DR. EMMANUEL OKEREKE VS. ROSS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE (L-1137-11, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0892-16T1
DR. EMMANUEL OKEREKE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROSS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
MEDICINE, DR. ENRIQUE FERNANDEZ,
and DR. NANCY PERRI,
Defendants-Respondents.
__________________________________
Argued March 1, 2018 – Decided June 26, 2018
Before Judges Simonelli and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-
1137-11.
Christian R. Oehm argued the cause for
appellant (Lindgren, Lindgren, Oehm & You,
LLP, attorneys; Christian R. Oehm, on the
briefs).
Glenn T. Graham argued the cause for
respondents (Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP,
attorneys; William S. Gyves, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Emmanuel Okereke appeals from the September 30,
2016 trial court order denying his motion to vacate the 2012
dismissal of his complaint against defendants Ross University
School of Medicine (RUSM) and two of its faculty members. The
underlying action arose out of plaintiff's unsuccessful attempt
to secure a medical degree from RUSM where he re-enrolled in 2002.
The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice based on
plaintiff's repeated discovery violations. Plaintiff asserts his
attorneys' misconduct, errors, or negligence constituted
exceptional circumstances warranting relief under Rule 4:50-1(f),
and the court should have excused his four-year delay in applying
for relief. We disagree and affirm.
On February 8, 2011, plaintiff filed a five-count complaint
against defendants, seeking injunctive relief and monetary
damages. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that while attending
RUSM, the staff "singled [him] out for derogatory and
discriminatory treatment" and "unfairly, arbitrarily and
capriciously [gave him] a failing grade despite his excellent
performance of the requisite academic requirements of his
studies." He further alleged that when he complained, he was
retaliated against and received more unfair treatment, which
ultimately caused him to miss a required portion of the United
States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE). Plaintiff, who is
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Nigerian, asserted claims for violation of the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination, tortious interference, defamation, and
breach of contract. He also requested an order compelling
defendants to grant him an extension of time to register, prepare,
and sit for the USMLE.
In a July 8, 2011 order, the court granted in part defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim,
dismissing all but the breach of contract and injunctive relief
claims. Defendants filed a contesting answer on September 22,
2011, and, on November 2, 2011, served plaintiff with
interrogatories and document demands, as well as a notice to
produce plaintiff for deposition on December 15, 2011. By letter
dated November 15, 2011, plaintiff's then-attorney, John Charles
Allen, forwarded the requests to plaintiff, and asked plaintiff
to return the interrogatory answers and requested documents to him
so that he could review them before forwarding them to defendants.
The letter also invited plaintiff to contact Allen if he had "any
questions or would like to speak with [him]."
When plaintiff failed to respond, by letter dated December
13, 2011, defendants informed Allen that if they did not receive
responses by December 27, 2011, they intended to move to compel
discovery or, alternatively, dismiss the complaint for failure to
submit timely responses to their discovery requests.
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Subsequently, defendants agreed to extend the response deadline
to January 11, 2012. When plaintiff failed to respond, on January
12, 2012, Allen sent plaintiff another letter advising him it was
"imperative that [he] provide . . . answers in order to avoid a
[m]otion by [d]efendants to [d]ismiss [his] complaint and case."
In the letter, Allen reiterated that plaintiff should contact him
with "any questions[.]"
Receiving no response and with the March 21, 2012 discovery
end date approaching, on January 18, 2012, defendants filed a
motion to compel discovery responses or, alternatively, dismiss
the complaint. The following day, Allen forwarded defendants'
motion to plaintiff, accompanied by a letter stating it was "at
least [his] fifth . . . request for [plaintiff] to provide [his]
responses to [d]efendants' [d]iscovery [r]equests." Allen
cautioned plaintiff that failure to comply would "very likely"
result in the dismissal of the case.
On February 3, 2012, the court granted defendants' motion and
dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice for failure to
respond to discovery demands. On February 6, 2012, Allen sent
plaintiff an email stating he had "warned [plaintiff] on numerous
occasions that this would occur" if he did not provide answers to
defense counsel. Allen also explained that the dismissal of the
complaint was without prejudice, meaning the court could reinstate
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the complaint if plaintiff submitted complete responses to their
discovery requests within ninety days of the dismissal and paid
the reinstatement fee. Allen implored plaintiff to "[p]lease make
it [his] absolute priority to prepare and provide [him] with [his]
answers . . . without further delay." The email included a read
receipt notification, indicating plaintiff opened the email
approximately thirty minutes after Allen sent it.
