SUNDIATA ACOLI VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) ( 2019 )


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  •                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5645-16T2
    SUNDIATA ACOLI, a/k/a
    CLARK EDWARD SQUIRE,
    APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    Appellant,
    December 27, 2019
    v.                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
    NEW JERSEY STATE
    PAROLE BOARD,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________
    Argued September 9, 2019 – Decided December 27, 2019
    Before Judges Fasciale, Rothstadt and Moynihan
    (Judge Rothstadt dissenting).
    On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
    Bruce Ira Afran argued the cause for appellant.
    Christopher Josephson, Deputy Attorney General,
    argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal,
    Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher
    Josephson, on the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    FASCIALE, P.J.A.D.
    In accordance with remand instructions from the Supreme Court, Acoli
    v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Acoli II), 
    224 N.J. 213
    , 217 (2016), the New Jersey
    State Parole Board (the Board) conducted a full Board in-person hearing to
    complete Acoli's administrative parole process. The Court remanded solely on
    procedural grounds, disagreeing with our earlier determination that a full
    Board hearing was not required. 
    Id. at 232
    . Acoli—a convicted murderer of a
    State Trooper—appeals from the Board's unanimous1 June 21, 2017 final
    agency decision (final decision) denying parole and imposing a 180-month
    Future Eligibility Term (FET).
    At the remand hearing, the Board extensively questioned Acoli about a
    multitude of subjects, including his prior assertion that he "blacked out," which
    Acoli maintained rendered him unable to remember how the trooper died. But
    at the full Board hearing, Acoli provided these details: he explained that while
    he struggled with the trooper, another trooper "probably" shot the trooper with
    a "friendly fire shot." That explanation—which necessarily required that he
    was conscious during the struggle when the "friendly fire shot" occurred—
    1
    The individuals who comprised two- and three-member Board panels, which
    previously denied parole, did not participate in the full Board hearing. See
    N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.58(a) (stating that any Board member who participated in
    the decision from which the appeal is taken may not participate in the
    disposition of that appeal).
    A-5645-16T2
    2
    contradicted Acoli's previous assertion that a bullet grazed his head, rendering
    him temporarily unconscious.
    Our review of the final decision comes to us on a different record. In
    addition to considering a critical confidential report by a new psychologist, the
    Board extensively questioned Acoli, which is demonstrated by the 286-page
    transcript of the hearing. The Board considered the entire administrative paper
    record, the new psychological evaluation, and, importantly, Acoli's own
    responses, leading it to conclude—based on a preponderance of the evidence—
    that there was a substantial likelihood that Acoli would commit another crime
    if paroled.
    On this more developed record, we conclude the Board applied the
    correct law, the record contains substantial credible evidence to support its
    findings, and there is no basis to determine that the Board clearly erred in
    reaching its conclusion. The Board's final decision is not arbitrary, capricious,
    or unreasonable.
    We therefore affirm.
    I.
    In 1973, Acoli murdered State Trooper Werner Foerster and assaulted
    State Trooper James Harper. After a lengthy trial, a jury found him guilty of
    A-5645-16T2
    3
    "murder; atrocious assault and battery; assault and battery; assault with an
    offensive weapon; assault with intent to kill; illegal possession of a weapon;
    and armed robbery." 
    Id. at 218
    . Acoli received life in prison for the murder
    conviction. The judge imposed consecutive sentences of "ten to twelve years
    of imprisonment for his conviction for assault with intent to kill; two to three
    years of imprisonment [for his conviction] for illegal possession of a weapon;
    and twelve to fifteen years of imprisonment [for his conviction] for [the]
    armed robbery." 
    Ibid.
     The aggregate sentence equaled life plus twenty-four to
    thirty years. 
    Ibid.
    In 2010, Acoli became eligible for parole. 2 A hearing officer referred
    the matter to a Board panel for a hearing. On March 4, 2010, a two-member
    Board panel interviewed Acoli and concluded that "a substantial likelihood
    exists that [he] would commit a new crime if released on parole at this time."
    
    Ibid.
     On July 7, 2010, a three-member Board panel set a 120-month FET.
    2
    The Board previously denied Acoli parole twice. In a decision dated January
    3, 1994, the Board cited Acoli's "continued antisocial behavior" and his failure
    to "change[] appreciably during [his] incarceration" as factors contributing to
    his substantial likelihood to commit a new crime if released. And in its written
    decision dated August 11, 2004, the Board noted that "[Acoli's] denials and
    version of events are contrary to logic and to the evidence at trial," and that he
    was "not credible on numerous factual matters." The Board denied him parole
    because of this, and because the Board thought that Acoli's "radical and
    revolutionary politics have not fundamentally changed."
    A-5645-16T2
    4
    Acoli appealed to the full Board, which conducted a "paper hearing."
    That hearing was substantially different than the Board's hearing on remand.
    The "paper hearing" entailed consideration of the record before the hearing
    officer and the two- and three-member panels.        Unlike in the full Board
    hearing leading to this appeal, the Board did not hear testimony or create its
    own record. On February 23, 2011, the Board upheld the denial of parole and
    the establishment of the 120-month FET.
    Acoli appealed to us.     Looking at the administrative record and the
    merits of the Board's February 23, 2011 decision, we reversed the denial of
    parole and concluded the Board's basis for denying parole was arbitrary. This
    court then ordered the Board to set conditions for Acoli's parole. See Acoli v.
    N.J. State Parole Bd. (Acoli I), No. A-3575-10 (App. Div. Sept. 29, 2014) (slip
    op. at 10).       On procedural grounds, the Board unsuccessfully sought
    reconsideration of our judgment, solely contending that a full Board in-person
    hearing was required before proceeding directly to release.
    The Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for certification,
    interpreted N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f),3 and agreed with the Board that it was
    3
    The statute provides in pertinent part:
    (continued)
    A-5645-16T2
    5
    entitled to conduct a full hearing. The Court remanded with instructions for a
    "full Board in-person review and hearing of a convicted murderer prior to his
    or her parole release." Acoli II, 224 N.J. at 217. As to the merits of Acoli's
    parole, the Court stated:
    We express no view on what the outcome of that full
    assessment should be. Whatever it shall be, there will
    be a right of appeal to the Appellate Division. If
    Acoli is denied parole, then that would be the
    appropriate time at which the Appellate Division
    might have occasion to consider whether the unusual
    remedy of judicially ordered parole of a convicted
    murderer might be in order. However, that possibility
    must await completion of the parole process in its
    entirety.
    [Acoli II, 224 N.J. at 232.]
    On June 8, 2016, the Board conducted the hearing. Board members
    extensively questioned Acoli and gave him an opportunity to read a prepared
    statement. The Board considered the entire record before it, including the new
    (continued)
    Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the
    contrary, if an inmate incarcerated for murder is
    recommended for parole by the assigned board
    member or the appropriate board panel, parole shall
    not be certified until a majority of the full parole
    board, after conducting a hearing, concurs in that
    recommendation. The board shall notify the victim's
    family of that hearing and family members shall be
    afforded the opportunity to testify in person or to
    submit written or videotaped statements.
    A-5645-16T2
    6
    confidential psychological evaluation, which had a significant impact on the
    Board's decision.
    On June 8, 2016, the full Board denied parole. On that date, the Board
    rendered its "Panel Decision," which reflects that the Board found—once
    again—that there existed "a substantial likelihood" that Acoli "would commit a
    new crime if released on parole." After further documenting the consideration
    of multiple mitigating factors, and as part of its conclusion that Acoli lacked
    insight into his criminal behavior, the Board stated:
    [Acoli] cannot articulate how he has changed his anti-
    social thought patterns. [He] [p]resents as continuing
    to believe his actions were justified. [He] has no
    understanding why he believed violence was
    necessary to affect social change, nor does he
    demonstrate understanding how his criminal thinking
    pattern has changed.
    The next day, the Board notified Acoli that "establishing a [FET] within
    the Board's presumptive schedule may be inappropriate due to your lack of
    satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood of future criminal behavior."
    The Board then referred the FET issue to the full Board. On November 16,
    2016, the full Board established a 180-month FET, and on December 22, 2016,
    the Board rendered a comprehensive written decision for its FET
    determination.
    A-5645-16T2
    7
    In its final decision (addressed to defense counsel), the Board stated it
    was responding to Acoli's "administrative appeal . . . of the Board's June 8,
    2016 decision to deny [Acoli] parole[,] and the Board's November 16, 2016
    decision[,]" which established the 180-month FET. The Board rejected Acoli's
    argument that it failed to apply the "post-August 19, 1997" parole release
    standards. The Board stated:
    In     accordance     with  New      Jersey   statutes,
    Administrative Code, and court decisions, the standard
    for parole where the committed offense(s) occurred
    prior to August 19, 1997, is whether the
    preponderance of evidence indicates a substantial
    likelihood that an inmate would commit a new crime
    if released on parole. The Board finds that [Acoli's]
    commitment offenses occurred in 1973 and that
    therefore, it is the "substantial likelihood" standard
    that applies to his case.
    In its final decision, the Board acknowledged Acoli's additional
    contentions pertinent to the denial of parole.    Acoli argued that the Board
    withheld confidential information, excluded favorable information, violat ed
    his due process rights, ignored material facts, and rendered an excessive FET.
    The Board acknowledged those arguments and addressed them in the final
    decision.
