STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHARLIE RODRIGUEZ (04-06-0741, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5616-16T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHARLIE RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted May 22, 2018 – Decided June 22, 2018
Before Judges Fasciale and Moynihan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No.
04-06-0741.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Kevin G. Byrnes, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Christopher W. Hsieh,
Chief Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals the denial – without an evidentiary hearing
— of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) involving four
matters on which he was sentenced1 in October 2003, January 2005,
June 2009 and October 2009,2 arguing:
POINT I
THE FIVE-YEAR PROCEDURAL BAR FOR THE FILING
OF A PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (PCR)
SHOULD NOT APPLY.
A. ENFORCING THE PROCEDURAL BAR
1
Defendant was sentenced pursuant to plea agreements as follows:
1. A two-year probationary term in October 2003 on a
fourth-degree conspiracy to distribute a controlled
dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; 2C:35-
5(b)(12) (03-06-0615A).
2. A five-year probationary term in January 2005 on a
third-degree possession of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)
(04-06-00741I).
3. A five-year probationary drug-court term in July
2009 on a third-degree distribution of CDS in a school
zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (09-05-0559A).
4. A five-year probationary drug-court term in
November 2009 on a third-degree theft from the person,
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2; 2C:20-3 (09-09-1071A).
He pleaded guilty to a violation of probation in January 2014 on
09-09-1071A, and was sentenced to a three-year prison term.
2
Although defendant was sentenced in late June 2009 and late
October 2009, the judgments of conviction were not filed until
July 2009 and November 2009, respectively. See State v. Dugan,
289 N.J. Super. 15, 20 (App. Div. 1996) (concluding a PCR petition
"must be filed within five years of entry of the judgment
memorializing the conviction"); see also R. 3:22-12; R. 3:21-5.
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CONSTITUTES A MANIFEST INJUSTICE.
B. THE PROCEDURAL BAR SHOULD NOT APPLY
DUE TO EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ART. 1, PAR 10 OF THE NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTION.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.
We conclude these arguments are meritless and affirm.
Absent an evidentiary hearing, our review of the factual
inferences drawn by the PCR court from the record is de novo.
State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 226 N.J. 213 (2016). Likewise, we review de novo the PCR
court's legal conclusions. Ibid.All of defendant's arguments center on the contention that
he was never advised of what he terms "the material collateral
consequences" of his plea agreements: that his New Jersey
convictions could be used to enhance his sentence on federal
charges on which he was arrested in May 2016.
We reject that basis as a reason to relax the strictures of
Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) which, at the time defendant filed his petition,
provided in pertinent part:
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no petition shall be filed pursuant to this
rule more than 5 years after the date of entry
pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the judgment of
conviction that is being challenged unless it
alleges facts showing that the delay beyond
said time was due to defendant's excusable
neglect and that there is a reasonable
probability that if the defendant's factual
assertions were found to be true enforcement
of the time bar would result in a fundamental
injustice.
"[A] court should relax Rule 3:22-12's bar only under exceptional
circumstances. The court should consider the extent and cause of
the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the
petitioner's claim in determining whether there has been an
'injustice' sufficient to relax the time limits." State v.
Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992).
Defendant did not file a petition because he did not know his
prior convictions would enhance the sentence meted out in
connection with his 2016 federal charges. "Ignorance of the law
and rules of court does not qualify as excusable neglect." State
v. Merola, 365 N.J. Super. 203, 218 (Law Div. 2002), aff'd o.b.,
365 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 2003). Similarly, a defendant's
"lack[] [of] sophistication in the law" is not excusable neglect.
State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000). Further, defendant's
significant filing delay – ranging from seven to thirteen years —
would obviously prejudice the State if it was required to
reconstruct these matters for trial.
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We also determine that the substance of defendant's claim
presents no injustice to relax the Rule, and that it also fails
to demonstrate that his trial counsel erred so seriously that he
failed to function as a constitutionally-guaranteed counsel.3 We
3
To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant
must satisfy two prongs. First, he must
demonstrate that counsel made errors "so
serious that counsel was not functioning as
the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105
N.J. 42, 52 (1987). An attorney's
representation is deficient when it "[falls]
below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688;
see Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.
Second, a defendant "must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the
defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz,
105 N.J. at 52. A defendant will be prejudiced
when counsel's errors are sufficiently serious
to deny him "a fair trial." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52. The
prejudice standard is met if there is "a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Fritz, 105 N.J.
at 52. A "reasonable probability" simply
means a "probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome" of the proceeding.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Fritz, 105 N.J.
at 52.
[State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014)
(alteration in original).]
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previously held the failure of counsel to advise a defendant "of
possible or even potential enhancement consequences of future
aberrant conduct is not ineffective assistance of counsel. There
is no constitutional requirement for such advice. It involves
only a collateral issue." State v. Wilkerson, 321 N.J. Super.
219, 227 (App. Div. 1999). Thus none of defendant's counsel were
ineffective because they did not advise him he would face a greater
sentence if he was later convicted in federal court. Likewise,
the failure to so advise him does not implicate an injustice that
would extend the five-year filing limit.
We determine the balance of defendant's arguments lack
sufficient merit for discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
We add, defendant did not present a prima facie case in support
of his PCR application by demonstrating a reasonable likelihood
of succeeding to warrant an evidentiary hearing. R. 3:22-10(b);
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992).
Affirmed.
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