On March 1, 2012, plaintiff sent Allen his purported answers
to defendants' interrogatories and supporting documents. However,
before Allen forwarded the responses to defendants, on April 9,
2012, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.
On April 26, 2012, Allen sent a letter to the court requesting an
adjournment of defendants' motion. Allen explained he had "only
recently . . . received [plaintiff's] responses to [d]efendants'
discovery requests" and needed two weeks "to prepare them for
service upon [d]efense [c]ounsel." Allen also informed the court
that plaintiff had been in a remote part of Nigeria caring for ill
family members for several months, making communication difficult.
Based on Allen's representations in his April 26, 2012 letter,
defendants withdrew the motion.
On the same date, Allen advised plaintiff he had "successfully
negotiated the withdrawal of [defendants'] motion[.]" However,
Allen informed plaintiff that his interrogatory responses were
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"quite deficient[,]" as they were uncertified and "[m]any of the
answers [were] not responsive to the questions[.]" Allen told
plaintiff "[i]t [was] imperative that [plaintiff] contact [him]
to discuss these responses as [they] must promptly [correct] the
deficiencies to avoid the potential of another motion to dismiss."
Upon receiving no responses, in a June 5, 2012 letter,
defendants warned Allen that they would renew their motion to
dismiss the complaint with prejudice if plaintiff did not respond
within thirty days. In response, Allen forwarded plaintiff's
uncertified interrogatory responses to defense counsel and
informed him he was still waiting for plaintiff's certification,
which he would forward upon receipt. Defendants' thirty-day
extension expired on July 5, 2012, and plaintiff again failed to
submit a timely response. After granting plaintiff another five-
day extension, to which he also failed to adhere, defendants
renewed their motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. On
July 27, 2012, the court granted defendants' unopposed motion and
dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice for failure to
provide responsive answers to interrogatories and requested
documents.
On November 2, 2013, plaintiff retained Christopher J.
Cassar, a New York attorney. On May 9, 2014, Cassar filed a legal
malpractice lawsuit against Allen in the United States District
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Court for the Southern District of New York in connection with
Allen's representation of plaintiff in his lawsuit against
defendants. A default judgment was entered on October 3, 2014.
However, on September 17, 2015, the default judgment was vacated
and the case was transferred to the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey on Allen's motion. On March 16,
2016, plaintiff retained a third law firm, the Mark Law Firm, LLC,
to replace Cassar in the malpractice case against Allen.
In September 2016, plaintiff filed a pro se motion pursuant
to Rule 4:50-1, seeking to reinstate his complaint in the
underlying action against defendants. In his supporting
affidavit, plaintiff explained that in March 2011, about a month
after filing suit against defendants, he went to Nigeria "to care
for a family member . . . , as [his] presence and expertise were
necessary for [his family member's] treatment and recovery."
Plaintiff averred he had given Allen instructions to contact his
business partner and guarantor Josephine Circosta, who could reach
him in the remote part of Nigeria where he was located and "was
in constant and continuous contact" with him. He further averred
that he informed Allen in October 2011 that, while in Nigeria, his
mother fell critically ill, requiring him to extend his stay.
Plaintiff acknowledged receiving several communications from
Allen regarding his discovery obligations. However, according to
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plaintiff, he "was confused and did not know how to respond to the
discovery requests . . . so [he] waited for [Allen] to contact and
instruct [him] . . . how to answer the discovery questions." Then,
after Allen informed him that the court had dismissed his complaint
without prejudice because of his non-compliance, he "undertook to
answer . . . as best as [he] possibly could," without Allen's
guidance. In a May 8, 2012 letter to Allen, plaintiff acknowledged
the deficiencies in his answers and admitted that phone contacts
were difficult and unreliable. Nevertheless, plaintiff asked
Allen to contact him by phone to "correct the deficiencies" or
indicated he would contact Allen to discuss them upon his return
to the United States.
Plaintiff averred that "Allen never called [him] to go through
the discovery" or "advise [him] how to answer the interrogatories."
However, plaintiff acknowledged receiving Allen's May 24, 2012
reply to his May 8, 2012 letter, in which Allen indicated that he
had "attempted several times to reach [plaintiff] by phone,
however, the calls would not go through." Allen also reiterated
that plaintiff could call him at any time.
