STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIAM S. SNEAD (15-10-1195, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2842-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM S. SNEAD,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted April 9, 2019 – Decided April 18, 2019
Before Judges Fisher and Geiger.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 15-10-1195.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Susan Lee Romeo, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Monica Anne Martini, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress
statements he made to police. He also poses questions about the sentence
imposed. We find no merit in defendant's arguments and affirm.
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder of one individual,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(2), and second-degree aggravated assault of another,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), as well as a number of weapons offenses. He moved
for suppression of statements he made to police, claiming he did not wai ve his
Miranda1 rights. After an evidentiary hearing at which only a police officer
testified, the judge denied the motion. Defendant later pleaded guilty to a single
count of second-degree aggravated manslaughter and was sentenced to a fifteen-
year prison term subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility
under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
Defendant appeals, arguing:
I. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT MUST BE
SUPPRESSED BECAUSE HIS SIGNED WAIVER OF
HIS RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA . . . WAS
OBTAINED THROUGH DECEPTIVE TACTICS
WHERE POLICE MISLEADINGLY TOLD HIM
THAT HIS SIGNATURE WAS MERELY
ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD
THE RIGHTS THAT THE POLICE PREVIOUSLY
HAD READ TO HIM, NOT THAT HE WAS
WAIVING THEM . . . .
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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II. DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE MUST BE
REVERSED AND THE MATTER REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
FAILED TO CONSIDER MITIGATING FACTORS
THAT WERE RAISED BY DEFENDANT AND
AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant discussion in a written
opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), adding only a few brief comments about Point I.
In his oral decision on the suppression motion, the judge thoroughly
explained why he found the only witness – a police detective – to be credible
and that, in making his findings, the judge "relied heavily" on the detective's
testimony. The judge also acknowledged that he watched the entirety of the
recorded interrogation multiple times.
The events that preceded the actual questioning of defendant were fully
explored at the hearing and in the judge's decision. As the detective
acknowledged, and as the video recording of the events reveal, the warnings and
explanations given by the officers did not occur as usual. Defendant contends
that the particular eliciting from defendant of his waiver of his rights
"undermined the entire concept of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver
of rights . . . [because] [t]he police obtained defendant's signed waiver -of-rights
with no awareness on defendant's part that that was what he was doing." In
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essence, the record reveals that some rights were read to defendant and he then
signed the waiver form when one of the officers reading the document to him
left the room without having read to defendant the waiver aspect of the form. In
short, defendant's complaint here is that he executed the waiver form before
knowing he had the right to waive his right to remain silent. But, as the judge
recognized in his oral decision, when the officer returned to the interrogation
room, she read to defendant what hadn't previously been read to him.
The judge acknowledged that "the manner in which the warnings were
presented was not ideal." The detective who testified at the hearing also
acknowledged this; the judge found this concession "enhance[d]" the detective's
credibility. And, after thoroughly reviewing and carefully considering the
circumstances, the judge concluded that, despite the irregularities, defendant
was given Miranda warnings, "which he acknowledged and waived." The judge
emphatically held that:
[N]otwithstanding the imperfect manner in which the
warnings were imparted in which the acknowledgement
and waiver were obtained, it is in fact clear to me, very
clear that the defendant was given the warning which is
required. That he acknowledged the warning,
understood the warning and ultimately waived his
rights. And that is . . . very clear, entirely clear to me.
....
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I've watched the entirety of the interrogation on more
than one occasion. There was no inappropriate
psychological technique used. There was no
inappropriate technique of any kind.
The defendant made no request for counsel in a clear or
even ambiguous way. The defendant did nothing which
could be construed in any way as an ambiguous
invocation of rights. There was never any need for
police to clarify whether the defendant was voluntarily
proceeding with the interrogation because it is entirely
clear that he was.
This was not a lengthy police interrogation. The
entirety of it from beginning to end consumed
approximately one and one half hours.
In short, my conclusion is that once the defendant
started talking, he kept talking. [H]e did so in a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary way. He was not
forced, threatened or coerced. His will was not
overborne in any way.
The defendant's demeanor on the video fully supports
this conclusion which I draw.
He was given his Miranda rights. He waived his
Miranda rights after indicating that he understood them
and then he proceeded to talk. And it really is that
[straight] forward.
Our review of such a determination is limited. We defer to a judge's
factual and credibility determinations when, as here, supported by evidence in
the record. State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 603 n.4 (2011). We, of course, do not
defer to legal determinations, but, having considered defendant's argument about
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the order in which things were read and the waiver was obtained, we conclude
that the police action here did not warrant a different outcome. It is enough, as
the judge correctly held, that defendant understood his rights and voluntarily
waived those rights. In deferring to the judge's findings based on his observation
of the witness at the hearing and his review of the video recording of the
interrogation, we find no reason to intervene. See also State v. Davila, 203 N.J.
97, 109-10 (2010); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). We affirm
substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Peter E. Warshaw, Jr.'s oral
decision.
Affirmed.
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