    As to Acoli's assertion that the Board violated his due process rights, the
    Board explained that it "carefully and thoroughly reviewed all the reports
    contained in the case file," and reached its decision "on the totality of the
    A-5645-16T2
    8
    information in the administrative record." The Board noted that as part of the
    full hearing on remand, it gave Acoli the opportunity to participate and provide
    information.   Indeed, Board members thoroughly questioned Acoli, and he
    read a prepared statement that he and his friend drafted. The Board contended
    it did not violate his due process rights because it denied parole after fully
    applying the requirements of N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11 (setting forth multiple
    factors considered at parole hearings).
    In the final decision, the Board rejected Acoli's argument that it failed to
    consider material facts. Acoli maintained that the Board did not consider his
    age, his lack of prior convictions for violent crimes, his listing as infraction -
    free in a lesser security status, his good institutional work record, and his
    parole plans. Acoli specifically contended that he led a crime-free life for
    roughly forty years, and that he took "full responsibility" for the trooper's
    death. The Board explained its reasons for denying parole, which we have
    partially quoted:
    [The] serious nature of offense (homicide of a law
    enforcement officer); prior offense record noted;
    nature of criminal record increasingly more serious;
    committed to incarceration for multiple offenses; prior
    opportunity on probation has failed to deter criminal
    behavior; and commission of current offense while on
    recognizance bail. Furthermore, based on [Acoli's]
    responses to questions posed by the Board at the time
    of the [full] hearing [on remand], the pre-parole
    report, and the documentation in the case file, the
    A-5645-16T2
    9
    Board determined that [Acoli] exhibited insufficient
    problem resolution, specifically, that he lacked insight
    into his criminal behavior; that he denied his offense,
    and that he minimized his conduct. The Board
    [repeated], "[Acoli] cannot articulate how he has
    changed his anti-social thought patterns. [Patterns] as
    continuing to believe his actions were justified. Has
    no understanding why he believed violence was
    necessary to affect social change, nor does he
    demonstrate understanding how his criminal thinking
    pattern has changed." The Board . . . relied on
    confidential material and, pursuant to N.J.A.C.
    10A:71-2.2(c), identified for the record the nature of
    the confidential information.        The Board also
    considered [Acoli's] risk assessment evaluation score
    of [twenty], which indicates a moderate risk of
    recidivism.
    Additionally, the Board noted as mitigation: minimal
    offense record; all opportunities on community
    supervision completed without violations; infraction
    free since last panel; participation in programs specific
    to behavior; and participation in institutional
    programs.
    ....
    [T]he Board reviewed [Acoli's] entire record in
    rendering its decision. His age and personal and
    medical histories; his criminal history; his record of
    rehabilitative program participation (including each of
    those programs referenced in [his] [administrative]
    appeal); his current custody status and institutional
    work history; and his infraction-free status (since his
    last Board panel hearing); are all matters of record
    . . . . [T]he Board appropriately noted as mitigation on
    the Notice of Decision: minimal offense record; all
    opportunities on community supervision completed
    without violations; infraction free since last panel;
    participation in programs specific to behavior; and
    A-5645-16T2
    10
    participation in institutional programs. As a result, the
    Board . . . did not solely base its decision to deny
    parole on the negative aspects in the record, rather, the
    Board . . . based its decision on the entire record
    governed by the factors set forth in . . . N.J.A.C.
    10A:71-3.11.
    ....
    [T]he Board . . . consider[ed] [Acoli's] parole plans
    . . . which includ[ed] his proposed place of residence
    and his employment plans [and] noted on the Case
    Assessment at the time of his [i]nitial [p]arole
    [h]earing . . . . Additionally, the Board routinely
    reviews the plans submitted by the inmate for
    consideration and is therefore aware of significant
    information such as employment plans, residence,
    community and family support.
    ....
    Lastly, [Acoli] contend[s] that the Board did not
    consider that [Acoli] has taken . . . "full
    responsibility" for [the trooper's] death . . . . The
    Board . . . conducted [Acoli's] hearing to determine
    his suitability for parole. The Board had the ability to
    ask [Acoli] questions and to review his case to
    evaluate whether he . . . gained the problem resolution
    necessary to ensure that there is not a substantial
    likelihood that he would commit a crime if released on
    parole. The Board determined, based on its interview
    [of Acoli], and its review of the case file, that [Acoli]
    does not demonstrate the insight necessary to be a
    viable candidate for parole release at the present time.
    Although he may believe that he has [] made progress
    [] sufficient to ready him for parole release, the Board
    found otherwise.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    A-5645-16T2
    11
    Referring to its December 22, 2016 written decision establishing the
    180-month FET, the Board stated that Acoli "demonstrated a lack of
    satisfactory progress in reducing future criminal behavior[,] and that therefore,
    pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d), a [FET] within the statutorily provided
    guidelines [was] inappropriate[.]"   Moreover, in rejecting Acoli's argument
    that the 180-month FET was excessive, the Board stated:
    [Acoli] continues to demonstrate no insight towards
    understanding the lifestyle and behavior choices that
    he was making leading up to the murder. While he
    states that he no longer advocates violence, he yet
    cannot provide tangible explanations as to how he has
    changed his behavior choices or patterns. [Acoli] has
    made only negligible progress into understanding why
    he chose to be a part of a violent militant organization.
    He does not appear to recognize what changes he
    needs to make to ensure a crime[-]free lifestyle.
    Further, he seems conflicted in his thinking and is
    unable to fully reconcile his behaviors and actions
    involved in the time leading up to the murder, and the
    murder itself. He repeatedly states that he takes
    ownership and responsibility for the murder of the
    trooper, but there are significant contradictions to
    those statements in his further testimony before the
    Board. He presents as being emotionless and lacking
    in empathy and does not appear to realize the severity
    of his violent actions. The Board finds that more
    work needs to be done on [Acoli's] part, in order for
    him to undergo a meaningful introspection into the
    internal and external factors that impelled his life
    choices.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    A-5645-16T2
    12
    Moreover, in its six-page December 22, 2016 notice of decision, the Board
    stated:
    [Y]ou have never before speculated as to who you
    believed shot and killed the trooper, instead
    maintaining that you were in an unconscious state
    when the act occurred. At the [remand] hearing, you
    chose to deviate from your past statements and
    speculated that the trooper was killed by friendly fire.
    Although the ballistic evidence reveals that could not
    be the case, as the trooper was shot with his own
    weapon, it is disturbing that you would make such
    conjecture, especially considering your assertions that
    you take responsibility for the crime.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    Consideration of Acoli's suitability for parole release—albeit on a different
    record—returns to us on this appeal in the aftermath of the Board's final
    decision.
    II.
    On this appeal, Acoli raises the following points:
    [POINT I]
    THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW BY A
    PREPONDERANCE      OF    THE  CREDIBLE
    EVIDENCE    THAT      [ACOLI] HAS    A
    "SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD" OF COMMITTING
    FUTURE CRIME IF RELEASED.
    A. IN NEW JERSEY[,] PAROLE IS PRESUMED
    UPON REACHING THE ELIGIBILITY DATE AND
    THE BURDEN IS ON THE STATE TO PROVE
    [ACOLI] IS A RECIDIVIST.
    A-5645-16T2
    13
    B.  THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A
    SHOWING THAT [ACOLI] IS "SUBSTANTIALLY
    LIKELY" TO BE A RECIDIVIST.
    1. THE BOARD IMPROPERLY RELIED
    UPON REMOTE OFFENSES AS A
    BASIS FOR DENIAL OF PAROLE.
    2.  THE   BOARD'S  FOCUS   ON
    [ACOLI'S]             ALLEGED
    UNWILLINGNESS TO ADMIT THE
    PREMEDITATED NATURE OF THE
    OFFENSE DOES NOT ESTABLISH A
    SUBSTANTIAL   LIKELIHOOD   OF
    RECIDIVISM.
    3. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT
    THE BOARD'S CONCLUSION THAT
    [ACOLI]    HAS    NOT   OPENLY
    ACKNOWLEDGED AND ADMITTED
    [TO] HIS PAST ASSOCIATIONS WITH
    A VIOLENT POLITICAL MOVEMENT.
    4. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT
    THE STATE'S NEW PSYCHOLOGIST'S
    CONCLUSION THAT [ACOLI] HAS
    FAILED TO MAKE SUFFICIENT
    GAINS FROM COUNSELING AND
    THERAPY.
    5. THE BOARD'S BASIS FOR
    DENYING PAROLE IS SPECULATIVE
    AND DOES NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL
    OF   PROOF   THAT    ACOLI   IS
    "SUBSTANTIALLY[] LIKELY["] TO
    COMMIT FUTURE CRIME.
    A-5645-16T2
    14
    [POINT II]
    [ACOLI'S] RECORD WHILE INCARCERATED
    FOR NEARLY [FORTY] YEARS MITIGATES
    AGAINST THE FINDING THAT HE IS
    "SUBSTANTIALLY   LIKELY" TO  COMMIT
    FURTHER CRIMES.
    Our narrow standard of review is critical to adjudicating Acoli's
    arguments on appeal. Of course, parole determinations are subject to j udicial
    review. When reviewing the Parole Board's denial of parole, we concentrate
    on three inquiries:
    (1) whether the agency's action violates express or
    implied legislative policies, i.e., did the agency follow
    the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial
    evidence to support the findings on which the agency
    based its action; and (3) whether in applying the
    legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
    erred in reaching a conclusion that could not
    reasonably have been made on a showing of the
    relevant factors.
