STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BRET A. HENDERSON (16-04-0355, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0936-17T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRET A. HENDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted March 11, 2019 – Decided April 18, 2019
Before Judges Messano and Fasciale.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Gloucester County, Indictment No. 16-04-
0355.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, on
the briefs).
Charles A. Fiore, Gloucester County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Dana R. Anton, Senior
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
A Gloucester County grand jury charged defendant Bret Henderson with
second-degree aggravated arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)(2), and third-degree
aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(8). Before turning to defendant's
specific arguments, we briefly review the evidence at trial.
I.
The State contended that defendant's history with his estranged wife, J.B.,
was the motive for setting fire to what had been the couple's marital home.
During colloquy before trial, the prosecutor indicated his intent to introduce
evidence of the frayed relationship, including the parties' appearance in Family
Court two days before the fire, during which the judge awarded J.B. possession
of the house. Without conducting a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing or analysis under State
v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992), the judge ruled the evidence was
admissible, as well as "any threats [defendant] made to burn the car and house,"
finding the evidence was relevant to "motive or . . . intent."
Before the jury, the evidence revealed that in the morning of June 14,
2015, emergency personnel responded to defendant's home, which was ablaze.
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Three hours later, the fire was suppressed, but the home was in ruin. One of the
firefighters received serious burns to his neck that required medical treatment.1
A subsequent investigation revealed that the fire was "set" with two points
of origin, suggesting arson. Additionally, videos recovered from a camera
mounted on a neighboring home, and security camera footage from a nearby gas
station, depicted a man who shared defendant's physical characteristics walking
down the street toward the gas station, using a gas pump, and returning toward
the home.
Because the State did not provide discovery regarding any out-of-court
identification of the man depicted in the video, defendant moved to exclude any
identification of the person in the video by a State's witness. The judge granted
the motion, holding:
The witness[es] . . . cannot place themselves in the
shoes of being the finder of fact. It's up to the jury to
determine whether that is . . . defendant in the video, so
I am going to grant [defendant's] [m]otion to [s]uppress
the identification of . . . defendant from the video.
In other words, they can't look at the video and
say I know who that is.
1
This firefighter was the victim in the aggravated assault count of the
indictment.
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Despite this order, the investigating detective called by the State as a
witness testified that he secured the videos and was "able to see . . . defendant
on two separate – –[.]" Defense counsel immediately objected, and at sidebar,
moved for a mistrial. The judge denied the motion, but required the State to
reconfirm with its witnesses that they were not permitted to identify defendant
in the video. The judge issued the following curative instruction to the jury:
[Y]ou're to disregard the detective's inference as to
who's in the video. You will be given an opportunity
to see the video and the jury has the responsibility of
making the findings of fact[] in order to be able to
determine who's in that video. That's up to you. You
are the finders of fact.
J.B. testified about her tense domestic history with defendant, including a
prior threat defendant made that "he would set the truck on fire and drive it
through the house." J.B. vacated the house prior to the fire, and, on cross-
examination, defense counsel questioned J.B. whether she paid the gas bill for
the house. Apparently, the non-payment of the bill resulted in defendant being
unable to switch the service into his name.
Before re-direct, at sidebar, the judge permitted the State, over defendant's
objection, to question J.B. about her nonpayment of the bill. Both sides
acknowledged that the questioning would likely elicit evidence of specific acts
by defendant. Without any Cofield or N.J.R.E. 104 analysis, the judge permitted
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the questions "to rebut why this particular bill wasn't changed . . . because it's
been brought out before the jury." J.B. then testified that she did not pay the
bill because defendant would "turn the heat all the way up and leave the windows
wide open. And he would turn the oven on high, with the door open, just
running. So you'd walk into a sweltering house with the windows wide open."
During summation the prosecutor suggested that based on defendant's
height and body type, "there [was] reason to believe that the individual in the
video is . . . defendant." There was no objection.
The jury convicted defendant of the lesser-included offense of third-
degree arson, N.J.S.A 2C:17-1(b)(2), and aggravated assault. The judge
sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of four-years' imprisonment.
On appeal defendant asserts the following:
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT A
MISTRIAL, WHEN THE POLICE OFFICER
IDENTIFIED DEFENDANT AS THE MAN
APPEARING ON SURVEILLANCE VIDEO
DURING HIS TESTIMONY CONTRARY TO THE
COURT'S RULING THIS [SIC] OUT-OF-COURT
IDENTIFICATION WAS INADMISSIBLE [AND]
DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL.
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POINT II
THE PROSECUTOR'S IDENTIFICATION OF
DEFENDANT AS THE MAN IN THE VIDEO IN
SUMMATION FOLLOWING THE POLICE
OFFICER'S IMPROPER OUT-OF-COURT
IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT BEFORE THE
JURY [WAS] IN VIOLATION OF THE COURT'S
RULING [AND] DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A
FAIR TRIAL. (Not Raised Below)
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF N.J.R.E.
