David W. Opderbeck v. Midland Park Board of Education , 442 N.J. Super. 40 ( 2015 )


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  •                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2520-13T3
    DAVID W. OPDERBECK,
    APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    August 18, 2015
    v.                                      APPELLATE DIVISION
    MIDLAND PARK BOARD OF EDUCATION,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ___________________________________
    Argued December 17, 2014 – Decided August 18, 2015
    Before Judges Fuentes, Ashrafi, and O'Connor.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No.
    L-8571-13.
    Stephen R. Fogarty argued the cause for
    appellant (Fogarty & Hara, attorneys; Mr.
    Fogarty, of counsel and on the brief; Amy E.
    Canning, on the brief).
    David W. Opderbeck, respondent, argued the
    cause pro se.
    Carl Tanksley argued the cause for amicus
    curiae New Jersey School Boards Association
    (Cynthia J. Jahn, General Counsel, attorney;
    Ms. Jahn and John J. Burns, on the brief).
    Paul E. Griggs argued the cause for amicus
    curiae New Jersey Association of School
    Business   Officials  (Sciarrillo,   Cornell,
    Merlino,    McKeever  &    Osborne,   L.L.C.,
    attorneys; Mr. Griggs, of counsel and on the
    brief; Blake C. Width, on the brief).
    Emily B. Goldberg argued the cause for
    amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union
    of New Jersey (McCarter & English, LLP, and
    American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
    Foundation, attorneys; Ms. Goldberg, of
    counsel and on the brief; Roktim Kaushik, on
    the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    FUENTES, P.J.A.D.
    The Midland Park Board of Education (Board) appeals from
    the order of the Law Division permanently enjoining it to "make
    available to the public, by posting to its public website, no
    later than forty-eight (48) hours before all . . . meetings, the
    full   agenda    for    such     meetings,      if    such    agenda    is    posted,
    including copies of any appendices, attachments, reports, and
    other documents referred to in the agenda[.]"                   (Emphasis added).
    The    injunction      exempts     from       this     publication      requirement
    documents the Board in good faith believes are "subject to an
    enumerated privilege, exemption, or the like" under the Open
    Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, the Open
    Public   Meetings      Act   (OPMA),   N.J.S.A.        10:4-6    to    -21,   or    the
    common law right of access.
    Because   the    issues    raised      in     this    appeal    involve     only
    questions of law, our review of the Law Division's decision is
    de novo.    Saccone v. Bd. of Trs. of the Police & Firemen's Ret.
    Sys., 
    219 N.J. 369
    , 380 (2014).                    After reviewing the record
    2                                   A-2520-13T3
    presented by the parties, we reverse.                            The mandate imposed on
    the    Board    by    the     Law    Division          in     this      injunction         is     not
    supported      by    the     "adequate         notice"        requirements          imposed        on
    public bodies by the OPMA.                    We hold the term "agenda," as used
    in N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d), does not impose a legal obligation on
    public bodies to provide copies of any appendices, attachments,
    reports, or other documents referred to in their agendas.
    Although the issue before us is purely a legal one, a brief
    recitation      of     the    dominant           facts      of    this       case       will    help
    contextualize our analysis.
    I
    Plaintiff David W. Opderbeck is a professor at Seton Hall
    University      School       of    Law     and    a    resident         of   the    Borough       of
    Midland Park.         Over the last twelve years, at least one of his
    children       has    attended        a       public     school         in    Midland           Park.
    Plaintiff and his wife, Susan Opderbeck, attended the May 28,
    2013   meeting       held     by     the      Board      to      discuss      certain          school
    activities      in     which       their       children          were    involved.               Mrs.
    Opderbeck      had    obtained       the       agenda       of    the    meeting         from    the
    Board's official website.
    The agenda for the May 28, 2013 meeting consisted of ten
    pages.      The      first    part       of   the     agenda      contained         a    statement
    claiming "adequate notice" of the meeting had been provided "as
    3                                        A-2520-13T3
    specified in the Open Meeting Act[,]" and specifically mentioned
    that     notices         had   been      sent        to   "the    HERALD-NEWS,        RECORD,
    RIDGEWOOD NEWS, and to the Midland Park Borough Clerk for the
    2013 elective year."                After roll call of the members present,
    there    were     sections         for     the       Board     Secretary's      Report     and
    approval of the minutes for the meetings held on April 9, 2013
    and April 30, 2013.                The last item of this part of the agenda
    was titled, "Superintendent's Report."