    [Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino IV), 
    154 N.J. 19
    , 24 (1998).]
    We will reverse an administrative agency's decision "only if it is arbitrary,
    capricious, or unreasonable or [if] it is not supported by substantial credible
    evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80 (1980) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 
    39 N.J. 556
    , 562
    (1963)).
    A-5645-16T2
    15
    We undertake that analysis understanding the uniqueness of the Parole
    Board. See Acoli II, 224 N.J. at 222-23 (explaining the specialized nature of
    the Parole Board). The Legislature purposefully established the Parole Board
    that collectively embodies unique and particular characteristics.          Under
    N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.47(a), the Board consists of a chairperson, fourteen
    associate members, and three alternate board members. Acoli II, 224 N.J. at
    222. The Governor appoints these individuals with the advice and consent of
    the Senate, and selects them based on their qualifications.         Ibid. (citing
    N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.47(a)). Indeed, the statute requires that they be "qualified
    persons with training or experience in law, sociology, criminal justice, juvenile
    justice or related branches of the social sciences." N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.47(a).
    We expressly draw attention to the qualification-based appointment of
    the Board members especially because here, the Board utilized its expertise
    and conducted a full in-person hearing, listened to Acoli's responses during the
    lengthy hearing, and observed Acoli interact with the Board.         The Board
    members' individual, diverse, and combined expertise was important, as they
    undertook their weighty responsibility of deciding whether Acoli satisfied the
    criteria for parole release. The Parole Board is the only agency entrusted with
    the "specialized knowledge to administer [the] regulatory scheme." Acoli II,
    224 N.J. at 222.
    A-5645-16T2
    16
    Based on the diverse background of its members, the Parole Board
    makes "highly predictive and individualized discretionary appraisals." Ibid.
    (quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    62 N.J. 348
    , 359 (1973)). The
    appraisals   are   inherently    imprecise   because   they   are   "discretionary
    assessment[s] of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a
    man is and what he may become rather than simply what he has done." 
    Ibid.
    (alteration in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
    Complex, 
    442 U.S. 1
    , 10 (1979)). "Stripped to its essentials, a parole board's
    decision concerns a prediction as to an inmate's future behavior, a
    prognostication necessarily fraught with subjectivity." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Trantino
    v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino VI), 
    166 N.J. 113
    , 201 (2001)) (Baime,
    J.A.D., dissenting).
    Given the subjective nature of the Board's prediction of an inmate's
    future behavior, and the highly specialized composition of the Board itself, we
    are not permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the Board's. Indeed, in
    the Court's remand, it stated:
    By virtue of our remand, we ensure that subsequent
    judicial review, if critical of the substance of that
    ultimate determination by the Parole Board under the
    applicable standard of review, does not impermissibly
    result in a judicial substitution of a decision reposed
    by the Legislature with the Parole Board. The
    Appellate Division here declined to remand to the
    A-5645-16T2
    17
    Parole Board for a full hearing, as was requested on
    reconsideration by the Parole Board. The panel,
    essentially, saw no point to that step, having itself
    evaluated Acoli's bases for asserting that he is ready
    for release and determining that there has been no
    convincing reason presented to date to require his
    further incarceration.      That remedy basically
    substituted the appellate panel's judgment for that of
    the agency charged with the expertise to make such
    highly predictive, individualistic determinations—the
    full Parole Board.
    [Acoli II, 224 N.J. at 230-31.]
    We note that Acoli is serving a sentence imposed under Title 2A, the
    predecessor to the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, now codified under
    Title 2C. The Parole Act of 1979, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to -123.79, governs
    Acoli's parole fitness, and provides for parole of an inmate upon eligibility
    unless a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates "there is a substantial
    likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of this State if
    released on parole at such time." N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53 (amended 1997). The
    Board utilized this correct standard during the remand proceedings.
    Here, the Board also complied with all other applicable law, including
    N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11. The regulation, entitled "Factors considered at parole
    hearings; adult inmates," states:
    (a) Parole decisions shall be based on the aggregate of
    all pertinent factors, including material supplied by
    the inmate and reports and material[,] which may be
    A-5645-16T2
    18
    submitted by any persons or agencies which have
    knowledge of the inmate.
    (b) The hearing officer, Board panel or Board shall
    consider the following factors and, in addition, may
    consider any other factors deemed relevant:
    1. Commission of an offense while
    incarcerated.
    2. Commission of serious disciplinary
    infractions.
    3. Nature and       pattern   of   previous
    convictions.
    4. Adjustment to previous probation,
    parole and incarceration.
    5. Facts and circumstances of the offense.
    6. Aggravating and mitigating factors
    surrounding the offense.
    7. Pattern of less serious disciplinary
    infractions.
    8. Participation in institutional programs
    which could have led to the improvement
    of problems diagnosed at admission or
    during incarceration. This includes, but is
    not limited to, participation in substance
    abuse programs, academic or vocational
    education programs, work assignments
    that provide on-the-job training and
    individual or group counseling.
    9. Statements by institutional staff, with
    supporting documentation, that the inmate
    is likely to commit a crime if released;
    A-5645-16T2
    19
    that the inmate has failed to cooperate in
    his or her own rehabilitation; or that there
    is a reasonable expectation that the inmate
    will violate conditions of parole.
    10. Documented pattern or relationships
    with institutional staff or inmates.
    11. Documented changes         in   attitude
    toward self or others.
    12. Documentation reflecting personal
    goals, personal strengths or motivation for
    law-abiding behavior.
    13. Mental and emotional health.
    14. Parole plans and the investigation
    thereof.
    15. Status of family or marital
    relationships at the time of eligibility.
    16. Availability of community resources
    or support services for inmates who have
    a demonstrated need for same.
    17. Statements by the inmate reflecting on
    the likelihood that he or she will commit
    another crime; the failure to cooperate in
    his or her own rehabilitation; or the
    reasonable expectation that he or she will
    violate conditions of parole.
    18. History of employment, education and
    military service.
    19. Family and marital history.
    A-5645-16T2
    20
    20. Statement by the court reflecting the
    reasons for the sentence imposed.
    21. Statements or evidence presented by
    the appropriate prosecutor's office, the
    Office of the Attorney General, or any
    other criminal justice agency.
    22. Statement or testimony of any victim
    or the nearest relative(s) of a
    murder/manslaughter victim.
    23. The results of the objective risk
    assessment instrument.
    [N.J.S.A. 10A:71-3.11 (emphasis added).]
    "Common sense dictates that [the Board's] prediction as to future conduct . . .
    be grounded on due consideration of the aggregate of all of the factors which
    may have any pertinence." Beckworth, 
    62 N.J. at 360
    .
    III.
    In denying parole, the Board heavily relied on Acoli's insufficient
    problem resolution. After completing its in-person interview of Acoli, the
    Board concluded that he lacked insight into his criminal behavior, denied key
    aspects of his crimes, and minimized his criminal conduct and anti-social
    behavior. The Board found Acoli did not answer questions at the hearing
    spontaneously, paused "before answering each question," and was "often
    hesitant to provid[e] details to even the simplest of questions." The Board
    A-5645-16T2
    21
    determined that his responses were "superficial in nature and appeared
    rehearsed in their structure."
    A.
    As to his continued denial of key aspects of his crimes, and his
    minimizing of his criminal conduct and anti-social behavior, we emphasize the
    difference between Acoli's present assertions and his previous statements in
    past hearings.    Previously we addressed whether Acoli's "forty-year-old
    recollection of the events [was] likely to change." We stated:
    The Board appeared to rely most heavily on its
    evaluation that Acoli lacked insight into his criminal
    behavior as he minimized his conduct and denied "key
    aspects of his commitment offenses." Specifically, the
    Board points out that he did not accept responsibility
    for his crimes because Acoli's version of the crimes
    was not consistent with the established facts[.]
    ....
    Acoli has alleged that he did not see who fired first as
    he was on the other side of the car; during the struggle
    with Foerster he was grazed by a bullet that rendered
    him temporarily unconscious; and when he regained
    consciousness Foerster was dead, and Harper had
    retreated.     Nevertheless, he has accepted full
    responsibility for the murder of Foerster and admitted
    he should not have struggled with the trooper and
    prevented him from aiding Harper.
    ....
    A-5645-16T2
    22
    The Board's reasoning that Acoli is likely to commit
    another crime if he does not recall the State's version
    of his crime has the draconian effect of condemning
    him to prison for the rest of his life.
    [Acoli I, slip op. at 8-9 (emphasis added).]
    In our unpublished opinion, we acknowledged the difficulty of
    considering parole of an inmate who admitted his role in murders, but also
    claimed he was unable to remember details of the crimes:
    [I]n Trantino IV, . . . the Board "based its successive
    denials of parole in large measure on the fact that
    Trantino was avoiding responsibility for [his] crimes."
    154 N.J. at 33-34. The Board refused to grant parole
    until Trantino fully admitted his role in his murders,
    which Trantino did not deny responsibility for, but
    claimed that he could not remember the details of
    because of the drugs and alcohol he had consumed
    that night. Id. at 34-35. Since Trantino's absence of
    memory was consistent, the Supreme Court found that
    he could not and would not "ever be able to remember
    actually pulling the trigger." Id. at 35, 38. As such,
    the Court precluded the Board from relying on his lack
    of recollection in its parole denial. Trantino VI, . . .
