LORENZO RICHARDSON VS. VIDYA GANGADIN VS. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY (COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION) ( 2018 )


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    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1572-16T3
    LORENZO RICHARDSON,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    VIDYA GANGADIN, BOARD OF
    EDUCATION PRESIDENT and
    RAMON RIVERA, BOARD ATTORNEY,
    Respondents,
    and
    THE JERSEY CITY EDUCATION
    ASSOCIATION, RONALD F.
    GRECO, JR., MONIQUE K.
    ANDREWS and ELLEN ZADROGA,
    Petitioners-Appellants,
    v.
    THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
    CITY OF JERSEY CITY and
    DR. MARCIA V. LYLES,
    Respondents-Respondents.
    _________________________________
    Argued May 23, 2018 – Decided June 25, 2018
    Before Judges Koblitz, Manahan and Suter.
    On appeal from the Commissioner of the New
    Jersey Department of Education, Docket Nos.
    62-2/16 and 85-3/16.
    Albert J. Leonardo argued the cause for
    appellants Jersey City Education Association,
    Ronald F. Greco, Jr., Monique K. Andrews and
    Ellen Zadroga (Bucceri & Pincus, attorneys;
    Louis P. Bucceri, of counsel; Albert J.
    Leonardo, on the brief).
    Perry L. Lattiboudere argued the cause for
    respondent Board of Education of the City of
    Jersey City (Adams, Gutierrez & Lattiboudere,
    LLC, attorneys; Perry L. Lattiboudere, of
    counsel and on the brief; Ruby Kumar-Thompson,
    on the brief).
    Stephen J. Edelstein argued the cause for
    respondent Dr. Marcia V. Lyles (Schwartz,
    Simon, Edelstein & Celso, LLC, attorneys;
    Stephen J. Edelstein, of counsel and on the
    brief; Stephen M. Bacigalupo and Aimee S.
    Weiner, on the brief).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
    for respondent Commissioner of Education (Lori
    Prapas, Deputy Attorney General, on the
    statement in lieu of brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Petitioners Jersey City Education Association, Ronald F.
    Greco, Jr., Monique K. Andrews and Ellen Zadroga (collectively
    petitioners) appeal from a final decision of the Commissioner of
    Education (Commissioner) dismissing the petition.   The petitioners
    sought to enjoin the Jersey City Board of Education (Board) from
    renewing the contract of Dr. Marcia V. Lyles as Superintendent of
    Schools (superintendent).   We affirm.
    2                           A-1572-16T3
    We recite the facts and procedural history relevant to our
    decision.    In August 2012, the Board entered into a contract of
    employment with Dr. Lyles for the position of superintendent.                  The
    contract's   term   was    through     June   30,   2016,     and    included    a
    renewal/non-renewal       provision.       That     provision       provided    in
    pertinent part:
    The parties agree that prior to October 31,
    2015, the [s]uperintendent shall notify the
    Board of her desire to extend her employment
    on the terms offered or upon other terms upon
    which the parties may agree. The Board agrees
    that by December 31, 2015[,] it shall notify
    the [s]uperintendent in writing whether it
    desires to renew this Agreement for an
    additional period of time, and of the terms
    and conditions proposed for that period.
    Failure to notify the [s]uperintendent by that
    date of an intention to renew will mean that
    an offer of renewal is not being made.
    N.J.S.A.     18A:17-20.1     provides        for   a   superintendent's
    automatic    reappointment      unless     "the     [B]oard     notifies       the
    superintendent in writing that he will not be reappointed at the
    end of the current term."            The statute provides a formula to
    determine the deadline by which the Board shall provide such
    notice, which was undisputed to be 120 days prior to the expiration
    of the contract.
    On December 17, 2015, the Board's attorney advised the Board
    that notice of non-renewal had to be given to Lyles by December
    31, 2015, or her contract would be deemed automatically renewed
    3                                 A-1572-16T3
    by operation of N.J.S.A. 18A:17-20.1.               Notwithstanding, the Board
    took no action with regard to the renewal or non-renewal of Lyles'
    contract prior to March 2, 2016.
    On March 14, 2016, petitioner filed a petition with the
    Commissioner challenging Lyles' continued employment.                  After the
    Board and Lyles filed motions to dismiss the petition in lieu of
    an    answer,    the    matter      was   transferred     to    the   Office       of
    Administrative Law.        The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an
    order consolidating the instant matter with a related petition
    filed by Lorenzo Richardson, which also challenged the renewal of
    the contract.1 Motions for summary decision and opposition thereto
    were filed.          The ALJ issued an initial decision granting the
    Board's and Lyles' motions for summary decision and recommending
    the dismissal of the petition with prejudice.                  Petitioners filed
    exceptions      to    which   the    Board    and    Lyles     responded.        The
    Commissioner adopted the ALJ's findings and his initial decision
    dismissing the petition.
