DCPP VS. T.L. AND J.J., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.J. (FG-02-0040-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5548-17T2
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
T.L.,
Defendant,
and
J.J.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF M.J.,
a Minor.
_____________________________
Submitted April 9, 2019 – Decided May 8, 2019
Before Judges Suter and Geiger.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
Docket No. FG-02-0040-17.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Britt J. Salmon-Dhawan, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Sara M. Gregory, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor (Margo E.K. Hirsch, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant J.J. appeals the Judgment of Guardianship that terminated his
parental rights under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). He contends the trial court erred
because there was not clear and convincing evidence under any of the four
required portions of the statute to terminate his parental rights. We reject these
arguments and affirm the judgment substantially for the reasons expressed by
Judge William R. DeLorenzo, Jr., in his comprehensive written opinion.
A-5548-17T2
2
Defendant and T.L. have two children but only M.J. (Marci) 1 is the subject
of this appeal.2 Marci was born in October 2015 and resided with her parents
for two months until the Division of Child Protection and Permanency
(Division) removed her on an emergency basis. Both parents had mental health
problems, were not employed, were homeless, and their relationship was
volatile. Neither parent was compliant with homemaker services, therapy or
counseling. The Division was granted custody, care and supervision of Marci,
who was placed with a resource parent where she continues to reside. 3
T.L. agreed to terminate her parental rights on the condition that the
resource parent adopt Marci. 4 Following a two-day trial that defendant did not
attend, the trial court also terminated his parental rights.
1
This is a fictitious name.
2
Their older daughter, born fifteen months earlier, was residing with her
paternal grandmother.
3
By the conclusion of the trial, the older daughter also was residing with the
same resource parent.
4
T.L. did not appeal the Judgment of Guardianship accepting surrender of
parental rights.
A-5548-17T2
3
I
The Division was providing services to the family before Marci was born.
Defendant was attending Comprehensive Behavior Healthcare (CBH) for
therapy and medication monitoring. When Marci was born, defendant and T.L.
were living in a motel; defendant was not employed. The Division engaged
additional services that included family education and parenting classes at Care
Plus's Families First program, and a homemaker to assist the family with daily
tasks, transportation and appointments. The caseworker testified that these
services were to prevent Marci's removal, to assist the family "with their mental
illness and to help them with their financial and housing stability."
There were issues with defendant's compliance with the services. He did
not want the homemaker and he did not keep appointments. By December 2015,
they no longer could stay at the motel and they went missing for a brief period.
The Division was concerned about defendant's mental health, specifically
depression and anxiety, housing, and his volatile relationship with T.L. When
the family was located, the Division removed Marci, who was then two months
old, and placed her in the resource home where she currently resides. It was not
successful in placing her with relatives.
A-5548-17T2
4
The caseworker testified at trial that defendant claimed he was "too tired
to work or he was unable to focus to work." The family moved from living in
shelters, to motels or with friends. He and T.L. had a volatile relationship and
they were asked to leave shelters. The Division referred defendant to the
"PATH" program "[t]o stabilize his mental health and to get stable housing," but
within three months, PATH terminated its services and closed the case having
"exhausted all options of housing the family." Defendant abandoned two jobs.
He was referred to CBH for individual therapy, but would not go, and it "closed
out" the services. The Division again referred him to the program, but he was
closed out again due to missed appointments. Defendant attended a program for
domestic violence, but he did not complete it, and that service was terminated.
The Division referred defendant for parenting classes, and although he initially
did not attend, he was referred again and completed it. Defendant also attended
a psychological evaluation but would not go to the psychiatric evaluation. He
would not sign releases for any of his records to assist the Division.
The caseworker testified that the Division met regularly with defendant to
develop a plan for the family, but he did not make efforts to comply with the
recommended services. His plan for reunifying with Marci was "to get a job
and get [Marci] back and then he [would] be able to get shelter." However, he
A-5548-17T2
5
had no job or housing and was not attending services. For the most part, he
resided in shelters or on the streets.
The Division provided defendant with bus passes and tickets for
transportation for visits with Marci. His visits were once a week supervised at
the Division. He was supposed to have supervised visitation twice a week at
Care Plus, but he did not attend any of those visits because he wanted the visits
to include both children. Care Plus terminated its services; the Division resumed
weekly supervised visitation at its offices. Defendant's visits became
inconsistent later in 2017 because he moved to a shelter in Brooklyn. His last
visit with Marci was in January 2018. The case worker testified that she did not
know whether he was attending any services in New York.
Dr. Frank J. Dyer testified at the trial as an expert in forensic psychology.
He conducted an individual psychological evaluation of defendant, a bonding
assessment of the child and defendant, and a bonding assessment of the child
and resource parent. He found defendant appeared to be suffering from "a
clinical depression." Defendant blamed the Division for "any adverse
conditions." He denied the need for domestic violence counseling, therapeutic
services or medication.
