WILLIAM C. HOOD, III VS. TIMOTHY IROKA (DC-016317-18, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0508-19
WILLIAM C. HOOD, III,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TIMOTHY IROKA,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted September 22, 2021 – Decided October 1, 2021
Before Judges Fuentes and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Docket No. DC-016317-18.
Timothy Iroka, appellant pro se.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
In this one-sided appeal stemming from unpaid legal fees, defendant
Timothy Iroka appeals from the November 4, 2019 Law Division order entering
judgment for plaintiff William C. Hood, III for $2510, plus $57 in court costs,
and dismissing defendant's counterclaim.
By way of background, on May 31, 2016, Iroka retained Hood, a licensed
attorney, to represent him during his divorce and related proceedings. The
parties executed a retainer agreement detailing the fees. The following year,
Iroka fired Hood, retained new counsel, and disputed outstanding legal fees due
Hood before two different panels of the District Fee Arbitration Committee. On
August 22, 2017, following a hearing, the first panel ruled in Iroka's favor, but
that ruling was set aside due to a conflict of interest. On October 17, 2018, the
second panel ruled in Hood's favor after a hearing. The Disciplinary Review
Board (DRB) subsequently affirmed the October 17, 2018 award by dismissing
Iroka's appeal. Thereafter, Hood filed an action in Superior Court to enforce the
arbitration award, resulting in the November 4, 2019 order of judgment that is
the subject of Iroka's current appeal.1
1
"The only provision for appeals from awards made by fee arbitration
committees is contained in R[ule] 1:20A-3(c)." Linker v. Co. Car Corp., 281
N.J. Super. 579, 586 (App. Div. 1995). "Under subsection (c) there is generally
no appeal on the merits from the determination of a Fee Committee." Ibid. "An
appeal may be taken by the client or the attorney to the DRB" on limited
grounds. Ibid. The DRB "shall dismiss the appeal on notice to the parties if it
determines that the notice of appeal fails to state a ground for appeal specified
in paragraph (c) of [Rule 1:20A-3] or that the affidavit or certification fails to
A-0508-19
2
Having considered Iroka's brief and appendix in terms of compliance with
the rules of procedure set forth in Part II, "Rules Governing Appellate Practice
in the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division of the Superior Court," we are
constrained to dismiss the appeal with prejudice but without costs.
Iroka, a self-represented litigant, filed an amended Notice of Appeal
(NOA) from the November 4, 2019 order on November 7, 2019. He filed a case
information statement (CIS) on February 20, 2020. R. 2:5-1. For many months,
Iroka failed to file a conforming brief and appendix per Rule 2:6-1 and Rule 2:6-
2. Although we ultimately accepted Iroka's brief and appendix, that acceptance
did not constitute our "imprimatur" of conformance with the rules. Rather, our
acceptance was to afford Iroka an opportunity to prosecute his appeal subject to
our plenary review both on the appeal's procedural compliance and on the
appeal's merits.
state a factual basis for such ground." R. 1:20A-3(d). "Review of the DRB's
decision is by the Supreme Court only." Ibid. (citing R. 1:20-16(g)). While an
action may be filed in the Law Division "to reduce the award to judgment,"
"[t]he Law Division judge ha[s] no power to review the panel's award in any
respect under this administrative scheme." Id. at 588.
A-0508-19
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We commence by noting that parties to appeals must fully comply with
the appellate rules. In Still v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 189 N.J.
Super. 231 (App. Div. 1983), in addressing rule compliance, we stated:
The rules which deal with appellate briefs are few in
number, easy to understand and simple to follow. Each
rule was adopted for a specific reason. Together, they
contribute to make the administration of justice
smoother and more expeditious. Any violation of the
rules makes it more difficult for the courts to operate,
slows down the administration of justice and increases
its costs. Violations cannot and will not be tolerated.
[Id. at 236.]
In Abel v. Bd. of Works of City of Elizabeth, 63 N.J. Super. 500 (App.
Div. 1960), we held that our rules "are more than mere guides and admonitions.
They were made to be complied with, and should not be lightly disregarded."
Id. at 509. Indeed, failure to abide by the appellate rules implicates sanctions,
including the sanction of dismissal. In that regard, Rule 2:9-9 states:
Failure properly to prosecute or defend an appeal or
proceedings for certification shall be ground for such
action as the appellate court deems appropriate,
including, but not limited to, dismissal of the appeal or
petition, imposition of costs or attorney's fees or such
other penalty as may be assessed personally against the
attorney.
Pertinent to this appeal, there is no assurance of lenity in enforcing the
rule's requirements in a case of a self-represented litigant, as here. As we held
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in Venner v. Allstate, 306 N.J. Super. 106 (App. Div. 1997), status as a pro se
litigant does not relieve the obligation of compliance with the rules. Id. at 110.
To be sure, we recognize that dismissal of the appeal is the ultimate sanction
and one which must be cautiously invoked. See Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk
A.G., 96 N.J. 336, 345 (1984); Gnapinsky v. Goldyn, 23 N.J. 243, 247-48
(1957). Thus, we have considered alternative sanctions. However, we conclude
those alternatives lack contextual suitability here.
Indeed, in our view, the deficiencies in Iroka's appeal would not be
remediated by reprimand, censure, suppression of the brief and appendix,
monetary sanctions or assessments of costs and attorney's fees. First, the
appendix is haphazardly put together and contains no pleadings, no judgment or
order appealed from, no NOA, and no "table of contents of the brief and
appendix" as required under Rule 2:6-1. The deficiencies of the brief include
but are not limited to failure to provide a concise statement of facts with
references to the appendix and the transcript; failure to include legal argument
that contains point headings so as to allow a reviewing court to arrive at a proper
determination based on legal authority; and failure to address only those issues
relating to the appeal of the order. R. 2:6-2(a)(5); R. 2:6-2(a)(6).
A-0508-19
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A proper statement of facts is vital to the appellate process. In Patel v.
Erhardt, 177 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 1981), we noted that the required
statement of facts is critical to our "independent examination of the record." Id.
at 558. Additionally, we have frequently emphasized the need for point
headings in the brief's legal argument, as proper presentation of applicable law
is essential to appellate review. See Hayling v. Hayling, 197 N.J. Super. 484,
488-89 (App. Div. 1984). The failure to provide point headings in the
presentation of legal argument has resulted in our declining to consider the issue
raised. See Solar Energy Indus. v. Christie, 418 N.J. Super. 499, 508 (App. Div.
2011). Further, Iroka's failure to provide a conforming brief is in derogation of
his responsibility to refer us to specific parts of the record that support his
argument. It is not our obligation to "scour the record" in search of such support.
See Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 454, 463 (App. Div. 2008).
Nor is the defendant's failure to conform to our appellate rules to be
indulged as "form over substance." The product of defendant's non-
conformance is a legal argument that is rambling, disjointed, raises issues
outside the notice of appeal, and lacks requisite reference to controlling
decisions of law. This does not just unduly burden us; it prevents us from
exercising our appellate role.
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Finally, we have considered the sanction of a dismissal without prejudice.
However, when considering the numerous opportunities provided to Iroka over
many months to cure his non-conformance, we exercise our discretion per Rule
2:9-9 and dismiss the appeal with prejudice.
Appeal dismissed.
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