In the Matter of Registrant J.S. ( 2016 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3541-14T1
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE MATTER OF February 23, 2016
REGISTRANT J.S. APPELLATE DIVISION
_______________________________
Submitted October 26, 2015 - Decided February 23, 2016
Before Judges Lihotz, Fasciale and Nugent.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, ML No. 01070068.
Carolyn A. Murray, Essex County Prosecutor,
attorney for appellant State of New Jersey
(Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
Maynard & Sumner, LLC, attorneys for
respondent J.S. (James H. Maynard, on the
brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LIHOTZ, P.J.A.D.
The State appeals from an April 2, 2015 order terminating
petitioner's obligations under the Registration and Community
Notification Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, also known as Megan's
Law.1 The same order released petitioner from community
supervision for life (CSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4,2 and removed
petitioner's name from the State Sex Offender Registry. The
judge was asked to interpret the statute's requirement that
termination from the registration requirements may be ordered
"upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within
15 years following conviction." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). He found
petitioner satisfied N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), calculating the time
period began upon the entry of defendant's guilty plea. At the
State's request the order was stayed pending appeal. The State
now argues:
"Conviction" in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) means the
date the judgment of conviction was entered.
That section permits relief after 15 years
of successful compliance with Megan's Law's
registration requirements, which do not go
into effect until the registrant is
sentenced and the judgment of conviction
entered.
We agree and reverse.
1
Megan's Law requires "prescribed categories of sex
offenders register with law enforcement agencies through a
central registry maintained by the Superintendent of State
Police. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1), 4(d)." In re Registrant N.B.,
222 N.J. 87, 89 (2015).
2
"A 2003 amendment replaced all references to 'community
supervision for life' with 'parole supervision for life.'" See
L. 2003, c. 267, § 1 (eff. Jan. 14, 2004)." State v. Perez, 220
N.J. 423, 429 (2015).
2 A-3541-14T1
On January 14, 2000, petitioner pled guilty to two counts
of third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A.
2C:14-3(a), resulting from the assault of a thirteen-year-old
child. The probationary sentence, imposed on November 13, 2000,
included mandatory compliance with Megan's Law and CSL. In
early 2015, petitioner moved to terminate his Megan's Law and
CSL obligations. The applicable provision for seeking
termination of the Megan's Law registration requirements,
states:
Except as provided in subsection g.[3] of this
section, a person required to register under
this act may make application to the
Superior Court of this State to terminate
the obligation upon proof that the person
has not committed an offense within 15 years
following conviction or release from a
correctional facility for any term of
imprisonment imposed, whichever is later,
and is not likely to pose a threat to the
safety of others.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).]
The State agreed petitioner met all statutory requirements,
except the fifteen-year period of compliance. Over the State's
objection, the judge accepted petitioner's position the fifteen-
3
"N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) prohibits persons convicted,
adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted by reason of insanity for
more than one sex offense as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b), or
aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), or sexual
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), from making application to
terminate their registration obligations." In re Registrant
A.D., 441 N.J. Super. 403, 406 n.3 (App. Div. 2015).
3 A-3541-14T1
year clock commenced on the day he pled guilty. Accordingly,
the judge ordered termination of defendant's compliance with
Megan's Law and CSL.
The matter was initially listed on our excessive sentencing
oral argument calendar. R. 2:9-11. We granted the State's
motion for transfer to a plenary calendar. The question is a
legal one, which we review de novo. State v. Revie, 220 N.J.
126, 132 (2014).
When we interpret a statute, "[t]he overriding goal is to
determine as best we can the intent of the Legislature, and to
give effect to that intent." State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594,
604 (2014) (quoting State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513, 529 (2012)).
First, we consider the plain language of the statute.
In the construction of the laws and statutes
of this state, both civil and criminal,
words and phrases shall be read and
construed with their context, and shall,
unless inconsistent with the manifest intent
of the [L]egislature or unless another or
different meaning is expressly indicated, be
given their generally accepted meaning,
according to the approved usage of the
language.
[State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222, 232 (2010)
(quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1).]
We apply common sense in deducing the meaning of the
Legislature's chosen language, drawing inferences based on the
statute's structure and composition. Id. at 231-32. See also
4 A-3541-14T1
State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 180 (2010) (quoting State v.
Thomas, 166 N.J. 560, 567 (2001)) ("Ordinarily, when a statute's
language appears clear, 'we need delve no deeper than the act's
literal terms to divine the Legislature's intent.'").
Second, "[i]f a plain-language reading of the statute
'leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretive
process is over.'" Hupka, supra, 203 N.J. at 232 (quoting
Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192
N.J. 189, 195-96 (2007)). On the other hand, if we find an
ambiguity in the statutory language, we turn to extrinsic
evidence. Ibid. When such evidence is needed, we look to a
variety of sources, "'such as the statute's purpose, legislative
history, and statutory context to ascertain the legislature's
intent.'" Thomas, supra, 166 N.J. at 567 (quoting Aponte-Correa
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318, 323 (2000)). See also State
v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 453 (resorting to legislative history
for extrinsic aid in interpretation of statute), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1078, 127 S. Ct. 740, 166 L. Ed. 2d 563 (2006).