    On appeal, petitioners raise the following arguments:
    POINT [I]
    LYLES' CONTRACT PROVIDED NOTICE OF NON-RENEWAL
    IN ACCORDANCE WITH N.J.S.A. 18A:17-20.1 WHICH
    THUS PROHIBITED HER AUTOMATIC RENEWAL AND THE
    COMMISSIONER'S    DETERMINATION    THAT    HER
    1
    Richardson has not filed an appeal.
    4                                 A-1572-16T3
    CONTRACT DID NOT SERVE AS WRITTEN NOTICE IS
    ENTITLED TO NO DEFERENCE.
    A. Lyles' contract and other actions
    by the Board provided her with
    notice of her non-renewal, contrary
    to   the   Commissioner's    plainly
    erroneous application of N.J.S.A.
    18A:17-20.1 and basic principles of
    contract law.
    B. The contract between the Board
    and   Lyles   is  valid   and   even
    assuming,    arguendo,   that    its
    provision on renewal is invalid,
    that provision is severable from the
    non-renewal provision because the
    non-renewal provision would not and
    did not bind a successor Board.
    C. Lyles is serving in the position
    of    [s]uperintendent    illegally
    because the Board took no action to
    renew her employment.
    POINT [II]
    LYLES MUST BE REMOVED FROM HER POSITION AS
    SUPERINTENDENT BECAUSE THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO
    LEGALLY APPOINT HER VOIDS HER ABILITY TO SERVE
    AS SUPERINTENDENT.
    The scope of our review in an appeal from a final decision
    of an administrative agency is limited.   Russo v. Bd. of Trs., 
    206 N.J. 14
    , 27 (2011) (citing In re Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 27 (2007)).
    The agency's decision should be upheld unless there is a "clear
    showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that
    it lacks fair support in the record."     
    Ibid.
       (quoting Herrmann,
    
    192 N.J. at 27-28
    ).    We are not, however, bound by the "agency's
    5                           A-1572-16T3
    interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly
    legal issue."   
    Ibid.
         (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of
    Sec., 
    64 N.J. 85
    , 93 (1973)).
    Public   employees   and   their   employers   may   not   agree    to
    contractual terms that contravene a specific term or condition of
    employment set by a statute.    Rita Spiewak, et al. v. Bd. of Educ.
    of Rutherford, et al., 
    90 N.J. 63
    , 76 (1982).         N.J.S.A. 18A:17-
    20.12 governs the reappointment of superintendents, and provides
    (in pertinent part) that:
    At the conclusion of the term of the initial
    contract or of any subsequent contract as
    hereinafter   provided,   the   superintendent
    shall be deemed reappointed for another
    contracted term of the same duration as the
    previous contract unless . . . .       b. the
    [B]oard notifies the superintendent in writing
    that he [or she] will not be reappointed at
    the end of the current term, in which event
    his [or her] employment shall cease at the
    expiration of that term, provided that such
    notification shall be given prior to the
    expiration of the first or any subsequent
    contract by a length of time equal to [thirty]
    days for each year in the term of the current
    contract.
    2
    The statute was originally enacted in connection with the
    abolition of lifetime tenure for superintendents appointed after
    August 24, 1991, as a means of promoting stability of employment.
    Gonzalez v. Bd. of Educ. of Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 
    325 N.J. Super. 244
    , 253-54 (App. Div. 1999). This section was modified to its
    current form in 2008, and previously required one year's notice
    of non-renewal. L. 2008, c. 106, § 1.
    6                              A-1572-16T3
    Here, the contract of employment terms may neither substitute
    nor override the statutorily required written notice.      To the
    contrary, the Legislature's express mandate requires Boards of
    Education to provide superintendents with an affirmative, timely
    declaration of non-renewal in writing.
    Since Lyles' contract spanned four years, the applicable
    statutory formula required the Board to provide her with written
    notification of non-renewal by March 2, 2016.   As noted above, it
    is without dispute the Board did not issue a formal written notice
    of non-renewal to Lyles within the statutory timeframe.           It
    follows, as the Commissioner decided and we agree, the renewal of
    Lyles' contract occurred by operation of law.
    Petitioners' remaining arguments, not specifically addressed
    herein, lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
    opinion.   R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
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