DCPP VS. N.G. AND A.T., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.K.T. (FG-07-0108-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-1773-18T1
A-1774-18T1
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
N.G. and A.T.,
Defendants-Appellants.
__________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF A.K.T.,
a Minor.
____________________________
Submitted October 2, 2019 – Decided October 9, 2019
Before Judges Fasciale, Rothstadt and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
No. FG-07-0108-18.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant N.G. (Deric D. Wu, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant A.T. (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel; Kisha M. Hebbon, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Katherine Anne Gregory, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor A.K.T. (Melissa R. Vance, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In these consolidated appeals, A.T. (the father) and N.G. (the mother)
(collectively defendants) appeal from two orders, dated December 5, 2018. One
entered a guardianship judgment terminating their parental rights to their son
A.K.T. (the child); the other order denied their motion for a change in placement
of the child. Following the guardianship trial, Judge James R. Paganelli entered
the order terminating their parental rights and rendered a comprehensive twenty-
seven page written opinion. The judge also conducted a hearing and provided a
detailed thirty-seven page written decision denying defendants' motion for
change of placement of the child. The father appeals only the trial court's
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2
judgment terminating his parental rights and awarding the Division of Child
Protection and Permanency (the Division) guardianship over the child. He
argues that the Division failed to satisfy each prong under the best interests test,
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1. The mother appeals only the trial judge's decision denying
her motion of a change of placement for the child. We affirm.
I.
The child was born on October 31, 2017. On November 1, 2017, after
noticing the mother's previous contact with the Division, a hospital social
worker notified the Division of the child's birth. 1 Division investigators arrived
at the hospital and met with the mother, her sisters, the father, and the father's
sister, S.T. The mother presented the Division investigator with what she
explained was a notarized letter granting guardianship of the child to her sister.
The father's sister, S.T., told the investigator that she was willing to care for the
child, as she was a licensed resource parent. When the investigator spoke with
1
The mother has a history with the Division, and she has several other children,
none of whom are in her custody; the mother's parental rights to two other
children were terminated, and she surrendered her rights to a third child, K.G.
The father is also the biological father of K.G. His parental rights to K.G. were
terminated after trial, and we affirmed that decision. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency v. A.T., No. A-2848-17 (App. Div. Apr. 18, 2019).
A-1773-18T1
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the father, the father also stated that he wanted his sister to be assessed as the
child's relative resource.
On November 8, 2017, the Division filed a verified complaint for
guardianship of the child. That same day, the court issued an Order to Show
Cause for temporary custody. The mother told a Division caseworker that she
understood she would not have custody of the child, and she wanted to discuss
adoption. On November 15, 2017, the Division placed the child with the father's
sister, S.T. On January 31, 2018, the mother informed a Division caseworker
that she wished to surrender her rights to the child to K.T., the foster parent to
her other child, K.G. But several months later, she advised the Division that she
wanted to surrender her rights to S.T., who was caring for the child at the time.
On April 10, 2018, the FN litigation was terminated, and the FG litigation
commenced.
On May 29, 2018, the Division learned that S.T.'s home was involved in
two shootings, and it removed the child from the home. That day, Division
caseworker, Latoya Bowers, visited S.T.'s home for a regular monthly visit.
When she arrived, she noticed a police vehicle in front of the house. As she
approached the home, Bowers noticed a small hole near the doorknob. When
Bowers entered the home, S.T. explained that there was a shootout in her house.
A-1773-18T1
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S.T. showed bullet holes throughout the house to Bowers, including in S.T.'s
bedroom where the child slept. S.T. told Bowers that her son was sitting on the
porch when he noticed two men running toward the home, at which point he ran
into the house, and shut the door. Then, they heard the gunshots. S.T. stated
that she did not know the shooters and did not know why they shot at her house.
But S.T. also stated that this was the second shooting at the home. Several days
earlier, a vehicle pulled in front of the house and shot at her daughter's car. S.T.
did not report either shooting to the Division.
Immediately thereafter, Bowers discussed the situation with her
supervisor, office manager, and the area director, and she initiated the child's
removal and placed him with K.T. On July 23, 2018, the Division mailed a
"rule-out" letter to S.T. and explained that the child would remain with K.T. At
the time of the placement hearing in November 2018, K.T. was in the process of
adopting the child's biological sister, K.G., and she was also committed to
adopting the child.
