I/M/O THE ESTATE OF MABEL A. MCDERMOTT (P-001917-13, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4060-16T4
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF MABEL A. MCDERMOTT,
Deceased.
______________________________
Argued February 6, 2019 – Decided May 14, 2019
Before Judges Fuentes, Accurso and Moynihan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Morris County, Docket No. P-
001917-13.
Elliott L. Pell argued the cause for appellant Joy
McDermott-Guber.
Jennifer L. McInerney argued the cause for respondent
Bart Alan McDermott (Torzewski & McInerney, LLC,
attorneys; Jennifer L. McInerney on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Joy McDermott-Gruber appeals from the judgment entered by the
trial court, following a five-day bench trial, in favor of her brother, defendant
Bart Alan McDermott (Alan), individually and as executor of the estate of their
mother, Mabel McDermott, 1 and the defendant-estate (collectively:
defendants).2 The court dismissed with prejudice Joy's amended verified
complaint in which she advanced claims for unjust enrichment, breach of
fiduciary duty and conversion.
Joy argues she is entitled to judgment on each of her three causes of action
because: Mabel made two gifts inter vivos to her – the proceeds of the sale of
properties in Parsippany and assets in a Charles Schwab portfolio – which were
misappropriated by defendants who converted plaintiff's money and property to
their unlawful use and benefit; Mabel agreed to manage plaintiff's funds and
breached the fiduciary duty arising from that agreement; and Mabel was unjustly
enriched by those acts. Joy also argues the trial court erred in dismissing her
complaint under the entire controversy doctrine. We determine the trial court's
findings of fact and its conclusion that Joy failed to prove any of her three causes
of action are supported by sufficient, credible evidence in the record and affirm.
We glean the facts, including pertinent, contextual family history, from
the trial court's findings as supported by the trial record. Mabel and her husband,
1
Mabel passed on June 7, 2013.
2
We use the given names of the McDermott family for clarity; by doing so, we
mean no disrespect or familiarity.
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2
Bart McDermott both operated Bart J. McDermott, Inc. (BJM), a company
primarily involved in residential real estate development until Bart's death in
1992. Mabel handled "the books," that is, the financial end of the business.
Alan was "very much involved" in the business. Joy testified she operated a
retail florist shop with her husband during the day but was steadily involved in
design work for BJM in the evenings after the florist shop closed and on
weekends. Alan countered that Joy was uninvolved with BJM and worked full-
time with her husband at the florist shop. The court did not credit Joy's
testimony and found she "received money from BJM without working there."
Joy and Alan, through transfers from Mabel and Bart, acquired an
interest in a Parsippany property commonly known as 8 Grange Road and in a
contiguous vacant tract. Alan, with plans to develop the Parsippany properties ,
contracted to purchase Joy's share in 8 Grange Road and the vacant tract in
September 2004 for $318,055.55; the deeds, dated July 21, 2005, were recorded
in August 2005.3 The trial court found Joy gave the proceeds checks to Mabel.
3
We cannot discern the exact date the deeds were recorded. Consideration on
each of the deeds is one dollar.
A-4060-16T4
3
Plaintiff's expert witness traced the sum paid to Joy for the properties.
Based on his testimony, the trial court found those funds were deposited on
December 13, 2005 into Bank of America (BOA) money-market account 42864
in the names of Mabel, Joy and Alan; interest income from the account was
credited to Joy for income-tax purposes. On January 25, 2006, Mabel
transferred $318,000 from account 4286 to BOA certificate of deposit (CD)
account 8826 held jointly by Mabel, Joy and Alan. Upon maturity of the CD on
January 25, 2007, Mabel transferred the balance – $331,781.33 – into BOA
checking account 1121 on which Mabel and Joy were signatories. 5 Account
1121 already had a balance, including the proceeds from a property-damage
settlement, in excess of $40,000, paid to Mabel from a motor vehicle accident
in which she was involved. Mabel withdrew $400,000 from account 1121 on
4
Like the trial court, we use only the last four digits of each account number.
5
At one point during its oral decision, the trial court stated this account was "in
the names of" Joy, Alan and Mabel. The documentary evidence, however,
shows that Alan was not included on this account. In the balance of its decision,
when the court referenced this account, it mentioned only Mabel's and Joy's
activity; it did not mention Alan. In fact, the court found the account was placed
in the names of Joy and Mabel in early 2007; Joy identified hers and Mabel's
signatures on the signature card for account 1121 and confirmed she signed it
"[a]round January 2007" even though her "name was already on the account."
