STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAMON WILLIAMS (14-12-3823, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0517-17T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAMON WILLIAMS, a/k/a
DANEN WILLIAMS, DAVID
BOWMAN, and DAMON
BAILEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted September 9, 2019 – Decided September 19, 2019
Before Judges Moynihan and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 14-12-3823.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Nancy Philion Scharff,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Appellant filed pro se supplemental briefs.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Damon Williams appeals his conviction of second-degree
robbery pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:15.1(a). Defendant also appeals the trial court's
imposition of an extended sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). Having
reviewed the record in light of the applicable legal principles, we affirm.
At approximately 9:40 a.m. on August 13, 2014, defendant, 1 carrying a
white bag and wearing a sweatshirt, dark pants, a blue New York Giants hat and
aviator sunglasses, entered the lobby of the Bank of America branch in
Merchantville, New Jersey. Defendant approached the window of teller Maria
Cervantes, bent down until the two were at eye level, and leaned close to the
bars of the cage separating the teller from the customers. Defendant passed
Cervantes a note reading, "Please, all the money, 100, 50, 20, 10. Thank you."
Defendant did not brandish or threaten the use of any weapon, nor did he make
any verbal threat of violence if Cervantes did not comply with his request.
1
Defendant made an argument below that he had an alibi for the time of the
offense; however, he has not raised the issue on appeal and we therefore consider
that issue waived. See In re Bloomingdale Convalescent Ctr., 233 N.J. Super.
46, 48 n.1, (App. Div. 1989) (citing Kelly v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev.
Com., 172 N.J. Super. 223, 228 n.1 (App. Div. 1980)). Indeed, on appeal
defendant does not seriously dispute that he was the person who commi tted the
offense.
A-0517-17T4
2
Cervantes opened her cash drawer and gave the man approximately $4600.
When Cervantes tried to include a pack of $20 bills containing a GPS tracker,
which would trigger an alarm, the man motioned for her not to do that. The man
then left the bank at 9:44 a.m. According to Cowgill, another bank teller who
was present that day, Cervantes was crying and shaking when the man left.
Cowgill subsequently triggered the alarm.
After a trial, the jury convicted defendant of second-degree robbery. The
trial court granted the State's motion to impose an extended term of
imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), and sentenced defendant to an
extended term of fourteen years, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2 (NERA). This appeal ensued.
On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments for our review:
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
ON THE SECOND[-]DEGREE ROBBERY CHARGE
POINT TWO
A MISLEADING JURY INSTRUCTION AND VERDICT SHEET ON
SECOND[-]DEGREE ROBBERY DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL
(Not Raised Below)
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE
DEFENDANT'S D-6, WHICH WAS OFFERED TO ILLUSTRATE A
A-0517-17T4
3
PROPERLY PREPARED FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS SHEET WAS ERROR
WHICH UNDULY PREJUDICED THE DEFENSE 2
POINT FOUR
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS AND USE OF A PHOTOGRAPH
NOT IN EVIDENCE DURING SUMMATION DENIED DEFENDANT A
FAIR TRIAL
POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF AN EXTENDED TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHICH RESULTED
IN AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE
We will address each of these issues in turn.
Denial of defendant's motion for acquittal
Defendant argues that because he did not brandish or threaten the use of a
weapon, and because he did not overtly threaten the bank teller with any injury
if she did not accede to his demands, he "engaged in no demonstration or threat
as to create a reasonable apprehension on the part of the teller." Accordingly,
defendant argues, no reasonable jury could find him guilty of the elements of
robbery, and the trial court erred by denying his motion for acquittal at the end
of the State's case. We disagree.
We review the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. State v.
Dekowski, 218 N.J. 596, 608 (2014).
2
Defendant filed a supplemental pro se brief that largely reiterates and expands
upon his objection to the fingerprint analysis.
A-0517-17T4
4
At the close of the State's case or after the evidence of
all parties has been closed, the court shall, on
defendant's motion or its own initiative, order the entry
of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses
charged in the indictment or accusation if the evidence
is insufficient to warrant a conviction.
[R. 3:18-1.]
The standard for such a motion is as follows:
[T]he broad test for determination of such an
application is whether the evidence at that point is
sufficient to warrant a conviction of the charge
involved. More specifically, the question the trial judge
must determine is whether, viewing the State's evidence
in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial,
and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable
testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences
which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a
reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.
