STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DEANDRE PARKER (16-04-1096 AND 16-04-1097, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2026-17T2
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    v.                                               May 13, 2019
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DEANDRE PARKER,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    ___________________________
    Submitted April 25, 2018 – Decided May 13, 2019
    Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Suter.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 16-04-1096
    and 16-04-1097.
    Robert D. Laurino, Acting Essex County Prosecutor,
    attorney for appellant (Frank J. Ducoat, Special
    Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
    of counsel and on the briefs).
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    respondent (Margaret R. McLane, Assistant Deputy
    Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    FUENTES, P.J.A.D.
    An Essex County grand jury returned Indictment No. 16-04-1096
    charging defendant Deandre Parker with second degree unlawful possession of
    a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), fourth degree possession of hollow-nose
    ammunition, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f), and third degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A.
    2C:29-2(a)(3)(a). Indictment No. 16-04-1097, arising under the same core of
    operative facts, charged defendant with second degree possession of a handgun
    by a person previously convicted of one of the crimes listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:39 -
    7(b).
    Defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence seized by the police
    that formed the basis for these charges. The State filed a brief opposing the
    motion, which included the indictments returned by the grand jury, an incident
    report prepared and filed by one of the police officers who arrested defendant,
    and the transcript of the grand jury minutes. Defendant's reply included a
    computer aided dispatch (CAD) report. In an order dated September 18, 2017,
    the trial court granted defendant's motion without conducting an evidentiary
    hearing or considering oral argument from counsel. The judge explained the
    basis of his ruling in a letter-opinion attached to the order.
    On October 7, 2017, the State filed a motion for reconsideration. In an
    order dated November 22, 2017, accompanied by a letter-opinion, the trial
    judge denied the State's motion for reconsideration, again without affording
    A-2026-17T2
    2
    counsel the opportunity to present oral argument. By leave granted, the State
    now argues the motion judge erred when he suppressed the physical evidence
    without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We agree and reverse. Because
    the parties dispute the material facts that led to defendant's arrest and
    subsequent indictment, the motion judge was required to conduct an
    evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 3:5-7(c).       We gather the following
    account of events from the documents the parties presented to the motion
    judge in support of their respective positions.
    At approximately 11:44 p.m. on February 4, 2016, Newark Police
    Department detectives assigned to the Firearm Interdiction Team (FIT)
    responded to a report of "shots fired" near the intersection of Avon Avenue
    and South 12th Street.      Upon arrival, the detectives saw two men, later
    identified as defendant and Quadri Cureton, standing by the driver-side door of
    a parked car. As Detective Lamin Barryoh approached them, he saw defendant
    drop a silver metal object; Barryoh also heard the sound of the object as it hit
    the ground. Barryoh testified before the grand jury that Detective Holmes 1
    retrieved the metal object and "immediately recognized that that metal object
    1
    The incident report Barryoh filed indicates that the five FIT detectives who
    responded to the report of "shots fired" that day were himself, Detective J.
    Duran, Detective P. Hamilton, and Essex County Sheriff's Department
    Detectives A. Holmes and S. Dellavelle.
    A-2026-17T2
    3
    was, in fact, a revolver." Holmes thereafter yelled "gun, gun" to alert the other
    officers at the scene.
    According to Barryoh, when he attempted to arrest defendant, he resisted
    by "flailing his hands." He was able to control defendant and effectuate the
    arrest with the assistance of the other officers at the scene. The Crime Scene
    Unit took possession of the handgun and found it was a .38 caliber revolver
    that contained "two live rounds of ball ammunition[,] . . . one hollow -point
    round[,]" and three spent rounds. A subsequent search of defendant's criminal
    history revealed he had two open arrest warrants and prior convictions for
    crimes listed as predicate offenses under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7.
    In his September 18, 2017 letter-opinion, the motion judge included a
    "Counterstatement of Facts" derived exclusively from defense counsel's
    motion brief. In this alternative narrative of events, defendant denied every
    material factual contention made by the State. Specifically, defense counsel
    claimed that defendant "at no point in time dropped a gun beneath or beside
    the white vehicle . . . [or] resist[ed] arrest[.]"        Despite the obvious
    irreconcilable material differences between the State's version of events and
    the account described by defense counsel, the motion judge found: "Defendant
    has not challenged the State's facts with sufficient specificity to warrant a
    hearing." After citing State v. Elders, 
    192 N.J. 224
    , 250 (2007), a case that
    A-2026-17T2
    4
    involved the articulable suspicion required by police officers to request
    consent to search a car, State v. Rodriguez, 
    172 N.J. 117
    , 126-28 (2002), in
    which the Court addressed the requirements for a valid investigative detention,
    and other inapposite cases, the judge concluded: "[T]he Incident Report and
    Grand Jury transcript did not illustrate that the detectives, based on their
    experience and training, had an inclination of what the dropped object was
    between the time it was dropped and the time [d]efendant was called over by
    Detective Barryoh. Therefore, this stop was unlawful."
    Pursuant to Rule 3:5-7(c), "[i]f material facts are disputed, testimony
    thereon shall be taken in open court." Our Supreme Court has also recently
    made clear:
    The proper mechanism through which to explore the
    constitutionality of warrantless police conduct is an
    evidentiary hearing. At evidentiary hearings, the State
    presents witnesses to substantiate its basis for the
    challenged warrantless conduct, and the defense is
    afforded the opportunity to confront and cross-
    examine the State's witnesses.
    [State v. Atwood, 
    232 N.J. 433
    , 445 (2018) (citations
    omitted).]
    Here, the parties made clear in their respective written submissions that
    they had diametrically irreconcilable accounts about what Detective Barryoh
    claimed occurred when he approached defendant. Under Rule 3:5-7(c), the
    motion judge must conduct an N.J.R.E. 104 evidentiary hearing to provide the
    A-2026-17T2
    5
    parties the opportunity to probe the veracity of Barryoh's testimony.     The
    motion judge thereafter must make factual findings that will be substantially
    influenced by an opportunity to hear and see the witnesses. State v. Gamble,
    
    218 N.J. 412
    , 424-25 (2014). Equally problematic is the judge's decision to
    adjudicate this motion without affording counsel the opportunity to present
    oral argument.   "The availability of oral argument on criminal motions is
    implicit within the language of [Rule] 1:6-2(a)." State v. Mayron, 
    344 N.J. Super. 382
    , 386 (App. Div. 2001). Oral advocacy is a fundamental aspect of
    our criminal justice system and should be encouraged, preserved, and
    protected.
    Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
    A-2026-17T2
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-2026-17T2

Filed Date: 5/13/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/20/2019