STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. FARARHD H. GUNTER (14-02-0285, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0735-16T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FARARHD H. GUNTER, a/k/a
SHAMILL ABDULLAH, ANTWAN
GUNTER, FARAHD GUNTER, FARHAD
GUNTER, FARRARHD GUNTER,
HAKIM GUNTER, SAMAD GUNTER,
SAMMAD GUNTER, FARHAD GUNTHRE,
FAROD JOHNSON, FARROD JONES,
and JAMAR WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted May 1, 2018 – Decided June 22, 2018
Before Judges Moynihan and Natali.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No.
14-02-0285.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Stephen P. Hunter, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Svjetlana Tesic,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Fararhd H. Gunter appeals from his convictions by
jury for first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
4(a)(1) (count one);1 first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(3) (count two); first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1
(count three); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count four); second-degree possession of
weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count five);
second-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count nine); and
second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (count
ten), contending:
POINT I
THE STATEMENT OF CO-DEFENDANT HARRIS
INCULPATING DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN FURTHERANCE
OF THE CONSPIRACY AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
EXCLUDED ON DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OBJECTION. THE
IMPROPER ADMISSION OF THIS BRUTON[2]-TYPE
EVIDENCE DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL AND
REQUIRES REVERSAL.
1
The jury found defendant not guilty of murder – the indicted
charge – but found him guilty of the lesser-included charge of
aggravated manslaughter.
2
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
2 A-0735-16T3
POINT II
WHILE THE DENIAL OF THE DEFENSE MOTION FOR
SEVERANCE WAS REASONABLE, A SPECIFIC CHARGE
TO THE JURY ON PROPENSITY, AS THE TRIAL COURT
INITIALLY STATED WOULD BE GIVEN, WAS
NECESSARY. WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
GIVE ANY SUCH INSTRUCTION, THE DEFENDANT WAS
DENIED DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT III
IT IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT THAT A
FELONY MURDER CONVICTION LEADS TO A GREATER
SENTENCE THAN AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER BECAUSE
IT IS GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE AND IT SERVES
NO LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE TO PUNISH
A NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE MORE SEVERELY THAN A
RECKLESS HOMICIDE.
POINT IV
THE SENTENCE WAS EXCESSIVE.
In his pro se brief, he adds:
POINT I
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE
HE WAS DENIED RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION WHEN THE
STATE'S MAIN WITNESS GAVE A TESTIMONIAL
STATEMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT MADE BY A NON-
TESTIFYING CO-DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, PARAGRAPH 10 OF
THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION OF 1947.
POINT II
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL DUE TO
THE STATE['S] USE OF IMPERMISSIBLY SUGGESTIVE
OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES ON THE
LONE EYEWITNESS IN VIOLATION IN VIOLATION OF
THE PROCEDURES SET FOR IN STATE V. HENDERSON,
3 A-0735-16T3
208 N.J. 208 (2011); THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND
THE N.J. CONSTITUTION.
Two incidents in Jersey City during the evening of May 17,
2013, form the basis for the charges — indicted and tried together
— against defendant and codefendants Shawn Harris and Janice
Everett. In the earlier incident, a twelve-year-old boy was shot
and killed and his father suffered a gunshot wound to his leg
during a robbery. Later that evening, a victim was shot after he
followed and yelled at two men who had just robbed him and another
victim at gunpoint as the victims sat in a car.
I
Defendant challenges the admission of Harris's statement,
related by Everett. During her trial testimony, Everett testified
that prior to the robberies, Harris – who was driving her car –
picked her up from her workplace. Later that afternoon, they met
defendant, who she knew as "Slim," and the codefendants drove to
Jersey City. Harris told Everett they were "going to take a run,"
which, based on Harris's prior explanation of the phrase, informed
her they were going to "rob somebody."
Everett said she remained in the car while Harris and
defendant committed the first robbery. When the two men reentered
the car Harris said, "This idiot back here [meaning the rear-
seated defendant] did something stupid."
4 A-0735-16T3
Defense counsel lodged a hearsay objection just prior to the
State's elicitation of Harris's statement.3 When, at sidebar, the
State argued the statement was admissible as that of a
coconspirator, defense counsel countered, "I don't think we even
get to that Judge, it certainly is more prejudicial than -- I
agree with [the assistant prosecutor] that [Harris] is a
coconspirator, I have no argument." Notwithstanding defense
counsel's seeming concession that the statement was admissible
under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(5),4 the judge recalled Everett's testimony
at the N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing regarding the admissibility of
defendant's statements, and ruled
[Everett] was there, . . . she knew it was
going to be a robbery. This was an ongoing
conspiracy, the statement was made it appears
to be immediately after and during the
f[l]ight from. And what I also understand is
going to be . . . before another robbery
occurs. So I find that the statement is made
during the ongoing course of the conspiracy.