    The    next       section    was    designated,           "Open    to   the   Public."
    This part of the agenda was separated into Sections A through L.
    The relevant sections here are Section A Personnel, Section B
    Finance Committee, Section C Curriculum Committee, and Section I
    Personnel       Committee.               Only        these     four      sections     include
    references to "attachments" or "appendices" that were not made
    available to the public as part of the "agenda" posted on the
    Board's website.
    Section       A    Personnel       consists        of   twenty-seven      enumerated
    items.       Ten of these agenda items (37.04 percent) include either
    the phrase "as per the attached appendix" or "support material
    attached."       The following four items represent a sampling of the
    total seventeen items listed in Section A Personnel that do not
    reference an "attachment" or "appendix":
    3. Approve the reappointment of Dr. Everett
    Schlam, School Physician, for the 2013-2014
    4                                   A-2520-13T3
    school year.       His    yearly     rate   will   be
    $4,500.
    4. Approve the non-tenured reappointment of
    Christopher Swank as the Buildings & Grounds
    Supervisor for the 2013-2014 school year
    (salary to be determined).
    5. Approve the non-tenured reappointment of
    Ristem Sela as the Computer Technician for
    the 2013-2014 school year (salary to be
    determined).
    By contrast, Section A Personnel contains items requesting
    the Board's approval that refer to information undisclosed to
    the public and acknowledged only by the phrase, "as per the
    attached appendix."      There are also items proposing that the
    Board   undertake   a   certain   course   of   action,    followed   by    a
    reference to a document "which is attached as an appendix."                As
    noted earlier, there are a total of ten agenda items in Section
    A Personnel that fall into this category.              In lieu of listing
    all ten items, we have opted to list the following four specific
    items for illustrative purposes only:
    9. Approve the tenured reappointment of all
    Clerks/Secretaries for the 2013-2014 school
    year, as per the attached appendix.
    10. Approve the non-tenured reappointment of
    all Instructional Aides for the 2013-2014
    school year, as per the attached appendix.
    11. Approve the reappointment of all non-
    tenured    full-time    Custodial/Maintenance
    personnel for the 2013-2014 school year, as
    per the attached appendix.
    5                              A-2520-13T3
    17. Approve the staff appointments for the
    Extended School Year Program, effective July
    1 - 31, 2013, which is attached as an
    appendix[.]
    Section B Finance Committee contains thirteen individually
    numbered items.      Only five items refer to "support material
    attached" or "an appendix."      Two of these items are:
    10. Approve the use and rental of the High
    School and Highland School gyms to Hoop
    Heaven, sponsored by Midland Park Continuing
    Education, for Basketball Tournaments to be
    held on Saturday, June 1, 2013 from 8:00
    a.m.   –   9:00   p.m.   (support   material
    attached).
    12. Approve the resolution for equipment
    financing with Global Strategic LLC, which
    is attached as an appendix.
    Section   C     Curriculum   Committee   has   a   total   of   five
    enumerated items.     Three items contain a reference to either an
    attached "appendix" or "support material":
    1. Approve the following staff members
    requesting   workshop attendance (support
    material attached)[.]
    4. Approve the recommendation of the Interim
    Director of Special Services for the special
    education placements and transportation for
    the summer of 2013, which is attached as an
    appendix.
    5. Approve the proposed overnight trip for
    the high school Track Team to compete in the
    State Championship Meet in Egg Harbor, NJ
    from May 31 - June 1, 2013 (support material
    attached).
    6                           A-2520-13T3
    Section     D      Policy    Committee          through    Section     H      Public
    Relations Committee did not have anything to report.1                       Section I
    Personnel      Committee       listed         the   following      item    for      Board
    approval: "Approve the following job descriptions for Advisors
    to Activities and Clubs, which are attached as an appendix[.]"