    
    166 N.J. at 193-94
    .
    [Acoli I, slip op. at 9 (alteration in original) (emphasis
    added).]
    The Board members questioned Acoli about Trantino at the full Board
    in-person hearing. Acoli stated, "[Trantino is] a very well-known case . . . I
    know a little about it now . . . because I read it and [it is] a famous case." At
    the hearing Acoli asserted that he "blacked out" from a grazed bullet, which
    A-5645-16T2
    23
    purportedly rendered him temporarily unconscious and therefore unable to
    know who killed the trooper.        A Board member stated that Acoli's
    assertion⸻that he could not remember since he "blacked out"⸺was
    remarkably similar to Trantino's inability to remember the details of the
    underlying crime.
    The Board had difficulty believing Acoli "blacked out" and was rendered
    unconscious because of a grazed bullet. The Board also found it "disturbing"
    that Acoli "deviate[d] from [his] past statements and speculated the trooper
    was killed by friendly fire." The Board noted Acoli previously asserted he
    "blacked out" before the trooper was shot, which is inconsistent with his
    statement at the hearing that the trooper was probably killed while Acoli
    struggled with him. In other words, Acoli—unlike in Trantino—did not have a
    consistent "absence of memory."
    Q. [Trooper Foerster] began to pat you down?
    A. Right.
    Q. Okay. And what . . . did he find?
    A. He found the [ammunition] clip in my belt pocket,
    and the [loaded] 380 [semiautomatic handgun] in my
    right pocket.
    ....
    Q. What happen[ed] next?
    A-5645-16T2
    24
    A. [H]e seemed to get mad, and I think he swung and
    hit me with [a] roundhouse right upside the head on
    my . . . temple.
    ....
    Q. So he hit you with the gun[?]
    A. Right . . . with his gun.
    ....
    Q. [Y]ou heard shots fired, correct?
    A. Right, um-hum.
    ....
    Q. [W]here did the first gunshots come from, do you
    know?
    A. No, I don't know.
    ....
    Q. [Y]ou knew it was not from Trooper Foerster[?]
    A. Right, um-hum.
    Q. Okay. So then what did you do in response to . . .
    the shots being fired?
    A. I immediately grabbed [Trooper Foerster's] gun
    that he was whipping me with by the barrel, and
    pushed it to the side.[4] And just as I pushed [it] to the
    side, [Trooper Foerster] fired . . . in[to] my [right]
    hand.
    4
    Trooper Foerster died from two bullets that came from his own gun.
    A-5645-16T2
    25
    ....
    Q. And where was your weapon at the time?
    A. [Trooper Foerster] had it in his left hand.
    ....
    Q. [Y]ou thought you were protecting yourself?
    A. [Y]eah, in other words I figured . . . I didn't want
    him to shoot me.
    Q. How many times did he hit you with his weapon?
    A. [T]wo or three[.]
    ....
    Q. [H]e gave you a roundhouse, you said before.
    A. Right, uh-huh.
    Q. Are you saying he followed that up with two or
    three more blows?
    A. Uh, yeah[.]
    ....
    Q. Did you hear [the gunshots] stop[?]
    A. Yeah. . . . [Trooper Harper] was aiming a gun at
    me, and then a – puff of smoke, just seemed as [if] it
    came out – out of the barrel, and I blacked out.
    At the hearing, Acoli stated that he regained consciousness after Trooper
    Foerster was shot, then he returned to his car and helped his two passengers
    A-5645-16T2
    26
    into it, and then drove three-to-five miles away. The Board questioned Acoli
    about these details:
    Q. [W]hat did you do next?
    A. [I could not] see because the blood was running all
    in my eyes[.]
    Q. Because blood was running into your eyes –
    A. Right.
    Q. – from the wound on your –
    A. Right, on my –
    Q. – person?
    A. Yeah, on my head.
    Q. Where were you wounded?
    A. Uh, where the bullet grazed my head[.]
    ....
    Q. But I'm looking at the pictures here when you were
    taken into custody, and there are no marks on your
    face . . . . [W]hy don't [you] think you had marks on
    your face if somebody pistol-whipped you?
    A. Because, uh – okay, the first time he hit me, he hit
    me with the flat of the gun . . . up the side of [my]
    temple. And then – and the next ones, I kind of – kind
    of blocked it . . . . And by then, uh, a little shortly
    after that, the gunfire broke out on the other side of
    the car[.]
    A-5645-16T2
    27
    Q. But you also said [Trooper Foerster] shot you [in
    your hand].
    A. Yeah, he did[.]
    ....
    Q. [Trooper] Foerster's gun was a six-shot Colt
    revolver . . . and only had two spent rounds in the
    cartridge, and both of those bullets were . . . taken out
    [of] his head . . . . There was no third shot, sir.
    A. Then, uh – I don't know, you know.
    ....
    Q. [Y]ou're claiming that . . . Trooper Harper shot[] at
    you?
    A. Yes[.]
    Q. Okay.
    A. [Trooper] Harper hit me in the head with the
    gunshot.
    ....
    Q. [But] [t]here's no reference to [your head wound]
    in the trial record. Why is that?
    ....
    A. [A]t the time I went to trial[,] . . . [my lawyer] was
    useless.
    ....
    Q. "[Trooper Foerster] had head bore abrasions on the
    left cheek, lacerations at the top of the forehead, the
    A-5645-16T2
    28
    mid forehead, and the left side of the head . . . . He
    had bruises and abrasions on both hands." Upon your
    arrest, "[t]he only injury found was a cut on the
    webbing between [your] right thumb and forefinger.
    Otherwise, [you were] unmarked and uninjured."
    A. All I know is [Trooper Foerster] assailed me.
    ....
    Q. Well, then how did he have so many bruises and
    bumps, and you only [had] one?
    A. I had more, they weren't – they didn't record those.
    Q. You think they're lying [about your injuries]?
    ....
    A. They're lying about it.
    At a later point during the full hearing, Acoli explained to the Board for the
    first time that Trooper Foerster was killed during Acoli's struggle with him—
    which necessarily means that he was not unconscious when the trooper was
    shot.
    Q. Who do you think killed Trooper Foerster?
    ....
    A. I think he was probably shot by Trooper Harper.
    ....
    Q. You really think that?
    A. Yeah, um-hum.
    A-5645-16T2
    29
    Q. While you were struggling with him?
    A. Um-hum.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    Acoli provided inconsistent responses.      He alleged that "during the
    struggle with Foerster he was grazed by a bullet that rendered him temporarily
    unconscious[,] [and] when he regained consciousness[,] Foerster was dead[.]"
    Acoli I, slip op. at 8. But at the full hearing, he said that Trooper Harper shot
    Trooper Foerster while Acoli was struggling with Trooper Foerster.
    The Board therefore determined that Acoli appeared to "emotionally
    block[] any association to the murder by deflecting any acceptance of personal
    liability or responsibility." At the hearing, instead of maintaining that he was
    unconscious when the killing occurred, and therefore he did not know who
    killed the trooper, Acoli explained that the trooper was shot during the
    struggle. As to Acoli's explanation for how Trooper Foerster was killed, the
    Board stated:
    Although the ballistic evidence reveals that could not
    be the case, as the trooper was shot with his own
    weapon, it is disturbing that you would make such
    conjecture, especially considering your assertions that
    you take responsibility for the crime. Based upon the
    fact that you present as not having conducted a
    complete critical analysis of yourself and the internal
    and external factors that control your behaviors, the
    Board finds that more work in this area must be
    completed.
    A-5645-16T2
    30
    B.
    The Board was troubled by Acoli's responses and mannerisms, his
    refusal to accept responsibility for Trooper Foerster's murder, and his inability
    to elaborate on his behavioral growth.         The Board found that Acoli's
    "presentation" at the hearing was insincere, as his "answers were not
    spontaneous and [he] paused before answering each question[.]"         As to his
    rehearsed responses, the Board questioned him about his efforts to use his
    counseling to become more convincing. The following colloquy occurred:
    Q. [Y]ou expressed . . . that you wanted to work on
    counseling, and it says [in the counseling report] that
    "[y]ou came up with the idea that you're not
    convincing enough during your parole hearings, and
    wanted to know, through counseling, how to be more
    convincing in the parole hearings."
    A. Um –
    ....
    Q. [W]hat were you trying to be convincing about?
    A. I don't know[.]
    After assessing his manner during the hearing, the Board found that Acoli's
    "presentation" was "shallow and emotionless."
    To support its conclusion that Acoli lacked insight into his criminal
    behavior, the Board pointed out that Acoli failed to take responsibility for
    A-5645-16T2
    31
    shooting   Trooper   Foerster⸻especially       since   he   apparently    was    not
    unconscious during the shooting of Foerster. Rather, Acoli took responsibility
    for struggling with the trooper, which he then maintained led to Trooper
    Harper killing Trooper Foerster.      Nevertheless, the Board found that the
    ballistics evidence showed otherwise. Importantly, the Board questioned how
    Acoli could say⸻if he "blacked out" before the killing⸻that he believed
    Trooper Harper accidentally shot Trooper Foerster.
