IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF E.D. (SVP-75-00, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1159-18T5
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL
COMMITMENT OF E.D.,
SVP-75-00.
_____________________________
Argued May 14, 2019 – Decided May 24, 2019
Before Judges Fisher, Hoffman and Suter.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, SVP-75-00.
Patrick Madden, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney).
Ragner Jaegar, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney).
PER CURIAM
E.D. is a resident of the Special Treatment Unit (STU), the secure
custodial facility designated for the treatment of those in need of commitment
under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -
27.38. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.34a. He appeals from a September 20, 2018
order that continues his commitment. 1 We affirm substantially for the reasons
stated by Judge James F. Mulvihill in his oral decision.
A person who has committed a sexually violent offense may be confined
only if suffering from an abnormality that causes serious difficulty in
controlling sexually violent behavior such that commission of a sexually
violent offense is highly likely without confinement "in a secure facility for
control, care and treatment." In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 120,
132 (2002).
Annual review hearings to determine whether the person remains in need
of commitment despite treatment are also required. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35;
1
E.D. was initially committed in 2000 and his commitment has been
continued on numerous occasions, as revealed in both published, In re Civil
Commitment of E.D., 183 N.J. 536 (2005); In re Civil Commitment of E.D.,
353 N.J. Super. 450, 455-56 (App. Div. 2002), and unpublished decisions, In
re Civil Commitment of E.D., No. A-0759-17 (App. Div. June 21, 2018); In re
Civil Commitment of E.D., No. A-5263-13 (App. Div. Oct. 28, 2016); In re
Civil Commitment of E.D., No. A-0685-05 (App. Div. Jan. 14, 2008); In re
Civil Commitment of E.D., No. A-3984-02 (App. Div. May 14, 2004). He was
twice conditionally discharged, once in 2003, and later in 2010. E.D., No. A-
0759-17, slip op. at 3. In the latter instance, E.D. absconded in 2012; he was
later arrested in New York and returned to the STU in 2014. We find no merit
in the inference suggested by E.D. in this appeal that the absence of proof that
E.D. committed a sex offense during the time he absconded somehow supports
E.D.'s contention that he is not highly likely to reoffend. The record does not
reveal what E.D. was doing when he violated the conditions for his discharge
on that occasion.
A-1159-18T5
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N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32.2 An order of continued commitment under the SVPA,
like an initial order, must be based upon "clear and convincing evidence that
an individual who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, and presently has serious
difficulty controlling harmful sexually violent behavior such that it is highly
likely the individual will reoffend" if not committed. In re Civil Commitment
of G.G.N., 372 N.J. Super. 42, 46-47 (App. Div. 2004); see also In re
Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 173 (2014); W.Z., 173 N.J. at 132; In re
Civil Commitment of J.J.F., 365 N.J. Super. 486, 496-501 (App. Div. 2004); In
re Civil Commitment of V.A., 357 N.J. Super. 55, 63 (App. Div. 2003); E.D.,
353 N.J. Super. at 455-56; N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26; N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32; N.J.S.A.
30:4-27.35. "[O]nce the legal standard for commitment no longer exists, the
committee is subject to release." E.D., 353 N.J. Super. at 455; see also W.Z.,
173 N.J. at 133; N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32; N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35.
Our review is "extremely narrow." R.F., 217 N.J. at 174; see also V.A.,
357 N.J. Super. at 63. Trial judges who hear these matters are "'specialists'
and 'their expertise in the subject' is entitled to 'special deference.'" R.F., 217
2
In addition, if the STU "treatment team determines that the person's mental
condition has so changed that the person is not likely to engage in acts of
sexual violence if released, the treatment team [must] recommend"
authorization for a petition for discharge. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.36a.
A-1159-18T5
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N.J. at 174 (quoting In re Civil Commitment of T.J.N., 390 N.J. Super. 218,
226 (App. Div. 2007)). So, we give these judge's determinations the "utmost
deference" and will intervene or modify the determination "only where the
record reveals a clear abuse of discretion." Ibid.; see also In re Civil
Commitment of J.P., 339 N.J. Super. 443, 459 (App. Div. 2001). The judge's
decision here, when compared to the record on appeal, commands that
deference. The commitment order under review is adequately supported by the
record and consistent with the controlling legal principles. In assessing and
weighing the evidence provided by the State's experts and the evidence
provided by E.D. and his expert, the judge concluded that E.D. still denies his
"offending history," "still suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder that does not spontaneously remit," has "[s]erious difficulty . . .
controlling his sexually violent behavior," and, although progress has been
made since his last review and E.D. may be "very close to conditional
discharge," he still is "highly likely to sexually reoffend at this time." We
have been offered no principled reason for second-guessing these fact findings.
Affirmed.
A-1159-18T5
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