IN THE MATTER OF BETTY GENE JOHNSON-TAYLOR (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3069-16T3
IN THE MATTER OF BETTY
GENE JOHNSON-TAYLOR.
Submitted December 12, 2018 – Decided February 26, 2019
Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.
On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket No. 2015-2424.
Betty Gene Johnson-Taylor, appellant pro se.
Law Office of Steven S. Glickman, attorneys for
respondent City of Paterson (Steven S. Glickman, of
counsel and on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission
(Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney General, on the
statement in lieu of brief).
PER CURIAM
Betty Gene Johnson-Taylor appeals the Civil Service Commission
February 8, 2017 final decision terminating her from employment with the City
of Paterson. We affirm.
A January 16, 2015 final notice of disciplinary action (FNDA) removed
Johnson-Taylor from her position as an assistant personnel director for the City
effective January 16, 2015. The grounds were violations of N.J.A.C.
4A:2-2.3(a)(6) and (12), conduct unbecoming a public employee and other
sufficient cause.
Johnson-Taylor misrepresented her income on an application for the
Home Paterson Pride Rehabilitation Program (HOME). At the time she filed,
she was earning $52,811 annually and resided with her nephew. The HOME
booklet listed the income maximum for a household of two at $53,750.
On July 13, 2010, Johnson-Taylor's income increased to $80,340 annually
because she was appointed acting director of personnel. In that capacity, her
duties included, as the Commission found, "the handling of personnel and
employee relations problems and [functioning] as a liaison between the
appointing authority and the Commission in personnel matters, including
appointments, promotions, transfers, demotions, dismissals and disciplinary
matters." As the Commission also found, her falsification of the loan documents
made it impossible for the appointing authority "to continue to trust her ability
to do her job, which involves sensitive and confidential personnel matters."
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Johnson-Taylor signed an affidavit on December 1, 2010, falsely
verifying her income at $53,868.12. HOME loan proceeds were disbursed a few
days later. She was required to verify her income every six months while the
loan was pending. At no time did she disclose her promotion and the salary
increase.
Additional circumstances bear at least brief mention. They did not result
in formal disciplinary action, only Johnson-Taylor's transfer back or demotion
to assistant personnel director from acting personnel director. In 2011, after
investigation, the City determined that Johnson-Taylor had authorized overtime
payments to City employees without proper documentation. She herself
received such payments, totaling $11,549.12 from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011,
and $3326.29 from July 1, 2011 to December 15, 2011.
The Commission adopted the factual findings of the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ), but did not adopt the ALJ's recommendation that the removal be
modified to a six-month suspension. The Commission instead upheld the FNDA
sanction of termination from City employment.
The Commission did not consider progressive discipline, as defined
beginning with West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962), to be appropriate
given the nature of Johnson-Taylor's conduct. Johnson-Taylor signed loan
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documents with full knowledge of the contents, falsifying an application for loan
proceeds. The HOME program was administered by her employer and was
intended to assist those with limited income. Therefore the Commission
concluded the penalty of removal was "appropriate notwithstanding a largely
unblemished prior record."
The Commission also noted that although the appointing authority itself
bore some responsibility since it drafted the loan documents, clearly Johnson-
Taylor "knew her income exceeded the threshold for the grant." That she was
not criminally charged because of the incident, and that the conduct did not
relate directly to her job description was irrelevant. Her role with the appointing
authority made it impossible for her to continue. Furthermore, she could not
properly act as the liaison between Paterson and the Commission in personnel
matters.
Now on appeal, Johnson-Taylor asserts the following points of error:
1. THE FINAL ACTION OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION WAS "ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE" BASED
UPON THE FACTS SET FORTH IN THE RECORD.
2. THE FINAL DECISION OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION IS "SHOCKING" TO
ONE'S SENSE OF FAIRNESS AS THE
PUNISHMENT IS DIS[PROPORTIONATE] TO THE
OFFENSE.
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We consider Johnson-Taylor's arguments to be so lacking in merit as to not
warrant much discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
In order for us to disturb an agency's final action, it must be found to have
been arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or lack fair support in the record as a
whole. Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998). A strong
presumption of reasonableness attaches to final agency decisions. In re Carroll,
339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001).
In essence, Johnson-Taylor's challenge to the Commission's action is not
that the falsification of the loan application did not occur—rather, it is that the
appointing authority was implicated in the process, and that principles of
progressive discipline should be applied. The Commission's findings are
supported by the record, however. See In re Galloway Twp. & Bridgeton, 418
N.J. Super. 94, 103 (App. Div. 2011). The agency's observations regarding the
sensitivity of Johnson-Taylor's position with the appointing authority, including
interaction with the Commission itself in employee matters, are entitled to great
deference. An employee in that position cannot continue after the
misrepresentation of income involved in the falsification of documents. We are
satisfied that the Commission's findings are not clearly mistaken, nor are they
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so "plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and
correction." Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 169 N.J. 579, 587-88 (2001).
Affirmed.
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