The guardianship trial took place on October 1, October 9, and October
25, 2018. At trial, Dr. Peter DeNigris, a clinical psychologist, testified for the
Division and discussed his findings from two psychological evaluations he
conducted on the father. Dr. DeNigris noted the father's substance abuse issue,
A-1773-18T1
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his history of noncompliance with substance abuse treatment, and his
minimization of his substance abuse problem. Dr. DeNigris also emphasized
the father's poor judgment, as exemplified by his lengthy criminal history. The
father estimated that he had been arrested and incarcerated on fifteen different
occasions, with charges including distribution of cocaine, possession of
marijuana, possession of a gun, violation of probation, assault, and domestic
violence in his relationship with the mother. Dr. DeNigris concluded that
"[g]iven the ongoing nature of [the father's] poor judgment and unresolved
substance use and criminal behaviors, children placed into his care would be at
risk of harm and/or neglect." Dr. DeNigris did not conduct an evaluation of the
mother because she did not attend the appointment. The Law Guardian did not
present any evidence and supported the Division's application for guardianship.
Throughout the FG litigation, defendants sought to have the child returned
to S.T. When the FG trial concluded, the judge conducted a hearing on
defendants' motion for change of placement on November 13, November 15, and
November 27, 2018. K.T., S.T., and caseworker Bowers testified at the hearing.
On December 5, 2018, the judge issued separate written decisions
terminating defendants' parental rights and denying their motion for a change in
placement. The judge found that the Division proved by clear and convincing
A-1773-18T1
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evidence all four prongs of the best-interests test under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).
The judge also upheld the Division's decision to remove the child from S.T.'s
home and place the child in K.T.'s custody alongside his biological sister. The
judge concluded that the Division's decision to remove the child and place him
with K.T. was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The judge also
independently found that it was in the best interests of the child to be placed
with K.T.
II.
We begin our discussion with the well-settled legal framework regarding
the termination of parental rights. Parents have a constitutionally protected right
to the care, custody and control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753 (1982); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999).
However, that right is not absolute. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G.,
217 N.J. 527, 553 (2014); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J.
591, 599 (1986). At times, a parent's interest must yield to the State's obligation
to protect children from harm. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198
N.J. 382, 397 (2009); In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). To
effectuate these concerns, the Legislature created a test for determining when
parental rights must be terminated in a child's best interests. In order to obtain
A-1773-18T1
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parental termination, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires the Division prove by
clear and convincing evidence the following four prongs:
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been
or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
delay of permanent placement will add to the harm.
Such harm may include evidence that separating the
child from his resource family parents would cause
serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm
to the child;
(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to
provide services to help the parent correct the
circumstances which led to the child's placement
outside the home and the court has considered
alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
harm than good.
See also A.W., 103 N.J. at 604-11. The four prongs of the test are not "discrete
and separate," but "relate to and overlap with one another to provide a
comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." K.H.O., 161 N.J.
at 348. "The considerations involved in determinations of parental fitness are
'extremely fact sensitive' and require particularized evidence that address the
A-1773-18T1
8
specific circumstances in the given case." Ibid. (quoting In re Adoption of
Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 139 (1993)).
Our review of a family judge's factual findings is limited. Cesare v.
Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). "When a biological parent resists termination
of his or her parental rights, the [trial] court's function is to decide whether that
parent has the capacity to eliminate any harm the child may already have
suffered, and whether that parent can raise the child without inflicting any
further harm." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81,
87 (App. Div. 2006). The factual findings, which support such a judgment,
"should not be disturbed unless 'they are so wholly insupportable as to result in
a denial of justice,' and should be upheld whenever they are 'supported by
adequate, substantial and credible evidence.'" In re Guardianship of J.T., 269
N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs
Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)). "[T]he conclusions that logically
flow from those findings of fact are, likewise, entitled to deferential
consideration upon appellate review." R.L., 388 N.J. Super. at 89.
A-1773-18T1
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III.
We now turn to the father's argument that the judge erred in finding that
the Division proved by clear and convincing evidence each of the four prongs
under the best interests test.
A.
The father asserts that there was no substantial, credible evidence in the
record to find the child's safety, health, or development was or would continue
to be endangered by the parental relationship. He asserts that the Division
presented "absolutely no evidence" that he abused or neglected the child, and as
a result, there was no basis to find that the Division satisfied the first prong of
the best interests test.