Defendant, for the first time, advances that Harris's
statement was inadmissible because it was not made in furtherance
of the conspiracy. Our usual standard of review requires that we
3
Harris did not testify.
4
N.J.R.E. 803(b)(5) provides that the hearsay rule does not
exclude "[a] statement offered against a party which is . . . a
statement made at the time the party and the declarant were
participating in a plan to commit a crime or civil wrong and the
statement was made in furtherance of that plan."
5 A-0735-16T3
grant substantial deference to the trial court's evidentiary
rulings, State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 453 (1998); State v.
McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 577-78 (1990), and will reverse a trial
court's evidentiary rulings only where there is an abuse of
discretion, State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 470 (2002); State v.
Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 82 (1998). If in response to objection the
trial court did not analyze evidence under the applicable rules
of admissibility, our standard of review is plenary. See State
v. Lykes, 192 N.J. 519 (2007). Where defendant failed to object
at trial and raises an evidentiary issue for the first time on
appeal, we apply the plain error standard of review. See R. 2:10-
2; State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 363 (1989); State v. Macon, 57
N.J. 325, 337-38 (1971).
Requisite to admission as a coconspirator's statement under
N.J.R.E. 803(b)(5), is the State's proof that "(1) the statement
was 'made in furtherance of the conspiracy'; (2) the statement was
'made during the course of the conspiracy'; and (3) there is
'evidence, independent of the hearsay, of the existence of the
conspiracy and [the] defendant's relationship to it.'" State v.
Cagno, 211 N.J. 488, 529-30 (2012) (alteration in original)
6 A-0735-16T3
(quoting State v. Taccetta, 301 N.J. Super. 227, 251 (App. Div.
1997)).5
It is longstanding hornbook law that "where it appears that
two or more persons have conspired to commit an offense, everything
said, done, or written by one of them during the existence of the
conspiracy, and in the execution or furtherance of the common
purpose, is admissible in evidence against the others." 16 C.J.
§ 1283 (1918) (footnotes omitted); see State v. Seidman, 107 N.J.L.
204, 206-07 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd sub nom., State v. Fischman,
108 N.J.L. 550 (E. & A. 1931). Although post-conspiratorial
statements are not admissible against a defendant, State v.
Sparano, 249 N.J. Super. 411, 420-21 (App. Div. 1991), a conspiracy
may extend beyond the actual commission of a crime when the
conspirators make statements to enlist false alibi witnesses,
conceal weapons, or flee to avoid apprehension, State v. Savage,
172 N.J. 374, 403 (2002). Even statements relating to past events
that "serve some current purpose, such as to promote cohesiveness,
provide reassurance to a co-conspirator, or prompt one not a member
of the conspiracy to respond in a way that furthers the goals of
5
The trial judge's brief sidebar ruling addressed only the second
of the three factors. Defendant argues only that the first factor
was not established.
7 A-0735-16T3
the conspiracy" may be deemed to be in furtherance of a conspiracy.
Taccetta, 301 N.J. Super. at 253.
The record supports that Harris's statement to Everett
related to the ongoing crime. Harris and defendant fled from the
murder-robbery scene directly to Everett's car. There Everett –
knowing the men were going to commit a robbery — waited in the
driver's seat. Startled when the men entered the vehicle, she
noted Harris was "shaking and sweating and he looked angry." After
Harris told Everett that defendant "did something stupid," Everett
"panicked and . . . asked what happened." Defendant then said,
"I shot 'em." Everett smelled gunpowder and turned toward
defendant and saw a gun in his lap. Defendant then said, "They
wouldn't give it up"; and "he'll live." Harris then told Everett
to drive. When she stopped at a light, Harris made her move to
the rear seat, and he drove.6
Harris's statement was part of the post-murder-robbery
events. The recount by Harris and defendant brought Everett up
to speed on what transpired, including defendant's fatal actions,
and led to her driving them from the scene, furthering the
6
The same course was followed after the second robbery when
Everett drove the men from the scene for a short distance; she
then switched seats and Harris drove.