Plaintiff asserted that on June 6, 2012, Allen informed him
that defendants intended to file a motion to dismiss the complaint
with prejudice "unless [he] certified the [a]nswers to
[i]nterrogatories." He claimed that on June 13, 2012, he emailed
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to Allen "the language required to certify and attest to the
truthfulness of [his] [a]nswers to [i]nterrogatories" that Allen
had previously provided to him. Plaintiff claimed that, although
he did not communicate with Allen between June 2012 and March
2013, he was waiting to hear from him regarding a date for his
deposition or settlement negotiations. He believed Allen "would
reach out and contact either [him] or . . . Circosta if he had any
updates regarding [the] case."
When no updates came, plaintiff returned from Nigeria in June
2013 to confront Allen regarding the status of his case. Plaintiff
claimed Allen called him in July 2013 to request a letter outlining
why he was out of the country, which he provided. Plaintiff also
claimed Allen "promised to send a form for [plaintiff] to fill
out," but he never received it. Meanwhile, according to plaintiff,
Allen refused to tell him "the status of the case" and "kept
avoiding [his] questions." As a result, plaintiff lost confidence
in Allen and retained Cassar in November 2013.
Plaintiff claimed he was unaware that the dismissal motion
had been filed or granted until June 18, 2014, after he retained
Cassar's firm. Plaintiff returned to Nigeria in November 2015 to
attend a funeral and remained there until January 2016. In
February 2016, he was advised that Cassar's firm could not proceed
with the litigation in New Jersey because Cassar was not licensed
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to practice in New Jersey and the associate on the case who "was
licensed to practice in New Jersey had earlier left the firm." At
that point, plaintiff sought out a New Jersey attorney and retained
the Mark Law Firm to represent him in his case against Allen.
Plaintiff explained he was unfamiliar with the legal system
and had "relied upon [his] attorneys to properly assist [him],"
but both Allen and Cassar "continuously misled and misinformed"
him. Plaintiff claimed the underlying complaint was dismissed
"through no fault of [his] own" and attributed the dismissal "to
the failures of . . . Allen." As to Cassar, plaintiff averred
"Cassar also failed to file the [reinstatement] motion, despite
his representations . . . that he would do so."
At the September 30, 2016 hearing on the Rule 4:50-1(f)
motion, the court questioned plaintiff's inaction since June 2014,
when plaintiff claimed he first learned of the dismissal.
Plaintiff responded he "started looking for other attorneys" but
"couldn't find anybody to assist [him,]" became "extremely
frustrated[,]" and kept writing to Cassar. Following oral
argument, the court denied the motion. The court noted that in
order to obtain relief, plaintiff needed to show "[e]xtraordinary
circumstances[,]" which are "circumstances beyond the ability of
the . . . moving party[] to file a [m]otion," that are "peculiar
to the individual" and "would make it unconscionable and an
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injustice to allow the [j]udgment to stand." The court concluded
plaintiff failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances
because he had "been derelict from the very beginning."
To support its finding, the court cited plaintiff's
abandonment of his lawsuit through his two-year absence from the
country, his failure to communicate with Allen after learning his
case was in danger of dismissal, and his two-year delay in filing
a motion to vacate. In contrast, the court noted that while
"plaintiff was out of the country[,] his lawyer sent him
communications, which he received over a period of many months,
and told him that he must file [c]ertified [a]nswers to the
[i]nterrogatories sought by the defendant or the [c]omplaint would
be dismissed." The court rejected plaintiff's contention that it
was his lawyer's fault that the case was dismissed because Allen
ignored plaintiff's requests for assistance. The court entered a
memorializing order and this appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff renews his argument that he is entitled
to relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) because the conduct of his previous
counsel constituted "exceptional circumstances." Plaintiff argues
the court erred by failing to apply the analysis set forth in
Jansson v. Fairleigh Dickinson University, 198 N.J. Super. 190,
195 (App. Div. 1985) since the dismissal was the result of his
attorney's failure to help him provide timely interrogatory
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answers despite his requests for assistance. He also contends his
"application was made within a reasonable amount of time from
being finally made aware of the true case status and his rights
and options."
A trial court's decision on a Rule 4:50-1 motion is entitled
to "substantial deference, and should not be reversed unless it
results in a clear abuse of discretion." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n
v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). An abuse of discretion
may be found when a decision lacks a "rational explanation,"
represents an inexplicable "depart[ure] from established
policies," or rests "on an impermissible basis." Id. at 467-68(quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123
(2007)). Our task is not "to decide whether the trial court took
the wisest course, or even the better course, since to do so would
merely be to substitute our judgment for that of the lower court.