A-5548-17T2
6
Dr. Dyer diagnosed defendant with a depressive disorder and "borderline
personality disorder 5 with narcissistic features." He testified that defendant's
case history suggested defendant was "extremely emotionally volatile" and
could be triggered by "slight provocations." "The narcissistic component [was]
evident in his attitude of knowing better than anybody." Dr. Dyer testified that
because of defendant's mental health issues, he would not be able to respond to
Marci in an appropriate manner. Defendant required intensive psychotherapy
or medication. In Dr. Dyer's opinion, defendant lacked any insight into his
mental health problems. He said that defendant did not "possess adequate
parenting capacity and that his prognosis for acquiring adequate parenting
capacity within the foreseeable future [was] extremely poor."
Dr. Dyer testified that Marci had either an "emotionally neutral
connection" to defendant or "something of a positive connection," but defendant
was not able to "provide a safe, stable, appropriately nurturing, structured and
fulfilling home environment for her." In contrast, he said that Marci was
"profoundly attached to her caretaker." If Marci were removed from her care,
she would be "at risk for a traumatic loss," including "impairment of her basic
5
Dr. Dyer testified this disorder is "characterized by emotional volatility, by
extremely negative, abrasive, conflicted interpersonal relations and by some
confusion in the individual sense of personal identity."
A-5548-17T2
7
trust, her self-esteem, and also her capacity to attach to new caretakers." He
testified that defendant was not equipped to assist Marci in overcoming this
harm. In his opinion, there was no advantage to giving defendant more time to
remedy his parental deficits because the prognosis for this was poor, and Marci
was securely attached to her resource parent. Dr. Dyer testified that adoption
by the resource parent was in Marci's best interest.
The court entered a Judgment of Guardianship that terminated defendant's
parental rights to Marci. In his written opinion, the court found that defendant
had no "viable plan for the long-term care" of Marci. He was unemployed for
substantial periods and lived in shelters or on the street. He had mental health
issues, suffered from depression and declined to take his medication. He
received services to address these issues but failed to complete them. He did
not complete domestic violence counseling. The Division's psychologist found
that defendant lacked the minimum parental capacity to safely parent Marci now
or in the foreseeable future. Marci was "profoundly" attached to the resource
parent and disrupting that would harm her.
The court found that the Division had proven each part of the four-pronged
test under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). With respect to prong one, defendant "failed
to provide a safe and stable home." He "made little or no progress in addressing
A-5548-17T2
8
his parental deficits." Dr. Dyer testified that Marci would be at "very great risk
of harm" if she were placed with defendant. The court found that prong one was
satisfied because "the safety, health and development of [Marci] was endangered
and continue[d] to be endangered to this day because [defendant] ha[d] failed to
remediate his parental deficits."
Under prong two, the court found that defendant was unwilling or unable
to eliminate the harms because "he [was] unable to continue a parental
relationship without recurrent harm to his child." Defendant did not have stable
or secure shelter; he did not attend services that were provided; he did not have
regular employment; and he had no viable plan to care for Marci. Dr. Dyer
testified that defendant was not likely to improve because of his attitude that he
did not need services.
Under prong three, the court found the Division provided reasonable
services to address these issues, which included: psychological and psychiatric
evaluations, domestic violence counseling, visiting homemaker services and
parenting classes. As the court observed, "[t]he fact that the Division was
unsuccessful in reunifying [defendant] with [Marci] is not an indication that the
Division failed to provide reasonable services or that the Division failed to make
A-5548-17T2
9
an appropriate effort to help [defendant]." The court found the Division
explored alternatives to placement but none were successful.
For the fourth prong, the court found that termination of defendant's
parental rights would not do more harm than good. Marci lived with the resource
parent for most of her life. Dr. Dyer testified there was a "profound" attachment
and that disrupting that bond would harm Marci more than terminating her
parental relationship with defendant. The court concluded that it was in Marci's
"best interest" to terminate defendant's parental rights.
On appeal, defendant argues that the Division did not satisfy any of the
four parts of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). He contends he was not provided proper
or consistent visitation with his child; did not receive reasonable services to
address his mental health issues and homelessness; that his parental relationship
with the child was not harmful; he was willing and able to change; and that
termination of his parental rights would be harmful.
II
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) authorizes the Division to petition for the
termination of parental rights in the "best interests of the child" if the following
standards are met:
A-5548-17T2
10
(1) The child's safety, health or development has been
or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
delay of permanent placement will add to the harm.
Such harm may include evidence that separating the
child from his resource family parents would cause
serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm
to the child;
(3) The Division has made reasonable efforts to
provide services to help the parent correct the
circumstances which led to the child's placement
outside the home and the court has considered
alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
harm than good.
A trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is subject to limited
appellate review. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605
(2007); see Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998) ("Because of the family
courts' special . . . expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord
deference to family court fact-finding."). The family court's decision to
terminate parental rights will not be disturbed "when there is substantial credible
evidence in the record to support the court's findings." N.J. Div. of Youth &
A-5548-17T2
11
Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (citing In re Guardianship of
J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)).
Because we find that the trial court's findings are supported by adequate,
substantial and credible evidence in the record, we affirm for the reasons set
forth in Judge DeLorenzo's thirty-nine page written decision. We add only these
comments.
The Division did not need to prove physical abuse and neglect of Marci
by defendant to satisfy the first prong of the statute. The Division could "bring
an action for the termination of parental rights . . . without first bringing an
action under Title [Nine]." N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.P., 408
N.J. Super. 252, 259 (App. Div. 2009).
That defendant completed one parenting program did not change the fact
that he remained without shelter, employment or a plan for how to care for
Marci. The Division has proven harm under the first prong of the statute where
it can show "the condition or behavior of a parent causes a risk of harm, such as
impermanence of the child's home and living conditions, and the parent is
unwilling or incapable of obtaining appropriate treatment for that conditio n
. . . ." N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. H.R., 431 N.J. Super. 212, 223
A-5548-17T2
12
(App. Div. 2013). Defendant did not eliminate these harms and provided no
reasonable plan for Marci's future.
It was not error for the court to rely on Dr. Dyer's unopposed testimony
that defendant lacked the capacity to parent and was unlikely to obtain these
skills in the reasonable future. "In a termination of parental rights trial, the
evidence often takes the form of expert opinion testimony by psychiatrists,
psychologists, and other mental health professionals." N.J. Div. of Child Prot.
& Permanency v. R.L.M., 236 N.J. 123, 146 (2018); see Kinsella v. Kinsella,
150 N.J. 276, 318 (1997) (providing that in guardianship cases, trial courts "rely
heavily on the expertise of psychologists and other mental health
professionals").
We agree there was substantial evidence to support the finding that
defendant was unwilling or unable to overcome these harms. The second prong
under the statute can be met "if the parent has failed to provide a 'safe and stable
home for the child' and a 'delay in permanent placement' will further harm the
child." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 352 (1999) (quoting
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2)). The trial court found credible both the caseworker's
testimony that services were offered to defendant but he failed to complete any
of them except for one parenting program, and Dr. Dyer's testimony that
A-5548-17T2
13
defendant was not capable of parenting and would not be able to do so in the
foreseeable future. Defendant remained without a viable plan for a safe and
stable home for Marci.
The record did not support defendant's claim that he was denied "proper
visitation" with Marci. The record showed it was defendant who missed visits
because his requests for changes in the schedule could not be met or he did not
confirm ahead of time that the visit would occur. The Division set up supervised
visitation through Care Plus twice a week but defendant did not attend, and this
program was cancelled. Visitation then was scheduled at the Division's office;
defendant attended in 2016, but in 2017, his visitation became irregular. His
visitation stopped after January 2018, apparently because he moved out of state
and absented himself. The record did not support the claim there was something
improper or inconsistent with the Division's actions.
There was no support for defendant's claim that the Division "neglected"
its obligation to help him overcome homelessness and mental health issues. The
Division arranged services to address both issues, but defendant did not attend,
or attended and did not complete the programs. Transportation assistance was
made available. Bus passes were provided. At times, the Division provided
A-5548-17T2
14
transportation to services and not just for visitations. If defendant had engaged
in services, monthly bus passes were available.
The court's finding that termination of defendant's parental rights would
not do more harm than good was clearly supported. Dr. Dyer's testimony that
Marci was securely bonded with her resource parent and not with defendant, and
that disrupting that bond would harm the child, was unrebutted. "The court can
rely on expert testimony to make the relevant determination." H.R., 431 N.J.
Super. at 226 (citing In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 (1992)). "When
a bond exists between the child and the caretaker parent, and the biological
parents cannot correct their poor conduct, the termination of their parental rights
will not do more harm than good." Ibid. (citing E.P., 196 N.J. at 108). Although
defendant may have made some efforts, he did not overcome his parental
deficits. "The child should not 'languish indefinitely in foster care while a birth
parent attempts to correct the conditions that resulted in an out-of-home
placement.'" Id. at 227 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.F., 392
N.J. Super. 201, 209 (App. Div. 2007)). Rather, the focus needed to be on
permanency for the child. See K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 357 (providing that "[i]n all
our guardianship and adoption cases, the child's need for permanency and
stability emerges as a central factor").
A-5548-17T2
15
We are satisfied that Judge DeLorenzo appropriately applied the best
interest standards under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) in terminating defendant's
parental rights.
Affirmed.
A-5548-17T2
16