8 A-0735-16T3
conspiracy by avoiding detection or apprehension.7 See Hunt, 115
N.J. at 342, 367 (holding co-conspirator's statement to his
girlfriend that the defendant killed someone was made in
furtherance of and during the course of the conspiracy because the
co-conspirator sought his girlfriend's "help in disposing of the
evidence of the murder").
We reject defendant's contention that Harris's statement was
akin to the "idle chatter" deemed inadmissible in State v.
Farthing, 331 N.J. Super. 58, 84 (App. Div. 2000). The statement
in issue was not made to someone unrelated to the crime, and it
was not an after-the-fact narration, but part of the conversation
among the participants during flight from the crime.
We find no error in the admission of Harris's statement
pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(b)(5).8 In light of our holding, we
determine that defendant's arguments in Point I of his pro se
7
Although the trial judge mentioned the second robbery during his
ruling, we see no evidence that the second robbery had been
discussed or planned; and certainly no evidence that Harris's
statement furthered that robbery.
8
Even if the challenged testimony was erroneously admitted, the
error was harmless, see Macon, 57 N.J. at 337-38; R. 2:10-2, in
light of statements made by defendant. Harris's statement did
not, as did defendant's, indicate what defendant did. Defendant's
admissions abated any prejudice caused by the admission of Harris's
statement.
9 A-0735-16T3
brief are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
II
Defendant concedes the trial court correctly denied his
motion for relief from the joinder of both incidents, but contends
he was denied a fair trial because the court failed to give a
"propensity" jury instruction, one that was never requested by
defense counsel. There is no merit to his contention.
We review errors in a jury instruction not raised at the time
of trial for "legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently
grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince
the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to
bring about an unjust result." State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538
(1969). Plain error is reversible if it is "clearly capable of
producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2; see Hunt, 115 N.J. at
363.
In determining the severance motion, the trial court analyzed
"whether the evidence from one offense would have been admissible
N.J.R.E. 404(b)[9] evidence in the trial of the other offense,
9
The four factors considered in determining admissibility under
N.J.R.E. 404(b) are:
10 A-0735-16T3
because '[i]f the evidence would be admissible at both trials,
then . . . a defendant will not suffer any more prejudice in a
joint trial than he would in separate trials.'" State v. Sterling,
215 N.J. 65, 98 (2013) (second and third alterations in original)
(quoting State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996)). It
is true that admission of evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b)
requires that a jury instruction be given by the trial court to
"explain precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the
evidence, with sufficient reference to the factual context of the
case to enable the jury to comprehend and appreciate the fine
distinction to which it is required to adhere." State v. Cofield,
127 N.J. 328, 341 (1992) (quoting State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289,
304 (1989)). But defendant conflates the court's consideration
of the Cofield factors used in determining the severance motion
with the necessity for a jury instruction once other-crime evidence
1. The evidence of the other crime must be
admissible as relevant to a material issue;
2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably
close in time to the offense charged;
3. The evidence of the other crime must be
clear and convincing; and
4. The probative value of the evidence must
not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
[State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992)].
11 A-0735-16T3
is admitted after an analysis under the same factors. Although
the judge applied the Cofield test in determining the severance
issue, evidence was not admitted under N.J.R.E. 404(b). No
limiting instruction was therefore required.
III
Defendant raises for the first time that "[i]t is cruel and
unusual punishment that a felony murder conviction leads to a
greater sentence than aggravated manslaughter because it is
grossly disproportionate and it serves no legitimate penological
objective to punish a negligent homicide more severely than a
reckless homicide." We determine defendant's comparison of the
sentence for felony murder to that for a "negligent homicide" to
be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following comments.
New Jersey's Criminal Code does not recognize "negligent
homicide."10 Further, defendant did not commit a negligent
homicide. The jury convicted him of aggravated manslaughter so
it found he recklessly caused the victim's death under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a).
10
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-2(a) provides "[a] person is guilty of criminal
homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or" by driving a
vehicle or vessel recklessly, causes a homicide. See N.J.S.A.
2C:11-5.
12 A-0735-16T3
Moreover, defendant is mixing apples and oranges in
attempting to compare a sentence for aggravated manslaughter to a
sentence for murder. "Felony murder is an absolute-liability
crime because the actor need not have contemplated or consciously
risked the victim's death." State v. McClain, 263 N.J. Super.