Third, "[w]hen construing a statute in which 'the
Legislature has clearly defined a term, the courts are bound by
that definition.'" A.D., supra, 441 N.J. Super. at 410 (quoting
Febbi v. Bd. of Review, 35 N.J. 601, 606 (1961)). We also may
consider "not only the particular statute in question, but . . .
5 A-3541-14T1
the entire legislative scheme of which it is a part." Kimmelman
v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 129 (1987).
This case turns on the meaning of "conviction," as it is
used to define the commencement of the requisite fifteen-year
period necessary for a petitioner to seek termination of Megan's
Law and CSL registration requirements. The parties' positions
are at odds. Petitioner asserts he was convicted on January 14,
2000, the date he entered his plea. The State asserts
petitioner was convicted on November 13, 2000, when the judgment
of conviction imposed, in the first instance, Megan's Law and
CSL requirements.
The trial judge relied on State v. Baker, 133 N.J. Super.
398, 399-400 (App. Div. 1975), which distinguished "conviction"
from "judgment" when reviewing the predecessor statute to
N.J.R.E. 609. The Appellate Division in Baker stated:
"[t]he ordinar[]y legal meaning of
conviction, when used to designate a
particular stage of a prosecution triable by
a jury, is the confession of the accused in
open court, or the verdict returned against
him by the jury, which ascertains and
publishes the fact of his guilt; while
'judgment' or 'sentence' is the appropriate
word to denote the action of the court * * *
declaring the consequences to the convict of
the fact thus ascertained."
[Id. at 401 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323 (Mass. 1872)).]
6 A-3541-14T1
We are mindful that generally, "when the Legislature uses
words in a statute that previously have been the subject of
judicial construction, the Legislature will be deemed to have
used those words in the sense that has been ascribed to them."
Thomas, supra, 166 N.J. at 567-68. However, this rule is not
absolute and "'it is possible to interpret an imprecise term
differently in two separate sections of a statute which have
different purposes.'" Id. at 568 (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer,
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 194 (6th ed.
2000)). Following our review, based on the reasons we discuss,
we are convinced the Legislature did not intend to import
Baker's definition of conviction when adopting N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
2(f).
When interpreting a statute, we start with the principle
that context matters. This court in Baker determined what
constituted a permissible "prior conviction" to be used to
attack the credibility of the State's witness. Baker, supra,
133 N.J. Super. at 399-400. On appeal, the defendant argued the
trial judge erred in limiting cross-examination of the witness,
after determining a conviction cannot be used to impeach the
witness before judgment was entered. Id. at 400. Reviewing
N.J.S.A. 2A:81-12, which has since been repealed, we concluded
the statutory provision allowing introduction of a "conviction"
7 A-3541-14T1
of a crime for the purpose of affecting the credibility of a
witness was not limited to final judgments of conviction. Id.
at 401. Rather, "the logic of the situation compels the
conclusion that a plea of guilty is as relevant as a judgment
after sentence. The witness' credibility is equally affected by
both and the sentence adds no more taint to that factor than is
implicit in a plea of guilty." Id. at 401-02 (emphasis added).
We also note Baker preceded adoption of the Criminal Code
in 1978, which provides the framework for the statute now under
review. Standing alone, "conviction" is not a defined term in
the Code. When a provision is subject to differing
interpretations, "it shall be interpreted to further the general
purposes [of the Criminal Code] and the special purposes of the
particular provision involved." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(c). See also
State v. Shaw, 131 N.J. 1, 14 (1993). Thus, the context in
which the word "conviction" is used in the current Code,
generally and specifically, weighs heavily when discerning
legislative intent.
Megan's Law, which is a legitimate regulatory measure,
includes a pronouncement of its public safety objectives. Doe
v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 73 (1995). In adopting the law and its
companion legislation, see id. at 25 n.6 (listing related
legislation adopted contemporaneously with Megan's Law), the
8 A-3541-14T1
Legislature found: "The danger of recidivism posed by sex
offenders and offenders who commit other predatory acts against
children . . . require a system of registration that will permit
law enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when
necessary for the public safety." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1(a). See also
Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 25 (explaining Megan's Law is
designed "to aid law enforcement in apprehending sex offenders
and to enable communities to protect themselves from such
offenders"); In re Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 80 (1996)
(reciting the sex offender registration law seeks "to protect
the community from the dangers of recidivism by sexual
offenders"). All of Megan's Law's provisions, "the requirements
for registration, the provisions for notification, the Tiers,
and the many other related parts, are tied together by the
statement of legislative purpose . . . ." Poritz, supra, 142
N.J. at 25. This objective must be respected and preserved when
we construe the intent of the statutory language.