404(B) EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ALLEGED
THREATS BY DEFENDANT AND DEFENDANT
LEAVING THE HEAT AND STOVE TURNED ON
TO DRIVE UP GAS BILLS WAS ERRONEOUS,
UNSUPPORTED BY AN ADEQUATE LIMITING
INSTRUCTION[] AND DEPRIVED DEFENDANT
OF A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT IV
THE FOUR-YEAR SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS
MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND AN ABUSE OF
THE LOWER COURT'S DISCRETION.
Having considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal
standards, we affirm.
II.
Motions for mistrial are "addressed to the sound discretion of the [trial]
court; and the denial of the motion is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion."
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State v. Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. 490, 503 (App. Div. 2019) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 647 (1984)). "The same
deferential standard that applies to the mistrial-or-no-mistrial decision applies
to review of the curative instruction itself." Ibid. (citing Winter, 96 N.J. at 647).
An abuse of discretion will only be found when the judge denies the mistrial and
provides an instruction when "the vice is plainly ineradicable by an instruction
to the jury . . . ." Winter, 96 N.J. at 647.
In Herbert, we identified three factors to assist our review of the trial
court's decision to issue a curative instruction instead of granting a motion for a
mistrial or new trial. 457 N.J. Super. at 505-08. First, we consider "the nature
of the inadmissible evidence the jury heard, and its prejudicial effect" because
"[e]vidence that bears directly on the ultimate issue . . . may be less suitable to
curative . . . instructions than evidence that is indirect . . . ." Id. at 505. However,
the Court has said that even highly prejudicial evidence, like an expert opining
about the defendant's guilt, is amenable to a curative instruction. See State v.
Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 614 (2000) (holding that the expert psychologist's
opinion that defendant was guilty was cured by a swift, firm, and specific jury
instruction).
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Second, we examine the "timing and substance" of the curative
instruction, with prompt, firm, and specific instructions being preferred.
Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. at 505-06. A curative instruction will generally "pass
muster" so long as it is "firm, clear, and accomplished without delay." State v.
Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 134-36 (2009) (citing numerous cases where swift, firm,
and clear instructions cured the prejudice of inadmissible testimony).
Third, we explore whether there is "tolerance for the risk of imperfect
compliance[,]" essentially determining whether the inadmissible evidence had a
real possibility to lead the jury astray, akin to our reversible error analysis.
Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. at 507-08 (citing Winter, 96 N.J. at 647-48).
Here, the State's witness inadmissibly testified to observing defendant in
the videos. However, while identification was certainly an important contested
fact, the judge's curative instruction has indicia of effectiveness. She issued it
immediately, informed the jurors to reject the detective's identification, and
reaffirmed the jury's role, as finders of fact, to decide for themselves whether
defendant was, in fact, the man depicted in the videos. Accordingly, the judge's
decision to deny the motion for mistrial and instead issue a curative instruction
was a sound exercise of her discretion.
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Defendant's argument in Point II lacks sufficient merit to warrant
extensive discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Prosecutors are permitted to make
passionate and forceful presentations to jurors, constrained by the evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80,
96 (2004). Here, the prosecutor's statement urging the jurors to conclude
defendant appeared in the video was a legitimate comment on the evidence and
a reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. Moreover, the absence of any
objection suggests the statement was not overtly inappropriate or inflammatory.
See State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 86-87 (1998). We find no reversible error.
III.
"A trial court ruling on the admissibility of other-crimes evidence is a
discretionary matter that receives 'great deference' and is reversible only if
clearly erroneous." State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 149 (2014) (quoting State v.
Gillispie, 208 N.J. 59, 84 (2011)). However, when the court does not engage in
a Cofield analysis, we conduct plenary review to determine admissibility. State
v. Barden, 195 N.J. 375, 391 (2008) (citing State v. Lykes, 192 N.J. 519, 534
(2007)).
Cofield provides that to be admissible, N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence must be:
(1) "relevant to a material issue"; (2) "similar in kind and reasonably close in
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time" to the instant offense; (3) "clear and convincing"; and (4) its prejudice
does not outweigh its probative value. 127 N.J. at 338. Defendant's threat to
"set the truck on fire and drive it through the house" satisfies the first prong as
it is highly probative of motive and intent. See State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 162
(2011). The second prong is not always applicable, State v. P.S., 202 N.J. 232,
255 n.4 (2010) (quoting State v. Williams, 190 N.J 114, 131 (2007)), but here
the threatened conduct implied arson and was temporally proximate, since it was
made approximately one month before the fire. Although the judge failed to
conduct an evidentiary hearing before trial, J.B.'s testimony at trial about the
threat was subject to cross-examination, such that "the surrounding
circumstances adequately support that the third prong of Cofield was satisfied."
