SELECTIVE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION VS. GUSSCO MANUFACTURING, LLC DIRECT COAST TO COAST, LLC VS. GUSSCO MANUFACTURING, LLC (L-8013-12, L-8018-12 AND J-198852-13, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4233-16T1
    SELECTIVE TRANSPORATION
    CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    GUSSCO MANUFACTURING LLC and
    SELCO INDUSTRIES, INC.,
    Defendants.
    ______________________________
    DIRECT COAST TO COAST, LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    GUSSCO MANUFACTURING LLC and
    SELCO INDUSTRIES, INC.,
    Defendants.
    ______________________________
    Argued May 30, 2018 – Decided June 26, 2018
    Before Judges Manahan and Suter.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket Nos.
    L-8013-12, L-8018-12, and J-198852-13.
    Ronald W. Horowitz        argued    the    cause    for
    appellants.
    Raymond G. Chow argued the cause for
    respondent   S.P.  Richards   (Breuninger &
    Fellman, attorneys; Susan B. Fellman, of
    counsel; Raymond G. Chow, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Selective Transportation Corporation and Direct Coast to
    Coast, LLC (collectively, Selective) appeal from a January 20,
    2017 order of the trial court quashing a subpoena duces tecum
    dated December 16, 2016.       Selective also appeals from an April 28,
    2017 order requiring non-party respondent S.P. Richards Company
    (SPR) to pay Selective a calculated sum of all debts owed to
    defendant Selco Industries, Inc. (Selco) by SPR.1 Given the motion
    judge's failure to provide the requisite statement of reasons with
    the order per Rule 1:7-4(a), we reverse and remand.                  Estate of
    Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2018)
    (slip op. at 4-5).
    We   recite   a   brief   summary   of   the    underlying      facts   and
    procedural history for the purpose of context.                On December 3,
    2012, Selective filed a complaint in the Superior Court, Law
    1
    Had we addressed the merits of the appeal we would have
    considered this argument to be abandoned.    Plaintiffs have not
    briefed this point.    Grubb v. Borough of Hightstown, 
    353 N.J. Super. 333
    , 342 n.1 (App. Div. 2002) (explaining that an issue
    raised in notice of appeal but not briefed is abandoned).
    2                                  A-4233-16T1
    Division against shippers and affiliated former customers Gussco
    Manufacturing, LLC (Gussco) and Selco and others for unpaid freight
    transportation charges.       Direct       Coast to Coast, LLC filed a
    separate action against Gussco and Selco, which was consolidated
    with the Selective claims by consent order on April 11, 2013.
    Thereafter,   by   consent   order,       Selective   obtained   a   judgment
    against Selco in the amount of $229,615.35.           Per the terms of the
    order, the judgment was stayed pending full compliance with the
    terms of the order, which included a payment schedule for Selco
    to satisfy the judgment.      If Selco failed to make a full timely
    payment, the stay was to be deemed vacated and Selective would be
    able to execute the judgment and join other defendants allegedly
    liable for the subject freight transportation services provided
    by Selco.
    In October 2013, Selective filed an amended complaint adding
    SPR as a non-party.      A month later, Selco defaulted under the
    terms of the consent order.       In December 2013, Selco filed for
    Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.
    In an attempt to execute the judgment, Selective served an
    information subpoena on SPR to determine what monies SPR owed to
    Selco.   After SPR refused to comply with the subpoena and after
    efforts to reach a settlement failed, SPR was dismissed from the
    action with prejudice by stipulation of the parties.
    3                               A-4233-16T1
    After Selco's bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed in 2016,
    Selective resumed execution proceedings of the 2013 consent order.
    On October 19, 2016, Selective again served SPR with an information
    subpoena.     Due to SPR's failure to respond to the subpoena,
    Selective filed a motion in aid of execution.             The motion was
    premised upon Selective's purported discovery of documents that
    demonstrated that the amount owed by SPR to Selco was $245,053.69.
    SPR eventually responded to the subpoena by stating that it
    currently owed Selco $10,507.43.
    On December 16, 2016, the court denied the motion in aid of
    execution for failure to comply with Rule 6:7-2.          Selective then
    served a subpoena duces tecum to SPR, seeking "[a]ll documents
    concerning Selco Industries, Inc., . . . including, but not limited
    to,   all   invoices,   cancelled   checks,   wire   transfers,   purchase
    orders, e-mails, correspondence, and facsimiles for the last five
    years of business with Selco Industries, Inc." SPR moved to quash,
    which the court granted without a providing a statement of reasons.
    This appeal followed.
    On appeal, Selective raises the following point:
    [POINT I]
    THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY QUASHED PLAINTIFFS'
    SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM WITHOUT ANY REASON.
    4                             A-4233-16T1
    Selective argues the court erred in failing to attach a
    statement of reasons to the order quashing the subpoena, per Rule
    1:7-4(a).   We agree.
    No one — not the parties and not this court — can properly
    function or proceed without some understanding of why a judge has
    rendered a particular ruling.       The Supreme Court said in Curtis
    v. Finneran, 
    83 N.J. 563
    , 569-70 (1980) (quoting Kenwood Assocs.
    v. Bd. of Adjustment, Englewood, 
    141 N.J. Super. 1
    , 4 (App. Div.
    1976)), that the absence of an adequate expression of a trial
    judge's rationale "constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the
    attorneys and the appellate court."       And this admonition has been
    repeated time and again.       Gnall v. Gnall, 
    222 N.J. 414
    , 428
    (2015); Estate   of     Doerfler,       N.J.   Super. at    ; State     v.
    Lawrence, 
    445 N.J. Super. 270
    , 276-77 (App. Div. 2016); Raspantini
    v. Arocho, 
    364 N.J. Super. 528
    , 533 (App. Div. 2003); In re
    Farnkopf, 
    363 N.J. Super. 382
    , 390 (App. Div. 2003); T.M. v. J.C.,
    
    348 N.J. Super. 101
    , 106-07 (App. Div. 2002).           The parties and
    this court are entitled to the judge's reasons for entering the
    orders under review.      We should not be put in the position of
    guessing or assuming what the judge might have been thinking.           As
    Judge Fuentes said last month in Estate of Doerfler, "our function
    as an appellate court is to review the decision of the trial court,
    not to decide the motion tabula rasa."         ___ N.J. Super. at ___.
    5                            A-4233-16T1
    Here, there is nothing in the order under review demonstrating
    indicative that the judge made an independent decision based upon
    an analysis of the facts and applicable law.         Thus, we are
    constrained to remand.     Given our determination, we have not
    addressed the merits of the substantive issues raised on appeal.
    Remanded.   We do not retain jurisdiction.
    6                           A-4233-16T1