[State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967) (citations
omitted).]
See also State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 406 (2008).
"In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is
whether 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 8 (1990)
(quoting State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587, 592 (1979)). "[T]he trial judge is not
concerned with the worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence,
A-0517-17T4
5
but only with its existence, viewed most favorably to the State." State v. Kluber,
130 N.J. Super. 336, 342 (App. Div. 1974) (citation omitted).
Robbery is a second-degree crime, and
[a] person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of
committing a theft, he: (1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses
force upon another; or (2) Threatens another with or
purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury;
or (3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit any
crime of the first or second degree.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a); State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444,
459 (2009) (emphasis omitted).]
When the theory of robbery is based on a threat or "purposely put[ting
another] in fear of immediate bodily injury," N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2), the
"'totality of the circumstances must be considered in determining if defendant's
purpose was to put the victim in fear of immediate bodily injury. In making this
determination, '[t]he focus . . . is on the conduct of the accused, rather than on
the characteristics of the victim.'" State v. Zembreski, 445 N.J. Super. 412, 433
(App. Div. 2016) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). "To be sure, no
special words and/or conduct are required to make out a threat or to purposely
put someone in fear of immediate bodily injury . . . ." State v. Smalls, 310 N.J.
Super. 285, 292 (App. Div. 1998).
A-0517-17T4
6
The State's theory of the robbery at trial was that defendant purposely put
Maria Cervantes, the teller who gave defendant the money, in fear of immediate
bodily injury. Both Cervantes and Cowgill testified that defendant walked up
to Cervantes' station very quickly, bent down and leaned in very close to the
cage separating the teller from customers. Cervantes specifically testified that
defendant was "in her space" and that she was very frightened and nervous
during the incident. Although defendant did not overtly verbally threaten
Cervantes with any consequence if she did not comply with his demand for cash,
he did pass her a note demanding money. Cowgill confirmed Cervantes'
account, and testified that Cervantes was crying and shaking after defendant left.
Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances presented at
trial, a rational fact finder could conclude that defendant's proximity to
Cervantes, his haste in entering Cervantes' teller station, his leaning down and
pressing his face very close to the bars of the cage, and his demand for money
from a bank teller, would have reasonably put her, or any reasonable bank teller,
in fear of immediate bodily injury. See Martin, 119 N.J. at 8. In that regard,
Cervantes had no reason to know what defendant would do if she simply said
"no thank you" and declined defendant's "request." It was reasonable under the
circumstances for a teller in Cervantes' position to fear that if she refused,
A-0517-17T4
7
defendant may well have had a weapon on him even if he did not brandish one.
Accordingly, a rational fact finder would have been able to, and did, conclude
that defendant's actions amounted to robbery. See Zembreski, 445 N.J. Super.
at 433. The trial court thus correctly denied defendant's motion for acquittal.
Jury charge on robbery
Defendant argues, for the first time on appeal, that the trial court
erroneously allowed the State to "include[] in the robbery jury instruction and
on the verdict sheet, the options to convict [d]efendant of robbery based upon
the knowing infliction of bodily injury, or the use of force against" the bank
teller. Defendant contends this was an error because the State based its theory
of the robbery on defendant's purposeful placing the bank teller in fear of
immediate bodily injury.
At the outset, generally "issues not raised below will . . . not be considered
on appeal unless they are jurisdictional in nature or substantially implicate the
public interest." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328,
339 (2010) (citation omitted). However, "appellate court[s] may, in the interests
of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate
court[,]" if "it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing
an unjust result . . . ." R. 2:10-2. "The mere possibility of an unjust result is not
A-0517-17T4
8
enough" to find plain error. State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016). The
possibility of an unjust result must be "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as
to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached."
State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1, 18-19 (1974); see also State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325,
335 (1971) ("No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error
is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility tha t it led
to an unjust verdict.").
"'Appropriate and proper charges to a jury are essential to a fair trial.' And
proper explanation of the elements of a crime is especially crucial to the
satisfaction of a criminal defendant's due process rights." State v. Burgess, 154
N.J. 181, 185 (1998) (citations omitted).