As a threshold matter, the father argues that the Division presented no
evidence of abuse or neglect. But this argument is misguided. The Division
sought to terminate his parental rights under Title 30, which "provides the legal
framework for guardianship proceedings through which the Division may seek
to terminate parental rights." N.E. for J.V. v. State Dep't of Children & Families,
Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 449 N.J. Super. 379, 400 (App. Div. 2017).
"Title 9 is intended to address cases in which children are abused and neglected."
Id. at 398. The Division was not attempting to remove the child based on abuse
A-1773-18T1
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or neglect under Title 9. The father's parental rights were terminated under Title
30, and thus, Title 9 is inapplicable and the Division did not have to prove abuse
or neglect.
The first prong of the best interests test requires the Division demonstrate
that the "child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be
endangered by the parental relationship[.]" N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1); K.H.O.,
161 N.J. at 352. The Division must prove that the child's health and
development were threatened and will continue to be affected by the parent-
child relationship. K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. The concern is not only with actual
harm to the child, but also the risk of harm. In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161
N.J. 365, 383 (1999). The focus is not on a single or isolated event, but rather
on the effect "of harms arising from the parent-child relationship over time on
the child's health and development." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. However, the
court does not need to wait "until a child is actually irreparably impaired by
parental inattention or neglect" to find child endangerment. D.M.H., 161 N.J.
at 383 (citing A.W., 103 N.J. at 616 n.14). And the Court has explained that a
parent's withdrawal of nurture and care for an extended period of time is a harm
that endangers the health of a child. Id. at 379. When children "languish in
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foster care" without a permanent home, their parents' "failure to provide a
permanent home" may itself constitute harm. Id. at 383.
The judge found Dr. DeNigris was credible and noted Dr. DeNigris'
conclusion that the father was "not fit to parent [the child] currently or in the
foreseeable future." The judge noted the factors Dr. DeNigris used to support
his conclusion that the father was not fit to parent the child:
(1) extensive history of poor judgment that includes
substance abuse and criminal activities; (2) failure to
complete substance abuse treatment, despite ample
time to address his issues, and his statement that no
services would benefit him, are indicators that he would
not successfully follow through with treatment and,
therefore, his long-term struggle with substance abuse
remains unresolved; (3) [the father] accepted minimal
responsibility (placed sole blame on [the mother], lack
of residential and financial stability) for [the child's]
placement into foster care; (4) continues to lack
knowledge of child development; (5) the results of the
psychological testing suggest that (a) he was reluctant
to recognize his minor faults and typically views
himself as a stable, confident and self-satisfied
individual, (b) tends to be wary and sensitive in his
interpersonal relationships, (c) substance abuse has led
to problems in his life such as strained interpersonal
relationships, vocational and/or legal problems, and
using substances to manage stress.
The judge also found that the father's contradictory statements, seeking
reunification and surrendering his rights to the child, "calls into question his
commitment to being a consistent and permanent caretaker to his son." The
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judge noted that the father had "ample time" to address the factors that made
him an unsuitable caretaker of his older child, K.G., yet he made "no substantive
progress."
Accordingly, there exists substantial credible evidence to find that the
Division satisfied the first prong under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).
B.
Next, the father contends that the Division presented insufficient evidence
that he was unwilling or unable to eliminate any harm the child faced or provide
a safe and stable home for the child. He asserts that he could improve his
problems – such as his substance abuse issues and lack of independent housing
– if the Division provided him the proper amount of assistance.
The second prong of the best interests test requires the Division to present
clear and convincing evidence that "[t]he parent is . . . unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent
placement will add to the harm." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). The relevant
inquiry for the trial court is whether the parent has cured and overcome the initial
harm that endangered the child, and the parent is able to continue the parental
relationship without recurrent harm to the child. K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348-49.
To satisfy its burden, the Division must show continued harm to the child
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because the parent is unable or unwilling to overcome or remove the harm. N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451, 483 (App. Div.
2012). The first and second prongs relate to one another and, often, "evidence
that supports one informs and may support the other as part of the
comprehensive basis for determining the best interests of the child." D.M.H.,
161 N.J. at 379.
"Parental unfitness may also be demonstrated if the parent has failed to
provide a 'safe and stable home for the child' and a 'delay in permanent
placement' will further harm the child." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352 (quoting
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2)). "Keeping [a] child in limbo, hoping for some long
term unification plan, would be a misapplication of the law." N.J. Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 438 (App. Div. 2001).
