STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JONATHAN F. RAMOS-PIEDRAHITA(13-12-1002, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5384-14T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN F. RAMOS-PIEDRAHITA,
a/k/a JONATHAN F. RAMOS-PEDTAHITA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Argued February 14, 2017 – Decided August 18, 2017
Before Judges Espinosa and Suter.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Union County, Indictment No 13-
12-1002.
Jaime B. Herrera, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney;
Ms. Herrera, of counsel and on the brief).
Kimberly L. Donnelly, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for respondent (Grace H. Park,
Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney;
Meredith L. Balo, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant was convicted of second-degree aggravated assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), and related offenses, arising out of the
stabbing of Mauricio Hurtado,1 whom he did not know, during an
altercation outside a bar in the early morning hours of August 4,
2013. He was sentenced to seven years subject to the No Early
Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. He appeals his conviction
and sentence, presenting the following arguments for our
consideration:
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR
TRIAL WHEN THE PROSECUTOR INDICATED
DURING HIS OPENING STATEMENT THAT A
WITNESS, WHOM HE KNEW COULD NOT BE
PRODUCED AT TRIAL, IDENTIFIED
DEFENDANT AS THE ASSAILANT.
DEFENDANT WAS FURTHER PREJUDICED
WHEN THE PROSECUTOR ARGUED IN
OPENING AND CLOSING STATEMENTS THAT
ANOTHER WITNESS SAW DEFENDANT STAB
THE VICTIM, WHEN THE WITNESS TOLD
POLICE AND TESTIFIED AT TRIAL THAT
HE DID NOT WITNESS THE ATTACK ON THE
VICTIM.
POINT II
THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING, AS THE TRIAL COURT
FAILED TO CONSIDER MITIGATING
FACTORS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE,
AND IGNORED THE PROSECUTOR'S
REQUEST FOR A DOWNGRADE AND THE
VICTIM'S PLEA FOR LENIENCY.
1
The transcript identifies the witness as Mauricio Furtado. We
have used the name as set forth in the indictment.
2 A-5384-14T2
The circumstances that led to the stabbing began when Carlos
Castano-Garcia, a friend of defendant's, became embroiled in an
argument with Jeffrey Martinez, who was dating Hurtado's ex-
girlfriend. The men went outside, engaged in some pushing, and
returned to the bar. Defendant arrived later and spoke with
Castano-Garcia about his altercation with Martinez.
At some point, Castano-Garcia, Hurtado, Martinez, defendant,
and a "bunch of people" went back outside the bar and into the
adjacent parking lot. According to Castano-Garcia, Martinez tried
to fight him, and defendant placed himself between the two men and
tried to separate them. While there was "some pushing and
shoving," nobody was punched, kicked, or injured other than
Hurtado.
Castano-Garcia testified that after about three or four
minutes, "[H]urtado was kind of want to fight, too, so [defendant]
tried to stop [H]urtado, and [H]urtado, you know, push [defendant]
with his lefthand side and he almost fell . . . but he didn't."
Hurtado also testified he pushed defendant "a little hard" and
defendant stumbled but did not fall to the ground.
Video surveillance footage from the bar shows defendant,
Martinez, and an unidentified male then left the group and walked
to defendant's red Mazda in the parking lot. Defendant went into
his car for two seconds and then began to return to the group.
3 A-5384-14T2
The two other men grabbed him; defendant broke free of their grip
and ran toward the group.
Castano-Garcia testified defendant ran to his car, and then
ran back with a knife to Hurtado and stabbed him.
Hurtado testified that, after returning from his car,
defendant stabbed him below his left armpit with a blade. Hurtado
also stated defendant tried to stab him two more times and was
aiming at his chest.
Juan Alvarez, the owner of the bar, testified he observed
defendant holding a blade while he and the other men were fighting.
He did not state he witnessed the actual stabbing.
After the attack, defendant drove himself and Martinez away
from the bar.
In response to a dispatch about the stabbing, Elizabeth Police
Officer Jeffrey Cruz and his partner drove to Morris Avenue, where
they encountered defendant shortly after 2:00 a.m. Officer Cruz
stated defendant was "sweating a little profusely" and "seemed
nervous." Defendant originally told the officers his name was
"Fabian Ramos," but then presented a form of identification with
his real name.
Officer David Haverty was on patrol when he was flagged down
by men at the bar. He attended to Hurtado's wound prior to the
arrival of an ambulance and then, upon learning of defendant's
4 A-5384-14T2
detention, transported witnesses to the scene to conduct "show-
up" identification procedures. Alvarez and Castano-Garcia
2
identified defendant. After the show-ups, defendant was
arrested. He told the officers what car he had and where it was
parked, and the car was towed to police headquarters that night.