488, 491-92 (App. Div. 1993) (citing State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2,
20 (1990)). The State need only prove the defendant's mental
state for the underlying felony set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(3), State v. Darby, 200 N.J. Super. 327, 330-32 (App. Div.
1984); not the defendant's mental state for the homicide – which
the Legislature deemed a murder, not a manslaughter.
We have previously held the mandated imposition of a minimum
period of thirty years parole ineligibility for felony murder
violates neither the Federal nor New Jersey constitutions, State
v. Johnson, 206 N.J. Super. 341, 349 (App. Div. 1985), holding:
It is firmly settled that the broad power
to declare what shall constitute criminal
conduct and to fix both the maximum and
minimum terms of imprisonment for such conduct
has been committed by the people of this State
to the legislative, rather than to the
judicial branch of government. State v.
Hampton, 61 N.J. 250, 273 (1972). See also
State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202, 211 (1971). The
fact that our Legislature has provided a more
severe punishment for criminal acts than the
courts approve is no grounds for judicial
interference, unless a constitutional or other
prohibition against such punishment has been
violated. In making this determination, our
13 A-0735-16T3
Supreme Court in State v. Hampton, expressed
the view that "courts consider whether the
nature of the criticized punishment is such
as to shock the general conscience and to
violate principles of fundamental fairness;
whether comparison shows the punishment to be
grossly disproportionate to the offense, and
whether the punishment goes beyond what is
necessary to accomplish any legitimate penal
aim." 61 N.J. at 273-[]74. Thus, "[a]bsent
such a showing[,] the judiciary must respect
the legislative will." Id. at 274.
[Johnson, 206 N.J. Super. at 343 (second
alteration in original).]
Defendant has made no such showing.
IV
Defendant asserts his life sentence for felony murder is
excessive because the judge improperly focused "on generally
deterring society's ills by sending a message that the [c]ourt
will not tolerate these kinds of crimes, as opposed to a specific
deterrence of defendant," and "found that defendant's lack of
remorse was a significant factor." We are unpersuaded.
Contrary to defendant's one-sided interpretation of the
sentencing judge's remarks, the record shows the judge addressed
both of the "two 'interrelated but distinguishable concepts,'
[incorporated in deterrence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9)], the
sentence's 'general deterrent effect on the public [and] its
personal deterrent effect on the defendant.'" State v. Fuentes,
217 N.J. 57, 79 (2014) (second alteration in original) (quoting
14 A-0735-16T3
State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 405 (1989)). As acknowledged by
defendant in his merits brief, the judge observed
there's truly something wrong with our society
when a father can't stand on the street and
throw a ball back and forth with his son and
hang out with his friends. There's something
wrong with our society when a couple guys
can't hang out with their friends on the
street corner on a nice evening without being
victimized.
He harkened to those comments when, in finding that the need to
deter defendant was "overwhelming in this case," he said: "Because
something is wrong when somebody like you can go out and victimize
innocent people that are standing out doing absolutely nothing
wrong." The judge pointed to the criminal acts defendant committed
in both incidents, thereby addressing a specific need to deter in
addition to the general need that defendant concedes was
established.
And contrary to defendant's contention, the judge's comments
on defendant's remorse did not address aggravating factors; rather
he – as was required — addressed defense counsel's advancement of
remorse as a mitigating factor. See State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J.
283, 297 (2010) ("[M]itigating factors that are suggested in the
record, or are called to the court's attention, ordinarily should
be considered and either embraced or rejected on the record.").
15 A-0735-16T3
V
Defendant in his pro se brief argues for a new trial because
the State introduced at trial what he now claims was an
impermissibly suggestive out-of-court identification by Curtis
Small who selected defendant's photograph from a six-photo array
which "had pictures that were of poor quality, so much so that
Small could not tell the accurate skin complexion of the subject."
Defendant contends the "[t]rial [c]ourt was mandated to conduct a
Wade[11] hearing" to determine the admissibility of Small's
identification.
Defendant never pursued a motion to suppress Small's
identification. Although there is mention in the record that
defendant filed a pro se motion to suppress,12 and defense counsel
advised the court at the pretrial conference13 that he would file
such a motion and accompanying brief, we do not see that one was
filed despite the judge's scheduling order for briefs and oral
argument. As such, we decline to consider this issue that was not
presented to the trial court. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19
(2009).
11
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
12
The record on appeal contains neither a copy of the pro se motion
nor the array shown to Small.
13
R. 3:9-1(f).
16 A-0735-16T3
Affirmed.
17 A-0735-16T3