The judge found the Division established by clear and convincing
evidence that the father is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm posed to the
child. The judge noted Dr. DeNigris' opinion that the father had ample time to
remedy the numerous factors that made him an unfit parent to his other children,
yet he was unwilling or unable to do so. Dr. DeNigris conducted two
psychological evaluations on the father: one in October 2017 and another in July
2018. In his report based on the evaluation in October 2017, Dr. DeNigris noted
A-1773-18T1
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the father's criminal history, substance abuse history, and his housing and
employment troubles. At the evaluation, the father told Dr. DeNigris that he
had not worked in the past month, and he could not keep up with his rent and
child support so "[i]t didn't make sense to go to work." The father explained
that he had no source of income, but he received food stamps. He stated that he
planned to get a job "in the future" when he moved to Florida with his girlfriend.
In July 2018, Dr. DeNigris evaluated the father again, and he concluded
that the father was unfit to parent the child. In his report, Dr. DeNigris
concluded that the father was "largely in the same position as he was when [he]
last evaluated [him] in 2017." Dr. DeNigris emphasized that the father had not
made any substantive progress, despite the time between the two evaluations.
Moreover, as to his housing, the father told the Division caseworker – one
week before the guardianship trial – that he was living in a shelter. As to his
substance abuse issues, the father enrolled in substance abuse programs, but he
was unable to successfully complete them. He received three separate Division
referrals, but he failed to finish any treatment. He attended the programs
sporadically and was discharged.
In sum, the judge found that the father's "extensive untreated substance
abuse history, a lengthy criminal background, a lack of knowledge regarding
A-1773-18T1
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child development, and a need to attain stable housing and consistent
employment" supported a finding that the father was unable to provide a safe
and stable home for the child. The judge did not find that a delay in permanent
placement would contribute to the harm or that "[s]uch harm may include
evidence that separating the child from [his] resource family parents would
cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child,"
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2), because no bonding evaluations were
conducted due to the child's young age. Although the father argues that he could
become a fit parent with more supportive services from the Division, the father
had nearly a year to address the issues noted in Dr. DeNigris' first evaluation,
but he failed to make any substantial progress. The child should not be kept "in
limbo, hoping for some long term unification plan." A.G., 344 N.J. Super. at
438. Accordingly, the judge's decision is supported by substantial credible
evidence in the record.
C.
The father contends that the Division failed to provide him with
reasonable reunification services. Specifically, the father argues that the
Division failed to offer him housing assistance.
A-1773-18T1
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The third prong requires evidence that "[t]he [D]ivision has made
reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the
circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court
has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C -
15.1(a)(3). "Reasonable efforts may include consultation with the parent,
developing a plan for reunification, providing services essential to the
realization of the reunification plan, informing the family of the child's progress,
and facilitating visitation." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189
N.J. 261, 281 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However,
"the [D]ivision shall not be required to provide reasonable efforts to reunify the
child with a parent if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that . . .
[t]he rights of the parent to another of the parent's children have been
involuntarily terminated." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(c). The father's parental rights
to his other children, namely the child's biological sister, K.G., were
involuntarily terminated after trial, and therefore, the court properly relieved the
Division of its obligations under the third prong of the best interests test.
Nevertheless, on appeal, the father argues that his parental rights to his
other children were involuntarily terminated not because of his actions, but due
to the children's mothers' actions. He asserts that because the children's mothers
A-1773-18T1
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were the subjects of the Division referrals, the Division was obligated to assist
him with independent housing. We disagree. The statute clearly states that the
Division is not required to provide reasonable reunification efforts if the parent's
parental rights were involuntarily terminated to another child. That is the case
here, and consequently, the Division was properly relieved of its obligations.
D.
Lastly, the father contends that the Division failed to present clear and
convincing evidence demonstrating that the good to be achieved by termination
of parental rights will outweigh the harm.
The fourth prong of the best interests test requires a determination that the
termination of parental rights "will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a)(4). The court must ask whether "after considering and balancing
the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination
of ties with [his] natural parents than from the permanent disruption of [his]
relationship with [his] foster parents." K.H.O, 161 N.J. at 355. This prong
"cannot require a showing that no harm will befall the child as a result of the
severing of biological ties." Ibid. "The overriding consideration under this
prong remains the child's need for permanency and stability." L.J.D., 428 N.J.
Super. at 491-92. "Ultimately, a child has a right to live in a stable, nurturing
A-1773-18T1
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environment and to have the psychological security that his most deeply formed
attachments will not be shattered." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M.,
211 N.J. 420, 453 (2012). "A child cannot be held prisoner of the rights of
others, even those of his or her parents. Children have their own rights,
including the right to a permanent, safe and stable placement." N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div. 2004).