    The following list constitutes a representative cross-section of
    the over forty different clubs and activities listed:
    7th & 8th Grade Class Advisor
    9th & 10th Grade Class Advisor
    11th & 12th Grade Class Advisor
    Art Club Advisor
    Biology Club Advisor
    Biology Team Advisor
    Chemistry Team Advisor
    Chess Club Advisor
    Choral Advisor – Madrigals
    Drama Advisor
    Drama Producer
    French Club Advisor
    Gay-Straight Alliance Advisor
    High School Newspaper – Panthers' Pause
    Because the Board makes its agendas available to the public
    by   posting     them     on     its        official    website,    Mrs.        Opderbeck
    contacted the Board's Secretary's Office to request that the
    attachments     and     appendices           referred    to    therein     be    equally
    electronically       available         on    the    Board's    website.          She   was
    advised, however, that the attachments and appendices indicated
    1
    The remaining Sections which also did not have anything to
    report were Section E Legislative Committee, Section F Buildings
    & Grounds Committee, Section G Negotiations Committee, Section J
    Liaison Committee, and Section K Old Business.
    7                                  A-2520-13T3
    in the agenda would not be made available to the public until
    after the meeting.         She was further informed that the only means
    to obtain these documents was to file a formal written request
    under OPRA.       Mrs. Opderbeck requested that a representative of
    the Board respond to her concerns via email.
    On May 29, 2013, Dr. Marie Cirasella,                        the Midland Park
    Superintendent        of   Schools,   wrote       an   email       to    Mr.    and    Mrs.
    Opderbeck in response to the questions raised by Mrs. Opderbeck
    "at   last      night's     Board     of       Education      meeting"         concerning
    "overnight field trip proposals for the Syracuse and California
    band trips."          The Superintendent noted that pursuant to Board
    regulation, overnight field trips "should not be approved until
    the   school    calendar     has    been    struck."         Due    to    a     number   of
    factors, the Board was unable to finalize the school calendar
    until April 30, 2013.
    Addressing the concerns raised in the public session of the
    May 28, 2013 Board meeting, the Superintendent informed Mrs.
    Opderbeck      that    "[t]he   Board      cannot      and   should      not     rely    on
    information provided by [B]oard meeting attendees during open
    session – it is the school administration's responsibility and
    charge to do so."          Superintendent Cirasella ended the email by
    reminding      Mrs.    Opderbeck    that    the     trip     proposals         were   again
    placed on the agenda for curriculum committee discussion and
    8                                      A-2520-13T3
    would be brought before the Board for final approval at its
    meeting scheduled for June 4, 2013.
    By    email   dated   May    30,       2013,    plaintiff      responded     to
    Superintendent     Cirasella     concerning         the   Board's    refusal      to
    provide the appendices and attachments noted in the agenda as
    supplementary material to specific items.                  Citing Board Bylaw
    0164,2 plaintiff advised the Superintendent as follows:
    By withholding from public scrutiny the
    "reports and supplementary materials" that
    are part of the "agenda" as defined by BOE
    By-Law 0164, the Board is not providing
    notice of the agenda "to the extent known"
    to the Board, in violation of the Sunshine
    Law [(OPMA)].     It is a matter of grave
    concern that the Board would withhold such
    information from the public absent the
    limited exceptional procedures specified in
    [the] Sunshine Law.     See N.J.S.A. 10:4-9b.
    Please   confirm   that   the   full  agenda,
    including attachments provided to the Board,
    hereafter will be supplied to the public in
    advance of Board meetings.
    By letter dated June 3, 2013, the Board's General Counsel
    informed   plaintiff   that      the    Board   would     not    provide    agenda
    attachments to the public prior to the meetings.                  Relying on an
    advisory opinion of the New Jersey Attorney General, counsel
    2
    Bylaw 0164 is titled, "CONDUCT OF BOARD MEETINGS."        The
    relevant section, denoted "Agenda," states: "The Superintendent
    shall prepare an agenda of items of business to come before the
    Board at each meeting.    The agenda shall be delivered to each
    Board member no later than Friday before the meeting and shall
    include such reports and supplementary materials as are
    appropriate and available." (Emphasis added).
    9                                  A-2520-13T3
    informed plaintiff "the word agenda refers solely to the list of
    items to be discussed or acted upon at the meeting."               The record
    shows plaintiff and the Board's counsel attempted to reach a
    compromised position without success.
    II
    A
    The Board argues "there is nothing contained in the OPMA to
    suggest the Legislature intended to apply anything other than
    the plain, dictionary meaning to the term agenda."                 Absent any
    clear direction from the Legislature, the Board argues we should
    construe the term "agenda" in N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d) by its ordinary
    meaning.     Harking back to 1975, the year the Legislature adopted
    the OPMA, the Board cites the 1975 Webster's New Collegiate
    Dictionary, which defines "agenda" as "a list, outline, or plan
    of things to be considered."           The Board also cites Black's Law
    Dictionary    58   (4th   rev.   ed.   1968),    which   defines    agenda    as
    "memoranda    of   things   to   be    done,    as   items   of   business   or
    discussion to be brought up at a meeting; a program consisting
    of such items."