The question is only whether the trial judge pursued a manifestly
unjust course." Gittleman v. Cent. Jersey Bank & Tr. Co., 103
N.J. Super. 175, 179 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 52
N.J. 503 (1968).
Rule 4:50-1 provides various grounds for a court to relieve
a party from a judgment. Under subsection (f), the judgment should
be set aside for "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment or order." R. 4:50-1(f). "[R]elief
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under Rule 4:50-1(f) is available only when 'truly exceptional
circumstances are present'" such that "were it not applied, a
grave injustice would occur." Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 484 (quoting
Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 286, 289 (App.
Div. 1994)). A party seeking relief under subsection (f) should
file a motion "within a reasonable time" after the judgment's
entry, "which, in some circumstances, may be less than one year."
Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431, 437 (App. Div. 2011); R. 4:50-
2.
An attorney's error, misconduct or incompetence may
constitute exceptional circumstances warranting relief under Rule
4:50-1(f). Jansson, 198 N.J. Super. at 196. In Jansson, the
plaintiffs provided their interrogatory answers to their attorney,
who then failed to submit them to the defendants by the applicable
deadline, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint. Id. at
192-93. The attorney then "repeatedly misrepresented that the
trial was imminent when the plaintiffs inquired as to the status
of the case." Id. at 193. The matter remained dormant until the
plaintiffs dismissed their attorney and retained new counsel who
promptly moved to reinstate the complaint, albeit three years
after the dismissal order was entered. Ibid. In reversing the
trial court's order denying the reinstatement, we enunciated four
factors courts should consider in determining whether the rules
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should be relaxed: "(1) the extent of the delay [between dismissal
and the motion to reinstate], (2) the underlying reason or cause,
(3) the fault or blamelessness of the litigant, and (4) the
prejudice that would accrue to the other party." Id. at 195.
In Parker v. Marcus, 281 N.J. Super. 589, 593-94 (App. Div.
1995), we extended the Jansson analysis to cases involving attorney
misconduct unrelated to discovery, and in Ridge at Back Brook, LLC
v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 99 (App. Div. 2014), we applied
the Jansson factors to errors made by pro se litigants when their
acts or omissions would have been grounds to vacate a judgment if
committed by an attorney. However, in Albarran v. Lukas, 276 N.J.
Super. 91 (App. Div. 1994), we questioned whether subsequent
amendments to the court rules for discovery default rendered the
Jansson analysis inapplicable. Under the amended rule, a party
who defaults on his or her discovery obligations has ample
opportunities to cure the deficiency. See R. 4:23-5; see also
Albarran, 276 N.J. Super. at 94-95. In Albarran, following the
entry of an order of dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule
4:23-5(a)(2) for failure to answer interrogatories, plaintiffs
moved twice to reinstate their complaint, which was ultimately
granted by the trial court. Albarran, 276 N.J. Super. at 93-94.
We reversed because, inasmuch as the amended rule gave a
party "[]four[] opportunities . . . to avoid dismissal . . . with
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prejudice" due to discovery default, "we perceive[d] no reason why
[the] approach in Jansson should continue to govern this [R. 4:23-
5] discovery default problem." Id. at 95. We explained that
"[a]fter a party has defaulted in [his or] her discovery
obligations" and "foregone four opportunities to discharge [their]
responsibilities as a litigant[,]" "the New Jersey Court Rules
provide three additional opportunities to a party who seeks to
avoid the consequence contemplated by the rule[,]" by virtue of a
motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 4:49-2, an appeal
pursuant to Rule 2:4-1(a), and a motion for relief from a final
order pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. Id. at 94.
Here, plaintiff has not shown that the trial court's refusal
to grant relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) was a mistaken exercise of
discretion. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the dismissal of
the complaint was the result of attorney error, misconduct or
incompetence. On the contrary, the record is replete with letters
and emails from Allen imploring plaintiff to respond to defendants'
discovery requests, inviting plaintiff to contact him with
questions, and informing him that defendants intended to move for
dismissal if he did not correct the deficiencies. Indeed, the
trial court found that the failure to comply with the discovery
obligations was entirely plaintiff's fault, rather than his
attorney's, noting plaintiff had been derelict from the very
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beginning. Even applying the Jansson analysis, all four factors,
particularly "the fault . . . of the litigant[,]" militate against
granting plaintiff relief. 198 N.J. Super. at 195. As plaintiff's
own actions caused the dismissal, this case falls far short of the
"truly exceptional circumstances" required for relief under Rule
4:50-1(f), and we do not believe that any of the aforementioned
decisions require a different result.
Affirmed.
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