With defendant's consent, Detective Lawrence Smith searched
defendant's vehicle and recovered a knife in the front passenger
compartment. At trial, Hurtado identified this knife as the one
used to stab him. The knife was sent for DNA testing at the Union
County Prosecutor's Laboratory. Monica Ghannam, a forensic
scientist at the laboratory, testified she tested a bloodstain on
the knife and the DNA matched Hurtado's DNA sample.
At around 2:50 a.m. that morning, Hurtado arrived at
University Hospital in Newark. He had a stab wound approximately
one centimeter long, and the trauma surgeon used one suture to
close the wound. Hurtado was kept in the trauma bay for a short
period after that to "sober up," and he was discharged at 4:25
a.m. He later identified defendant as the man who stabbed him,
selecting his photo from a photo array.
The jury convicted defendant of second-degree aggravated
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (count one); third-degree
2
Alvarez later identified a photograph of defendant at the police
department.
5 A-5384-14T2
aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2) (count two); fourth-
degree unlawful possession of a weapon (knife), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(d) (count three); and third-degree possession of a weapon (knife)
for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count four). The
trial judge merged courts two, three, and four into count one and
sentenced defendant to seven years of incarceration with an eighty-
five percent parole disqualifier on count one.
II.
3
For the first time on appeal, defendant argues that
statements made by the prosecutor in his opening statement and
summation regarding identifications of defendant deprived him of
a fair trial. "The jurisdiction of appellate courts rightly is
bounded by the proofs and objections critically explored on the
record before the trial court by the parties themselves." State
v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009). Because there were no
objections to these comments at trial, our review is limited to
"a search for plain error." State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504, 516
(2006). That is, a reversal is only warranted if the alleged
error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R.
2:10-2.
3
We note that, contrary to the requirement of Rule 2:6-2(a)(1),
the fact that these arguments were not raised in the trial court
is not noted in the point headings or the arguments.
6 A-5384-14T2
We acknowledge at the outset that the comments challenged
here can fairly be characterized as imprudent statements regarding
the number of persons who identified defendant. The capacity of
these alleged errors to "produc[e] an unjust result" is negligible
because one of the witnesses who did identify defendant was a
personal friend of long-standing. Further, the potential for
prejudice was essentially negated by the trial judge's vigilant
and astute response.
During his opening statement, the prosecutor referred to
Hurtado, Castano-Garcia, and Alvarez and stated: "All three of
those witnesses are going to testify that they saw this defendant
stab the victim and attempt to stab him again." (Emphasis added).
After telling the jury that Officer Cruz detained defendant, he
told them: "Three individuals – not including the victim at this
point – were taken in police cruisers to the area where the
defendant was being held and ident – 100-percent positively
identified him as the person who stabbed the victim." (Emphasis
added).
These comments strayed from the evidence that was produced
at trial. Although Alvarez stated he observed defendant with a
knife during the altercation, he did not state he saw defendant
stab Hurtado. The evidence also failed to support the prosecutor's
assertion that three witnesses identified defendant at the show-
7 A-5384-14T2
up because the State was unable to locate one of the witnesses.
The prosecutor disclosed this fact during the trial and defendant
does not contend the prosecutor knew the witness was unavailable
when he gave this opening statement.
Haverty was asked about the identifications at trial. When
the prosecutor asked how many witnesses he brought to the scene,
Officer Haverty testified: "I believe it was three." When asked
about the results, Officer Haverty stated: "I believe all three
were positive. They positive -- positively identified the
suspect." Haverty did not identify the names of the witnesses who
had made these identifications.
At this point in the trial, although two witnesses had
identified defendant, Hurtado and Alvarez, only Alvarez had
identified him at a show-up. Following Haverty's testimony, the
trial judge questioned the prosecutor about the number of
identifications Haverty had mentioned. She noted, "any prior
identifications of the defendant . . . can't be testified to
unless those witnesses are actually witnesses under the hearing
under Evidence Rule 803." She determined that Castano-Garcia was
a second person who identified defendant at the show-up and asked
the assistant prosecutor who the third person was. He replied,
"[t]here was another guy[, W.C.]." When the judge asked if the
prosecutor planned to call W.C., the prosecutor disclosed that the
8 A-5384-14T2
State was not able to find him. The judge stated she did not want
the jury to hear further testimony about a third person identifying
defendant at the show-up. She directed the prosecutor to instruct
other police officers who testified about the show-up not to talk
about any third identifying witness. The judge asked defense
counsel if he had any objection and he replied, "Certainly not,
Judge."4
Later, Officer Cruz took the stand and stated he "had two
show-ups where people positive[ly] identified the suspect in this
case."
