DARRELL CARLESS VS. EAST ORANGE GENERAL HOSPITAL (L-3375-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3886-17T4
    DARRELL CARLESS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    EAST ORANGE GENERAL
    HOSPITAL,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    _________________________
    Submitted December 3, 2019 – Decided December 13, 2019
    Before Judges Fisher and Rose.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-3375-16.
    Darrell Carless, appellant pro se.
    Rosenberg Jacobs Heller & Fleming, PC, attorneys for
    respondent (Raymond J. Fleming, of counsel;
    Christopher Klabonski, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff Darrell Carless filed a complaint, asserting a slander cause of
    action, against defendant East Orange General Hospital. The alleged slander
    was based on statements allegedly made by hospital representatives to police
    concerning the fact that plaintiff, who was involuntarily committed at the
    hospital, was violent. That complaint was filed on May 9, 2016. Before the
    month ended, plaintiff filed eight more complaints in the Law Division against
    the hospital.
    To bring order to the confusion caused by these multiple filings, the trial
    judge entered an order in June 2016 that consolidated all nine complaints. The
    hospital filed responsive pleadings and moved to dismiss seven of the nine
    complaints due to plaintiff's failure to comply with the affidavit of merit statute,
    N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. That motion was denied, and plaintiff was permitted an
    additional sixty days to comply. Plaintiff then moved to be relieved of having
    to comply with the affidavit of merit statute because of his indigency status. The
    judge denied that motion and repeated that the affidavit of merit requirement did
    not apply to three of the complaints, which appear to allege intentional torts.1
    1
    Two of these allege an assault and criminal restraint. A copy of the third
    complaint, which fell within the judge's exception to the holding that plaintiff
    was required to comply with the affidavit of merit statute, was not included in
    plaintiff's appendix. For present purposes, we assume the accuracy of plaintiff's
    (continued)
    A-3886-17T4
    2
    After the sixty days permitted by the court had elapsed without plaintiff's
    compliance with the affidavit of merit statute, the hospital moved for dismissal ,
    and in granting that motion, the judge dismissed six of plaintiff's nine complaints
    with prejudice.
    Discovery then continued on the remaining three complaints, which were
    also scheduled for non-binding mandatory arbitration to occur on February 13,
    2018. Plaintiff moved to advance the date of the arbitration to January 31, 2018,
    because he was then residing in Las Vegas and represented that he could be in
    New Jersey on the latter date. The judge granted plaintiff's motion and changed
    the arbitration date to January 31, 2018. Despite being given the arbitration date
    he sought, plaintiff did not appear and, due to that failure, plaintiff's three
    remaining complaints were dismissed without prejudice.
    Plaintiff moved for the reinstatement of the three remaining complaints,
    arguing he was unaware of the order that scheduled the arbitration for January
    31, 2018, even though he had requested it. This motion was denied. In the
    written decision made part of the March 2, 2018 trial court order, the judge
    explained the motion was denied because plaintiff failed to appear on the
    assertion in his appeal brief that this third complaint alleged he was assaulted
    by a hospital security guard.
    A-3886-17T4
    3
    arbitration date that he requested with knowledge of the arbitration date. The
    judge determined plaintiff was aware of the order fixing the arbitration date
    because the order was "served . . . personally on [plaintiff] on 1/29/18 as
    [p]laintiff was in the Hall of Records on another matter." The judge also s tated
    in the order that her chambers "left multiple voice messages on the phone
    number [p]laintiff provided with his motion papers advising him" of the
    rescheduled January 31, 2018 arbitration date.
    Even though the last three complaints were only dismissed without
    prejudice, the judge's later denial of the motion to reinstate meant that plaintiff
    could no longer revive those complaints. All the orders we have mentioned
    collectively disposed of all issues as to all parties. We are satisfied plaintiff was
    entitled to file an appeal as of right.
    In appealing, plaintiff argues:
    I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
    [DISMISSAL] WITH PREJUDICE [OF THE SIX
    COMPLAINTS] FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
    THE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT STATUTE . . .
    BECAUSE AN AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT IS NOT
    REQUIRED IN COMMON KNOWLEDGE CASES.
    II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY BEING UNDER
    THE IMPRESSION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
    PERSONALLY SERVED WITH AN ORDER
    RESCHEDULING AN ARBITRATION DATE . . .
    AND THAT MULTIPLE VOICE MESSAGES WERE
    A-3886-17T4
    4
    LEFT [O]N PLAINTIFF'S PHONE ADVISING HIM
    OF THE CHANGE (Not Raised Below).
    We find insufficient merit in plaintiff's arguments to warrant further discussion
    in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only a few comments.
    As to the first point, there is no question that plaintiff's claims of
    negligence or malpractice – as the six complaints were properly understood as
    alleging – arose from plaintiff's allegations about the hospital's screening of him
    for an involuntary commitment and whether the hospital adhered to proper
    screening standards. These were matters beyond the common knowledge of
    laypersons, thereby requiring plaintiff's compliance with the affidavit of merit
    statute. See, e.g., Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 
    168 N.J. 387
    , 389-96
    (2001); Cowley v. Virtua Health Sys., 
    456 N.J. Super. 278
    , 288-89 (App. Div.
    2018). The judge correctly held that plaintiff was obligated to comply with the
    affidavit of merit statute on these six complaints.
    As for the second point, plaintiff argues that the judge inaccurately
    determined that he had been personally served with the order rescheduling the
    arbitration and in finding that voice mails were left for him advising of the new
    arbitration date. Plaintiff, however, acknowledges he never made that argument
    in the trial court by noting that his second point was "not raised below." Based
    on the record before her, we find the judge acted well within her discretion in
    A-3886-17T4
    5
    denying plaintiff's motion to reinstate. If plaintiff had a quarrel with the facts
    upon which the judge refused to reinstate the three complaints, he should have
    moved for relief from the judge's order.
    Affirmed.
    A-3886-17T4
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-3886-17T4

Filed Date: 12/13/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2019