    Following this approach, the Board urges us to reverse the
    Law Division's expansive definition of "agenda," and vacate the
    burdensome injunction which imposes obligations to post on its
    website supplementary materials never intended to be included
    10                             A-2520-13T3
    within the definition of "adequate notice" in N.J.S.A. 10:4-
    8(d).3
    Plaintiff    argues    that   citing    "a    number   of       dictionary
    definitions" in an attempt to ascertain the plain meaning of the
    term "agenda" "at best beg[s] the question whether a document
    incorporated by reference into a 'list, outline, or plan' is, in
    fact, part of the 'list, outline, or plan.'"            Citing a number of
    cases    discussing   and   applying   the   contract    law     doctrine     of
    "incorporation   by   reference,"4     plaintiff   argues      the   documents
    3
    The Board also argues its position before us is supported by
    the Supreme Court's decision in Witt v. Gloucester County Board
    of Chosen Freeholders, 
    94 N.J. 422
    (1983), and our decision in
    Crifasi v. Governing Body of Oakland, 
    156 N.J. Super. 182
    (App.
    Div. 1978).     We disagree. Neither one of these opinions
    addressed the scope or content of an "agenda" under N.J.S.A.
    10:4-8(d).   In 
    Witt, supra
    , 94 N.J. at 432, the Supreme Court
    determined that "a public body that has complied with the annual
    notice requirements of N.J.S.A. 10:4-18 [need not] also comply
    with the forty-eight-hour notice requirements of N.J.S.A. 10:4-
    8(d)."    In 
    Crifasi, supra
    , 156 N.J. Super. at 185-86, we
    approved the appointment of a replacement member to the Borough
    Council at a regularly scheduled meeting, despite the fact that
    the topic had not been included in the meeting's agenda.
    4
    By way of example, plaintiff cites Alpert, Goldberg, Butler,
    Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 
    410 N.J. Super. 510
    (App. Div.
    2009), certif. denied, 
    203 N.J. 93
    (2010), in support of his
    argument to apply the contract law doctrine of "incorporation by
    reference" to the question of statutory construction we confront
    here. Quinn involves a dispute between an attorney and a client
    over the terms of a retainer agreement.       
    Id. at 518.
        As
    explained by our colleague Judge Lyons, "[u]nder New Jersey law,
    two or more writings may constitute a single contract even
    though they do not refer to each other. Whether two writings are
    to be construed as a single contract, however, depends on the
    (continued)
    11                                A-2520-13T3
    attached by the Board to an agenda "highlights an ambiguity in
    the statutory language" that should be resolved by this court
    "liberally" in favor of disclosure under N.J.S.A. 10:4-21.
    Amici New Jersey School Boards Association (NJSBA) and New
    Jersey Association of School Business Officials (NJASBO) both
    urge   us    to   reverse   the   Law   Division's   ruling    and   adopt   the
    definition of agenda contained in Formal Opinion No. 19-1976,
    prepared by Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Mary Ann Burgess on
    June 22, 1976, in response to four specific questions asked by
    the State Commissioner of Education concerning the then recently
    adopted OPMA.       In question number four, the Commissioner asked:
    "What is the scope of the term 'agenda' as used in the Open
    Public      Meetings   Act?"      DAG   Burgess   noted   the    Commissioner
    "specifically ask[ed] whether the term [agenda] may be construed
    to mean the several sheets of paper which enumerate the items
    for consideration by the [State] Board, or whether the term must
    be defined to include all the pages of descriptive materials
    provided to members of the Board."
    DAG Burgess began her analysis by acknowledging "[t]here is
    no definition of 'agenda' within the [OPMA]."                 After citing to
    (continued)
    intent of the parties."   
    Id. at 533
    (citation omitted).  These
    principles of contract law are not useful or relevant to the
    question of statutory construction raised in this appeal.