    Q. [Y]ou're not responsible for the death, are you?
    A. Responsible for the death? Yeah, I'm responsible
    for the death. Part of it because, uh, uh, I guess I – if I
    hadn't struggled with him, he could have likely went
    and helped his partner . . . and he might have lived.
    But I don't really see how he could've went and helped
    him until he took care of me, one way or the other.
    And I think the quickest way to take care of me
    would've been to have shot me, and get me out of the
    way, and go help his partner. But by me struggling
    with him, it did, uh, possibly keep him from living.
    And I'm probably, you know, the cause of his death.
    ....
    Q. I don't understand how a man can do [forty-three]
    years [in prison] and still act like he didn't [shoot the
    trooper].
    A. I took responsibility for it.
    Q.   How can you take responsibility, sir, for
    something you say you didn't do?
    A-5645-16T2
    32
    A. I – uh, I explained what I said – that I did, that I
    struggled with him, and prevent[ed] him from going to
    the aid of his –
    Q. Sir, you didn't get life for a struggle. You got life
    for the murder, for putting the bullets in his head,
    that's what you got life for.
    A. I didn't put the bullets in his head.
    Q. But that's what you got life for.
    A. Um, that's what I took responsibility for then.
    These concerns, in part, led the Board to conclude Acoli lacked sufficient
    problem resolution, "specifically, that he lacked insight into his criminal
    behavior."
    On remand, the Board obtained a new psychological evaluation pursuant
    to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.7, which states "[a]t any time while an inmate is
    committed to the custody of the Commissioner, the appropriate Board panel or
    the Board may require, as often as it deems necessary, the inmate to undergo
    an in-depth pre-parole psychological evaluation conducted by a psychologist."
    The new report—a confidential report that was not part of the previous
    administrative record—is unquestionably less favorable to Acoli than the 2010
    evaluation. This new report, by a different psychologist, which we have fully
    reviewed, played an indispensable part in the Board's final decision.
    A-5645-16T2
    33
    Although Acoli contends that the Board did not fully consider mitigating
    evidence, the record reflects otherwise.      The Board reviewed his program
    participation, prison history, pre-parole reports, and respective notices of
    decisions and case assessments. The Board was aware of Acoli's rehabilitation
    efforts when it conducted the full Board in-person hearing. It is undisputed
    that Acoli participated in programs during incarceration. As the Board pointed
    out in its final decision:
    [T]he Board reviewed [Acoli's] entire record in
    rendering its decision. His age and personal and
    medical histories; his criminal history; his record of
    rehabilitative program participation (including each of
    those programs referenced in your appeal); his current
    custody status and institutional work history; and his
    infraction-free status (since his last Board panel
    hearing); are all matters of record, were noted in the
    pre-parole report, the parole case file, and/or the Case
    Assessment at the time of his Initial Parole Hearing,
    and were considered by the Board. Based on the
    information on record, the Board appropriately noted
    as mitigation on the Notice of Decision: minimal
    offense record; all opportunities on community
    supervision completed without violations; infraction
    free since last panel; participation in programs specific
    to behavior; and participation in institutional
    programs.
    After fully questioning Acoli and considering the entire record—especially the
    new psychological evaluation—the Board exercised its expertise and
    concluded that the aggravating factors, specifically his insufficient problem
    resolution, outweighed the mitigating factors.
    A-5645-16T2
    34
    After we noted that "Acoli acknowledged that at the time of the crimes
    he was involved in revolutionary groups, was armed with a weapon, and was
    traveling with a wanted fugitive[,]" Acoli I, slip op. at 8, we stated—based on
    the administrative paper record⸻that "Acoli consistently espoused the same
    sequence of events since his arrest[.]" 
    Ibid.
     But that is no longer the case.
    Instead of consistently saying that "a bullet . . . rendered [Acoli] temporarily
    unconscious[,] . . . and when he regained consciousness [Trooper] Foerster was
    dead," ibid., Acoli stated that Trooper Harper accidentally shot Trooper
    Foerster while Acoli struggled with Trooper Foerster.5
    Finally, the Board concluded that Acoli could not articulate how he
    changed his anti-social patterns. Considering Acoli's previous participation in
    a "radical organization," the Board thought it was important to assess "the
    manner in which [Acoli would] conduct [himself] and address and process
    confrontational situations or situations involving societal conflict." The Board
    stressed that "upon release, [Acoli] may be faced with similarly charged
    5
    In our prior opinion, we stated that "[t]here were no eyewitnesses to
    [Trooper] Foerster's shooting[,] and [that] the Middlesex County Prosecutor[,]
    in a letter to the Board opposing Acoli's parole before the hearing, pointed out
    that [Acoli's passenger] might have fired [Trooper] Foerster's gun." Acoli I,
    slip op. at 8 n.9. But at the full hearing, the Board questioned Acoli about
    whether one of his passenger's shot [Trooper] Foerster, and Acoli remained
    steadfast that, in a "[f]riendly fire shot," Trooper Harper "probably" shot
    Trooper Foerster while Acoli struggled with Trooper Foerster because Trooper
    Harper "was doing . . . all the shooting."
    A-5645-16T2
    35
    situations regarding social injustice and community activism." Therefore, the
    Board felt it was necessary to understand how Acoli's views on violence and
    activism changed throughout his confinement.          The Board found that he
    continued to believe his actions were justified, he had no understanding of why
    violence was necessary to affect social change, and that he failed to show how
    his criminal thinking pattern changed. The Board questioned him on these
    topics. For example, the Board addressed a Criminal Thinking Program Acoli
    participated in.
    Q. [Do you remember] taking the Criminal Thinking
    Group [class]?
    A. . . . I do remember taking Criminal Thinking.
    ....
    A. I can't remember . . . many details [of] it.
    Q. Details about what? I'm just asking about the
    Criminal Thinking Program.
    A. That's what I mean, that – uh, all that I know is
    that I knew – I know that – that I took it.
    ....
    Q. [W]hat [did] you learn[] in it?
    A. . . . I'm not absolutely sure, but I think it probably
    had to do with, um, criminal mentality[.]
    Q. . . . I want to know how it helped you, and what it
    changed in your way of thinking, and making
    A-5645-16T2
    36
    decisions, and how you look at the issues that you've
    been involved in[.]
    A. Okay. All I . . . can really know is I don't [have]
    intentions of being involved in any criminal activity.
    Q. . . . I'm more interested in what you've learned
    [from the program] [b]ecause you say that you've
    completed the program [but the record] says here that
    you didn't[.]
    ....
    Q. [Y]ou can't tell me what you've learned, but can
    you explain to me how your criminal thinking has
    changed?
    A. Uh –
    ....
    Q. Explain to us, please, what have you learned from
    that class?
    A. Um, offhand, I'd have to say that you don't break
    the law. It has something to do with not breaking the
    law.
    Acoli continued that one should "stay away from the violence" and avoid
    "getting something for nothing."
    IV.
    Our dissenting colleague concludes that our opinion "inflicts a blow to
    the integrity of our justice system[.]" Post at ___ (slip op. at 1). The premise
    of his conclusion is that the remand proceedings amounted to "nothing more
    A-5645-16T2
    37
    than a 'show hearing,' [which] only resulte[d] in the denial of parole again 'for
    no rational or just purpose.'" 
    Ibid.
     Our colleague asserts that we "abandon[ed]
    our guiding principles" and have "contravene[d] the public policy behind the
    Parole Act[.]"   
    Id.
     at ___ (slip op. at 1-2).      To the contrary, we have
    systematically adhered to decades of precedent, applied our long-standing
    standard of review, and resisted the temptation to substitute our judgment for
    that of the "agency charged with the expertise to make such highly predictive,
    individualistic determinations—the full Parole Board." Acoli II, 
    224 N.J. 230
    -
    31. We therefore, respectfully, strongly disagree with his characterization of
    our decision—or for that matter—his implication that the Board simply went
    through the motions on remand.
    As the new record reflects, our colleague erroneously suggests the Board
    denied parole solely because Acoli "refus[ed] to accept the facts as found by
    the jury."6 Post at ___ (slip op. at 13). He is concerned that "other prisoners
    6
    Our colleague relies on Kosmin v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    363 N.J. Super. 28
    ,
    42 (App. Div. 2003) for the proposition that "[t]he Parole Board cannot insist
    that [an inmate]'s insight into [his] criminal behavior is impaired by reason of
    the fact that [he] will not admit that [he] was the actual shooter." Post at ___
    (slip op. at 12). The Board here did not find Acoli's "criminal behavior was
    impaired" as a result of his unwillingness to admit he shot the trooper.
    Instead, the Board relied on the new psychological report—as well as the
    entire new record—and concluded that Acoli suffered from insufficient
    problem resolution (despite his rehabilitation efforts). And importantly,
    Kosmin is factually distinguishable. In Kosmin, the defendant pled guilty, and
    (continued)
    A-5645-16T2
    38
    who . . . look to the Parole Board's actions [will] see no reason to hope that
    they will be paroled when eligible[.]" 
    Id.
     at ___ (slip op. at 15-16). Our
    colleague has determined that because the Board purportedly ignored Acoli's
    "development and rehabilitation [efforts] since he committed his crime," and
    has instead denied parole based "upon the crime itself," there may be no
    incentive for "model prisoners[] like Acoli" to "maintain order." 