Rose, 206 N.J. at 163. Finally, the statement, while prejudicial, is highly
probative. Therefore, the admission of evidence of defendant's prior threat was
proper.
However, evidence of defendant's practice of leaving the stove on was
irrelevant to any material issue in the case, and therefore, its obvious prejudice
outweighed its non-existent probative value. The judge permitted the evidence
by reasoning it was appropriate to rebut questions posed during cross-
examination, i.e., that defense counsel had opened the door.
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However, that doctrine is "a rule of expanded relevancy and authorizes
admitting evidence which otherwise would have been irrelevant and
inadmissible in order to respond to (1) admissible evidence that generates an
issue, or (2) inadmissible evidence admitted by the court over objection ." State
v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 582 (2018) (quoting State v. James, 144 N.J. 538, 554
(1996)). The doctrine does not give the State carte blanche to introduce N.J.R.E.
404(b) evidence and admission of such evidence is still subject to a balancing
under N.J.R.E. 403. Id. at 583 (citing James, 144 N.J. at 554). For example,
entering irrelevant evidence under the doctrine for the narro w purpose of
bolstering a witness's credibility "does not satisfy the relevancy element of the
Cofield test." Ibid. (citing State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496, 520 (2014)).
Here, the State sought to "explain why [defendant's wife] was behind [o]n
her gas bill." The evidence was irrelevant, except to rehabilitate the witness,
while its prejudicial character was obvious, given the nature of the charge. Its
admission was a mistaken exercise of the judge's discretion, but it does not
require reversal.
Not every admission at trial of inadmissible evidence is reversible error.
Vallejo, 198 N.J. at 132. "[T]o warrant reversal of defendant's conviction, those
errors, singly or collectively, must 'raise a reasonable doubt' as to whether they
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affected the result reached by the jury." Prall, 231 N.J. at 588 (quoting State v.
Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)). "Also, '[t]he error[s] must be evaluated in
light of the overall strength of the State's case.'" Ibid. (alterations in original)
(quoting State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 468 (2018)).
Here, evidence about defendant leaving the stove and heat on to drive up
J.B.'s energy bills was irrelevant. However, it was introduced on re-direct after
defense counsel had posed questions about the subject during cross-
examination. As a result, its admission in this context limited the evidence's
prejudicial nature. Given the overall strength of the State's case, we find no
basis to reverse.
IV.
At sentencing, the judge found aggravating factors one, two, three, six,
eight, and nine. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) ("[t]he nature and circumstances of
the offense, . . . including whether . . . it was committed in an especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved manner"); (a)(2) (gravity and seriousness of the offense);
(a)(3) (risk of re-offense); (a)(6) (the extent of defendant prior criminal record);
(a)(8) (defendant committed the offense against a "fireman"); and (a)(9) (the
need to deter). She also found mitigating factors ten and eleven. See N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(b)(10) (defendant would likely respond to probation); and (b)(11)
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(imprisonment would impose hardship to defendant or his family). The judge
gave moderate weight to aggravating factor one, finding the circumstances were
exceptionally cruel or depraved because the possessions of defendant's children
were destroyed by the fire.
Defendant contends that the sentence is excessive because the judge
misapplied aggravating factor one by "double-counting" an element of arson.
See N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(b)(2) (defining elements of arson as "purposely start[ing]
a fire . . . [t]hereby recklessly placing a building or structure . . . in danger of
damage or destruction"). We disagree and affirm the sentence.
Our review of a sentence "is relatively narrow and is governed by an abuse
of discretion standard." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010) (citing
State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 401 (1989)). Generally, we only determine
whether:
(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the
aggravating and mitigating factors found by the
sentencing court were not based upon competent and
credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application
of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the
sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the
judicial conscience."
[State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65,
(1984)).]
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"Elements of a crime, including those that establish its grade, may not be
used as aggravating factors for sentencing of that particular crime [,]" State v.
Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 608 (2013), because that would lead to impermissible
double-counting. State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 353 (2000). However, a
court "does not engage in double-counting when it considers facts showing
defendant did more than the minimum the State is required to prove to establish
the elements of an offense." State v. A.T.C., 454 N.J. Super. 235, 254-55 (App.
Div. 2018) (citing Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 75).
Here, the judge noted that defendant victimized his own children in
addition to the intended victim, J.B. While the offense implicates the setting of
a fire and destruction of property, the emotional impact inflicted on unintended
victims elevated the circumstance beyond what the State was required to prove.
Moreover, the judge only accorded factor one "moderate weight." And,
there was substantial evidence in the record supporting her findings regarding
the other aggravating factors, including defendant's extensive prior record. The
judge imposed a sentence that was in the middle of the authorized sentencing
range for a third-degree crime, and she imposed a concurrent sentence on
defendant's other conviction. In short, there is nothing excessive about this
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sentence, and, even if the judge's finding as to aggravating factor one was
erroneous, the sentence does not shock our judicial conscience.
Affirmed.
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