It is the independent duty of the court to ensure that the
jurors receive accurate instructions on the law as it
pertains to the facts and issues of each case, irrespective
of the particular language suggested by either party.
Finally, "[a]s an indication of the paramount
importance of accurate jury instructions, we have held
that erroneous instructions on material issues are
presumed to be reversible error."
[State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 613 (2004) (citations
omitted).]
In this case, not only did defendant fail to object to the jury instructions,
but his counsel affirmatively stated that he was "satisfied" with the instructions.
A-0517-17T4
9
Beyond this, however, the trial court used language from the model jury
instructions, which indisputably was an accurate charge on the elements of
robbery. See Reddish, 181 N.J. at 613. Although the trial court also charged
the jury on the alternative bases to convict, the charge included the language
concerning purposely placing the teller in fear of immediate bodily harm, which
was very plainly the State's theory at trial. We thus conclude that there was no
error, let alone plain error, in the trial court's jury charge instruction to the jury
on robbery. See M.C. III, 201 N.J. at 339.
Denial of the admission of defendant's exhibit D-6.
We also reject defendant's argument that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to admit defendant's exhibit D-6 because it would have
shown the jury that the fingerprint analysis was not properly conducted in this
case.
Crime Scene Unit Detective Victoria Fallon collected the note requesting
money, examined it for fingerprints, and found six latent fingerprints on the
note. All of the latent prints were partial prints, and three of them were usable.
Detective Fallon sent the fingerprints to the Camden County Sheriff's
Department to be submitted to the Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(AFIS). At the Sheriff's Department, Record Support Technician Sheryl
A-0517-17T4
10
Klemowitz processed the fingerprints through AFIS on August 27, 2014. AFIS
linked one of the fingerprints to defendant.
Klemowitz made the fingerprint comparison on October 27, 2014.
Detective Fallon was present when she made the comparison, and Fallon took
the evidence back with her that same day when the comparison was complete.
Klemowitz matched one of the latent prints from the note to defendant's left
thumb print, but she was not sure how many points of comparison she found .
On cross-examination, Klemowitz admitted that verification of her
fingerprint analyses is an important part of the process, but that, although the
name of the verifier is supposed to be documented, she did not do so in this case.
Defendant offered D-6,3 an exhibit from an unrelated case, as an example of the
proper way to complete the documents. The trial court ruled that the exhibit was
inadmissible as unrelated and therefore irrelevant.
An appellate court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 31 (2007). Thus, an appellate
court will not disturb a trial court's evidentiary rulings unless they are "so wide
off the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted." Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins.
Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999) (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982)).
3
At the suppression hearing, this exhibit was labeled "D-5."
A-0517-17T4
11
However, an appellate court will review questions of law de novo. Balsamides
v. Protameen Chems., 160 N.J. 352, 372 (1999).
Trial errors that were brought to the attention of the court are reviewed
for harmful error. State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 86 (2016) (citations
omitted). "Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court
unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an
unjust result . . . ." R. 2:10-2. Thus, if a trial court is found to have abused its
discretion, or otherwise erred, the appellate court must then determine whether
that error amounted to harmful error, provided the alleged error was brought to
the trial court's attention. See State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 581 (2018) ("Our
review of the evidentiary determinations cannot end our analysis when we find
an abuse of discretion; rather, we must then determine whether any error found
is harmless or requires reversal.").
Except in certain circumstances, relevant evidence, which is "evidence
having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the
determination of the action[,]" is admissible. N.J.R.E. 401, 402. See also State
v. Castagna, 400 N.J. Super. 164, 174 (App. Div. 2008). The evidence must be
probative of a fact that is "really in issue in the case[,]" as determined by
A-0517-17T4
12
reference to the applicable substantive law. State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 261
(2013) (quoting State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 359 (App. Div. 1990)).