The trial later gave a curative instruction to the jury to
clarify the evidence regarding the number of identifications at
the show-up. Defense counsel expressed he had no objection to the
proposed statement. The court then told the jury the following:
I think there was some mention of the fact
that there were three on-scene identifications
of the Defendant. Remember one of the
witnesses was talking about the show-up
procedure about witnesses being brought to the
scene.
And I think someone – I don't remember
who – said three. There were actually two on-
scene identifications of the Defendant during
that show-up procedure, not three. There were
4
Although defendant now complains that no curative instruction
was given following Haverty's testimony, there was neither an
objection nor a request for any curative instruction. Nonetheless,
the trial judge took a proactive role to avert further error and
defense counsel explicitly approved of the procedure she outlined.
9 A-5384-14T2
two. And I believe and, again, it's your
recollection that counts, not mine.
The on-scene identifications of the
identification [sic] were by Mr. Alvarez, the
owner of the bar; and also Carlos C[a]stano-
Garcia, who of course both of them testified
yesterday. So I just wanted to clear that up.
During his summation, the prosecutor stated Alvarez:
[p]ositively identified the Defendant at a
show-up shortly after this event
occurs . . . . And he says that's him, the
guy with the knife in his hand. Comes in to
court, looks at him again, and says that's him
right there. That's the guy with the knife
in his hand.
Then, discussing Officer Haverty's testimony, the prosecutor
stated two witnesses, Castano-Garcia and Alvarez went to the show-
up and "positively identified the Defendant as the person who
stabbed [Hurtado] and tried to stab him two more times in the
chest." In discussing Officer Cruz's testimony, the prosecutor
again referenced the two show-up identifications by Castano-Garcia
and Alvarez and stated, "they all positively identified the
Defendant as the individual who stabbed the victim in this case
and attempted to stab him twice more in the chest."
These comments failed to acknowledge that, although he
identified defendant and said he had a blade during the altercation
that resulted in the stabbing, Alvarez did not state he saw
defendant stab the victim.
10 A-5384-14T2
"A prosecutor must 'conscientiously and ethically undertak[e]
the difficult task of maintaining the precarious balance between
promoting justice and achieving a conviction,' ensuring that at
all times his or her 'remarks and actions [are] consistent with
his or her duty to ensure that justice is achieved.'" State v.
Jackson, 211 N.J. 394, 408 (2012) (alterations in original)
(quoting State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 447-48 (1988)). Thus,
although prosecutors are afforded "considerable leeway" when they
address the jury, their comments must be "related to the scope of
the evidence." State v. Cole, ___ N.J. ___ (2017) (slip op. at
39-40 (quoting State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82 (1999)). References
made by the prosecutor "to matters extraneous to the evidence" may
provide a ground for reversal. Jackson, supra, 211 N.J. at 408.
"Notwithstanding the high standard to which a prosecutor is
held as he or she gives an opening statement or summation, 'not
every deviation from the legal prescriptions governing
prosecutorial conduct' requires reversal." Id. at 408-09 (quoting
Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 452). "Prosecutorial misconduct is
a basis for reversal of a criminal conviction if the conduct was
so egregious that it deprived the defendant of the right to a fair
trial." State v. Gorthy, 226 N.J. 516, 540 (2016) (quoting State
v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 124 (2002)). In determining whether a
prosecutor's improper comments are grounds for reversal, "the
11 A-5384-14T2
making by trial counsel of a timely and proper objection and the
action of the trial judge in connection therewith are ordinarily
controlling considerations." State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super.
88, 149 (App. Div.) (quoting State v. Wilson, 57 N.J. 39, 50-51
(1970)), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 335 (2011).
We draw no inference from the failure to object to the
prosecutor's statement in his opening that three persons
identified defendant at the show-up because it was unknown at that
time that the third person would be unavailable to testify.
Turning to the misstatements that Alvarez identified
defendant as the man who stabbed Hurtado — although we do not
condone this sloppy lumping of Alvarez with the two other witnesses
who did provide such testimony — the failure to object reasonably
reflects defense counsel's perception that the comments were not
prejudicial. Alvarez did identify defendant as holding a blade
during the fight; no one else was seen with a knife; Hurtado was
stabbed; and both he and defendant's friend of a dozen years
testified it was defendant who stabbed him.