    Id.
     at ___
    (slip op. at 6). Our colleague believes this may lead to a "possibility" of
    creating a risk of resurgence in prison unrest. 
    Id.
     at ___ (slip op. at 6-7). This
    is not a situation where the Board found Acoli was a "model prisoner[],"
    ignored his rehabilitation efforts, and then denied him parole "for no rational
    or just purpose." 
    Id.
     at ___ (slip op. at 1, 6).
    We disagree with our colleague's assertion that "the record . . . has
    remained virtually unchanged since [this court] visited this matter in 2014."
    
    Id.
     at ___ (slip op. at 1). One obvious difference is the new psychologist
    report, which added different critical insight for the Board's consideration.
    (continued)
    the Board considered a psychological report that explained the defendant
    displayed "evidence of anxiety, sadness, remorse, guilt and pain"; that her
    "[s]peech was fluid, articulate and relevant"; and that "[s]he was primarily
    fully engaged in direct eye contact with the examiner." Kosmin, 363 N.J.
    Super. at 35.
    A-5645-16T2
    39
    Indeed, our colleague concedes that the new report—obtained properly by the
    Board under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.7—"formulated a much less favorable opinion
    about Acoli than the [psychological] report the Board considered in 2011." Id.
    at ___ (slip op. at 10). The dissent points out that the new report does not use
    the words "friendly fire." Id. at ___ (slip op. at 11 n.6). Rather than focusing
    on what the report did not say, the Board concentrated on what the
    psychologist actually said.
    Let us be clear. Our colleague states that the new psychologist did not
    mention in her report that "Acoli said anything about 'friendly fire.'" Ibid.
    Instead, she reported he could "not even fathom who could have possibly
    pulled the trigger." This is diametrically opposed to his unequivocal statement
    to the full Board⸻given just a couple of months after the psychological
    interview—that Trooper Harper "probably shot" Trooper Foerster while (not
    after) Acoli struggled with Trooper Foerster. Acoli did not say to the Board
    that Trooper Harper shot Foerster while Acoli was unconscious; he said that
    Harper "probably" shot Foerster during the struggle because Harper "was
    doing . . . all the shooting."   Questioning him about the shooting is not
    surprising, especially because Acoli himself placed his credibility in play when
    he said he blacked out.
    A-5645-16T2
    40
    There was nothing perfunctory about the new report. To the contrary,
    the psychologist rendered her twelve-page, single-spaced report after
    interviewing Acoli on two days, reviewing approximately twenty-one
    documents (including the previous psychology report referred to by our
    colleague), and performing a psychometric evaluation. The Board's reliance
    on her clinical opinions and recommendations undermines our colleague's
    determination that the Board somehow denied parole "for no rational or just
    purpose." Id. at ___ (slip op. at 1).
    Another obvious important difference is that during the last hearing
    before it, the Board conducted a lengthy in-person hearing at which all the
    members questioned Acoli about a variety of subjects. We must not lose sight
    of what that means. The Board based its findings—that his responses were
    insincere, rehearsed, shallow, and emotionless—on each Board member's first-
    hand opportunity at the hearing to observe and listen to his testimony, things
    that no reviewing court (without being there) can perceive by simply reading a
    transcript.     The Board assessed Acoli's demeanor and mannerisms and
    concluded he gave contradictory and implausible responses, especially about
    blacking out.
    This record—not the earlier one—supports the difficulty the Board had
    believing Acoli blacked out. That is so because the Board learned for the first
    A-5645-16T2
    41
    time that Acoli remembered almost everything else.           For example, he
    remembered being pulled over; exiting his car with a loaded semiautomatic
    weapon; and walking towards Trooper Foerster. He recalled Trooper Foerster
    struck him with a roundhouse "upside my head," and that the Trooper
    "whipp[ed]" him two or three times with the "barrel" of Trooper Foerster's gun
    (although the photographs showed no injuries to his head or face) .            He
    identified the hand in which Trooper Foerster was holding a gun.               He
    explained he heard gunshots, saw gun smoke and Trooper Harper's face, and
    that Trooper Harper fired at him, grazing his head with a bullet, which Acoli
    said rendered him unconscious. He testified that Trooper Harper "probably
    shot" Foerster in friendly fire, and specifically denied that his two passengers
    could have done so.     Acoli testified that he regained consciousness after
    Trooper Foerster died, returned to his car, helped his passengers into his car,
    and drove three-to-five miles away from the scene of the murder, where the
    police captured him hiding in the woods. His entire testimony supported the
    Board's finding that he "emotionally blocked any association of the murder,"
    which directly supported its conclusion that he minimized his criminal conduct
    and anti-social behavior.
    Finally, the Board focused on Acoli's rehabilitation efforts and
    concentrated on his continued insufficient problem resolution. Our colleague
    A-5645-16T2
    42
    points out that Acoli participated in "at least 100 different programs for self -
    improvement as well as vocational training[.]" Id. at ___ (slip op. at 11 n.5).
    And he is right.      But when the Board asked him open-ended questions,
    specifically what he had learned from his Criminal Thinking Group class,
    Acoli said "I'm not absolutely sure . . . [i]t has something to do with not
    breaking the law." Thus, contrary to our colleague's belief that the Board
    denied parole only because Acoli did not admit to the shooting, the Board
    relied on all of his testimony—and its review of the entire case file—and
    concluded Acoli failed to demonstrate the necessary insight into his
    incomplete problem resolution progress, and denied parole "at the present
    time."
    Emphasizing that we are not to substitute our judgment for that of the
    full Parole Board, we will not do so here. Acoli II, 224 N.J. at 230-31. It is
    clear from the record before us that the Board did not act arbitrarily or
    capriciously in denying Acoli's parole application.     Indeed, there is ample
    support in the record for the Board's determination that there is a substantial
    A-5645-16T2
    43
    likelihood that Acoli will commit another crime under the laws of this State if
    the Board grants him parole.7 See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a).
    Affirmed.
    7
    We note the Board's December 22, 2016 FET decision states that Acoli's
    projected parole eligibility date was in March 2019; and he is entitled to
    annual parole reviews. The Board stated:
    It is strongly encouraged that you participate in these
    reviews. If the Board panel determines at your annual
    review that you have made progress towards your
    rehabilitation, the Board panel may authorize a
    reduction in the [FET]. Also, the Board panel has the
    option of referring your case for a parole release
    hearing.
    A-5645-16T2
    44
    ROTHSTADT, J.A.D. dissenting.
    As Justice Albin observed in his dissent from the Court's opinion in
    Acoli v. New Jersey State Parole Board (Acoli II), 
    224 N.J. 213
     (2016), "this
    case is about more than one individual. It is about the integrity of our justice
    system."   
    Id. at 241
     (Albin, J., dissenting). The majority's opinion today,
    affirming the Parole Board's latest denial of parole to Acoli, inflicts a blow to
    the integrity of our justice system by fulfilling Justice Albin's prediction, in the
    same dissent, that the Supreme Court's remand to the Parole Board in Acoli II
    would amount to nothing more than a "show hearing," and only result in the
    denial of parole again "for no rational or just purpose." 
    Id. at 240
    .
    Although the majority affirms the Parole Board's decision under its view
    that new information justified the Parole Board's actions, its perception is
    belied by the record that has remained virtually unchanged since we last
    visited this matter in 2014. See Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Acoli I), No.
    A-3575-10 (App. Div. Sept. 29, 2014). Moreover, despite the fact that in
    1974, Acoli's sentence could not legally have been life without parole, the
    impact of the majority's opinion affirming the Parole Board's actions, which
    were based upon the "strong winds of public opinion," Acoli II, 224 N.J. at
    241 (Albin, J., dissenting), imposes that very sentence on Acoli. In doing so,
    the majority abandons our guiding principles, that "the most despised inmate is
    entitled to the protection and enforcement of the law," id. at 234, "and that the
    law must apply 'equally to all persons, the bad as well as the good.'" Id. at 233
    (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino VI), 
    166 N.J. 113
    , 197-98
    (2001)).    Also, by affirming the Parole Board's action, the majority
    contravenes the public policy behind the Parole Act of 1979, N.J.S.A. 30:4-
    123.45 to -123.88 (Parole Act), which supports the maintenance of a fair
    system of parole, by jeopardizing the public's safety. For these reasons, I
    respectfully dissent.
    I.
    At the outset, as we acknowledged in Acoli I, I remain "appalled by
    Acoli's senseless crimes, which left a member of the State Police, [State
    Trooper Werner Foerster,] dead and another, [State Trooper James Harper,]
    injured, as well as one of Acoli's associates dead and the other injured."1 Acoli
    I, slip op. at 27.      Surely, it was "the most heinous crime . . . which, if
    committed today, would result in a life sentence without parole eligibility. "
    Acoli II, 224 N.J. at 234 (Albin, J., dissenting).    Moreover, both troopers'
    1
    As we observed in our earlier opinion, "Acoli began a physical struggle with
    Foerster. According to ballistic evidence, Foerster was shot once with Acoli 's
    weapon, then shot with his own service revolver twice more in the head,
    killing him." Acoli I, slip op. at 3. We also observed that there were no
    eyewitnesses to the shooting and noted a statement filed by the county
    prosecutor in response to Acoli being considered for parole, which speculated
    that a third party "might have fired Foerster's gun." Id. at 23 n.9.