    12                             A-2520-13T3
    the meaning of "agenda" in Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed.) and
    the    Webster's    Third      New    International       Dictionary    (1965),     and
    reviewing     the   then       most       recent     decisions   from    this    court
    discussing the canons of statutory interpretation, DAG Burgess
    concluded there was no indication in the OPMA that the term
    "agenda" should be accorded any "special meaning."                       Building on
    this    conclusion,      she     opined       that   "[t]he   notice    required     by
    N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d) . . . need only contain a listing of the
    items which will be before the Board at the meeting and need not
    include    the   supportive          or     explanatory   materials     and     reports
    relative to such items."
    Amicus the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
    (ACLU-NJ) begins its argument by emphasizing our State's long
    commitment to protecting and strengthening the public's right to
    access public information.                The ACLU-NJ quotes the testimony of
    Assemblyman      Byron      M.       Baer     before    the   Assembly     Judiciary
    Committee.       Assemblyman Baer was the sponsor of the bill that
    would become the OPMA, and is indisputably recognized as the key
    voice in the Legislature who advocated for the passage of the
    legislation officially known as the "Senator Byron M. Baer Open
    Public Meetings Act."            N.J.S.A. 10:4-6.
    Assemblyman Baer personally championed the public policies
    of transparency and access embodied in the OPMA.                         Despite the
    13                              A-2520-13T3
    provisions in the statute intended to protect these egalitarian
    values, the ACLU-NJ claims vague agendas and insufficient notice
    remain     a    persistent      problem        nearly     forty    years       after    the
    enactment of the OPMA.              The ACLU-NJ thus urges us to affirm the
    Law   Division's        expansive       view    of      "agenda"    as     a    means    of
    fulfilling the OPMA's promise of requiring transparency in the
    way public bodies transact the public's business.
    B
    We begin our analysis by acknowledging that the overarching
    public    policy       that    drives    the    OPMA     is     "'the    right    of    [a]
    citizen[] to have adequate advance notice of and the right to
    attend    all       meetings   of    public     bodies     at    which   any     business
    affecting the public is discussed or acted upon in any way.'"
    McGovern v. Rutgers, 
    211 N.J. 94
    , 99 (2012) (quoting N.J.S.A.
    10:4-7).        Our State's commitment to transparency in the conduct
    of governmental affairs has deep roots.                         As noted by Justice
    Pashman        in    Polillo    v.    Deane,      
    74 N.J. 562
    ,    570     (1977),
    "[a]lthough state legislation in this area has proliferated only
    in the last decade, the common law origins of this important
    policy may be traced to English law dating back to the first
    half of the 18th century."               We are thus bound to construe the
    provisions of the OPMA "liberally . . . in order to accomplish
    14                                    A-2520-13T3
    its purpose and the public policy of this State[.]"                                  N.J.S.A.
    10:4-21.
    The Board is a "public body" as defined in N.J.S.A. 10:4-
    8(a).        As    such,    absent       the    existence         of    two    specifically
    codified exceptions5 that are not relevant here, the Board is not
    permitted to meet to conduct official business without having
    provided "adequate notice" to the public.                          N.J.S.A. 10:4-9(a).
    The OPMA provides two separate, yet related, means for public
    bodies to provide the notice required by N.J.S.A. 10:4-9(a).
    Read in pari materia with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 10:4-
    8(d),    N.J.S.A.     10:4-18      requires         the   Board        to   publish,    "[a]t
    least once each year," notice giving the time, date, location
    and,    to   the    extent      known,    the       agenda   of    any      Board    meetings
    scheduled for that year.              This annual notice must be published
    in "at least two newspapers . . . designated by the public body
    to   receive       such    notices[.]"          N.J.S.A.      10:4-8(d).             The   two
    newspapers        designated     by   the       Board     must     have       "the   greatest
    likelihood of informing the public[.]"                    
    Ibid. Here, the Board
    admitted before the Law Division that in
    October      2013,        the    Board's        Secretary/School              Administrator
    5
    The two exceptions permitting a public body to meet without
    having provided "adequate notice" are codified in N.J.S.A. 10:4-
    9(b) and N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b). See 
    McGovern, supra
    , 211 N.J. at
    101.
    15                                    A-2520-13T3
    discovered the annual notice of the Board's meetings for the
    school year 2013-2014 had been published in only one newspaper.
    The   Secretary/School    Administrator   certified    that    the     Board
    elected "to voluntarily publish agendas for each meeting, which
    set forth, to the extent known, the order of business of the
    upcoming meeting.        These agendas are published within forty-
    eight (48) hours of the meeting."
    Although the Board decided to also post its agenda on its
    official website, it had no obligation under the OPMA to do so.