Here, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to admit
defendant's exhibit D-6 because the exhibit, in and of itself, was not relevant to
whether the fingerprint analysis was conducted properly in this case. See
Brenman, 191 N.J. at 31. In that regard, defendant did not offer any witnesses,
expert or otherwise, who would testify that the differences between the two
documents demonstrated that defendant's fingerprint analysis was conducted
improperly. Without that vital testimony to establish what errors were made and
what impact, if any, the alleged errors would have had on the reliability of
Klemowitz's analysis, we agree that D-6 was properly excluded as evidence. 4
Prosecutor's comments and displaying a photo not in evidence during
summation
Defendant contends that the State misstated the law of theft when it
provided an under inclusive example of what could constitute theft during
summations. Defendant also contends that the State's use of a still photo from
4
Even if defendant had called an expert to explain the proper procedures for
conducting a fingerprint analysis, D-6 would not have been entered into
evidence but would serve merely as a demonstrative exhibit.
A-0517-17T4
13
The Shining to illustrate how defendant put the bank teller in fear of immediate
bodily injury amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.
Prosecutorial misconduct is not ground for reversal of a criminal
conviction unless the conduct "was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a
fair trial." State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999) (citing State v. Ramseur, 106
N.J. 123, 322 (1987)). "[P]rosecutors are afforded considerable leeway in
closing arguments as long as their comments are reasonably related to the scope
of the evidence presented. Indeed, prosecutors in criminal cases are expected to
make vigorous and forceful closing arguments to juries." State v. Smith, 167
N.J. 158, 177 (2001) (citations omitted).
To justify reversal of a criminal conviction, the
prosecutor's conduct must "substantially prejudice the
defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly
evaluate the merits of his defense." The misconduct
must be "so egregious that it deprived defendant of a
fair trial."
Not every instance of misconduct in a prosecutor's
summation will require a reversal of a conviction.
There must be a palpable impact. Although prosecutors
may suggest legitimate inferences from the record, they
may not go beyond the facts before the jury.
[State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 219 (1996) (citations
omitted).]
A-0517-17T4
14
In determining whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct is a ground for
reversal, we
must take into account the tenor of the trial and the
degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court
to improprieties when they occurred. Specifically, an
appellate court must consider (1) whether defense
counsel made timely and proper objections to the
improper remarks; (2) whether the remarks were
withdrawn promptly; and (3) whether the court ordered
the remarks stricken from the record and instructed the
jury to disregard them.
[Frost, 158 N.J. at 83 (citations omitted).]
During summation, the State made the following comments regarding the
lesser-included offense of theft from the person:
The lesser included that the Judge has - has read to you
or will read to you, it's not a fact. Theft from the
person? He didn't reach into her purse and take $4,600.
Why is that? Because the money was in the drawer.
And he knew the bait money was in the drawer, and
knew enough to tell her not to take the bait money. This
isn't a theft. This isn't pickpocketing her. This is
nothing short of a robbery.
Defense counsel objected to the State's comments as a misstatement of the law
on theft. The court overruled the objection, finding that the State's argument
that defendant's demand for money wasn't "pickpocketing" to argue that
defendant's conduct was a robbery, rather than a theft, was merely an example
of what could constitute a theft.
A-0517-17T4
15
Beyond this, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the law of
robbery and the law of the lesser-included offense of theft. The court instructed
the jury that counsel's comments are merely argument and not binding on them.
We assume that the jury followed the court's instructions. See State v. Little,
296 N.J. Super. 573, 580 (App. Div. 1997) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we
find that the trial court was correct in overruling defendant's objection, and that
the State's comments regarding the evidence were not egregious, and did not
deprive defendant of a fair trial. See Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 322.
We also reject defendant's contention that the State committed
prosecutorial misconduct by using a still photograph from The Shining as an
illustration of how defendant purposely put Cervantes in fear of immediate
bodily injury during summations. In the course of summations, the prosecutor
argued that:
So when you're coming to think of that, I want you to
think of the fact that it's his actions, not his words alone,
okay? It's not his words alone. It's not the please and
the thank you. It's the actions. And I wanted to give,
like, a little bit of an illustration. And – and this is the -
the - the - how his actions are reflected in the video,
how close he got to her, and we know how tall he is
from when he walked into the - into the - the bank. So,
he's clearly making himself right at her level. I wanted
to give a little bit of an illustration.