The registration requirements of Megan's Law, as well as
related legislation adopted at the same time, including CSL, are
imposed at sentencing. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 (stating
registration requirements); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8 ("When a
defendant is found guilty of a sex offense, the court may, at
the time of sentencing and in addition to any other disposition
9 A-3541-14T1
authorized by law, order the continuation of a prior order or
condition of bail that restricts the defendant's contact with
the victim, or enter an order imposing such restrictions at the
time of sentencing."). The registration requirement is presumed
to be for life. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 21.
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1) requires "[a] person who has been
convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason
of insanity for commission of a sex offense . . . shall register
as required in subsections c. and d. of this section." The term
"convicted" was chosen and paired with other events that
transpire when a factfinder determines guilt or innocence
interchangeably. This same terminology "convicted, adjudicated
delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity" was not
repeated in subsection (f).
Zeroing in on the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), the
provision starts with the words: "a person required to register
under this act . . . ." As noted, the event compelling
registration occurs, not upon entering a plea, but at
sentencing. The word "conviction," used as the starting point
for the offense-free period, requires an offender to prove he or
she "has not committed an offense within 15 years following
conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term
of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later . . . ." Ibid.
10 A-3541-14T1
Thus, conviction is coupled with release from custody, and the
time period mandated is the longer of the two events. Reading
the statute, we conclude its design signals a desire to measure
the offense-free time frame against fifteen years of compliance
with the registration requirements. See also Poritz, supra, 142
N.J. at 25 ("Our Legislature could reasonably conclude that risk
of reoffense can be fairly measured, and that knowledge of the
presence of offenders provides increased defense against them.
Given those conclusions, the system devised by the Legislature
is appropriately designed to achieve the laws' purpose of
protecting the public.").
Our conclusion is further supported by the use of similar
language when allowing termination of CSL, which provides:
A person sentenced to a term of parole
supervision for life may petition the
Superior Court for release from that parole
supervision. The judge may grant a petition
for release from a special sentence of
parole supervision for life only upon proof
by clear and convincing evidence that the
person has not committed a crime for 15
years since the last conviction or release
from incarceration, whichever is later, and
that the person is not likely to pose a
threat to the safety of others if released
from parole supervision.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c).]
The provision adopted contemporaneously with Megan's Law mirrors
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) and permits an offender the opportunity to be
11 A-3541-14T1
released from mandatory supervision upon completion of the
fifteen-year offense free period. Naturally, the use of "[a]
person sentenced" invokes entry of a judgment of conviction.
Logically, the time period would not commence from the date of
entry of a guilty plea. We find it anomalous to suggest the
Legislature intended one time frame for termination of Megan's
Law registration and a different time frame for release from
CSL.
When considering the statutory scheme as a unitary whole,
in light of its public safety purpose, we conclude the import of
the statutory language requires, as a prerequisite for
requesting termination from the registration requirements, an
offender demonstrate a fifteen-year period of being offense-free
and Megan's Law compliant. This can only occur after the
registration requirements are imposed.
We agree exacting precision in drafting statutes would
obviate the need for judicial interpretation, such that had the
Legislature used the term "judgment of conviction," rather than
"conviction," any debate would have unmistakably ended.
However, defendant's illustrations plugging a single definition
into various statutes which use the word "conviction" are not
persuasive precisely because this approach ignores the statutory
context vital to understanding the Legislature's meaning. We
12 A-3541-14T1
reject this attempt to isolate the single word "conviction,"
without reference to its use in the statute under consideration.
For all the reasons stated, we are not persuaded the
Legislature's failure to include "judgment of" to accompany
"conviction," in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), as well as N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
6.4(c), was deliberate, as suggested by defendant. Rather, we
are persuaded the context defining the fifteen-year period for
termination of Megan's Law and CSL compliance commences upon
imposition of the registration requirements, not before.
As of this date, the required fifteen years has elapsed
from the date petitioner became subject to Megan's Law and CSL.
Recognizing "'[a]n issue is "moot" when the decision sought in a
matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the
existing controversy[,]'" Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs.,
382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting New York
S. & W. R. Corp. v. State Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Taxation, 6
N.J. Tax 575, 582 (Tax 1984), aff'd 204 N.J. Super. 630 (App.
Div. 1985)), we conclude mootness does not preclude our review
because the judge must actually review whether petitioner met
the requirement to be offense-free, see A.D., supra, 441 N.J.
Super. at 413, from March 31, 2015 through November 13, 2015.
We also conclude the issue on appeal is an important matter of
public interest and capable of repetition warranting our review.
13 A-3541-14T1
City of Plainfield v. N.J. Dept. of Health & Senior Servs., 412
N.J. Super. 466, 484 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 93
(2010).
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
14 A-3541-14T1