    A-5645-16T2
    2
    families' and Trooper Harper's continuing trauma, pain, and suffering cannot
    be overstated.
    It is beyond cavil that Acoli's receipt of the maximum lawful sentence
    available at the time was, to say the least, appropriate under the circumstances.
    However, it is equally beyond any dispute that parole determinations must be
    based upon "what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what
    he has done." Id. at 222 (majority opinion) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of
    Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 
    442 U.S. 1
    , 10 (1979)). That was not the case
    here.
    II.
    An understanding of parole and its importance to the public's safety is
    central to recognizing why parole determinations must be based upon an
    inmate's experience and development since he committed his crime, and why
    the Parole Board's actions here established a disincentive for inmates to pursue
    proper conduct while incarcerated, thereby threatening the public's safety.
    "Parole is a period of supervised release 'by which a prisoner is allowed
    to serve the final portion of his sentence outside the gates of the institution on
    certain terms and conditions, in order to prepare for his eventual return to
    society.'"    State v. Black, 
    153 N.J. 438
    , 447 (1998) (emphasis omitted)
    (quoting State v. Oquendo, 
    262 N.J. Super. 317
    , 324 (App. Div.), rev'd on
    A-5645-16T2
    3
    other grounds, 
    133 N.J. 416
     (1993)). Our current procedure for determining
    whether an inmate should be paroled was established by the Legislature's 1979
    enactment of the Parole Act that changed the entire process.
    The purpose for the new legislation was described in accompanying
    statements issued by the Assembly, Senate, and Governor in 1979. In those
    statements, the need for the reform was based upon "uncertainties about parole
    and perceptions of injustice in the parole process [that had been] key causes"
    of riots in prisons in New Jersey and elsewhere. Assembly Judiciary, Law,
    Public Safety and Defense Committee, Statement to Assembly Bill No. 3093,
    at 1 (Dec. 3, 1979).     The Legislature envisioned that the reforms would
    "contribute to the effectiveness of parole as a tool for reducing recidivism, and
    [would] contribute to the maintenance of institutional order." 
    Ibid.
     (emphasis
    added).
    Prior to the 1979 reforms, an inmate was obligated to "prove his fitness
    to be released in order to be granted parole." Id. at 2; see also In re Parole
    Application of Trantino (Trantino II), 
    89 N.J. 347
    , 355 (1982). One of the
    major reforms was to shift the burden of proof as to an inmate's eligibility for
    parole from the inmate to the Parole Board. The legislation required that an
    inmate "would be paroled on his primary eligibility date unless the State
    proves 'by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a substantial
    A-5645-16T2
    4
    likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime if released.'" Ibid.; see also
    N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 
    93 N.J. 192
    , 205 (1983) ("The legislation shifts
    the burden to the State to prove that the prisoner is a recidivist and should not
    be released.").
    The 1979 Parole Act therefore "create[d] a presumption of release on [an
    inmate's] parole eligibility date." Kosmin v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    363 N.J. Super. 28
    , 41-43 (App. Div. 2003).            Moreover, it "create[d] a legitimate
    expectation of release . . . absent findings that justification for deferral exists,"
    and gave rise to "a federally-protected liberty interest." Trantino VI, 
    166 N.J. at 197
     (quoting Byrne, 
    93 N.J. at 207
    ).
    The reasons for why this change was important to the overhaul of the
    process was summarized as follows:
    First, it is felt that this shift better complements
    the generally longer sentence of the code and that the
    power to decide how long a convict should be
    imprisoned belongs to the sentencing court rather than
    the parole board. Secondly, it is argued that the shift
    better reflects the practicalities of the parole process.
    Since the key issue in determining fitness for parole is
    the question of recidivism and since it is impossible
    for a person to prove he will not do something, the
    present practice is for the authorities to present
    evidence showing a likelihood of future criminal
    activity in order for there to be a denial of parole.
    Thus, it is felt that in shifting the burden, Assembly
    Bill No. 3093 merely confirms statutory law to the
    practical dynamics of the parole process. The third
    reason offered for the shift in burden is the hope that it
    A-5645-16T2
    5
    will make the parole process more consistent        and
    predictable. The official reports on the Rahway     and
    Attica riots cited uncertainties about parole       and
    perceptions of injustice in the parole process as   key
    causes of the riots.
    [Senate Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee,
    Statement to Assembly Bill No. 3093, at 2-3 (Dec. 10,
    1979) (emphasis added).]
    As the Legislature recognized, predictability is vital to the parole
    process. In order to maintain public safety, inmates must understand that their
    protected interest in being paroled is honored by the grant of parole to
    deserving prisoners. The anticipation of parole for inmates who have served
    sentences with little or no incidents or infractions provides positive
    reinforcement for behavioral change, and is a viable incentive for prisoners to
    rehabilitate themselves while in prison and avoid engaging in criminal
    behavior. The possibility of parole encourages prisoners to adhere to prison
    rules and maintain good behavior in prison.
    For that reason, if model prisoners, like Acoli, perceive that parole
    decisions are not based upon an inmate's development and rehabilitation since
    he committed his crime, but upon the crime itself, there is no incentive to
    maintain order, creating a risk of a resurgence in the prison unrest that the
    1979 Parole Act sought to address.        The possibility of that resurgence is
    A-5645-16T2
    6
    heightened where, as here, there is insufficient evidence that a candidate for
    parole is substantially likely to commit a crime if released.
    III.
    Under the Parole Act, a Parole Board's decision to grant or deny parole
    for crimes committed before August 1997 turns on whether there is a
    "substantial likelihood" that the inmate will commit another crime if released. 2
    N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) (1979); see also N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10(a); Acoli II,
    224 N.J. at 235-36 (2016) (Albin, J., dissenting); Williams v. N.J. State Parole
    Bd., 
    336 N.J. Super. 1
    , 7 (App. Div. 2000). "The [Parole] Act thus posits the
    likelihood of future criminal conduct as the determinative test for parole
    eligibility and effectively establishes a presumption in favor of parole."
    Trantino II, 
    89 N.J. at 355-56
    . Under this test, the burden is on the Parole
    Board "to prove that the prisoner is a recidivist and should not be released."
    Byrne, 
    93 N.J. at 205
    .
    "The [Parole] Board is the administrative agency charged with the
    responsibility of deciding whether an inmate satisfies the criteria for parole
    release under the Parole Act of 1979." Trantino VI, 
    166 N.J. at 173
     (quoting
    2
    The standard for parole for crimes committed after 1997 is different. That
    standard requires that there be proof "by a preponderance of the evidence that
    the inmate has failed to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation or that there
    is a reasonable expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of parole . . .
    if released on parole at that time." N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53.
    A-5645-16T2
    7
    In re Parole Application of Hawley, 
    98 N.J. 108
    , 112 (1984)). In determining
    parole eligibility, the Parole Board is to consider the twenty-three non-
    exclusive   factors   enumerated     in   N.J.A.C.   10A:71-3.11(b),     including
    commission of offenses or serious disciplinary infractions while incarcerated;
    the nature and pattern of previous convictions; facts and circumstances of the
    offense; participation in institutional programs; statements of institutional staff
    as to readiness for parole; relationships with institutional staff; changes in
    attitude; personal strengths and motivations; statements from the inmate, the
    prosecutor's office, and the victim's family; and the results of objective risk
    assessment instruments. However, the Parole Board is not required to consider
    each and every factor, rather it should consider those applicable to each case.
    McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    347 N.J. Super. 544
    , 561 (App. Div. 2002).
    It should not place undue emphasis on any one factor, especially the crime that
    the inmate committed. See Trantino VI, 
    166 N.J. at 189-90
     (stating the Parole
    Board may not rely on selective portions of the record that support its
    determination of likely recidivism while overlooking or undervaluing
    conflicting information).
    Here, "the Parole Board's finding that [Acoli] was substantially likely to
    recidivate was based not on a preponderance of the evidence in the record, but
    rather on the [Parole] Board's selective and arbitrary reliance on only those
    A-5645-16T2
    8
    portions of the record that could possibly support the [Parole] Board's
    conclusion," and which related to his refusal to admit that he shot Foerster. 
    Id. at 189
    . In reaching its conclusion that there was a substantial likelihood Acoli
    would commit a crime if released on parole, the Board ignored "substantial
    evidence in the record, spanning many years of infraction-free incarceration
    and [a] favorable psychological evaluation[], that demonstrated [Acoli]'s
    likelihood of success on parole." 
    Ibid.
    As recognized by the majority's opinion, the Parole Board's questioning
    of eighty-two-year-old Acoli and its final decision "heavily relied," ante at __
    (slip op. at 21), upon Acoli's commission of the crime and "for the first time,"
    ante at __ (slip op. at 29), his speculation about how his victim died, which
    differed from what his jury found more than four decades ago. 3 At the 2016
    hearing, as he did when we last reviewed this matter, and for decades before
    that, Acoli continued to maintain that he blacked out and did not know who
    actually shot Foerster. In response to questioning at the 2016 hearing that
    called for Acoli to speculate as to who he thought might have shot the Trooper,
    3
    As we observed in our earlier opinion, "Acoli consistently claimed that he
    was temporarily unconscious or 'blacked out' when Foerster was shot, having
    been grazed on his head by a bullet shot by Harper. He had no sign of such an
    injury when arrested." Acoli I, slip op. at 3 n.2.