In reviewing the challenged comments, we consider "the tenor
of the trial and the responsiveness of counsel and the court to
the improprieties when they occurred." State v. Timmendequas, 161
N.J. 515, 575 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S. Ct. 136,
151 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2001). As noted, there were no objections to
12 A-5384-14T2
any of the comments here. The failure to object deprived the
trial judge of the opportunity to ameliorate errors as they occur.
See id. at 575. Still, the trial judge acted presciently and
effectively to address the potential for prejudice in the testimony
that three persons identified defendant at the show-up.
Weighing the improper comments of the prosecutor against the
compelling evidence that it was defendant who stabbed Hurtado, we
are satisfied the comments did not have the clear capacity to
produce an unjust result, R. 2:10-2, requiring reversal.
IV.
Defendant argues his sentence was excessive. He contends the
trial judge erred in her assessment of aggravating and mitigating
factors. He also argues the judge should have imposed a more
lenient sentence in light of the prosecutor's recommendation that
a sentence one degree lower be imposed and the victim's endorsement
of leniency. We disagree.
"Appellate review of sentencing decisions is relatively
narrow and is governed by an abuse of discretion standard." State
v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010). The Supreme Court directs
appellate courts to determine whether:
(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated;
(2) the aggravating and mitigating factors
found by the sentencing court were not based
upon competent and credible evidence in the
record; or
13 A-5384-14T2
(3) the application of the guidelines to the
facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly
unreasonable so as to shock the judicial
conscience.
[State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014)
(alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)) (internal
quotations marks omitted).]
There were a number of statements in support of defendant at
sentencing. The trial judge heard statements from defendant,
defendant's mother, and defendant's wife. She received thirty-
five letters supporting leniency for defendant, including one
letter from the victim, Hurtado.
Defendant was on probation at the time of this offense. The
presentence report states the prior offense occurred approximately
one year earlier, and describes it as "aggravated assault - bodily
injury with deadly weapon (recklessly) (with accomplice, kicked
victim while on ground)." Defense counsel contended the weapon
was a chair, rather than a deadly weapon. He stated defendant
agreed to plead guilty to the offense as part of a plea agreement
to preserve the ability of his brother, who was not a United States
citizen, to remain in this country. The prosecutor confirmed that
nothing in the presentence report stated defendant used a deadly
weapon in the prior incident, but rather that his brother had used
the chair. The trial judge noted defendant had stated under oath
that he was guilty of the offense in pleading guilty.
14 A-5384-14T2
Defense counsel urged the court to sentence defendant one
grade lower pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). He argued
defendant was intoxicated and emotional at the time of the offense,
and further, was remorseful and thankful the injury was minor.
The trial judge found aggravating factors three, six, and
nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), (9). In finding aggravating
factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) (the risk defendant would
commit another offense), the trial judge noted defendant committed
the present offense while on probation for committing a previous
aggravated assault. She found that aggravating factor six,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) (the extent of the defendant’s prior
criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which he
has been convicted) was also supported by the prior aggravated
assault. No specific support was cited for the judge's finding
of aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) (the need for
deterring the defendant and others from violating the law).
The judge also found mitigating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(b)(9)("the character and attitude of the defendant indicated
that he's unlikely to commit another offense"). However, she gave
this factor limited weight. She noted, "[The present offense]
does seem out of character for [defendant] based upon everything
I read about him[,] . . . [b]ut in balance there's also a man
who's been involved in two violent incidents."
15 A-5384-14T2
The trial judge denied the request to sentence defendant one
degree lower, explaining N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) permits the court
to sentence defendant to a term appropriate for a crime of one
degree lower only if "clearly convinced the mitigating factors
substantially outweigh the aggravating factors" and the interests
of justice so demand. Quoting State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484,
496-502 (1996), the trial judge explained "defendant must provide
compelling reasons for the downgrade 'in addition to and separate
from the mitigating factors that substantially outweigh the
aggravating factors that the trial court finds.'"
The trial judge concluded the aggravating factors
substantially outweighed the mitigating factors and the interests
of justice did not demand defendant be sentenced as if the present
offense were a third-degree crime. She acknowledged defendant had
been pushed by Hurtado, but also that "[h]e didn't even fall to
the ground," "[t]here's no allegation he was injured," and
"[t]here's no evidence that Mr. Hurtado was armed or was acting
in a threatening manner towards the defendant." Although Hurtado
sustained only a "superficial injury," the judge noted defendant
could have injured Hurtado much more seriously and, in fact,
unsuccessfully attempted to stab him two more times. The judge
acknowledged defendant had been intoxicated, but noted this did
16 A-5384-14T2
not stop him from remembering, retrieving, and using the knife in
his car.