    The OPMA does not require public bodies to post on its public
    website,    no   later   than   forty-eight   (48)   hours    before    all
    meetings, the full agenda for such meetings.         N.J.S.A. 10:4-9.1,
    which was adopted by the Legislature effective November 4, 2002,
    provides:
    In addition to the notice requirements of
    the "Open Public Meetings Act," P.L. 1975,
    c. 231 (C. 10:4-6 et seq.), a public body
    may provide electronic notice of any meeting
    of the public body through the Internet.
    As used in this section, "electronic notice"
    means advance notice available to the public
    via electronic transmission of at least 48
    hours, giving the time, date, location and,
    to the extent known, the agenda of any
    regular, special or rescheduled meeting,
    which notice shall accurately state whether
    formal action may or may not be taken at
    such meeting.
    As used in this section, "Internet" means
    the international computer network of both
    16                           A-2520-13T3
    federal and non-federal interoperable packet
    switched data networks.
    [N.J.S.A. 10:4-9.1 (emphasis added).]
    Thus, as N.J.S.A. 10:4-9.2 makes clear, "no electronic notice
    issued pursuant to this act shall be deemed to substitute for,
    or be considered in lieu of, [the] adequate notice [in N.J.S.A.
    10:4-8(d)]."      See also 
    McGovern, supra
    , 211 N.J. at 100-01.
    With this statutory framework as backdrop, we now turn to
    the discrete issue before us - what the meaning of "agenda" is
    in the context of the "adequate notice" requirement in N.J.S.A.
    10:4-8(d).     As we have shown, the legislative history of the
    OPMA   includes    comments   exalting   the    laudable   goals   of    the
    drafters of this landmark legislation and the democratic values
    they hoped to promote by its passage.          The record also shows the
    executive branch was equally committed to taking public bodies
    out of the shadows and compelling them to conduct the public's
    business in the "sunshine."
    On October 21, 1975, Governor Brendan Byrne declared he
    expected the statute would "significantly alter the process of
    government in New Jersey . . . [a] process [that] has long
    demanded alteration."      The Governor noted the OPMA "is based on
    the fundamental premise that government should be open to public
    scrutiny, and accountable to the public it serves."
    17                              A-2520-13T3
    The   final    version   of   this      legislation   contains   a    clear
    declaration   of   public    policy        favoring   transparency   in    the
    conduct of public bodies and encouraging citizen participation
    in the democratic process.         The following relevant section of
    this declaration illustrates the point:
    The Legislature finds and declares that the
    right of the public to be present at all
    meetings of public bodies, and to witness in
    full detail all phases of the deliberation,
    policy formulation, and decision making of
    public bodies, is vital to the enhancement
    and proper functioning of the democratic
    process; that secrecy in public affairs
    undermines the faith of the public in
    government and the public's effectiveness in
    fulfilling its role in a democratic society,
    and hereby declares it to be the public
    policy of this State to insure the right of
    its citizens to have adequate advance notice
    of and the right to attend all meetings of
    public   bodies   at   which  any   business
    affecting the public is discussed or acted
    upon in any way except only in those
    circumstances where otherwise the public
    interest would be clearly endangered or the
    personal privacy or guaranteed rights of
    individuals would be clearly in danger of
    unwarranted invasion.
    The Legislature further declares it to be
    the public policy of this State to insure
    that the aforesaid rights are implemented
    pursuant to the provisions of this act so
    that   no  confusion,  misconstructions or
    misinterpretations may thwart the purposes
    hereof.
    [N.J.S.A. 10:4-7 (emphasis added).]
    18                             A-2520-13T3
    Governor Byrne made transparency of governmental affairs a
    central part of his official statement:
    On balance, I believe that the idea of open
    government deserves a chance in New Jersey.
    The public's business can and should be
    carried out in public.      Public agencies
    exist for the public's convenience, not
    their own. I have always pledged myself to
    that goal.   This bill will be critical in
    achieving that objective. It establishes in
    the statute books the public's right to know
    how, why and by whom the public trust in
    public bodies is effectuated in governmental
    decisions.