    A-5645-16T2
    9
    Acoli stated it could have been "friendly fire," and he did not mention whether
    he was conscious.
    As the majority discusses at length, that speculation was inconsistent
    with his previous assertion that he did not know who shot Foerster and
    contradicts his claim that he passed out before the Trooper was shot. All of
    the other factors relied upon by the Parole Board in reaching its decision to
    deny parole were essentially identical to those that the Parole Board panel
    relied upon when it denied Acoli parole in 2011. 4 The only new substantive
    material considered by the Parole Board was a report from a psychologist who
    formulated a much less favorable opinion about Acoli than the report the
    Board considered in 2011, from Lois D. Goorwitz, Ph.D. 5 The new report,
    4
    At oral argument, the Parole Board agreed that it primarily relied upon
    Acoli's refusal to admit he pulled the trigger on the gun that killed Trooper
    Foerster, and that nothing else had changed about Acoli since we last reviewed
    the Parole Board's 2010 denial.
    5
    On remand from the Supreme Court, the Parole Board did not explain why it
    failed to rely on Goorwitz's report, but instead considered a new, less favorable
    report from a different professional.
    In his dissent, Justice Albin summarized the factors that we found in
    2014, which I conclude remained unchanged in 2016, and Goorwitz's findings.
    He stated the following:
    The appellate panel made the following observations:
    (1) Acoli has not committed a single disciplinary
    infraction since 1996, and accumulated only minor
    (continued)
    A-5645-16T2
    10
    which recommended against parole, also relied upon Acoli's refusal to admit
    he fired the weapon that killed Trooper Foerster. 6
    (continued)
    infractions since 1979; (2) his institutional progress
    report indicated that he "'has displayed a positive
    rapport with both staff and inmates'"; (3) Acoli
    "completed at least 100 different programs for self-
    improvement as well as vocational training"; (4) Acoli
    was a prisoner representative for the correctional
    facility's social resource organization, and as a result
    of "his positive institutional record, he became a
    member of the Honors Unit program"; and (5) in 2008,
    prison staff reported that Acoli had "demonstrated
    adequate coping skills . . . and ability to establish
    positive interaction with others," and that he was
    expected "to be able to transition to the community if
    paroled."
    The appellate panel also referenced the pre-parole
    mental     health    evaluation     conducted     by . . .
    Goorwitz . . . . Dr. Goorwitz noted that Acoli
    "'expressed regret and remorse about his involvement
    in the death of the state trooper'" and "'appeared to be
    answering honestly.'" Dr. Goorwitz also found Acoli
    "'to be very cooperative, self[-]reflective, thoughtful,
    and non[-]defensive in his responses to the questions
    posed to him.'"        (alteration in original).     She
    concluded that "'there were "NO psychological
    contraindications to granting parole."'"
    [Acoli II, 224 N.J. at 238-39.]
    6
    Without breaching the confidentiality of the report, it bears mentioning that
    it did not state that Acoli said anything about "friendly fire" when asked to
    speculate about who killed Foerster.
    A-5645-16T2
    11
    After considering the new report and other confidential records, as well
    as Acoli's testimony, the Parole Board denied his application, relying upon its
    members' dissatisfaction with Acoli's development over the last forty -six years
    since he committed his heinous crime. The Parole Board based its decision on
    his slow manner of speaking, the lack of depth to his answers, and
    significantly, as the majority recognized, the Parole Board's primary concern
    that Acoli still refused to admit that he shot Foerster. The Parole Board relied
    on that refusal to discount Acoli's repeated expressions of remorse for his
    involvement in the conduct that led to the Trooper's death and his exemplary
    record as a model prisoner for at least the past twenty years.
    The Parole Board's continued reliance on Acoli's refusal to admit to
    firing the fatal shots was insufficient to support its conclusion that he is
    substantially likely to commit a crime if released. "[T]he Parole Board cannot
    insist that [an inmate]'s insight into [his] criminal behavior is impaired by
    reason of the fact that [he] will not admit that [he] was the actual shooter."
    Kosmin, 363 N.J. Super. at 42. Such reliance is an abuse of the Parole Board's
    discretion. See Trantino VI, 
    166 N.J. at 177-78
     (finding that "the Board's
    A-5645-16T2
    12
    reliance on [petitioner's] inadequate recollection of the details of his crimes to
    support its denial of parole constituted a clear abuse of discretion").7
    I recognize the deference we afford to Parole Board determinations and
    that we will "not lightly reverse a parole-denial decision by the Parole Board."
    Kosmin, 363 N.J. Super. at 43.        Such action in the case of a convicted
    murderer of a law enforcement officer is, to say the least, "unusual." Acoli II,
    224 N.J. at 232. But, we remain tasked with "ensuring that administrative
    agencies not thwart the law in unpopular cases."           Id. at 240 (Albin, J.,
    dissenting) (citing Trantino VI, 
    166 N.J. at 197
    ). "[C]ourts [cannot] permit
    agencies of government to create exceptions to the rule of law, applying it for
    the many but exempting the disfavored, [without] irreparably damag[ing] the
    foundation of our democracy." 
    Id. at 233
     (quoting Trantino VI, 
    166 N.J. at 198
    ).
    Where, as here, the Parole Board denies parole because of an inmate's
    refusal to accept the facts as found by the jury, its decision cannot stand.
    7
    Notably, at the 2016 hearing, one of the Parole Board's members expressed
    his misguided view of the Court's holding in Trantino VI when he asked Acoli
    "Why would we think that you haven't taken a page out of the Trantino
    handbook, you know, which is basically, you know, how to -- how to kill a
    police officer, and then get paroled for it later on in life by -- by saying I don't
    remember?" The same member described the Court's holding again by stating
    "Well, it's basically a blanket disclaimer of responsibility for anything that
    happened because . . . I just can't remember it."
    A-5645-16T2
    13
    "[E]ven the most despised inmate is entitled to the protection and enforcement
    of the law." 
    Id. at 234
    . For this reason, although Acoli may be one of "the
    most disfavored member[s] of society," 
    id. at 241
    , I continue to hew to our
    earlier conclusion regarding Acoli's entitlement to parole and I would reverse
    the Parole Board's denial in this case. 8 See Acoli I, slip op. at 27-28. I would
    do so because our system of justice does not permit anything less.
    My view is not altered by the majority's opinion. Its reliance on Acoli's
    recent speculation about who may have shot Trooper Foerster fails to
    recognize that Acoli's speculation is an opinion about a possibility and not a
    statement of fact, and his flawed or even feigned memory loss is not sufficient
    cause to deny parole. Despite his speculation, Acoli has always maintained
    that he does not know who actually shot Trooper Foerster.
    Acoli has completed the penal portion of his sentence. He is now over
    eighty years old. He speaks slowly and forgets things. As we previously
    noted in 2014, his recollection overall was "consistent, but flawed." Acoli I,
    slip op. at 24. Now, years later, Acoli remains consistent in his claim that he
    does not remember who in fact shot Foerster. The majority's reliance on his
    8
    Notably, the Supreme Court did not pass upon our reasoning in Acoli I as it
    reversed our determination on procedural grounds, finding that after the Parole
    Board's panel denied parole, the next step in the administrative process was a
    full hearing before the entire Parole Board. See Acoli II, 224 N.J. at 232.
    A-5645-16T2
    14
    flawed speculation as to how he supposes that friendly fire may have caused
    Trooper Foerster's death is not sufficient to sustain the Parole Board's actions.
    In any event, although not admitting to being the actual shooter, Acoli
    has repeatedly expressed his remorse for his involvement in the crime that led
    to Trooper Foerster's death, he has disavowed his involvement with the radical
    group—the Black Liberation Army—and the necessity for violence, and he
    acknowledged the change in his thinking through counseling, classes, and
    President Obama's election. Acoli I, slip op. at 24-25.9 Also, as Acoli is now
    an octogenarian, there is a substantial decrease in any likelihood that he would
    commit a crime if released.      See State v. Davis, 
    96 N.J. 611
    , 618 (1984)
    ("[A]ge, as a demographic variable, has consistently been found to be strongly
    related to subsequent criminal activity.").
    The majority's comprehensive explanation of the Parole Board's actions
    does not alter the reality that Acoli, who is one of the longest-serving inmates
    in New Jersey, if not the longest, and who has been a model prisoner for
    decades, is being denied parole without any evidence that he is substantially
    likely to commit a crime if released. Both Acoli and other prisoners who will
    9
    Progress notes in the record described Acoli's success in prison programs
    and individual counseling geared toward developing positive changes in his
    attitudes that were also reflected by his testimony about the need to avoid
    criminal behavior, his repudiation of violence, and the positive development of
    his attitude toward the police and authorities in general and on racial issues.
    A-5645-16T2
    15
    look to the Parole Board's actions here and see no reason to hope that they will
    be paroled when eligible, are being wrongfully denied the predictability and
    justice that the Parole Act of 1979 was intended to secure—not only for their
    benefit, but for the benefit of the public as well.
    "Because of the Parole Board's unjustifiable and 'obvious overlooking or
    undervaluation of crucial evidence,' [I] have no doubt that its determination,
    based not on a preponderance of all evidence, but on evidence arbitrarily
    selected to support a desired result, is manifestly mistaken and [should] be set
    aside." Trantino VI, 
    166 N.J. at 192
     (citation omitted).
    A-5645-16T2
    16