The judge said he could not consider the child's relationship with
defendants or his foster parents because no bonding evaluation was performed
due to the child's young age. However, considering the child's right to a
permanent and stable placement, the judge concluded that terminating the
father's rights would not do more harm than good. The judge stated that neither
the father nor the mother were fit to care for the child. He also noted that the
child's resource parent was "capable and loving" and committed to adopting the
child. The judge further added that the child could continue to grow his
relationship with his biological sister, who was adopted by K.T.
Here, the judge's decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in
the record. As indicated by the father's psychological evaluations, he was not a
viable parenting option and would not likely become one in the near future. Dr.
DeNigris concluded that the father had poor judgment, a criminal history,
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untreated substance abuse issues, minimal acceptance of responsibility, and
housing and employment issues. Dr. DeNigris stated that there were no services
"that would render [the father] capable of parenting" the child in the foreseeable
future. Accordingly, the judge's determination that the Division satisfied the
fourth prong is supported by substantial credible evidence.
IV.
Finally, we turn to the mother's appeal, in which she argues that it was in
the child's best interests to be returned to the care and custody of S.T. She
further argues that in the alternative, a comparative bonding evaluation was
required to make a placement decision. We reject both arguments and affirm.
"In reviewing a child's placement, courts must determine whether 'such
placement ensures the safety and health and serves the best interest of the child.'"
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.F., 357 N.J. Super. 515, 528 (App.
Div. 2003) (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4C-51). The child's best interests "is always
the polestar in such matters." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.S.,
432 N.J. Super. 224, 229 (App. Div. 2013). Although the Division has a
statutory duty to evaluate relatives as potential caretakers, there is no
presumption that favors the child's placement with such relatives. N.J.S.A.
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30:4C-12.1; N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 81-
82 (App. Div. 2013).
Here, S.T. and her household were involved in two shootings: her
daughter's car was shot, and, about a week later, the home was shot at and bullets
entered the home. The judge noted that S.T. failed to notify the Division of
either shooting. The judge further opined that "any suggestion that this was a
drive by or random type shooting is dispelled by [S.T.]'s mugshot identification,
and the daughter's involvement, which was revealed to [S.T.] on the night of the
shooting." S.T. attempted to minimize the shooting by stating that the shooting
was outside and only "the car got shot up." The judge concluded that S.T.'s
household, including the child, "was directly impacted and at risk."
The judge noted that K.T. provided "care, love and support" for the child.
The child was with his sister, and their relationship was described as "loving,
caring and growing." The judge concluded that the mother proffered no legal
basis as to why the child should be removed from the resource parent. The judge
found that "permanency with [K.T.] is in [the child's] best interests: (1) he can
grow in a family with his sister [K.G.]; (2) [S.T.]'s failure to visit [the child]
since his removal; (3) the manner in which [S.T.] handled the shootings[;] and
(4) there is no reason to subject [the child] to another removal." We agree.
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Lastly, despite the mother's argument, a bonding evaluation should not
have been required due to the child's young age. In support of her argument, the
mother cites to N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.S., 432 N.J. Super.
at 229, for the proposition that when a child is moved from a placement where
he has spent a significant amount of time, a bonding evaluation is required to
aid the court in determining whether the best interests of the child are served in
the new placement. In C.S., we reversed an order transferring placement of a
child from her foster home to her grandparents and remanded for an evidentiary
hearing "for the development and consideration of bonding evidence." Id. at
227-29. However, we explicitly "reject[ed] the argument that every temporary
removal of a child from [a] foster home to a relative's home will require a
bonding evaluation[.]" Id. at 229. We noted that under the specific
circumstances presented in that case, the judge should not have refused to allow
the Law Guardian to present bonding evidence before making the change in
placement. Ibid.
Here, as we noted in C.S., there is no bright-line rule that every transfer
of placement requires a bonding evaluation, contrary to the mother's argument.
The child was removed from S.T.'s home when he was seven months old; he
only spent the first seven months of his life with S.T. Dr. DeNigris opined that
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he could not perform a bonding evaluation because the child was too young.
The judge also concluded that "compelling [the child] to sustain another removal
from another family is unnecessary and maybe detrimental to him."
Accordingly, the judge's decision is supported by substantial credible evidence.
To the extent that we have not addressed the parties' remaining arguments,
we conclude that they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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