner, M.D., as her expert
    oncologist.   On the question of what caused the lung cancer in
    Dennis to develop, the substance of Dr. Lerner's testimony was:
    There are a lot of things out there that are
    . . . known carcinogens[] that are
    contributing to developing lung cancer. In
    somebody who is exposed to chemicals like
    that and asbestos with no other smoking
    history and no other known cause for his
    lung cancer[,] a reasonable probability of
    these carcinogens causing [Dennis's] lung
    cancer . . . is not unreasonable as a
    conclusion.
    He subsequently testified:
    There are lots of things that we don't know
    why people get certain cancers. . . .
    [T]here are things that we don't know that
    he may or may not have been exposed to that
    could have led to his increased risk of lung
    cancer.
    Lawes' expert oncologist, Jack Goldberg, M.D., testified
    that if asbestos fibers enter the lung and cause cancer, neural
    plaques and "B readers" are visualized on radiographical films.
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    He noted none of these was found on Dennis's radiographical
    studies.   Further, none of the pathological studies indicated
    Dennis had been exposed to asbestos.    In addition, Dr. Goldberg
    testified the radiographical studies failed to show evidence
    Dennis's cancer was caused by chemical exposure.
    The judge found Dr. Goldberg more credible than Dr. Lerner,
    and concluded that even if Dennis had been exposed to asbestos
    or carcinogenic chemicals when he worked for Lawes, there was no
    objective medical evidence such exposure caused or contributed
    to the onset of Dennis's lung cancer.    As the judge stated, this
    is "a case where there [is] zero medical evidence and 100%
    medical speculation."
    On appeal, Michelle argues there was sufficient evidence
    Dennis was exposed to asbestos or other chemicals while he
    worked for Lawes that led to his developing lung cancer.
    The scope of our review is limited.    Our function is to
    determine "'whether the findings made could reasonably have been
    reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record,'
    considering 'the proofs as a whole,' with due regard to the
    opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge . . .
    their credibility."   Close v. Kordulak Bros., 
    44 N.J. 589
    , 599
    (1965) (quoting State v. Johnson, 
    42 N.J. 146
    , 162 (1964)).
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    A-1169-16T1
    N.J.S.A. 34:15-31 defines a compensable occupational
    disease as any "disease[] arising out of and in the course of
    employment, which [is] due in a material degree to causes and
    conditions which are or were characteristic of or peculiar to a
    particular trade, occupation, process or place of employment."
    "Material degree" means "a degree substantially greater than de
    minimis."    Fiore v. Consol. Freightways, 
    140 N.J. 452
    , 467
    (1995).
    The burden is on a petitioner to prove his case by a
    preponderance of the evidence.    Rivers v. Am. Radiator Standard
    Sanitary Corp., 
    24 N.J. Misc. 223
    , 227 (C.P. 1946).    A
    petitioner seeking worker's compensation benefits must prove
    both legal and medical causation when those issues are
    contested.   Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Dep't, 
    175 N.J. 244
    , 259 (2003).   Medical causation means the disability is
    a consequence of work exposure.    
    Ibid.
       Legal causation requires
    proof the disability is work connected.    Kasper v. Board of
    Trustees of Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund, 
    164 N.J. 564
    ,
    591 (2000) (Coleman, J., concurring).
    We have examined the evidence, and concur with the judge of
    compensation's finding there was no evidence of substance that
    causally links Dennis's lung cancer to asbestos or other
    chemicals to which he may have been exposed while working for
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    Lawes.   Even if Dennis had come into contact with such agents,
    there was no evidence of the extent to which he was exposed.
    Further, the judge credited Dr. Goldberg's testimony, who
    testified that if Dennis's cancer were caused by asbestos or
    chemical exposure, evidence of such exposure would have but did
    not appear on his radiographical and pathological studies.
    Because the judge's findings were reached on sufficient credible
    evidence present in the record, we must affirm.
    Affirmed.
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    A-1169-16T1