The trial judge also stated: "I appreciate that Mr. Hurtado
has asked for leniency, that's important to the Court, and I
appreciate that [defendant] has expressed remorse. However, while
he apologized[,] he also minimized his responsibility." The trial
judge then sentenced defendant to seven years of incarceration
with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier.
Defendant argues the trial judge abused his discretion when
it imposed a seven-year prison sentence because (1) its findings
of both a need to deter defendant and that defendant was unlikely
to commit another offense were inconsistent, (2) it ignored the
video evidence that the victim provoked the attack relevant for
mitigating factors four and five, and (3) it ignored the
recommendation of the prosecutor and the victim that defendant
receive a lenient sentence.
We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the trial
judge should have determined that the victim was the aggressor
and, as a result, find mitigating factors four, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(b)(4) (substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the
defendant's conduct), and five, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(5) (victim of
defendant's conduct induced or facilitated its commission). It
is undisputed that Hurtado was unarmed. Pushing and shoving are
17 A-5384-14T2
inadequate provocations for initiating an assault with a deadly
weapon. See State v. Docaj, 407 N.J. Super. 352, 369 (App. Div.
2009) (noting, in a murder case in which defendant contended the
offense was a passion/provocation manslaughter, "Even in instances
of 'mutual combat,' the defendant's response must be proportionate
to the provocation." (citing State v. Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522, 536
(1991)).
Moreover, the judge acknowledged Hurtado pushed defendant and
that defendant's assault may have been in response. She found
that Hurtado's push was too weak to cause defendant to fall down,
notwithstanding his level of intoxication, and therefore
incomparable to defendant's violent retaliation. The
determination that mitigating factors four and five were not
applicable was supported by competent, credible evidence.
We also discern no irreconcilable conflict in finding both a
need to deter defendant and that defendant was unlikely to commit
another offense. Aggravating factor three evaluates a defendant's
overall risk and mitigating factor nine focuses narrowly on the
influence of the defendant's "character and attitude," in the
determination of risk. In this case, the court found all the
support given for defendant demonstrated this offense was "out of
character," but the evidence of his prior violent offense coupled
with details surrounding this present offense demonstrated a
18 A-5384-14T2
greater probability that defendant might commit another offense.
In other words, defendant might typically be a law-abiding person
but his character did not preclude him from engaging in behavior
that was both criminal and violent. Therefore, the sentencing
court's determination that the risk of defendant committing
another offense outweighed his character and attitude to avoid
such conduct was supported by competent, credible evidence.
Turning to the trial judge's decision not to sentence
defendant to a third-degree sentence, we note the bar is very high
for a defendant to obtain such relief. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)
provides:
[W]here the court is clearly convinced that
the mitigating factors substantially outweigh
the aggravating factors and where the interest
of justice demands, the court may sentence the
defendant to a term appropriate to a crime of
one degree lower than that of the crime for
which he was convicted.
[(Emphasis added).]
"The reasons justifying a downgrade must be 'compelling,' and
something in addition to and separate from, the mitigating factors
that substantially outweigh the aggravating factors." State v.
Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 384 (App. Div.) (quoting Megargel,
supra, 143 N.J. at 505), certif. denied, 212 N.J. 431 (2012).
However, "because the focus remains on the offense and not the
offender, the surrounding circumstances used as compelling reasons
19 A-5384-14T2
for a downgrade should arise from within the context of the offense
itself." State v. Lake, 408 N.J. Super. 313, 326 (App. Div. 2009)
(citing Megargel, supra, 143 N.J. at 500-01). Factors a court may
consider include "the degree of the crime [which] is the focus of
the sentence"; whether "[t]he surrounding circumstances of an
offense may make it very similar to a lower degree offense"; and
"facts personal to the defendant," including his "role in the
incident." Ibid. (quoting Megargel, supra, 143 N.J. at 500-01).
The offense here was a second-degree aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon. Defendant stabbed the victim just under his
armpit and attempted to stab him in the chest twice, circumstances
that do not "make [the offense] very similar to a lower degree
offense." Defendant's role in the offense was that he left an
altercation with an unarmed man to retrieve a weapon and return
to stab him repeatedly.
We therefore conclude the trial judge's determination that
the mitigating factors did not substantially outweigh the
aggravating factors and that there were no compelling reasons to
sentence defendant in the third-degree range was amply supported
by the record and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
20 A-5384-14T2