We do not perceive that the single reference to Alan in connection with account
1121 had any significance in the ultimate outcome of this case.
A-4060-16T4
4
February 12, 2007 and deposited the funds into BOA certificate of deposit
account 8524 in the name of Joy and Mabel. On April 27, 2010, the sum of
$296,055.43 was redeemed from account 8524 and deposited into an individual
BOA checking account 4309 in Mabel's name only. Shortly thereafter Alan's
name was added to account 4309. On November 18, 2011, Alan transferred
$353,472.35 from account 4309 into BOA account 8479, in his name only.
Mabel also withdrew $60,000 from Joy's Charles Schwab account in six
$10,000 increments in September and October 2010 and February, April, June
and July 2011. The trial court found the account – which had a balance of
$736,334.86 in September 2010 – was "a portfolio with various stock holdings
and other financial assets which [Joy] funded from the money she derived from
her role as a BJM shareholder." The court also found "Joy came to have" "the
contents [of the portfolio], including a rather large holding of stock in Exxon
Mobil, . . . through Mabel's generosity."
Joy avers she entrusted to Mabel the management of the inter vivos gifts
made to her – the proceeds from the sale of the Parsippany properties and the
assets in the Charles Schwab account – and that Mabel breached a fiduciary duty
owed to Joy resulting in Mabel's unjust enrichment. She also alleges these
defendants converted these assets.
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5
The trial court concluded the fatal flaw in all Joy's claims was that she
failed to prove the funds taken belonged to her. Finding that "so much of what
Joy and Alan had derived was from the generosity of their parents," and that
Joy, who "derived little income from her work" at the small retail florist shop,
particularly benefitted from "her parents, and especially her mother's
generosity," the trial court determined that "Mabel maintained her interest in all
of this money . . . and it didn't belong to Joy"; "[t]his was family money."
The court said Joy gave Mabel the proceeds from the sale of the
Parsippany property "because she knew that Mabel exercised dominion and
control over the family assets and the money derived from the business." The
court attributed Joy's testimony that she was unaware that the proceeds were to
be deposited in BOA account 1121 to her knowledge "that Mabel exercised
dominion and control over the money because its source was derived from assets
of the parents." When Joy testified that she wasn't involved in various BOA
account transfers, the court said "that's because it was not her money." And the
court found the reason Joy testified that she did not know "what was happening
with what she called 'her money'" between 2007 and 2010 was that Joy "didn't
consider it to be hers. It was, in fact, her mother's money."
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Some of the accounts were jointly held and thus, pursuant to N.J.S.A.
17:16I-4(a), "[i]n the absence of proof of net contributions" to the amounts on
deposit, the account would normally belong in equal shares to all parties who
had a present right of withdrawal. That general rule, however, can be set aside
if there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent at the time the
account is created. N.J.S.A. 17:16I-4. The judge found such evidence:
Joy's contributions were very few. The statute simply
doesn't apply in this case because of the nature of the
relationship between especially Mabel and Joy, and
how the parties treated this rather considerable sum of
money with which this family was blessed, and Mabel
always had the ability to determine where money would
go and how it would be spent.
The trial court explained that the crediting of income from some accounts
to Joy for tax purposes was "not surprising because Joy had the benefit of a lot
of this money and Mabel, who was paying taxes on other money, simply felt it
was fair that Joy should pay her share of some of the taxes from this family
money." And the court was unconvinced by evidence presented to support Joy's
claim to the accounts:
[R]eferences to "Joy's account" found in certain
exhibits, annotated in Mabel's hand . . . was simply a
reference to Joy's taking income on accounts for tax
purposes. The same purpose regarding . . . "her CD[.]"
This was not a designation of ownership by Mabel of
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the account or the money there. Mabel . . . controlled
the account.
The trial court found Joy did not object to Mabel's withdrawals from the
accounts. The court concluded Joy knew of those withdrawals and that she was
not credible when she professed not to have knowledge of them. The court
credited Alan's testimony that: the account statements went to the Arlington
Avenue house where Joy then lived with Mabel; 6 Joy opened all the mail and
received the statements; and that only Joy had access to the statements,
especially during the time Mabel was too frail to "make her way down to get the
mail" from the mailbox at the end of the driveway.