    Competing for legislative attention alongside these high
    ideals were also the concerns expressed by those who would be
    directly affected by the legal and practical obligations imposed
    by   this    statute.       Governor    Byrne    articulated      one    of   these
    concerns in the following prescient question: "Will the courts
    find it impossible to apply definitions of essential terms in
    particular contexts?"           Although the question before us does not
    present us with an "impossible" task, it is, at the very least,
    a    daunting    one.      We    are   asked    to   construe    forty-year-old
    statutory terms rooted in the concept that notice requires some
    form    of   paper      publication,    in     the   context    of   our      modern
    electronic      age,     where    hand-held      wireless      devices     are    as
    ubiquitous      and   seemingly    indispensable      as   newspapers      were   in
    1975.
    19                                 A-2520-13T3
    Specifically, we are asked to construe the term "agenda" as
    used in N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d).              It seems clear to us that the
    drafters of the OPMA wanted to compel public bodies in this
    State to conduct the public's business in the light of day,
    hence its unofficial moniker, "the Sunshine Law."                          The OPMA
    protects the right of the public "to be present at all meetings
    of public bodies, and to witness in full detail all phases of
    the   deliberation,     policy     formulation,        and   decision     making    of
    public bodies."        N.J.S.A. 10:4-7.             Toward that end, the OPMA
    obligates public bodies to provide "written advance notice of at
    least 48 hours, giving the time, date, location and, to the
    extent known, the agenda of any regular, special or rescheduled
    meeting[.]"    N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d) (emphasis added).
    The   OPMA   does    not    define      the    term    "agenda."     The     Law
    Division construed the term "agenda" to include the attachments
    and supplemental documents mentioned therein principally because
    the Board has been unable to articulate any persuasive reasoning
    why the attachments should not be posted with the agendas prior
    to Board meetings.        Once the Board undertook the voluntary step
    of posting the agenda on its website, the Law Division found no
    practical     reason      to     withhold      the     supplemental       materials
    mentioned    therein.          Under   this    line    of    reasoning,    the     Law
    20                                  A-2520-13T3
    Division filled this void of statutory authority by judicial
    fiat.
    The provisions in the OPMA that define "adequate notice"
    are tethered to a world where daily newspapers were presumed to
    be the most reliable and efficacious means of providing the
    public with notice of "the time, date, location and, to the
    extent known, the agenda of any regular, special or rescheduled
    meeting[.]"        N.J.S.A.   10:4-8(d).         In    construing    the   term
    "agenda" in our modern technological age,                it is tempting to
    define "agenda" to include attachments, appendices, and other
    forms of supplemental material because, practically, it merely
    requires   adding    an   electronic    "link"    to   the   Board's    agenda,
    which is already posted on its official website.                    Considering
    the public policy goals of the statute, it is nearly impossible
    to imagine this approach would have been rejected by Assemblyman
    Baer if it had been available in 1975.
    However, our role as judges in our tripartite system of
    government    is    to    construe   statutes     by    using   well-settled
    principles of legislative interpretation, not to amend statutes
    using our own notion of what is in the public's best interest.
    Our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed what this approach
    entails:
    In statutory interpretation, a court's role
    is   to   determine   and   effectuate  the
    21                              A-2520-13T3
    Legislature's intent. The first step toward
    that end is to consider the plain language
    of the statute.    Statutory language should
    be given its ordinary meaning and be
    construed    in   a    common-sense  manner.
    Further, when construing the Legislature's
    words, every effort should be made to avoid
    rendering    any   part    of   the  statute
    superfluous.
    In sum, our overriding goal is to discern
    and   effectuate    the   legislative    intent
    underlying the statutory provision at issue.
    Our role is not to rewrite a plainly-written
    enactment of the Legislature []or [to]
    presume   that    the   Legislature    intended
    something other than that expressed by way
    of the plain language.      Where the language
    is   unclear   or   ambiguous,     or  if   the
    Legislature's     intention     is    otherwise
    uncertain, resort may be had to extrinsic
    aids to assist us in our understanding of
    the Legislature's will.
    [State in the Interest of K.O., 
    217 N.J. 83
    ,
    91-92   (2014)   (alteration   in  original)
    (citations   omitted)   (internal  quotation
    marks omitted).]
    Applying    these   principles   of    statutory   construction,     we
    construe "agenda" by giving it its plain, ordinary meaning: "a
    list or outline       of things to be considered or done."6                The
    "adequate notice" requirement in N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d), including
    the reference to "agenda," has not been amended since the OPMA
    was   adopted    in   1975.   Although      Advisory   Opinions   issued    by
    6
    Merriam-Webster, Full Definition of Agenda,
    http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/agenda            (last   visited
    Aug. 9, 2015).