A-0517-17T4
16
At this point, to illustrate the argument, the prosecutor displayed on a
screen visible to the jury a still photograph taken from the movie The Shining,
depicting actor Jack Nicholson in his role as Jack Torrance, who becomes
violently insane, and attempts to murder his wife and child. THE SHINING (The
Producer Circle Company 1980). The photograph depicted a demented
Nicholson menacingly peering through a hole in a locked door, behind which
his wife retreated to escape him, Nicholson having used an ax to chop open the
door. Ibid. The prosecutor continued:
We've all seen this, right? This movie? And, you know,
these words, "Here's Johnny." Right? If you've never
seen the movie, The Shining, this is creepy, but not
scary, right? You've never seen it. All right. This guy
looks creepy and he's saying some very unthreatening
words, "Here's Johnny." But if you have ever seen the
movie The Shining, you know how his face gets
through that door. So, again, I just point that out to
illustrate. It's not just the words; it's what you do before
and what you do after the words that matters. And that's
what makes it a robbery.
Defense counsel objected to the depiction from the movie, pointing out
that the face peering through the broken door is preceded by the character using
an ax to smash the door, a scenario bearing no relation to the facts presented to
the jury. The trial court admitted that the depiction of Jack Nicholson was
unexpected. The court sustained the objection and offered to give a curative
A-0517-17T4
17
instruction, but defendant's counsel was reluctant to make any statement about
the display to the jury, for fear that it would highlight the photograph and the
comments.
Like the trial court, we find that, although unexpected, the State's remarks
about The Shining and the presentation of a still from the movie did not rise to
the level of impropriety required to find prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant
promptly objected to the State's language, and the objection was sustained. See
Frost, 158 N.J. at 83. While the remarks were not withdrawn and were not
stricken from the record, the trial court offered to give a limiting instruction.
See Ibid. However, defendant did not want to emphasize the comments and
declined a limiting instruction.
Taken in that context, the State's fleeting comments about The Shining at
the end of a multi-day trial with ample witness testimony and documentary
evidence to support the conviction, and in recognition of the considerable
leeway accorded the State in closing arguments, were not so egregious as to
constitute prosecutorial misconduct.
The trial court's imposition of an extended term of imprisonment.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing a fourteen-year extended term of imprisonment. Defendant contends
A-0517-17T4
18
that he "took pains to avoid harming anyone" at the bank where he committed
the robbery and that despite his qualification for an extended term, the current
offense did not warrant an extended term.
We review an imposition of a sentence for abuse of discretion. See State
v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 10, 15 (1990).
The court may, upon application of the prosecuting
attorney, sentence a person who has been convicted of
a crime of the first, second or third degree to an
extended term of imprisonment if it finds one or more
of the grounds specified in subsection a., b., c., or f. of
this section.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3.]
One ground for imposition of an extended term is when
[t]he defendant has been convicted of a crime of the
first, second or third degree and is a persistent offender.
A persistent offender is a person who at the time of the
commission of the crime is 21 years of age or over, who
has been previously convicted on at least two separate
occasions of two crimes, committed at different times,
when he was at least 18 years of age, if the latest in time
of these crimes or the date of the defendant's last release
from confinement, whichever is later, is within 10 years
of the date of the crime for which the defendant is being
sentenced.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a).]
"In determining the appropriate sentence to impose within the range,
judges first must identify any relevant aggravating and mitigating factors set
A-0517-17T4
19
forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a) and (b) that apply to the case. The finding of any
factor must be supported by competent, credible evidence in the record." State
v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014) (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court's imposition of an extended sentence was well
within the bounds of his discretion. The trial court's finding that defendant is a
"persistent offender" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) is amply supported by
defendant's extensive criminal history of eleven convictions. These convictions
include two third-degree thefts, two second-degree robberies, one third-degree
escape, one third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and five fourth-
degree convictions including joyriding, hindering, criminal mischief and two
convictions for aggravated assault.
The trial court's finding that aggravating factors (3) (the risk that the
defendant will commit another offense), (6) (the extent of the defendant's prior
criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which he has been
convicted), and (9) (the need for deterring the defendant and others from
violating the law) is also abundantly supported by defendant's extensive criminal
history and the failure of prior incarcerations to deter him from committing
additional offenses. Indeed, defendant committed this robbery after having been
released from incarceration only two weeks earlier for another robbery, and
A-0517-17T4
20
defendant has also had several convictions for violating his probation . We thus
discern no abuse of discretion in the court's imposition of an extended term of
imprisonment.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining arguments
raised by plaintiff, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-0517-17T4
21