The trial court also found Joy was not credible on a number of other issues,
including her testimony about the origin of the Schwab assets and that: she was
the sole owner of BOA account 4286; Mabel did not have authority to withdraw
funds from the Schwab account; she did not know how much she earned from
the florist shop.
We defer to the trial court's factual findings so long as "there is substantial
credible evidence in the record to support the findings." Brunson v. Affinity
Fed. Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381, 397 (2009) (quoting State v. Adams, 194 N.J.
6
Joy's residence as set forth in her amended complaint is the Arlington Avenue
address.
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186, 203 (2008)). "Appellate courts should defer to trial courts' credibility
findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the
character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are
not transmitted by the record." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999). In
a non-jury case, we will not disturb the findings upon which the judgment is
based unless "they are so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice
. . . ." Rova Farms Resort v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-484 (1974) (quoting
Greenfield v. Dussesault, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. Div. 1960)).
Ultimately, our role
is to determine whether the result could reasonably
have been reached by the trial judge on the evidence, or
whether it is clearly unfair or unjustly distorted by a
misconception of law or findings of fact that are
contrary to the evidence. The task is a difficult one of
balancing the need for a check on unbridled discretion
in the trial court against affording a trial de novo in this
court.
[Perkins v. Perkins, 159 N.J. Super. 243, 247 (App.
Div. 1978).]
Applying those tenets, we determine the trial court's judgment was well-
supported by the record.
A claim of conversion requires a showing that "the owner has been
deprived of his property by the act of another assuming an unauthorized
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dominion and control over it." Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 299 N.J. Super. 203,
217 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Charles Bloom & Co. v. Echo Jewelers, 279 N.J.
Super. 372, 381 (App. Div. 1995)), aff'd as modified, 157 N.J. 504 (1999). "The
crux of conversion is wrongful exercise of dominion or control over property of
another without authorization and to the exclusion of the owner's rights in that
property." Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 409 N.J. Super. 444, 456 (App. Div.
2009). "Therefore, the property allegedly converted 'must have belonged to the
injured party.'" Sun Coast Merch. Corp. v. Myron Corp., 393 N.J. Super. 55, 84
(App. Div. 2007) (quoting Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark v. Apgar, 111 N.J.
Super. 108, 115 (Law. Div. 1970)).
The trial court rejected Joy's conversion action because it found she never
proved the funds taken were hers. The court's finding that the funds were
"family money" controlled by Mabel negates key elements of conversion.
Mabel exercised dominion and control over that family money as she had
authority to do since the time she and Bart ran BJM.
A "fiduciary relationship arises between two persons when one person is
under a duty to act for or give advice for the benefit of another on matters within
the scope of their relationship," or when "one party places trust and confidence
in another who is in a dominant or superior position." F.G. v. MacDonell, 150
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N.J. 550, 563 (1997). The proofs support the trial court's conclusion that Joy's
claim that a fiduciary relationship was created when she entrusted her monies to
Mabel was "not true."
The trial court did not find credible Joy's claim that Mabel agreed to
manage her finances and pay her bills from BOA account 1121, which Joy
termed a "convenience account." The court found Joy paid many of her bills
from Joy's account at Sovereign Bank and "reject[ed] the notion that [Joy] was
completely reliant upon Mabel." And the court concluded the funds did not
belong to Joy.
That finding also supported the trial court's rejection of Joy's unjust
enrichment claim. Joy was required to prove Mabel received a benefit and that
retention of that benefit "would be unjust." Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. Wallia,
211 N.J. Super. 231, 243 (App. Div. 1986) (quoting Callano v. Oakwood Park
Homes Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 105, 109 (App. Div. 1966)). As the trial court
ruled, "[Joy] did not meet those proofs here because the money was Mabel's."
We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment for defendants. In light of
our decision on the merits, it is unnecessary to determine if the trial court – in
finding that this action should have been joined with Joy's quiet title action,
commenced in June 2012, which, like this action, was precipitated by a dispute
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between Joy and Mabel that commenced in November 2011 – properly applied
the entire controversy doctrine to preclude Joy's claims.7
Affirmed.
7
Joy also advanced in her merits brief that the trial court's application of the
entire controversy doctrine deprived her of her right to a jury trial. At oral
argument, she, through counsel, conceded that "the parties agreed there wouldn't
be a jury trial" when they decided to maintain this action in the Chancery
Division.
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