    22                               A-2520-13T3
    Attorneys General are not binding on the judiciary, a formal
    opinion of the Attorney General on an issue of law is binding on
    State agencies.       See In re Town of Harrison, 
    440 N.J. Super. 268
    , 298-99 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Gladden v. Bd. of Trs. of
    the PERS, 
    171 N.J. Super. 363
    (App. Div. 1979)).
    The    Attorney      General's      Advisory   Opinion      No.     19-1976     was
    issued shortly after the Legislature adopted the OPMA and has
    guided public bodies on the meaning of "agenda," as used in
    N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d), for nearly forty years.                     The approach the
    Attorney General used to construe the term "agenda" in Advisory
    Opinion    No.   19-1976     tracks      the    methodology         for    statutory
    construction our Supreme Court reaffirmed in K.O.                     We discern no
    rational   or    legal    basis    to    deviate   from       the   definition      of
    "agenda" the Attorney General endorsed in Advisory Opinion No.
    19-1976.
    Furthermore, by enjoining the Board to post attachments in
    an agenda unless it "has a good faith belief that such documents
    are subject to an enumerated privilege, exemption, or the like"
    under OPRA, the OPMA, or the common law right of access, the Law
    Division improperly conflated three legally distinct sources of
    authority.       Although    all     three     promote    a    public      policy   of
    transparency     in      governmental      affairs,      they       each    serve     a
    23                                  A-2520-13T3
    different purpose and have different and independent procedural
    and substantive standards for obtaining judicial relief.
    The OPMA is intended to insure the right of citizens "to
    have adequate advance notice of and the right to attend all
    meetings        of     public       bodies[.]"                  N.J.S.A.         10:4-7.         "The
    Legislature          adopted      OPRA     to       maximize         public      knowledge      about
    public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to
    minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process."                                     O'Boyle v.
    Borough     of       Longport,       
    218 N.J. 168
    ,   184       (2014)   (citations
    omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).                                     The common law
    right of access is an independent source of legal authority for
    the    public    to        gain   access       to       public       records     and    defines      "a
    public record" more broadly than the definition of "government
    record" contained in OPRA.                    Bergen Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. N.
    Jersey    Media       Grp.,       Inc.,       370       N.J.     Super.     504,      509-10    (App.
    Div.), certif. denied, 
    182 N.J. 143
    (2004).
    We conclude our analysis by noting that changes in the law
    often do not occur parallel with technological or scientific
    advancements.          In 2002, the Legislature adopted N.J.S.A. 10:4-
    9.1,    giving       public       bodies       the       option      to    "provide     electronic
    notice     of        any     meeting          of        the     public     body       through     the
    Internet[,]"          but     only       as        an     addition        to    the     traditional
    newspaper       notice       required          by       N.J.S.A.       10:4-8(d),        not    as    a
    24                                     A-2520-13T3
    substitute.     See N.J.S.A. 10:4-9.2.     With the exception of this
    notable "internet"-related amendment, the OPMA remains firmly
    rooted in 1975.
    The information technology revolution has transformed our
    lives in profound and irrevocable ways since the adoption of the
    OPMA    over    forty   years   ago.      Thus,     there   may     be     no
    technologically    sound   reason   to   disagree   with    the    facially
    sensible approach adopted by the Law Division here.               However,
    "[t]he wisdom of a statute is not for the courts."                
    Harrison, supra
    , 440 N.J. Super. at 301 (quoting Dacunzo v. Edgye, 
    19 N.J. 443
    , 454 (1955)).       As Justice LaVecchia recently reminded us
    writing on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court, "[i]t is not our
    job to engraft requirements [on a statute] that the Legislature
    did not include.        It is our role to enforce the legislative
    intent as expressed through the words used by the Legislature."
    Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., ____ N.J. ____, ____ (2015) (slip op.
    at 46-47).
    We thus respectfully suggest that the other branches of our
    tripartite system of government heed Governor Byrne's admonition
    included in his statement endorsing the passage of the OPMA in
    1975:    "The   Legislature     should   systematically     monitor      the
    experience of government at all levels in living with this new
    law and analyze the need for amendment on the basis of that
    25                             A-2520-13T3
    experience."    In the meantime, our duty is to uphold the OPMA in
    its current form.
    Reversed.
    26                       A-2520-13T3