URSULA CARGILL VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM (PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2167-16T2
URSULA CARGILL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT
SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
Argued August 29, 2018 – Decided September 6, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the
Public Employees' Retirement System,
Department of Treasury, PERS No. 2-10-266853.
Samuel M. Gaylord argued the cause for
appellant (Gaylord Popp, LLC, attorneys;
Samuel M. Gaylord, on the brief).
Austin J. Edwards, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S.
Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H.
Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Robert S. Garrison, Jr., Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Ursula Cargill appeals from the December 15, 2016 final
determination of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Public
Employees' Retirement System, finding she was not eligible for
accidental disability retirement benefits. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
Cargill, a long-time employee of the New Jersey Department
of Education, was required to attend monthly managers' meetings.
On February 9, 2010, an email was sent to those attending, changing
the meeting time. The email stated that if adverse weather
conditions continued into February 10, employees should check
their email at 8:00 p.m. - or the next morning at the latest - to
confirm the off-site meeting was neither cancelled nor postponed.
At 4:22 p.m. on February 10, 2010, the meeting coordinator emailed
those attending cancelling the meeting due to snow. Cargill
testified that she did not receive the email and thus headed out
from her home in the snow the morning of February 11, 2010. She
hit ice less than half a mile away and slid off the road. In
order to maneuver her car back onto the road, she pushed down on
the rear bumper attempting to free the vehicle from a snow bank.
When she straightened, she felt a twinge in her lower back, but
drove on to the meeting site.
Cargill worked for approximately a year before the pain in
her lower back required surgery. She stopped working the following
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month, in March 2011, and applied for an accidental disability
pension based on the incident.
The Board determined that Cargill was permanently disabled
and qualified for ordinary disability - not accidental - based on
its opinion that the incident was not undesigned and unexpected,
two of the conditions required by Richardson,1 and that,
additionally, the incident could not trigger payment of accidental
disability based on the "going and coming" rule. When Cargill
appealed, the matter was transferred to the Office of
Administrative Law as a contested case under the Administrative
Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -31 and 52:14F-1.
The issues presented to the administrative law judge (ALJ)
were whether the incident occurred during and as a result of
Cargill's regular or assigned duties, and whether the alleged
incident was undesigned and unexpected. Relying on Kasper v.
Board of Trs. of the Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 164 N.J.
564 (2000), the ALJ found Cargill ineligible for accidental
disability because of the going and coming rule. When the incident
occurred, Cargill had not reached her normal work location or the
meeting site. She had neither signed in nor begun her usual work
duties - as the ALJ said, she "had not completed her commute to
1
Richardson v. Board of Trs., 192 N.J. 189 (2007).
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work." He found as additional grounds that because the meeting
had been cancelled, "Cargill was not authorized to travel to the
location."
The ALJ also concluded the event was neither undesigned nor
unexpected, as defined in Richardson. 192 N.J. at 201. Obviously,
Cargill deliberately pushed on the bumper to free her vehicle, and
a back sprain was within the realm of possible consequences. It
was neither extraordinary nor unusual. He said: "It can hardly
be argued that a forty-six-year-old woman sustaining a strained
back while attempting to dislodge a car from a snow bank is an
extraordinary or unusual consequence." Accordingly, the incident
was not a "traumatic event pursuant to Richardson." In its final
decision, the Board adopted the ALJ's recommendations.
The ALJ's findings were supported by the record. Cargill was
on the way to work, and had not yet arrived at a work destination.
Her argument that because she was going to a meeting site and was
being compensated for the time is not convincing. As we recently
reiterated, in order "to qualify for accidental disability
retirement benefits, an employee cannot merely be coming to, or
going from work." Mattia v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret.
Sys., ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op. at 9). An employee must
establish that he or she had completed his commute at the time of
injury, and was performing a function connected to his work. See
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id. at 8-9. Cargill's injury occurred while she was on her way
to work, or commuting, and was not causally connected to her work.
Therefore, she is not entitled to accidental disability retirement
benefits.
As the ALJ observed, if a person attempts to push or
manipulate a vehicle off an icy patch, a known consequence is a
back sprain. Thus, Cargill's proofs also failed to meet the
Richardson standard. See Richardson, 192 N.J. at 201.
Our standard of review "of an agency's final decision is
generally limited to a determination of whether the decision is
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or lacks fair support in
the record." Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., 431 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App.
Div. 2013) (citing Hemsey v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret.
Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223 (2009)). Though we owe no deference to
an agency's interpretation of legal precedent, the Board's
decision in this instance is fully supported by Kasper and
Richardson. It is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and
is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. See
In re Young, 202 N.J. 50, 70 (2010).
Affirmed.
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